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Thesis Abstract

Norway is the only country which has turned down EU membership in two popular 
referenda. It occupies a unique place in the study of Euroscepticism due to its 
population’s stable and persistent misgivings about European integration. The thesis 
seeks to find out what Norwegian Euroscepticism really is and how it can be 
explained. Adopting a theoretical framework drawn from the Norwegian and 
comparative literature on EU support and a sequential exploratory mixed methods 
research design, the thesis first examines how the Norwegian Eurosceptic discourse 
has played out in a major national newspaper and the party political arena in the last 
fifty years, through the three periods of heightened Euroscepticism (1961-62; 1970-72; 
1989-1994) and one period of latent Euroscepticism (1995-2010). Subsequently, the 
results of the qualitative analysis are tested on the 1994 Referendum Study to 
ascertain whether the issues mobilized in the public debate do indeed resonate on 
the popular level. The thesis finds that there are essentially two broad types of 
Norwegian Euroscepticism, mainstream (centre/left) and right-wing Euroscepticism. It 
argues that concerns about postmaterialist Values, political Culture and Rural 
society (VCR) are at the heart of mainstream Norwegian Euroscepticism, that values 
(the desire to make Norway and the world a better place), political culture (self-
determination) and rural attachment are much more potent explanations for the 
phenomenon than economic interest (wanting to make Norway a richer place) or 
national identity concerns. Right-wing Euroscepticism, however, has an altogether 
different structure. Although it shares the political culture element with its 
mainstream counterpart, it does not exhibit postmaterialist or rural society 
sentiments. Conversely, it is driven by economic utilitarianism and the view that the 
EU is not sufficiently neo-liberalist. The findings also suggest that perceived cultural 
threat might be relevant to right-wing Euroscepticism, but this is an issue which must 
be investigated further by future research. 
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Chapter 1

Introduction to the Thesis 
The poem Nordmannen (“The Norwegian”), written by Ivar Aasen in 1863, depicts 
the Norwegian building his home between hills and rocks out by the sea, enduring 
hardship and the harshness of the climate for the rewards of ownership and the 
beauty of the hills in the spring. Nordmannen represents part of the Norwegian 
cultural heritage, and narratives like Aasen’s have arguably helped shape aspects of 
the national identity because they illustrate the dynamics between the harsh 
landscape and central national values and characteristics such as independence, 
modesty and equality (Esborg 2002). The case against membership of the European 
Union (EU) in Norway has commonly been rooted in the argument that the 
Norwegian way of life and national social democratic values are incompatible with 
those of continental Europe. Indeed, the strong opposition in the Norwegian 
peripheries in both the 1972 and the 1994 referenda might suggest that opposition to 
EU membership can be explained by a desire to defend the Norwegian way of life 
against forces of centralization and Europeanization. 
European integration notwithstanding, peripheral Norway has not been immune to 
the forces of globalization. As Eriksen (1993a: 16) aptly puts it: 
“The Norwegian periphery, Utkantnorge,1 is scarcely that picturesque, 
slightly anachronistic kind of place which tourist brochures try to depict it 
as – where time has stood still for a century, where the fisherman still 
patiently mends his nets on the wooden pier and the farmer’s working-day 
follows the sun, where rustic and simple folk still worship nature and their 
Protestant god as if NATO and the European Community had yet to be 
invented.” 
1 Translations of Norwegian terms and names used throughout the thesis can be found in Appendix K. 
13 
However, while it is certainly true that life in peripheral Norway has departed from 
Aasen’s narrative and that Norwegians’ lives are much more urbanized today, the 
values of the rural, simple way of life remain important to the Norwegian nation. As 
Ramsøy (1987: 100-1) argues, despite the fact that many people have moved away 
from rural and peripheral areas and that “urban ways of life have been diffused to 
the countryside”, “few admit that any benefits are gained by being an urban 
dweller”. Aasen’s narrative is still relevant because of Norwegian culture, which is 
“a culture with a deep-seated anti-urban ideology” (Ramsøy 1987: 101). 
The recent comparative literature on EU support theorizes that issues of identity and 
cultural threat are important to the development of Euroscepticism. However, in the 
academic literature on Norway, perceived cultural threat and national identity 
concerns are rarely used to account for the Norwegians’ reluctance to join the EU. 
Rather, the country’s history of foreign rule and its oil wealth are frequently cited as 
explanations of Norway’s unwillingness to participate fully in European integration. 
Nevertheless, the latter proposition is open to criticism. Norwegian Euroscepticism 
is a phenomenon which precedes the discovery of the North Sea oil. Oil did not have 
an impact on the Norwegian economy until the mid-1970s (Galenson 1986), and, as 
Galenson (1986: 1) points out, Norway was already wealthy when the oil find 
occurred: “In 1970, Norway ranked seventh in per capita gross domestic product 
(GDP) among the OECD nations. It was already considerably ahead of the United 
Kingdom, and close to the United States and Germany.” Besides, if disregarding the 
interests of marginal economic sectors (the domestic industries) the “yes” side has 
had far stronger ownership of the economic argument than the “no” side in the 
debates on membership. Thus, it appears that the causality of Norwegian 
Euroscepticism is substantially more complex than the oil and pure economic 
considerations. 
In the literature on party-based Euroscepticism, there has been much debate about 
what Euroscepticism really is. Does opposition to some aspect of the EU suffice to 
qualify as Euroscepticism, or is Euroscepticism only present when European 
14 
integration is outright rejected? Typologies such as the hard/soft dichotomy (Taggart 
and Szczerbiak 2001) have been put forward to differentiate between different types 
of Euroscepticism, but it remains unclear how Norwegian Euroscepticism fits into 
these typologies, and indeed whether there is such a thing as a “Norwegian 
Euroscepticism”. The thesis attempts to enhance current understanding of what 
Norwegian Euroscepticism really is, and using the comparative and Norwegian 
literature on EU support, it also seeks to explain the phenomenon, examining the 
whole period of its existence, from 1961 to the present day. 
The remainder of this chapter is divided into five parts. First, the concept of 
Euroscepticism and the main developments in the literature on the phenomenon are 
introduced. Second, the chapter makes a case for studying Norwegian popular and 
party-based opposition to European integration. In the third section of the chapter, 
the research questions and the aims and objectives of the thesis are set out. Fourth, 
the chapter discusses the methodological issues involved in the research, and in the 
final section, an overview of the thesis is given. 
1.1 Euroscepticism: an Introduction 
The term “Euroscepticism” is thought to have first appeared in the British popular 
press, more specifically The Times newspaper, in the mid-1980s (Harmsen and 
Spiering 2004b). The label did not become widespread in use until after the 1992 
Maastricht Treaty, when the EU was created and European cooperation in new 
areas, such as Justice and Home Affairs (JHA) and foreign and security policy, were 
introduced. Since then, “Euroscepticism” has been increasingly used as a broad term 
in both the press and political debate to denote negative attitudes towards European 
integration and/or the EU.2 Taggart (1998) provides a definition which is in keeping 
with both popular and academic usages of the term. He defines Euroscepticism as 
2 The thesis will use the terms European Economic Community (EEC), European Community (EC) 
and European Union (EU) interchangeably to denote the processes and institutions of European 
integration. When specifically referring to the time before the 1992 Treaty of the European Union, 
EEC or EC will be used. 
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“the idea of contingent or qualified opposition, as well as incorporating outright and 
unqualified opposition to the process of European integration” (1998: 366). 
As mentioned above, one of the main strands of the increasing literature on 
Euroscepticism concerns the problem of definition. Some authors (Flood 2002a, b; 
Flood et al. 2007) criticize the inclusion of “Euro” in the nomenclature, arguing that it 
would be more correct to use the prefix “EU” to avoid confusion about what the 
scepticism is directed towards. Others are concerned about the broadness of the 
definition, arguing that by including qualified opposition in the definition, it 
wrongly ascribes Euroscepticism to broadly pro-European positions. This is linked 
with another definition issue commonly debated in the literature, namely whether or 
how Euroscepticism is best divided into different stances to denote varying degrees 
of opposition to the EU. To date, the “hard” and “soft” typology developed by 
Taggart and Szczerbiak (2001) is perhaps most used and acknowledged in the 
literature, despite having attracted criticism for being too broad and over-inclusive. 
The definition distinguishes between rejection or opposition to European integration 
in principle (“hard”) and qualified opposition to the EU, such as objection to a single 
EU policy (“soft”). 
In the scholarship on EU support, there was a watershed in the early 1990s, when 
what had been known as the “permissive consensus”3 came to an end with the 
referenda on the Maastricht Treaty in Denmark and France. Post-Maastricht, public 
opposition to European integration is thought to have escalated, due to European 
integration expanding into new policy areas outside the economic sphere and the 
public realizing that developments at the European level have a real impact on their 
lives. Along with the end of the permissive consensus, criticism of the EU’s 
democratic deficit became more widespread, as it was clear that the elites no longer 
had the support of the citizens of Europe to push integration forward. 
Linked to this, after 1992 it became more common for governments to use referenda 
This term was first coined by Lindberg and Scheingold (1970) and has been widely used in the 
scholarly literature to denote the largely uninterested EC public’s general sense of approval of 
European integration in the first thirty­five years of the Community’s existence. 
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as a means of ratifying significant European-level policy-decisions and this has 
increasingly enabled the public to put brakes on the level and pace of integration. As 
a corollary, in the second half of the 1990s, public opinion on the EU, previously 
considered largely irrelevant to the processes of European integration, suddenly 
became a popular subject of academic interest. Eurobarometer-based studies aiming 
to explain fluctuations in public support for the EU is now an integral part of EU 
studies. They put forward various theories explaining popular support for the EU, 
for example that EU support is related to cognitive skills, postmaterialist values, 
longevity of one’s country’s membership, political effects, economic interest and 
issues of identity.4 
As neither the public nor political parties exist in a vacuum, the developments in the 
EU in the early 1990s also had an impact on parties and their programmes. 
European political parties increasingly incorporated elements of Euroscepticism into 
their political platforms in response to the concerns of their constituencies, and as a 
corollary, questions of what drives Euroscepticism on both levels have frequently 
been posed in what has become a growing literature on the topic. Scholarly interest 
in what has become known as “party-based Euroscepticism” also expanded 
considerably in the late 1990s and early 2000s. Much of this research activity had its 
origin in the Opposing Europe Research Network (OERN) organized by Aleks 
Szczerbiak and Paul Taggart from the Sussex European Institute. The network, 
which in 2003 changed its name to the European Parties Elections and Referendums 
Network (EPERN), consisted of scholars conducting research into the comparative 
party politics of Euroscepticism and predominantly focused on issues of definition, 
measurement and causality. The network published a series of research papers 
which in 2008 culminated in two book volumes on party-based Euroscepticism (see 
e.g. Szczerbiak and Taggart (eds.) 2008b, c). However, there is still no consensus on 
the matter of causality or measurement. Observers determine variables such as 
ideology, strategy, party system centrality and institutional variations of differing 
importance as to why parties adopt Eurosceptic stances and/or rhetoric, and there is 
4 All of these theories are discussed in more detail in section 2.4 of Chapter Two. 
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considerable disagreement whether or to what extent it is possible to determine 
levels of Euroscepticism within a party system. This is because the research on party-
based Euroscepticism tends to rely on expert survey data and other quantitative 
indicators to map European parties’ positions on European integration and their 
relative strength. 
In spite of the expanding literature on Euroscepticism in the EU, Norwegian 
Euroscepticism, at least beyond the study of Euroscepticism as party strategy (e.g. 
Sitter 2005a, 2008), remains an under-researched area of study. This is undoubtedly 
due to the fact that Norway is not included in the Eurobarometer (EB) surveys on 
which scholars of comparative Euroscepticism most commonly base their research 
on; in EU studies, non-member states like Switzerland and Norway are commonly 
excluded by default. Some might even argue that EU membership is a precondition 
for Euroscepticism. According to Taggart’s (1998) definition, quoted above, this is 
clearly not the case, but it is important to acknowledge that there are structural 
differences between member states’ Euroscepticism and non-member states’ 
Euroscepticism. This especially applies to differences in how the pro-/anti-
membership question is treated in member and non-member states. 
Norway’s exclusion from the EB-based research notwithstanding, the Norwegian 
public’s rejection of EU membership has by no means been overlooked as an area of 
study. Quite the contrary, in parallel to the body of literature on EU support in 
member states, there is a considerable body of literature attempting to explain why 
Norway voted “no” to the EC/EU in 1972 and 1994. Many of the theories explaining 
opposition to the EU found in this body of literature are different from those 
mentioned above: these are history, geography, socio-economic and territorial-
cultural cleavages, Nordic exceptionalism, attachment to the countryside and 
primary sectors’ interests, to mention but a few. However, these explanations are 
rarely considered alongside each other or alongside the explanations put forward in 
the comparative literature. The next section explains why it is important to enhance 
current understanding of Euroscepticism, and of Norwegian Euroscepticism. 
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1.2 Why study Euroscepticism? And why study 
Norwegian Euroscepticism? 
Euroscepticism is a worthwhile research topic for many reasons. First, there is no 
doubt that Eurosceptic attitudes among both European publics and parties pose a 
threat to the future of European integration, or in the case of non-member states, 
countries’ ability to participate in the process. In member states, the threat by a 
negative public opinion is illustrated by the French and Dutch rejection of the 
European Constitution in 2005 and the Irish people’s “no” to the Lisbon Treaty in 
2008. In non-member states, the Norwegian “no” to membership in 1972 and 1994, 
and the Swiss “no” to the European Economic Area (EEA) agreement in 1992 give an 
idea of the public’s power to halt their countries’ participation in European 
integration. 
Political parties, on the other hand, can play a central role in relation to public 
attitude formation, as well as the shaping of European integration. Not only are they 
cue givers and agenda-setters (Zaller 1992), they are also “gatekeepers” between 
their political system and the EU when in government (Hoffmann 1966). Although 
the agenda-setting role of Norwegian political parties was remarkably incapacitated 
on the issue of EU membership in the post-referendum periods because of the 
devastating effect the EU battle had on the Norwegian party system and traditional 
cooperation constellations,5 in a future battle over membership, the parties are likely 
to reassume their roles as opinion shapers and agenda-setters. Besides, the parties’ 
continued polarization of opinion on the EU issue contributes to the legitimization of 
a variety of viewpoints in the electorate, as they signalise that there is no widely 
accepted “truth” about the desirability of increased European integration for 
Norway. Moreover, the parties and their elites are very central to the shaping of 
5 In 2001, the non­socialist Christian Democrats­Liberals­Conservatives coalition took office with a 
cooperation agreement including a so­called “suicide clause” on the EU issue, whereby the centrist 
parties announced their intent to withdraw from the coalition if the EU issue was brought up during the 
election term. The 2005­2009 socialist Labour­Socialist Left­Centre Party coalition has copied this 
clause. 
19 
Norway’s future relationship with the EU. For example, the power to introduce or 
block a new application lies with the political elites. 
The EU’s democratic deficit is a further reason why it is important to understand the 
currents of Euroscepticism in the population. The EU cannot be a credible champion 
of democratic values at home or in international relations if it does not have the 
support of its own electorate. Understanding Euroscepticism is essential to be able to 
overcome the difficulties the EU has in convincing its citizens and the citizens of 
prospective member states that European integration is a good thing. 
While the above reasons make up the rationale behind researching popular and 
party-based Euroscepticism in general, it is important to note what the value of a 
case study of Norway is. Firstly, by filling some of the gaps on Norway in the 
comparative literature, a case study of Norwegian Euroscepticism contributes to the 
body of knowledge in the comparative study of Euroscepticism. Secondly, as any 
future Norwegian application for EU membership will have to be followed by a 
referendum,6 new insights into what Norwegian Euroscepticism is, and what drives 
it, are undoubtedly valuable and of interest to anyone who wants to see a future EU 
vote in Norway result in a “yes”, or a “no”. 
1.3 The Research Questions and the Aims and Objectives 
Many scholars have attempted to explain why Norway is not a member of the EU, 
but, as Neumann (2002: 88) registers, “the literature on the topic is less than 
convincing”. The main objective of the thesis is to bridge this gap in the literature, to 
go some way to classify and explain Norwegian Euroscepticism, defined as qualified 
and unqualified opposition to the European Community (EC) or EU. Specifically, the 
thesis’ focus is on the nature and motivation of Norwegian Euroscepticism. 
Consequently, the research sets out to answer the following two research questions: 
6 Norway is not constitutionally bound to hold a referendum on the issue, but since a referendum was 
promised in connection to the first Norwegian EC membership application, the political establishment 
have been politically committed to the promise of a public vote (Bjørklund 1994). 
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1) What is Norwegian Euroscepticism?

2) How can Norwegian Euroscepticism be explained?

A number of sub-questions accompany these two questions, as touched upon above. 
For example, what is specific about Norwegian Euroscepticism? Is it appropriate to 
speak of a Norwegian Euroscepticism, or are there essentially many different types 
of Euroscepticism in Norway? When did it come about and how has it developed? 
Was the Euroscepticism which was rife in the early 1970s a different phenomenon 
from the Euroscepticism which exists in the Norwegian people and parties today? 
What motivated Euroscepticism in Norway then, and what motivates it today? 
As mentioned above, the research has two primary objectives. First, it aims to 
address the gap in the comparative and Norwegian literature on Euroscepticism in 
Norway. It is the thesis’ ambition to conduct a comprehensive investigation into 
Norwegian Euroscepticism, and thus, it does not, like previous research, restrict 
itself to only one level of analysis, one specific period or one specific type of data or 
methodological tool. By moving beyond the post-positivist research tradition of the 
majority of the existing literature and instead drawing on a wide variety of sources, 
it examines how Euroscepticism has developed across time, from 1961 to 2010, in the 
Norwegian public debate, in the political parties and the population. The wide time 
frame and the use of new data and alternative methods is where the thesis’ first 
principal claim to originality lies. 
The second objective of the thesis is to bring together the existing knowledge and 
theories from the comparative literature on Euroscepticism and the literature on 
Norway and assess to what extent they can assist in explaining Norwegian 
opposition to the EU. This is the second element of originality that the research 
offers, as no other study has fused the Euroscepticism literature and the Norwegian 
literature in this manner to inform research on the topic. The following section 
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outlines and considers the methodological choices and issues involved in the 
research. 
1.4 Methodology: Mixed Methods 
As already stated, as most of the existing literature on Euroscepticism and Norway is 
rooted in statistical methods and therefore does not offer much qualitative insight 
into the phenomenon, one of the main objectives of the research was to close some of 
this gap. Quantitative methods are indeed useful and can help to reveal part of the 
picture, but they are by no means capable of capturing the full picture. Therefore, the 
research employed a qualitative methodology to achieve a fuller understanding of 
Norwegian Euroscepticism. However, because the thesis extends to the public level 
and issues of representativeness made it necessary to use quantitative methods to 
make any inferences about public Euroscepticism, a mixed methods (MM) strategy 
was adopted. The MM sequential exploratory research method is designed to test the 
findings of qualitative research on quantitative data in order to establish the 
trustworthiness of the qualitative findings and maximize the impact of the study’s 
conclusions (Creswell 2009; Teddlie and Tashakkori 2009). Figure 1.1 provides an 
illustration of the research design used in the study. 
Figure 1.1 MM sequential exploratory research design7 
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The EU is an issue which has been in the majority of the Norwegian parties and

politicians’ interest to remove completely from the agenda when there have been no

7 Note that stage three, the quantitative data collection, in the case of this study is only the sourcing and 
adaptation of an already existing national survey. 
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active membership applications,8 and therefore, there is very little data available on 
Norwegian Euroscepticism. This practically necessitated the utilization of a variety 
of data and methods if the thesis was to fulfil its requirements as an independent 
and worthwhile piece of research. Using MM allowed for the combination of 
qualitative and quantitative methods to acquire the depth and breadth that was 
required to address the research questions. Besides, the cross-verification obtained 
from using different methodological techniques and sources is an added strength of 
the research; the triangulation of methods warrants more confidence in the results of 
the study. Furthermore, as the bodies of literature on Euroscepticism and Norway 
were used to inform the study, the study used a combination of inductive and 
deductive strategies. This made the research both exploratory and confirmatory, and 
the MM strategy is particularly suitable for carrying out this kind of research 
(Creswell 2009; Teddlie and Tashakkori 2009). 
1.4.1 The Choice of Time Period: 1961-2010 
As the research questions asked about the nature and causality of Norwegian 
opposition to the EC and EU and the main objective of the thesis was to give a 
comprehensive appraisal of Norwegian Euroscepticism, it was necessary to go back 
in time and start at the beginning of Norwegian Euroscepticism. 1961 was chosen as 
the starting point for the research because it marked the start of Norway’s 
involvement with integration in Europe. From 1960, Norway was member of the 
European Free Trade Association (EFTA), and the literature reveals that the 
appearance of the EC membership issue in 1961 caused considerable public debate 
and political tension (Rokkan and Valen 1964; Ørvik 1972b; Bjørklund 1994). 
Although there are some reports of late 1940s and 1950s elite scepticism towards 
European integration (e.g. Pharo 1986), the thesis does not go further back in time 
than to the 1960s because pre-1960s Euroscepticism did not extend to the public. As 
Chapter Eight will show, when the issue of EC membership appeared on the 
political agenda in 1961, the majority of the public was still poorly informed about 
European integration and was not able state a preference on EC membership. On the 
8 This is primarily due to the harmful effect the issue has on intra­ and inter­party cohesion (and in the 
pro­European parties, electoral fortunes) 
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opposite end of the time scale, 2010 was chosen in order to bring the analysis up to 
the present day. This also enabled the thesis to examine the phenomenon through 
five whole decades, and as the thesis also looks at Euroscepticism in the Norwegian 
political elite, it was also appropriate to bring the analysis past the 2009 
parliamentary (Storting) election. 
For the purposes of the research, the fifty-year period was divided into four sub-
periods of Norwegian Euroscepticism: First was the 1960s, when the issue of 
membership of the European Economic Community (EEC) appeared on the 
Norwegian political agenda and the British applications of 1961 and 1967 prompted 
Norway to follow suit. Second was the period from 1970-1972, a period which was 
characterized by heightened debate, membership negotiations with the EC and the 
1972 referendum. The third phase started in 1989, when European integration once 
again appeared on the agenda, as the plans for the EEA agreement started to unfold 
and the Iron Curtain fell. This period culminated in the 1994 referendum. The final 
period, 1995-2010, was a period which was characterized by Norway’s continued 
participation in European integration through the EEA and the Norwegian political 
elite’s inability to reintroduce the issue of full membership to the general public. The 
period between phase two and three (1973-1988) is not considered a separate period 
of Euroscepticism, because, as Chapter Six will reveal, during this period, the EC 
issue was completely removed from the political agenda. 
1.4.2 The Qualitative Part of the Research: the Public and Party Debate 
In MM research, the research questions drive the methods used (Teddlie and 
Tashakkori 2009), but it is worth keeping in mind that the thesis also had to take in 
to consideration significant restrictions on data availability. For the qualitative part 
of the research, the target data were documents which were likely to contain 
expressions of Euroscepticism. This meant that the options were more or less 
restricted to party documents, speeches and newspapers. Accordingly, it was 
decided that a documentary analysis would be carried out. For the public debate 
level of the study, readers’ letters were chosen as the primary documentary data on 
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which to base the analysis. It was decided to use readers’ letters as opposed to other 
newspaper features because of their larger likelihood of exhibiting Eurosceptic 
sentiments, as the readers are freer to express their disagreement with a newspaper’s 
pro-European stance than its journalists and editors.9 Moreover, it was thought that 
readers’ letters have the potential to contain truer expressions of popular 
Euroscepticism, as contributions to letter pages are not necessarily written by 
members of elites. After conducting a pilot study in Nasjonalbiblioteket’s (the National 
Library) micro film archive in Oslo, sampling readers’ letters in six Norwegian 
newspapers from the four phases,10 the plan was to analyse three newspapers in the 
study. Firstly, the national newspaper Aftenposten was chosen because of its status as 
the largest broadsheet in Norway. The tabloids VG and Dagbladet were not chosen 
because of their restrictions on the length of the letters and their policy of editing 
contributions, and the increased bias resulting from this. Secondly, Adresseavisen, 
Norway’s oldest daily newspaper still in print and local to the Trøndelag and Møre 
og Romsdal area,11 was chosen in order to control for regional differences.12 And 
third, Nationen, a daily newspaper which calls itself “District Norway’s National 
Newspaper” was chosen because of its Eurosceptic stance. In 2008, the newspapers’ 
daily readership numbers (as a percentage of the population) were 18.3 for 
Aftenposten, 5.6 for Adresseavisen and 1.7 for Nationen (Medienorge and TNS 
Gallup 2009).13 
There are no digital archives which contain Norwegian newspapers from before the 
1980s, and therefore, the micro film archive in Nasjonalbiblioteket in Oslo had to be 
used for the newspaper search. This meant that the newspapers had to be searched 
manually, and it soon became apparent that covering three newspapers was beyond 
9 All the biggest national newspapers and the vast majority of all Norwegian newspapers have a pro­

EU outlook.

10 Details about the pilot study can be found in Appendix C.

11 See Appendix A for a map of the Norwegian counties.

12 The reason why Adresseavisen was chosen instead of for example Nordlys, the local newspaper for

the northern region Troms, was that Nordlys’ readers’ letters column was more sporadic than

Adresseavisen’s.

The newspaper readership number for Aftenposten has remained relatively stable across time: 
between 1986 and 2010 it declined by only 4.3 percent. Adresseavisen and Nationen delined by 15.7 
and 31.9 percent respectively in the same period (Medienorge et al. 2011). 
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the realms of the project: it would have been far too time-consuming both in terms of 
data collection and data analysis. As a corollary, Adresseavisen and Nationen were 
dropped from the study. Aftenposten was retained because of its larger readership, 
because the content of the newspaper’s debate pages was likely to have influenced 
more people than the other newspapers, and because it was likely to be 
representative of the debate that went on in the mainstream national press in the 
different periods. Three years from each Euroscepticism period were selected for the 
data collection in order to make the workload manageable, in addition to three years 
from the 1980s (to affirm its lack of debate activity and justify its exclusion from the 
study). Due to the research being deductive in nature and aimed at theory testing,14 
initially, the sampling strategy chosen for the newspaper data collection was 
probability sampling. The idea was to collect Aftenposten readers’ letters from the 
first three years of each decade (i.e. 1960-62; 1970-72 etc.), because debating activity 
in this three-year period in the 1960s, 1970s and 1990s was expected to be high.15 
However, limited availability of “no” letters in certain periods16 as well as changes in 
newspaper practices across time made collecting a more or less random sample a 
meaningless goal. Besides, it can be argued that in this situation, there is no such 
thing as a random sample because of the editorial selection bias which is already 
inherent in the publication of letters to the editor. Purposive sampling, that is, 
targeting the years in each decade when the literature reported the most debating 
activity, was therefore used, in line with the traditions of qualitative inquiry. Thus, 
every Aftenposten newspaper,17 both the morning and evening edition,18 from the 
years 1960, 1961, 1962, 1970, 1971, 1972, 1980, 1981, 1986, 1992, 1993, 1994, 2000, 2002 
and 2004 were searched manually on micro film. Additionally, the debate pages 
from all the Aftenposten newspapers (morning edition only) from 2009 were accessed 
14 Testing six theories from the literature.

15 Due to the active applications.

16 The 1960s newspapers were searched in this way. Much time was wasted searching 1960 and 1961

newspapers in which extremely little EEC­related material in 1960 and no readers’ letters on the topic

were found.

Every newspaper on micro film in the Oslo National Library. Approximately a handful of 
newspapers were missing from the micro film collection from each decade. 
18 The morning edition is the nation­wide edition, while the evening edition is a newspaper only for the 
Oslo area. Because both editions were on the same micro film, it was unproblematic to include both in 
the study. 
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on the library’s online avis2 database to bring the study closer to the present day. If 
calculating with 290 newspaper days per year and two newspaper editions per day, 
the total number of newspapers searched manually was over 9,000.19 To maximize 
the size of the data sample, the target data was expanded to include not only 
readers’ letters, but any commentary/news item containing Eurosceptic 
argumentation. Nevertheless, letters to the editor were the main newspaper feature 
included in the analysis. At Nasjonalbiblioteket, all EEC/EC/EU-related letters and 
newspaper items were looked over or read and subsequently either electronically 
scanned and saved if deemed potentially suitable for the analysis or discarded if 
deemed irrelevant. All of the saved letters/items were later read more closely and 
considered for inclusion in the documentary analysis. For example, 180 items were 
saved from the 1960-62 search, but only 25 items qualified for the final data sample. 
For the other periods, the numbers were 1,073 and 187 (1970-2), 1,261 and 341 (1992-
94), and 275 and 51 (2000, 2002 and 2004).20 
For the research on party-based Euroscepticism, all the Socialist Left Party 
(Sosialistisk Venstreparti, SLP),21 Labour Party (Arbeiderpartiet), Centre Party 
(Senterpartiet, CP), Christian Democratic Party (Kristelig Folkeparti, CDP), Liberal 
Party (Venstre, LP), and Progress Party (Fremskrittspartiet, PP) manifestos from the 
period in question were included.22 There are several benefits of using party 
manifestos in the analysis. First, access to this type of document is relatively easy to 
obtain;23 second, manifestos provide an accurate record of parties’ positions across 
time, and finally, they include good examples of Eurosceptic argumentation. 
Nevertheless, the study of manifestos does carry some limitations. It does not 
necessarily allow for a thorough examination of nuances in party positions on 
19 There were no Sunday Aftenposten newspapers in the 1960s, 1970s and 1980s, and only a Sunday

morning edition in the 1990s and 2000s. 290 per year also factors in strikes, missing papers and other

bank holidays. In 2009, the number of newspapers searched was over 300.

20 Plus another eight from the 2009 avis2 search.

21 The manifestos from its predecessors, the Socialist People’s Party (Sosialistisk Folkeparti (SPP), 
1961, 1965 and 1969 elections) and the Socialist Electoral League (Sosialistisk Valgforbund (SEL), 
1973 election), were used prior to 1975. 
22 The Conservative party (Høyre) was excluded from the party analysis because of its pro­EU 
membership stance and lack of a Eurosceptic faction. 
23 The manifestos were accessed through NSD’s (2001) CD ROM and copies of the 2005 and 2009 
manifestos were downloaded from the parties’ websites. 
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European integration, especially at times when the EU issue is not considered 
politically salient, nor do they reflect the extent to which a party is internally divided 
on the issue. To address these problems, attempts were made at collecting 
Eurosceptic political speeches, and two elite surveys and interviews with politicians 
were carried out to supplement the document-based research. Unfortunately, the 
availability of speeches was sporadic. Johansen and Kjeldsen’s (2005) collection of 
political speeches was the primary source of the speeches used, and the majority of 
speeches were from the 1990s period. In addition to the qualitative party research, 
two surveys of Norwegian Members of Parliament (MPs), the Storting, were carried 
out, the first one in November 2006 and the second one in January 2010.24 
Questionnaires containing questions about MPs’ attitudes to EU membership, 
European integration and EU-related issues were delivered to all 169 MPs on both 
occasions.25 Translated copies of the questionnaires and further details about the 
surveys and their response rates can be found in Appendix D. Furthermore, semi-
structured interviews with one politician/representative from each of the parties 
under study were conducted in Oslo between March 2009 and September 2010. The 
interviewees were targeted on the basis of their experience and/or expertise in the 
area; in most cases, recommendations were made by the different parties’ head 
offices on who to contact. Two politicians from the PP were interviewed because the 
first interview was with the party’s foreign policy spokesman, who was not a 
declared Eurosceptic. The interview was therefore mainly focused on the party’s 
stance. The second PP interview, on the other hand, was with a professed 
Eurosceptic and so the interview focused mostly on the interviewee’s personal 
views. In addition to the elite interviews, interviews with the 2009/10 leader of the 
youth “no” organization Ungdom mot EU (UmEU, Youth against Norwegian 
Membership of the EU), her successor (2010/11 leader) and a Eurosceptic farmer, 
who is also a CP member and has previously been active in a local branch of the ad 
hoc organization Nei til EU (No to the EU, NtEU), were conducted to control for 
Both surveys were carried out by the author, but the 2006 survey was originally conducted for a 
separate project. 
25 The surveys included both open and closed ended questions, and thus produced both quantitative and 
qualitative data. 
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differences in the argumentation used by politicians and other activists. The two 
UmEU activists were approached because they were listed as “independent of 
party” on the organization’s website, and the interview with the farmer was 
unplanned, a random result of a conversation with an acquaintance. Details of the 
interviews and the interviewees can be found in Appendix E. 
Table 1.1 The newspaper items included in the study 
Time period Letters/commentaries26 Other newspaper items27 
1960-62 12 13 
1970-72 183 4 
1992-94 305 36 
2000s 59 0 
Total 559 53 
Source: Author’s newspaper study 
Having targeted newspaper items, manifestos, speeches from 1961-2010 for the 
documentary data collection and conducted elite surveys and interviews in 2006, 
2009 and 2010, the data acquired for each of the four periods of Euroscepticism were 
naturally not identical, neither in type nor in volume. As Table 1.1 illustrates, there 
were large differences in the number of Eurosceptic readers’ letters and other 
newspaper items across the decades, with the 1990s Aftenposten editors being most 
generous in allowing the expanse of Eurosceptic argumentation on its pages. While 
only 25 items containing Eurosceptic argumentation were found in the 1960s period, 
341 items were found in the 1990s period. This is of course not merely a result of the 
benevolence of the editors towards the “no” side or of their sense of duty to cover 
both sides of the debate in the 1990s, but more a reflection of the increasing number 
of readers letters and expansion of the newspaper’s debate pages over the decades; a 
total of 578 readers’ letters were found in Aftenposten’s newspapers from 1960, while 
in 1970 there were 4,028 and in 1993, 5,802 letters to the editor were searched. 
26 The vast majority of these were written by people who were against membership, but a few letters 
with an unclear stance or a “yes” stance which cited “no” argumentation were also included. 
27 E.g. interviews and news stories. 
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To address the imbalance in data across the periods, other material was also sourced. 
For example, in the absence of manifestos and other party material in the 1970-72 
period, a selection of material published by the ad hoc “no” organization 
Folkebevegelsen mot norsk medlemskap i Fellesmarkedet (the People’s Movement against 
Norwegian membership of the Common Market, Folkebevegelsen for short) was 
analysed to enable comparison between the newspaper debate and the 
argumentation of the “no” campaign. And in the 1990s period, material published by 
the organized “no” faction within the Labour Party, Sosialdemokrater mot EU (Social 
Democrats Against the EU, SME) was analysed to cover the gap on the social 
democratic argumentation against the EU, and in the 1995-2010 period, online 
commentaries and material from the “no” organization NtEU were included to 
increase the limited data sample. Naturally, the elite survey data and the interviews 
conducted were primarily useful to the latter period, but the interviewees who were 
active in the 1960s, 1970s and/or the 1990s debates were also able to give some 
interesting insights into how the debate has developed across the decades. The 
retrospective part of the interviews had merely an affirmative/ triangulating 
function. 
1.4.2.1 Data Analysis 
In the study of the documentary data, directed qualitative content analysis was used, 
whereby an initial list of coding categories was generated from the theory, but 
themes were allowed to emerge during the course of the analysis (Hsieh and 
Shannon 2005; Miles and Huberman 1994). Six of the theories used to account for 
Euroscepticism or Norwegian Euroscepticism, discussed in the literature review in 
Chapters Two and Three, made up the pre-defined categories for the analysis.28 
More interpretivist research techniques such as discourse analysis were rejected 
because of the remoteness of their epistemological underpinnings from the literature 
the study is informed by and aspires to contribute to. Moreover, the method does not 
marry well with the positivism of the second part of the research. Another reason 
28 The pre­defined coding categories are detailed in section 4.2.2 of Chapter Four and in Appendix G. 
30 
was lack of originality, as discourse analysis has been used on Norway before; 
Neumann’s (2001, 2002) work on “Why Norway is not a member of the EU” is 
rooted in this research tradition.29 
Because the vast majority of the documentary data were photocopies of printed 
material and not easily transferred to formats compatible with qualitative data 
analysis software such as Nvivo, the entire qualitative data analysis was conducted 
manually, without any technological aids. This had the advantage that full control 
over and perspective on the data and results was retained, even if the work was 
somewhat slowed down as a result of it. 
1.4.3 The Quantitative Part of the Research: Public Opinion 
Clearly, readers’ letters can not be treated as synonymous with expressions of 
Norwegian public Euroscepticism, as it has been shown that contributors to letters to 
the editor pages are not necessarily representative of the general public (Grey and 
Brown 1970). An analysis of Norwegian Eurosceptic argumentation undoubtedly 
generates valuable insight into the public debate on the EU issue in Norway, but the 
findings of such a study do not automatically extend to the general public, as 
research shows that writers of letters to the editor are more likely to be older, better-
educated, wealthier and more conservative-oriented than passive newspaper readers 
(Renfro 1979; Grey and Brown 1970). In effect, an analysis of letters to the editor and 
party documents alone was not sufficient to address the research questions. It was 
clear that the findings of the documentary analysis had to be tested on a nationally 
representative data sample for the conclusions drawn from the study to be extended 
to the general public. 
There are only two comprehensive surveys conducted covering public attitudes 
towards European integration and other political issues suitable for the theory 
testing the research sets out to conduct. Both of these were carried out in conjunction 
with the referenda in 1972 and 1994 by Statistisk Sentralbyrå (Statistics Norway, SSB). 
29 Neumann’s work is discussed later in the thesis. 
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The public opinion data analysis, the results of which are reported in Chapter Eight, 
was based on these data sets.30 Both data sets satisfied all the criteria of good and 
reliable secondary data.31 One of the major advantages with using these two data sets 
is that they were carried out by an organization which has wide experience with 
creating nationally representative data. 
The theories which made up the pre-defined categories in the qualitative part of the 
research were subjected to statistical testing on 1994 survey data. For this, regression 
analysis was used. In addition, descriptive statistics from both the 1972 and 1994 
data sets were used to triangulate the findings. The methodological issues involved 
in the quantitative part of the analysis are considered in further detail in Appendix 
H. 
Figure 1.2 Data used in the thesis 
QUAL Quan

- Readers’ letters/other newspaper
 Cross-sectional aggregate data

items, Aftenposten (all periods)
 (1972 and 1994 surveys)

- online commentaries/resources Elite surveys (2006, 2010)

(post-1995)

- Party manifestos (1961-2009)

- Political speeches (all periods)

- Ad hoc organizations’ material (all

periods)

- Secondary literature (all periods)

Figure 1.2 above gives an overview of the data used in the research. An exhaustive 
list of the documentary data which were systematically analysed according to the 
coding scheme can be found in Appendix F. 
30 Creating a new quantitative data set for the study was not considered an option for several reasons. 
The main reason was that, covering a fifty­year period, the research did not need to be based on a new 
data set; the data analysis could quite satisfactorily be carried out on the data from one of the 
referendum surveys. Besides, it was far beyond the capacity of the study to create a whole new data set 
that would be comparable to the referendum surveys, matching their quality and validity. 
31 A representative sample of the relevant population was used along with appropriate methods of data 
collection. Acceptable response rates were achieved, the availability of documentation was good, the 
data are widely used in other publications, and the originators have a respectable reputation. 
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1.4.4 A Final Note on Methodology: Why a Case Study? 
It is necessary to clarify the reasons why the case study approach was chosen for the 
research as opposed to a comparative study. The main reason was that no 
comprehensive study examining both public and party-based Norwegian 
Euroscepticism across time has ever been conducted, and doing a case study of 
Norway enabled the analysis to stretch both in terms of depth and breadth. 
Conversely, comparing Norway with for example Sweden or Switzerland would 
have limited the scope of the research on Norway, as time and resources spent on 
investigating another case would have equalled less time and resources spent on 
researching Norway. History was another reason why the case study approach was 
considered more expedient to investigate Norwegian Euroscepticism; the two 
“neutrals” do not share Norway’s history of intense public debates and campaigning 
on the European issue. Although Norway does indeed share some characteristics 
with the “usual suspects” of Euroscepticism, such as Sweden, Switzerland, Denmark 
and the United Kingdom (UK), the country’s history of clashes between pro-
European elites and the unwilling population is unique: it stretches back to the early 
1960s. In Sweden and Switzerland, EU membership was not a viable option until 30 
years later and the end of the Cold War because of their commitment to neutrality, 
and Denmark and the UK joined in the first enlargement wave in 1973. The 
Norwegians, on the other hand, have defied their principally pro-European press 
and political elite through fifty years. Thus, comparing Norwegian Euroscepticism 
with for example Swedish or Swiss Euroscepticism would have been incompatible 
with one of the objectives of the thesis, that is, exploring Norwegian opposition to 
European integration through the decades. 
1.5 Thesis Overview 
The thesis is divided into four parts. In Part I, the existing literature on 
Euroscepticism and Norwegian opposition to EU membership is reviewed. Part II 
reviews the history surrounding the Norwegian debate on Europe and reports on 
the results of the newspaper and party analysis. Part III investigates public opinion 
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through the whole period under study (1961-2010) and discusses the findings of the 
regression analysis. Part IV provides an interpretation of the overall analysis. 
1.5.1 Part I: Literature Review 
The aims of Chapter Two are to contextualize Norwegian Euroscepticism within the 
broader literature on Euroscepticism, identify gaps in existing knowledge and 
inform the research. It frames the research within the comparative literature on 
popular and party-based Euroscepticism, focusing on issues of definition, the 
arguments of Eurosceptics across Europe, how Euroscepticism has developed over 
time in the EU, theories of popular Euroscepticism, and the manifestation of 
Euroscepticism in European party systems. It is argued that different Euroscepticism 
typologies have different strengths and weaknesses and are more useful when used 
together as analytical tools. Furthermore, through its review of causality theories, the 
chapter finds that there is no consensus in either the public support or party-based 
Euroscepticism literature on what best explains Euroscepticism. The public support 
literature focuses on theories like postmaterialism, cognitive mobilization, 
socialization, utilitarianism, cueing and identity, whereas in the party-based 
Euroscepticism literature the discussion on which of ideology, strategy, party system 
centrality, institutions and inter-party competition are most central in shaping the 
politics of Euroscepticism continues. 
Chapter Three considers the academic debates on Norwegian opposition to the EU. 
Specifically, it looks at how Norwegian Euroscepticism has been defined in the 
literature and discusses existing theories attempting to explain Norway’s “no”s and 
party-based Euroscepticism. Discussion of the arguments most central to the 
Norwegian debate and the historical development of Norwegian Euroscepticism is 
left out of the review, as this forms part of the analysis in subsequent chapters. The 
purpose of the chapter is to identify gaps in existing knowledge and inform the 
research. It concludes that the issue of defining Norwegian Euroscepticism is largely 
overlooked in the literature; there is little to extract from existing research on 
different types of Norwegian Euroscepticism. Furthermore, the chapter finds that the 
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theories used to explain Norwegian Euroscepticism are different from those put 
forward in the comparative literature. In the Norway-related literature, the focus is 
on Rokkan’s (1967) cleavage model, geography, Atlanticism, rural identity, the oil 
economy, Scandinavian exceptionalism and cueing. In the party-based literature, 
Sitter’s work (2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005a, b, 2008) has brought Norway into the 
ideology/strategy/party system centrality discussions of the comparative literature. 
But although Sitter argues that parties emphasize their stance on the EU depending 
on whether or not they stand to gain from it in electoral, policy or office-seeking 
terms, his “politics of opposition” model does not explain why the different 
Norwegian political parties are Eurosceptic and have been Eurosceptic over the last 
almost fifty years. 
1.5.2 Part II: Analysis of the Newspaper and Party Debate 
Each of the four chapters in Part II of the thesis are made up of two components. In 
order to contextualize the documentary analysis, the first part of each chapter 
discusses issues and events relevant to the EU debate in each period, based on an 
intensive survey of secondary sources. Chapter Four starts by looking at the party 
system and foreign policy before 1961, before moving on to the first phase of 
Norwegian Euroscepticism, i.e. the 1960s. It first discusses the events and 
developments of the 1960s and subsequently reports on the 1960s documentary 
analysis. It is argued that 1961 is an appropriate starting point for studying 
Norwegian Euroscepticism because Eurosceptic attitudes prior to 1961 were only 
widespread among the elites and other motivations than Atlanticism did not come to 
the fore before 1961 due to the general consensus on non-participation. Moreover, 
the documentary analysis finds that political culture and political values, and also to 
a certain extent national identity and rural society concerns, were of importance to 
1960s Euroscepticism in Norway. Conversely, the results suggest that economic 
interest were only of secondary importance to its motivation. 
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Chapter Five covers the second phase of Norwegian Euroscepticism, that is, 1970-72. 
In the first part, it looks at the developments in the government(s) and parties and at 
the non-parliamentary opposition. It argues that it is necessary to separate the 1970-
72 period from the 1960s period in the study of Euroscepticism because the 1970s 
period witnessed higher levels of first, knowledge and experience with the EC issue, 
second, debating intensity, third, polarization and fourth, public involvement. In 
addition, the documentary analysis indicates that integration was viewed in more 
political terms in the 1970s than in the 1960s. It confirms that political culture and 
political values arguments were extremely central to early Norwegian 
Euroscepticism. It also suggests that rural society concerns, i.e. concern about e.g. the 
primary sectors, the settlement pattern and rural life, were also very important in the 
1970s debate. National identity argumentation, on the other hand, was less 
prominent; as was economic argumentation, which primarily consisted of counter-
argumentation to economic “yes” argumentation. 
Chapter Six deals with the third phase of Norwegian Euroscepticism, which started 
as the Cold War neared its end and the plans for the Single Market got underway. 
This period, which was a period of heightened Euroscepticism, culminated in the 
1994 referendum. The chapter finds that there is much continuity between the 1960s, 
1970s and 1990s debates, but argues that in the 1990s Eurosceptic argumentation it is 
possible to detect a rise in confidence in, and in many instances, sophistication of the 
arguments. This is put down to exogenous factors, such as the EC’s change from 
“Community” to “Union”, and endogenous factors, such as experience and learning 
from the previous debates. The chapter finds that the 1990s argumentation is more or 
less a perpetuation of the 1960s/1970s phenomenon. Political values and political 
culture are the two most central themes, and rural society also plays an important 
part in the 1990s argumentation. Economic interest comes up again as a second order 
concern, and the national identity argumentation makes up an even more marginal 
part of the Eurosceptic side of the debate than in the 1970s. Chapter Six is also able to 
conduct a closer examination of the different parties’ separate discourses on 
European integration. It finds that with the exception of the PP, whose Eurosceptic 
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argumentation is more economy-oriented, the Norwegian Eurosceptic parties’ 
argumentation follows the same pattern as the newspaper arguments. In other 
words, the focus is on political Values, political Culture and Rural society (VCR). 
Chapter Seven gives a thorough account of the developments in the relationship 
between Norway and the EU between 1995 and 2010 and the characteristics of the 
debate in the period. It is argued that 1995-2010 is a period of latent Euroscepticism, 
because the “suicide clause”, the EEA agreement’s function as a national 
compromise and the negative public opinion towards EU membership served to put 
a lid on the debate, at least in the parliamentary arena. Unlike the 1973-1988 latent 
period, 1995-2010 is treated as a separate period of Norwegian Euroscepticism, 
because post-1994, the EEA agreement and developments in the EU did not allow 
the elites to bury the issue. In the second part of the chapter, the documentary 
analysis confirms that the continuity observed in the 1960s, 1970s and 1990s 
argumentation can be extended to the 2000s. Again, it is argued that the Eurosceptic 
argumentation found in the newspaper/online debate is mirrored in the middle and 
left-wing parties’ discourse on the EU, with its emphasis on VCR issues, and lack of 
emphasis on economic interest and cultural threat. The VCR structure is also shared 
by the “no” organization, NtEU, but the PP’s Euroscepticism stands out in its focus 
on economic issues, and lack of concern for political values and rural society. 
1.5.3 Part III: Analysis of Public Opinion 
Chapter Eight examines the development and causality of public Euroscepticism in 
Norway. The first part looks at how the phenomenon has developed across the four 
periods, from its formation in the early 1960s, to its blossoming in the early 1970 and 
1990s and into the post-Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) and eastward 
enlargement period. The investigation shows that the strength and resilience of 
Norwegian popular Euroscepticism is more than a myth,32 as between 1961 and 2010, 
there were only short periods when the “yes” side were ahead in the polls (1972-73, 
1998-99, 2002-04). Using multiple regression analysis, the second part of the chapter 
32 These findings challenge Sitter’s (2009) claim that “there is as much change over time in Norway as 
there are in […] other countries”. 
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tests the VCR model and the economic interest and national identity theories on a 
nationally representative sample of the population (the 1994 Referendum Study) in 
order to find out whether the findings of the newspaper/party analysis can be 
extended to the public level. It confirms the centrality of geo-historical and rural 
society factors to Norwegian Euroscepticism, but the findings are inconsistent with 
the postmaterialist thesis. The national identity thesis is also rejected, but the 
economic interest thesis finds some support. 
1.5.4 Part IV: Norwegian Euroscepticism – what and why? 
Chapter Nine pulls the findings of the MM study together and concentrates on the 
research questions: what does the research tell us about the nature and causality of 
Norwegian Euroscepticism? It argues that there are two broad types of 
Euroscepticism in Norway, namely mainstream and right-wing Euroscepticism. The 
first type is characterized and motivated by postmaterialist values, geo-historical 
factors and ruralism (VCR), while the second type shares the geo-historical element, 
but is much more economy-oriented in its outlook on European integration. On the 
basis of a triangulation with additional public opinion data from the 1972 and 1994 
Referendum Studies, it is suggested that the VCR explanation is applicable also on 
the public level even though the regression analysis in Chapter Eight returned 
results which contradicted the postmaterialist and non-economic aspect of VCR. The 
above conclusions also bid further research into public opinion to establish whether 
the discrepancies between the results of the qualitative and quantitative parts were 
due to the failure of distinguishing between mainstream and right-wing public 
Euroscepticism. Furthermore, the chapter discusses the merits of the MM approach, 
arguing that in spite of its weaknesses, it offers valuable insights into and a new 
perspective on Norwegian Euroscepticism. The thesis concludes with a summary of 
the main arguments and makes suggestions for future research. 
This chapter has given an introduction to the study of Euroscepticism, considered 
why Norwegian Euroscepticism is a worthwhile area of research, outlined the 
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research questions, the aims and objectives and methodology of the study and given 
an overview of the thesis. The following chapter offers a review of the comparative 
Euroscepticism literature. 
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Chapter 2

A Review of the Comparative Euroscepticism Literature:

Definition, Trends and Causality 
This chapter focuses on five of the most important issues in the comparative 
literature. These include issues of definition; the variations in the foundation of EU 
opposition across Europe; how public Euroscepticism has developed through the 
last fifty years; the theories explaining variations in public support for and 
opposition to European integration; and Euroscepticism in party politics. The 
purpose of the chapter is to uncover how different types of Euroscepticism are 
defined; review the main developments of Euroscepticism in other European states 
in terms of argumentation and historical development, as well as theory pertaining 
to party politics and public opinion. This is all done to contextualize the research and 
identify the theories that are to be tested on the Norwegian case. First, the chapter 
deals with the problem of defining Euroscepticism. 
2.1 Defining Euroscepticism 
As the popularity of the term Euroscepticism increased through the 1990s, it became 
progressively necessary to evaluate the meaning behind the concept. Taggart (1997, 
1998: 366) provides a widely accepted definition of the term, attributing it to 
expression of “the idea of contingent or qualified opposition, as well as 
incorporating outright and unqualified opposition to the process of European 
integration”. Taggart and Szczerbiak (2000, 2001, 2002, 2003) provide a refined 
version of the above definition: while they consider Euroscepticism to be “all-
encompassing and to incorporate a wide range of varying positions” (2001: 9), they 
distinguish between “soft” and “hard” Euroscepticism. Their “hard” and “soft” 
categorization is widely used as a labelling schema for party-based Euroscepticism, 
and can arguably be transferred to other types of Euroscepticism, too. Hard 
Euroscepticism entails rejection of or principal objection to European integration, 
whereas the soft variety encompasses opposition to certain aspects of the integration 
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process. In other words, to be classified as a hard Eurosceptic, one would either have 
to be against one’s country’s membership of the EU, thus advocating withdrawal if 
already a member or opposition to joining if a non-member, or oppose European 
policy initiatives to such an extent that membership would, by implication, be 
untenable. Soft Eurosceptics, on the other hand, commonly oppose one or several 
aspects of the EU and/or the integration process, such as the Common Agricultural 
Policy (CAP), the EU’s democratic deficit and/or EMU. 
Kopecky and Mudde (2002) criticize Taggart and Szczerbiak’s (2001) definition for 
being too broad, as they believe it potentially ascribes Eurosceptic attitudes to people 
who are largely Europhile (pro-European) and only have reservations about limited 
aspects of the process. They introduce an alternative schema to that of Taggart and 
Szczerbiak, based on the two dimensions “diffuse” and “specific” support (for the 
ideal of European integration and the EU respectively), creating the four labels 
“euroenthusiasts”, “Eurosceptic”, “europragmatist” and “euroreject” (see Table 2.1 
below). 
Table 2.1 Kopecky and Mudde’s typology of party positions on Europe 
Support for European Integration (Diffuse support) 
Europhile Europhobe 
EU-optimist Euroenthusiast Europragmatist 
Support for the 
European Union 
(Specific support) EU-pessimist Eurosceptic Eurorejects 
Source: Kopecky and Mudde (2002: 303) 
Arguably, two of the most obvious flaws of their work are firstly, that it is overly 
complicated and creates confusion as to what attributes are ascribed which label, and 
second, that they have used the term “Eurosceptic” for one of their positions which 
carries a different meaning in the wider literature than it means here (in their model, 
a “Eurosceptic” harbours a combination of Europhile and EU-pessimist attitudes). 
Flood (2002b) provides a different categorization solution. In contrast to the 
arguments of the authors mentioned above, he argues that the Euroscepticism 
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classification should not be extended to include reformist positions which involve 
opposition to specific aspects of the EU but are broadly pro-integration (i.e. “policy” 
and/or “national interest” variations of Taggart and Szczerbiak’s “soft” 
Euroscepticism conceptualisation33). He believes the term is best used to describe 
three Euroscepticism positions, the first and softest being resistance to further 
integration; the second being a desire to reverse integration to a former stage (most 
commonly before Maastricht); and the third being a rejectionist position, advocating 
withdrawal or refusal to join the EU. Flood (2002a) emphasizes that an 
Euroscepticism categorization model should be clear and free of assumptions about 
positions, and he advocates the use of “EU” as a prefix instead of “Euro”, as he 
believes “Euro” has the potential to create confusion about what object the 
scepticism is directed towards.34 He puts forward a set of six descriptive labels which 
is arguably clearer and more specific than the hard/soft model and Kopecky and 
Mudde’s two-dimensional model. These are rejectionist, revisionist, minimalist, 
gradualist, reformist and maximalist, and all include the prefix “EU“ (see Flood et al. 
2007 for the refined version). A benefit of Flood’s model is that, as it includes both 
pro-European and anti-European attitudes, he avoids problems of separation 
between supportive and opposing positions altogether. Nevertheless, as Flood’s 
model is not as widely used as the hard/soft model of definition, its lack of 
familiarity is a disadvantage. Another limitation is that, although one can argue that 
the schema is more accurate and therefore more appropriate for the study of the 
Euroscepticism of elites and people with carefully thought out stances on European 
integration, its applicability to Euroscepticism in the general public is more 
ambiguous. When studying public Euroscepticism it may be more appropriate to 
separate between the hard and soft types rather than six different stances, as many 
do not have elaborate opinions on the intricacies of the different integrationist 
initiatives or the process of integration. Besides, in a non-member country like 
Norway, where European integration is primarily debated in terms of “yes” or “no” 
33 It should be noted that Szczerbiak and Taggart (2008a) have since acknowledged that national 
interest rhetoric does not qualify for inclusion in the definition of Euroscepticism, and now 
differentiate between “peripheral” and “core” policy opposition. 
34 He believes that “Euro” could potentially imply “Europe” as a geographical area or refer to the 
single currency. 
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to membership, it is perhaps more relevant to differentiate between different degrees 
of rejectionism, thus reverting back to the hard/soft continuum. 
Notwithstanding the dissent on which positions should be considered Eurosceptic 
and how the positions should be categorized, there is a consensus in the academic 
literature that differentiation between different kinds or degrees of Euroscepticism is 
required. Because the issue of European integration is complex by nature, attitudes 
towards the process are, too. Therefore, Euroscepticism can also be described as 
diverse sets of positions on European integration (Sitter 2002), as the project is in 
itself an elaborate and non-static set of ideals and processes. Consequently, it may be 
futile to conjure up a wide variety of Euroscepticism categories, as they are 
cumbersome and difficult to operate with. 
Figure 2.1 Three Euroscepticism typologies put together 
Soft Hard 
Minimalist 
Support for the 
principle and 
practice of the EU. 
Rejection of further 
integration. 
Rejectionis 
CFSP 
Single 
market 
EMU 
Social 
Dimensio 
Justice and 
Home Affairs 
Political 
Economic 
Revisionist 
Rejection of the 
principle, 
practice and 
future of the EU. 
No wish to 
participate. 
Support for the principle of 
the EU. Significant 
reservations about EU 
policies. Rejection of further 
integration. 
Source: Skinner (2011: 25) 
What is more, the majority of alternative Euroscepticism conceptualisations more or 
less resemble that of “hard” and “soft”,35 making a conversion to an alternative 
E.g. “rejectionist”, “radically revisionist” (Flood 2002b) and “fundamentalist sceptics” (Forster 
2002a) fit the “hard” definition, whereas “pragmatic opponents”, policy specific opponents (Forster 
2002a), and “revisionist” (Flood, 2002b) fit the “soft” definition. 
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labelling schema more or less without purpose. An example of this is illustrated in 
Figure 2.1, which displays Flood’s (2002a) three anti-EU categories (top), along 
Taggart and Szczerbiak’s hard/soft continuum, with Vasilopoulou’s (2009: 6) 
definitions below.36 Arguably, the three typologies complement, rather than compete 
with each other. 
2.2 The Diversity of Eurosceptic Argumentation 
As Euroscepticism is either opposition to European integration in principle (hard 
Euroscepticism), or a (potentially wide) variety of oppositional positions on aspects 
of the integration process (soft Euroscepticism), and thus is an exceptionally diverse 
concept, it is essential to review the most common arguments voiced by Eurosceptics 
across Europe to understand the origins of the phenomenon. 
According to Flood (2002b, 2005), Euroscepticism is most commonly based on 
arguments of over-centralisation; the perceived incompatibility of deepening and 
widening of integration; that the EU is undemocratic, bureaucratic and insufficiently 
transparent; the belief that EMU will have a grave impact on national economic and 
social stability; that national laws should have primacy over European laws; that a 
workable Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) for Europe is impossible to 
obtain; and/or that the EU should be based on a free, intergovernmental cooperation 
structure as opposed to moving towards increased supranationalism. Moreover, 
Euroscepticism commonly features across the left/right spectrum; it is ideologically 
diverse. For the same reasons as people and parties of different ideologies are in 
favour of European integration on different grounds,37 Eurosceptics base their 
opposition to the EU on a variety of arguments. Forster (2002a) argues that 
Euroscepticism on both the left and right of the political spectrum is based on 
concern about sovereignty, national identity and economic political autonomy. 
36 Vasilopoulou (2009) provides these definitions alongside her labels “rejecting”, “conditional” and 
“compromising” Euroscepticism. 
37 The right is traditionally attracted to the EU because of its commitment to market liberalism, 
whereas the Europhile socialist left sees it an important economic and social policy­making institution 
(reflected by for example the EU’s social policy dimension; environmental policy; cohesion policy; 
and structural funds). 
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However, concern for national sovereignty is more typically associated with right-
wing Euroscepticism (e.g. Flood 2002b; Holmes 2002), along with criticism of the 
EU’s liberalist shortcomings: excessive regulation and unreasonable budgetary 
demands (Flood 2002b). On the left, on the other hand, the EU is attacked for being 
too liberalist and acting as an agent of (undesired) deregulation, free trade and 
globalisation. 
Despite some elements of common ground across the borders of Europe, it is 
important to remember that there are national variations also in ideology-based 
arguments against the European project. In France, the EU is criticized for being too 
liberalist; here even the right is concerned about the liberalist direction of the EU 
(Benoit 1997; Flood 2005). In the UK, however, the scenario is quite the opposite; 
here European integration is “widely denounced as a socialist plot and a model 
based on archaic regulations” (Benoit 1997: 78). The French position is shared by 
many Germans (Hix 2005) and Scandinavians, where there is deep-rooted concern 
about the EU’s lacking social and environmental dimensions and the detrimental 
effect neo-liberalist EU policies have on national welfare provisions and public 
expenditure (e.g. Sørensen 2004; Petersson 2004; Fitzmaurice 1995). Another strong 
characteristic of French Euroscepticism is the perceived threat of European 
integration to French culture. 
In the Scandinavian countries, the democratic deficit argument has particular 
stronghold because of their relatively long history of stable democracy and value 
systems deeply concerned with democratic accountability, transparency and equality 
(e.g. Sørensen 2004; Petersson 2004). Moreover, Scandinavian Eurosceptics also differ 
with regard to their structure of the emphasis on economic interest, as they are 
particularly concerned with protecting societal and territorial interests (e.g. hostility 
towards EU agricultural and fisheries policies) (Milner 2000; Fitzmaurice 1995). 
Furthermore, regular payments of disproportionate budget contributions have given 
rise to the notion that their respective countries are unfairly treated and effectively 
“footing the bill” of the less developed parts of Europe, thus fuelling resentment 
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towards the EU. This is a sentiment shared with British Eurosceptics and which is 
arguably also increasing in force in Germany and the Netherlands (Hix 2005). 
Conversely, Sørensen (2006: 9) infers from 2001 EB poll data that the Danish are 
more positive than the majority of other EU nationalities towards taking on the 
financial burden of eastward enlargement. Another characteristic shared by 
Scandinavian and British Eurosceptics is the strength of opposition to EMU (e.g. 
Milner 2000; Petersson 2004), and German Euroscepticism is also characterized by 
reservations about the single currency (e.g. Noelle-Neumann 1980; Flood 2002b; Lees 
2002). Examples of additional nation-specific EU-related concerns are the Swiss 
defence of their unique political traditions (Church 2003); German Eurosceptic 
positions on European economic policies in relation to re-unification (Milner 2000); 
the German apprehensiveness regarding the eastward enlargements (Lees 2002); and 
the Finnish, Swedish and Austrian pre-1989 argument of neutrality. 
Considering the diversity of Eurosceptic arguments, it is quite clear that the 
phenomenon of Euroscepticism is multi-faceted, making it necessary to carefully 
consider the concept’s application to different cases. Its apparent complexities and 
lack of uniformity require scholars of the concept to approach it differently 
according to the level of inquiry (European aggregate/national 
aggregate/party/individual) as well as the national context. Sørensen (2006) argues 
that there are four types of Euroscepticism, ideological, utilitarian, sovereignty-based 
and principled,38 and that national variations of Euroscepticism draw on the four 
types to different degrees. Harmsen and Spiering (2004b: 17) also emphasize the 
importance of the national context, as they argue that “it assumes a meaning which 
must be understood relative to the different national political traditions and 
experiences of European integration which frame those debates”. The next section 
deals with how Euroscepticism and the debate on European integration have 
evolved during the last 50 years as well as events of particular importance to the 
pan-European and national development of Euroscepticism. 
In a later paper, Sørensen proposes a typology of public Euroscepticism which differentiates 
between economic, sovereignty, democracy and social Euroscepticism (Sørensen 2008). 
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2.3 The History and Development of Attitudes towards 
European Integration 
From the signing of the Treaty of Rome in 1957 up until the first accession in 1973 
and the preceding debates, the literature reports that there was very little opposition 
to the process of European integration, perhaps with the exception of the resentment 
which emanated from de Gaulle vetoes on British entry to the Community in the 
1960s (Inglehart and Reif 1991). The publics of the member states were relatively 
distanced from the project because of its elite-driven nature, and the common 
assumption is that there was little public interest in the EC and its workings despite 
essentially high support levels (Hewstone 1986). These healthy support levels might 
be explained by the high level of prosperity the member states were enjoying during 
this period, which was thought to be at least in part a product of European economic 
integration (Inglehart and Reif 1991). In the academic literature, this popular pro-
European atmosphere is widely referred to as the “permissive consensus” (e.g. 
Eichenberg and Dalton 1993; Evans 1998; Flood 2002a), a concept which was first put 
forward by Lindberg and Scheingold (1970). This “permissive consensus” is 
understood as “the general affirmation of a somewhat hazily understood European 
project by an uninvolved public” (Evans 1998: 576). 
The accession talks and ancillary debates in the four applicant countries (Denmark, 
Ireland, the UK and Norway) in the early 1970s arguably marked the first stage in 
the development of Euroscepticism. For the first time, the pros and cons of European 
integration were debated vigorously in the public domain in order to reach 
conclusions on the desirability of membership of the Community. The publics of 
Denmark and Ireland consented to joining the EC with healthy referenda majorities, 
whereas the Norwegians rejected membership with 53.5 percent voting against. The 
UK joined without consulting the public in a referendum, but as a result of the 
political establishment’s failure to promote the ideal of Europe in other than 
economic terms and the government allowing the EC to be blamed for the country’s 
economic problems, the unpopularity of membership grew among the public as well 
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as in the party system. This culminated in the renegotiation of the British terms of 
membership in 1974 and a referendum on withdrawal from the Community in June 
1975. Although the 1975 referendum campaign gave rise to Eurosceptic sentiment in 
the UK, the Europhiles won the referendum by 67.2 to 32.8 percent (George 1998: 95). 
The descriptor used for the Eurosceptics in Britain at this point in time, however, 
was “anti-marketeers”, because of their emphasis on the anti-market argument 
(Forster 2002b; George 1998). 
The 1970s saw popular support for the EC drop across Europe (see e.g. Niedermayer 
1995; Handley 1981; Inglehart and Reif 1991), as neither of the member states were 
exempt from the economic volatility of the decade or the destructive impact of 
enduring membership negotiations, the British re-negotiations, the Norwegian 
rejection of membership and the continuation of British “awkwardness” (George 
1998). Handley (1981) argues that the first enlargement afflicted the existing 
members with a large amount of stress and blames the decline in EC support in the 
1970s (or what he calls the “crisis of the 1970s”) on a combination of a damaged self-
image and economic decline. It is commonly thought that the EC’s inability to deal 
with the rising inflation levels and unemployment rates of the 1970s combined with 
the national governments’ proneness of using the EC as a scapegoat for economic ills 
are important factors in explaining why support for the EC declined in the 1970s 
(Eichenberg and Dalton 1993; Anderson and Reichert 1996). 
In the 1980s opinion polls showed that member state support levels for European 
integration were on the rise again (e.g. Niedermayer 1995; Evans 1998; McLaren 
2007b). According to EB data, the first half of the decade saw support for integration 
rise almost uniformly across the EC, a trend which continued in the remainder of the 
decade in the six newest member states, the UK, Denmark, Ireland, Greece, Portugal 
and Spain (Niedermayer 1995).39 A generally more positive public mood following 
39 This slowing­down (and in some cases even reversal) of support in the original member states has 
been explained by the “ceiling theory”. Anderson and Kaltenthaler (1996) believe that every country 
has a ceiling of support, and when reaching or coming close to this ceiling, support levels will slow or 
reverse. 
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improving economic conditions may account for this sudden resurgence in support 
for the European integration. However, this EC-optimism provided ample scope for 
a drop in support for European integration in the 1990s, when the actual deepening 
of integration was scheduled to take place. 
The Maastricht Treaty of 1992 marked a watershed in attitudes towards European 
integration, as the complexities of the treaty transformed the issue of Europe from 
being a question of support or opposition to membership of the EC/EU into highly 
diverse positions on different aspects of the various policies and developments of the 
integration process (i.e. a widespread appearance of soft Eurosceptic attitudes). The 
sudden decline in public support across the EU throughout the 1990s is clearly 
illustrated by opinion poll data for member states as well as for non-member states. 
As a result of this, the time of the Maastricht referenda in Denmark and France has 
been widely cited as the end of the public “permissive consensus”, thus 
characterising 1992 as a turning point in the debate on Europe and essential to the 
development of modern Euroscepticism (Forster 2002a). Additionally, the Maastricht 
debate put increased focus on the limited access European citizens had to European 
affairs, fuelling concerns over the legitimacy of the European institutions and the 
quality of EU democracy (Franklin et al. 1994). In effect, the Maastricht Treaty 
increased focus on the importance of popular involvement in the integration process 
and made it clear that the project could not progress without the continued support 
of its citizens. In other words, it was around Maastricht that the European public’s 
role in determining Europe’s future development became more widely recognized. 
Furthermore, a considerable discrepancy between mass and elite support for 
integration has been documented in recent years (e.g. Hansen 2002; Hix 2005; 
Petersson 2004; Sørensen 2004; Hooghe 2003). This gap has fuelled concerns that the 
European elite is losing touch with the public’s preferences (Hix and Lord 1997), 
exemplified by EB data which shows that 94 percent of European elites consider EU 
membership a good thing as opposed to only 48 percent of the EU public (Hix 2005: 
166). Startin (2005: 67) argues that in France “[i]t was the debate surrounding the 
Maastricht referendum which was to bring the issue of Europe to a head and to 
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demonstrate fully the gulf between France’s political elites and large swathes of the 
electorate”. In Denmark, on the other hand, Sørensen (2004) believes that it was 
around 1986, the time of the Single European Act (SEA), that public opinion changed 
and the gap between mass and elite support started widening. 
Another event important to the development of Euroscepticism post-Maastricht is 
that of the 1994 referenda in Austria, Finland, Sweden and Norway and the 
subsequent 1995 enlargement, which increased the number of members from twelve 
to fifteen. There are two main reasons why these developments are of particular 
significance to the debate on Euroscepticism. First, as Norway rejected membership 
for the second time (this time 52.2 percent voted “no”), it not only reinforced the 
position and strength of Eurosceptic sentiment in Scandinavia, throughout the next 
decade the country has also served as an example of an economically and politically 
successful West European non-member state, lending added credibility to the 
Eurosceptic argument that membership of the EU is not necessary for a country to 
prosper (e.g. Holmes 2002). Second, the accession of three countries thought to have 
above average levels of public Euroscepticism served to equal out the balance 
between the more eager member countries (traditionally the six original signatory 
countries, Ireland, Greece, Spain and Portugal) and the more “awkward” members 
(typically Denmark and the UK). In other words, it is argued that the 1995 accession 
“diluted” the pro-integrationist drive within the EU itself (George 1998) and 
consequently made Eurosceptic sentiments more common within the organisational 
structure of the EU. 
After the 1995 enlargement, there are three main developments which have 
influenced the debate on Europe. First, the introduction of the Euro mobilized large 
oppositional movements, especially in the UK, Denmark and Sweden, but also in 
Germany, where affective and historical ties to the national currency were 
particularly strong. Second, the issue of the eastward enlargement witnessed 
powerful stirrings of disagreement with the direction of integration as it represented 
threats to EU immigration controls, employment, welfare provisions, social 
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dumping, and cultural cohesion.40 In France, the potential accession of Turkey into 
the Union has been particularly controversial because of concerns about French 
culture and identity in the event of mass-migration from a country with a large 
Muslim population. In Germany (as well as other member states which are 
particularly exposed to influxes of Central and Eastern European (CEE) workers), 
fears of rising unemployment and social dumping have been at the centre of the 
scepticism directed towards eastern enlargement. Conversely, usual Eurosceptic 
suspects Denmark and Britain are curiously supportive of enlarging the Union. This 
feature of Danish and British Euroscepticism is commonly explained by their desired 
option of widening economic cooperation, which acts as a barrier to the undesired 
model of a close and more homogeneous political Union (e.g. Sørensen 2006; Flood et 
al. 2007). According EB data, in 2002, 72 percent of Danes were supportive of 
eastward enlargement, as opposed to a mere 20 percent of the French (Sørensen 
2006:17). The third important development was the “no” majorities in the French 
and Dutch referenda on the European Constitution in 2005, which sent the EU into a 
temporary existential crisis. Having the traditionally EU-supportive publics of two 
of the founding members reject an important treaty and subsequently halt planned 
developments in EU-level policy was an unexpected turn of events to very many. 
Admittedly, potential problems with ratification of the treaty in other member states 
had been anticipated, for example in the event of a British referendum on the issue, 
but the return of healthy “no” majorities in both France and the Netherlands was 
unprecedented. This was a serious blow to pro-integrationists, as it was not 
“merely” another protest by the usual suspects Denmark or Ireland;41 this was 
40 Taggart and Szczerbiak (2003; 2008a) argue that opposition to enlargement is not a feature of party­
based Euroscepticism. Sørensen (2006: 17), however, points out two valid points which link 
opposition to eastward enlargement to Euroscepticism quite convincingly. First, as enlargement to the 
East inevitably represents increased financial contributions to the Union to the majority of the existing 
member states (as well as the loss of benefits to some), it is reasonable to conclude that it carries 
implications for shifts in utilitarian EU support/opposition. And second, because of the scope of recent 
enlargements and the diversity of the joining countries and their cultures, it would be naïve to think 
that these considerable changes cannot touch on ideological grounds of support or opposition. 
Arguably, opposition to eastward enlargement is thus a powerful “soft” Eurosceptic stance, which, 
considering the EU’s current trajectory, has the potential to transform a “soft” Eurosceptic position 
into a “hard” one. 
41 Having rejected the Nice Treaty in June 2001, the Irish voted “no” again to the Lisbon Treaty on 12 
June 2008. Both referenda were followed by another referendum which resulted in a “yes”. Denmark 
voted “no” to Maastricht in June 1992 and to EMU in September 2000. 
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significant discontent with the EU’s trajectory voiced by the citizens whose support 
Brussels’ elites relied upon. Or was it? Could it instead have been the French and 
Dutch publics’ way of protesting against their respective governments, as the 
national government thesis would have it? The following section reviews the most 
established theories of public Euroscepticism, some of which have also been used to 
explain the outcome of the 2005 referenda on the European Constitution (e.g. 
Lubbers 2008). 
2.4 Explaining Public Support for/Opposition to the EU 
In the literature there are numerous theories explaining individual-level variation in 
public support for European integration and, by implication, popular 
Euroscepticism. Early work in this area mainly revolved around Ronald Inglehart’s 
(1977) theories of the “Silent Revolution”, which put forward postmaterialist values 
and high cognitive skills as predictors for support for European institutions and 
governance (see e.g. Janssen 1991; McLaren 2006). Early studies also found that the 
length of different countries’ membership had an impact on support levels (e.g. 
Inglehart 1977; Hewstone 1986). After the Maastricht referenda, however, much 
focus was shifted to the unpopularity of national governments as determinants of 
popular Eurosceptic sentiment (i.e. the use of proxies in attitude formation) (e.g. 
Franklin et al. 1994, 1995; Anderson 1998) as well as evaluative/utilitarian economic 
cost/benefit theories (e.g. Bosch and Newton 1995; Anderson and Reichert 1996; 
Gabel 1998a). More recent research has moved onto issues of identity (e.g. Deflem 
and Pampel 1996; McLaren 2002; Carey 2002) and political effects (party cueing) (e.g. 
Hooghe 2007). These shifts in theory focus are part of a natural process, considering 
the changes in and evolution of European integration. As the Union was primarily 
concerned with economic integration up until the mid- to late-1990s, the 
developments in the literature reflect this (Hooghe and Marks 2005). This part of the 
chapter summarizes the most important of these theories and briefly evaluates the 
extent of their validity. 
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2.4.1 The Postmaterialist Thesis 
First, the “political values” or “postmaterialist” thesis (Inglehart 1977) posits that 
people with postmaterialist values are more prone to support European integration 
than those who have materialist-based value systems, due to the expectation that the 
ideal of supranational governance has a stronger appeal among postmaterialists than 
materialists.42 The theory goes on to assume that support for European integration is 
higher among young people, as they score higher on the postmaterialist index than 
older people. This relationship has been confirmed by later studies (e.g. Deflem and 
Pampel 1996), but has also been widely contested. Janssen (1991), through his multi-
level evaluation of the thesis, finds no relationship between postmaterialist values 
and support for Europe, and Gabel’s (1998a) study shows that political values are 
related in quite the opposite direction. In other words, Gabel finds that materialists 
have more favourable attitudes towards the EU than post-materialists.43 Moreover, 
in Anderson and Reichert’s (1996) analysis of postmaterialist values’ impact on 
support, a relationship is found only in the newer member states. McLaren (2006), on 
the other hand, finds that the relationship between this type of political values and 
EU support is of a spurious nature. She argues that the relationship can be explained 
by Inglehart’s second theory, cognitive mobilization, as cognitive skills are thought 
to precede the development of political values. 
2.4.2 The Cognitive Mobilization Thesis 
Inglehart’s (1970) second theory, the “cognitive mobilization” thesis (also referred to 
as the “cognitive skills” or “political interest” hypothesis (Ray 2003b)) supposes that 
people with high cognitive skills/mobilization and thus increased understanding of 
the EU are more likely to support efforts of European integration than those with 
low levels of cognitive skills (Inglehart 1970; Hix 2005; Wessels 2007). McLaren’s 
(2007b) empirical testing of the thesis broadly supports its contention, but she points 
out that lacking knowledge of European governance and cognitive skills do not 
42 People with postmaterialist value systems typically emphasise values such as self­actualization, 
morality and quality of life over material values such as physical and economic security. 
43 However, in a different study, Gabel (1998b) finds that the thesis is valid in the founding members 
of the union. 
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necessarily link up with opposition to the EU, as there is a relative prominence of 
apathy towards the EU among people with low cognitive mobilization scores. 
Moreover, inconsistencies have been reported by a number of commentators 
(Janssen 1991; Gabel 1998a, 1998b; Lobo 2003) despite the theory’s established 
position in the literature. 
2.4.3 The Socialization Thesis 
Another traditional theory of public support for the EU is the “socialization” thesis, 
which links support for integration to how long a person’s country has been a 
member of the EC/EU.44 In other words, the theory contends that countries with a 
shorter history of participation in the EC/EU are more likely to have high 
Euroscepticism levels, due to lacking identification with and knowledge about 
European institutions and the notion that “familiarity breeds content” (Bosch and 
Newton 1995). This thesis is backed up by a number of studies (e.g. Inglehart 1977; 
Hewstone 1986; Eichenberg and Dalton 1993; Anderson and Reichert 1996; Anderson 
and Kaltenthaler 1996; Gabel 1998a), but has also been contested as it fails to account 
for increasing levels of public Euroscepticism in for example France and Germany 
post-Maastricht (Flood 2002b; Milner 2000; Hix 2005) and stable levels of support in 
countries such as Ireland and Spain, countries that either joined at the same time or 
later than Eurosceptic Denmark and the UK. As a potential explanation for these 
diverging reports, Anderson and Kaltenthaler’s (1996) suggests that it is useful to 
couple the “socialization” theory with that of timing of entry to the Union and the 
idea of a “ceiling” (as explained above). They expect support to be highest in the 
founding members of the Union, followed by the 1980s entrants and then the 1970s 
entrants, as the lateness of Greece, Portugal and Spain’s entry was due to 
institutional and democratic reasons, not Euroscepticism and lacking affective 
support for European integration. Arguably, Anderson and Kaltenthaler’s (1996) 
contentions can act as viable explanations for aggregate-level differences in 
Euroscepticism levels across the Western European member states, with the 
exception of Ireland. However, one might look to utilitarian considerations to 
44 This thesis has also been called the “acculturation thesis”, the “acclimatisation thesis”, the “national 
tradition” thesis or simply the “length of membership” thesis. 
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address further discrepancies, which brings the argument to the fourth theory of 
support and opposition to the EU. 
2.4.4 The Economic Interest Thesis 
The “economic interest” hypothesis, also labelled the “cost/benefit” thesis, can be 
divided into the “utilitarian” or “policy appraisal” hypothesis and the “economic 
perception” hypothesis, depending on whether it is based on subjective or objective 
evaluations (e.g. Gabel and Palmer 1995; Gabel 1998a, b; Anderson and Reichert 
1996; Anderson and Kaltenthaler 1996; McLaren 2006; Hix 2007; Hooghe and Marks 
2005). The thesis takes national (sociotropic) and/or individual (egocentric) 
evaluations of costs and benefits derived from European integration into account to 
determine support for the EU (see Table 2.2 below). The main focus here is on the 
utilitarian model of support (both individual and national), as this is the main 
explanation used to explain EU support variation in the literature. 
Table 2.2 The economic interest models 
Level Theory Indicators of support 
Individual Economic Positive evaluations of personal 
(egocentric) perception costs/benefits 
(Subjective) 
Utilitarian / Direct EU financial support for farmers 
policy-appraisal and fishermen 
(Objective) Indirect High socio-economic status 
(associated with relative advantage 
derived from the four freedoms45) 
National Economic Positive evaluation of one’s 
(sociotropic) Perception country’s costs/benefits 
(Subjective) 
Utilitarian / Direct Net budget returns (e.g. structural 
policy-appraisal funds) 
(Objective) Indirect EU trade surplus 
Source: Author’s summary of the various economic interest models46 
45 I.e. the four freedoms of movement: goods, services, capital and people. 
46 See Hooghe and Marks (2005: 422) for an alternative summary. 
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The “utilitarianism” theory posits that there is a positive relationship between 
support and the individual-level and/or national economic benefits derived from 
European integration. Gabel (1998a) argues that EU citizens form their attitudes 
towards European integration based on economic self-interest policy appraisals of 
the EU’s four freedoms and the CAP. Thus, he argues, the likely beneficiaries of 
Europeanisation are prone to favour the EU (e.g. people on high incomes, the highly 
skilled, and citizens connected to export-oriented businesses), and those likely to be 
disadvantaged by integration are prone to Euroscepticism (e.g. high income manual 
workers, public sector employees, and small-scale farmers). Anderson and Reichert 
(1996) find that sociotropic and egocentric utilitarian considerations are related to 
support and opposition to the EU, with the exception of individual direct 
costs/benefits (i.e. farmers and fishermen). Increasing Euroscepticism in the 
aftermath of the post-2004 enlargement reform of the cohesion policy in the 
countries traditionally major beneficiaries of the fund, Portugal, Spain, Italy and 
Greece, can also potentially be explained by the sociotropic “utilitarian” thesis. Put 
differently, the traditionally high levels of support for the European project in 
Southern Europe are widely thought to be (at least) partly due to the economic 
benefits they have derived from EU membership (see Lobo 2003; Royo and Manuel 
2003). 
It is clear that the utilitarian thesis is backed up by a number of studies and holds 
ground across different national contexts as well as time. Nevertheless, the major 
bulk of studies incorporate additional theories in their models (e.g. Gabel 1998a, 
1998b; Hix 2005; Royo and Manuel 2003; McLaren 2002, 2006, 2007a; Hooghe and 
Marks 2004, 2005). Bosch and Newton (1995), for example, find that sociotropic 
evaluations have stronger correlation to support than what they call “pocket-book 
calculations” (McLaren (2004) reports the same findings), and argue that economic 
benefit, although important, is not the primary determinant of EU support; idealistic 
convictions for supporting Europe are more important. This is in line with Gabel’s 
(1998a) argument; he, too, argues that the structure of support for European 
integration relies on the mixture of two different variables: affective support for the 
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EU as well as the utilitarian dimension (the Eastonian model of support).47 He 
believes that both diffuse and specific support have to be included to achieve valid 
conclusions on support for European integration. McLaren (2006), too, identifies an 
inconsistency in the thesis, as she finds that the so-called “losers” of integration do 
not convey particularly hostile attitudes towards Europe, rather “lukewarm” or 
apathetic attitudes. 
2.4.5 The National Economy Thesis 
Not very different from the sociotropic “utilitarian” hypothesis, the “national 
economy” thesis postulates that economic decline has a negative effect on public 
support for the EU (Eichenberg and Dalton 1993). In other words, it holds that 
citizens blame poor national economic conditions, such as high unemployment and 
increasing inflation as well as poor GDP growth, on EU institutions and governance. 
Thus, in times of economic recession, popular Euroscepticism levels are expected to 
rise. Hix (2005) supports the theory as he believes it can assist in explaining 
traditionally healthy levels of support in Germany and the Netherlands due to 
beneficial EU-trade arrangements and slumping support levels in recent years as a 
result of increased focus on disproportionate budget contributions. Moreover, Benoit 
(1997) believes that France’s economic decline (the drop in GDP growth and rising 
unemployment) in the 1990s was a major factor in explaining the increase in French 
Euroscepticism post-Maastricht. Gabel (1998a), on the other hand, discredits the 
thesis as he finds that improving national economic conditions are also related to a 
decline in support for the EU. Anderson and Kaltenthaler (1996) similarly question 
Eichenberg and Dalton’s (1993) thesis, as they report a weak relationship between 
GDP growth and EU support as well as negative relationships between 
unemployment and inflation. 
2.4.6 The Identity Thesis 
The sixth theoretical family embraces the issue of identity as a predictor of support 
for the EU; a variety of identity-based theories have been tested in the more recent 
47 For more on the two­dimensional Eastonian model of system support, see Easton (1965). 
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scholarly literature on Euroscepticism (e.g. Deflem and Pampel 1995; Hooghe and 
Marks 2004; Baker 2005; McLaren 2006). In one of her early articles on the topic 
(2002), McLaren contends that those who are particularly concerned about threats to 
the nation-state and thus national integrity are more likely to harbour Eurosceptic 
attitudes than those who are not. However, in a later article (2004), she argues that 
egocentric and sociotropic economic evaluations are the main predictors of EU 
support, as she finds that the perceived threat of European integration to national 
identity is not as central to opinion formation on the EU as expected. Nevertheless, 
McLaren (2006) later arrives at the conclusion that considering the perceived threat 
the EU poses to national identity (national symbols and resources such as the welfare 
state, pride in national economic success, language and culture) is essential to 
understand attitudes towards European integration. Carey (2002) also tests three 
diverging concepts of national identity and their relations to support for European 
integration: the intensity of attachment to one’s country; the relationship between 
different territorial identities; and the degree of perceived threat from other cultures 
and identities to one’s own. He argues that the issues of national identity are just as 
important as utilitarian considerations in predicting support for the EU. However, as 
his study was only based on survey data from 2000, one has to be careful to make 
sweeping statements about the role of these three identity variables. Nevertheless, 
Hooghe and Marks (2005) contend that, coupled with economic calculations, the 
issue of national identity is extremely important to understanding public Eurosceptic 
sentiment. However, they add another dimension to their model, that of political 
effects. Specifically, they argue that attitude formation on the issue of Europe is 
based on “Calculation, Community and Cues”. This brings us to the seventh theory 
of EU support: party cues. 
2.4.7 The Political Effects Thesis: National Government, Proxies and 
Partisanship 
Increased focus on the “political effects” or “party cue” thesis is another recent 
development in the literature on public support and opposition. This argument 
asserts that citizen positions on European integration are products of party and 
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government politics, implying resistance on the part of political parties to voter 
cueing as well as strong ideological preferences and party competition structures 
(Hooghe 2007). It is related to three other individual theories of mass support for 
European integration: first, the “national government” thesis of Franklin et al. (1994, 
1995; also see Franklin 2002; Gabel 1998b; Hix 2005; Marquis and Lutz 2004; Ray 
2003a; Svensson 2002) which links support for European integration with trust in or 
the popularity of the government;48 second, Anderson’s (1998) “proxy” model, which 
contends that, in the absence of sufficient knowledge about the EU and its workings, 
European citizens use national proxies in opinion formation; and third, the 
“partisanship” thesis, which holds that there is a relationship between party and 
voter positions on the European issue. The latter theory has been verified in 
numerous studies (Inglehart 1977; Gabel 1998a, b; Hix 2005; Lobo 2003). The 
robustness of the “partisanship” theory, in particular, poses the following question: 
do parties “pull” public opinion, or does public opinion “push” party positions? 
Hooghe and Marks (2005: 425) argue that since “[t]he European Union is part of a 
system of multi-level governance that encompasses domestic political arenas, […] 
one would expect domestic politics to shape public views on European 
integration.”49 Notwithstanding, the relationship between elite influence and public 
support for the EU is of a highly contested nature. Milner (2000:6) states that “[e]lite 
commitment to European integration plays a crucial part in shaping public 
responses, but the causal relationship remains elusive.” Ray (2003b) argues that 
political effects on public opinion about Europe depend on the contexts of the 
different national party systems. His study shows that there is a relatively strong 
positive relationship between party impact on public attitudes to the EU and high 
party emphasis on the issue and between party influence and the strength of party 
attachment. In addition, he establishes a (moderate but) positive relationship 
between political effect and variety of party positions on Europe and public interest 
48 The “government support” thesis is applied primarily in conjunction with European referenda, where 
“no” votes are thought to reflect dissatisfaction with the current government. 
Moreover, recent research has suggested that extremist parties are more powerful cue­givers than 
mainstream parties. A potential explanation for this divergence is party cues’ dependence on strong 
opinion leadership, which is a common characteristic of extremist parties (Steenbergen et al. 2007). 
This development could have significant implications for mass levels of Euroscepticism in countries 
with Eurosceptic extremist parties of relative strength and popularity. 
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in politics (cognitive skills) as well as a relationship between intra-party dissent on 
the issue and variation in voter preferences on Europe (see also Gabel and Scheve 
2007). Inglehart (1977: 328) also believes that the political effect thesis is conditional; 
he argues that public opinion is particularly receptive to elite influence when public 
preferences are not deep-rooted, but he also points out that “publics and decision-
makers are linked in a feedback relationship” (p. 328). It is in other words much too 
simplistic to approach popular Euroscepticism as a straight-forward matter of the 
public adopting party attitudes. 
2.4.8 Other Relevant Issues 
It has been pointed out that countries with strong (trade and/or security) relations 
with other than European partners, such as the UK And the Nordic countries, are 
more prone to high levels of Eurosceptic sentiment and commonly prefer a global 
intergovernmental cooperation structure including the United States of America 
(USA), as opposed to an exclusively European one (George 1998; May 1999; Hix 
2005; Sørensen 2004; Milner 2000). Moreover, satisfaction with EU democracy has 
been highlighted as a significant determinant of support for the EU (Lobo 2003; 
Petersson 2004). Furthermore, political/cultural heritage is also a relevant factor 
(Milner 2000); the focus here is on national political and historical factors that are 
seen as at odds with the direction and/or nature of European integration, in 
particular those related to the second world war (WWII) and the desirability of peace 
on the continent, political traditions and democratic stability. This provides a 
possible explanation for the support discrepancy between countries with significant 
historical baggage like traditionally pro-European Germany, Italy, Greece, Spain and 
Portugal and countries with a long history of stable democracy like the traditionally 
Eurosceptic UK and Nordic members (Hix 2005). Additional factors that are 
commonly brought to the fore are the Swiss political tradition of direct democracy, 
the increasing realization in France and Germany that the Franco/German power 
axis is losing its significance in an EU of 25 or more members; the absence of an 
affective dimension of British support for Europe (George 1998); and the vehemently 
Eurosceptic press in the UK (e.g. Hix 2005). 
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2.5 Euroscepticism in Party Politics: the Issue of Party-
based Euroscepticism 
Having explored different aspects of mass Euroscepticism, it is also necessary to 
comment on how Euroscepticism is embodied in European party systems, as 
political parties and governments clearly play an important part in both shaping 
European integration as well as influencing public opinion on the issue. Whereas up 
to the time of Maastricht there was little research into the question of what impact 
Euroscepticism had on European party systems, mostly due to the general pro-
European elite consensus on the issue, there has been an upsurge in the literature 
concerning party-based Euroscepticism in recent years.50 As a response to the rising 
importance of public Euroscepticism, the changing face of Europe and the increasing 
diversity of EU policy areas, Euroscepticism has become a significant feature of most 
European party systems51 despite its largely limited impact on electoral fortunes of 
political parties (Harmsen and Spiering 2004b). Before moving on to a review of the 
main developments in the literature on party-based Euroscepticism, the paper deals 
with the complex nature of the European issue and its contested applicability to 
ideology. 
Not only does European integration represent a vast selection of different policies 
and ideals, it is also highly dynamic. As Hooghe and Marks (2005: 426; also see 
Marks 2004) aptly put it, the EU is a “moving target”, and because the EU itself is 
constantly changing,52 positions and opinions on the EU cannot be static either. The 
element of dynamism has particularly relevance to soft Eurosceptic stances, as hard 
Eurosceptic stances are more commonly linked to opposition to the EU in principle 
and often based on ideological and static concerns (Kopecky and Mudde 2002). 
When examining party family affinity of Eurosceptic parties, it becomes clear that 
Euroscepticism commonly feature across the ideological spectrum (i.e. it is not 
50 See e.g. Harmsen and Spiering (eds., 2004a), Marks and Steenbergen (eds., 2004); Szczerbiak and

Taggart (eds., 2008b, c), Fuchs et al. (eds., 2009) and Leconte (2010).

51 with the exception of Spain (Taggart and Szczerbiak 2002).

52 European integration’s transition from being a mainly market­oriented to a more polity­oriented 
process is of extreme importance to the evolution of Euroscepticism and Eurosceptic stances (see 
Marks 2004). 
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confined to neither the left nor the right), illustrating that the European issue in 
general and Euroscepticism in particular are exceptionally malleable53 (e.g. Taggart 
1997, 1998; Flood 2002a). However, Brinegar et al. (2004) point out that in countries 
with extensive welfare states, the political left is prone to Eurosceptic stances, 
whereas in conservative welfare states, the right is more likely to be Eurosceptic. 
Moreover, it is worth noting the differences in how the issue of Europe presents 
itself in across borders, whether “Europe” is debated in terms of support for or 
opposition to policy, accession negotiations and/or membership. What Europe 
signifies is naturally related to membership status, whether a country is a member 
state, an applicant country or a non-applicant non-member state. Nevertheless, in 
some member states, like the UK and Sweden, the debate on whether or not their 
respective country should be a member of the EU continues (Sørensen 2004; 
Petersson 2004), and according to Church (2003), in non-member Switzerland, the 
debate is not mainly characterized by a uniform hostility towards the EU, but rather 
divisions over and scepticism about EU issues. 
Research shows that real levels of public Euroscepticism are higher than electoral 
support for hard Eurosceptic parties (e.g. Taggart 1998; Taggart and Szczerbiak 
2002). In other words, high levels of public Euroscepticism do not translate into high 
levels of support for Eurosceptic parties, or vice versa. As of yet there is no widely 
accepted indicator of the strength of party-based Euroscepticism and the impact it 
has on European party systems (see Taggart and Szczerbiak 2003). This is 
exemplified by France, which has generally high levels of public support for the EU 
and quite high support for Eurosceptic parties, and the UK, which conversely has 
high levels of public Euroscepticism, but limited success for parties expressing 
Euroscepticism.54 The reason for this discrepancy is simply that to very few voters 
European integration is a vote-defining issue; Europe is widely thought to be a 
second order issue (e.g. Flood 2002b, 2005; Taggart and Szczerbiak 2002). This 
applies to parties as well as voters, as European integration is a low-salience issue to 
53 I.e. it carries considerable potential to fit into virtually any policy platform, regardless of ideology. 
54 At least hard Eurosceptic parties, such as the UK Independence Party. 
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the majority of European parties; in most cases Euroscepticism is only a small 
component of a party’s overall programme. Besides, parties experiencing internal 
dissent or that have adopted an unpopular stance on the European issue (i.e. those 
parties which stand to suffer from emphasizing it) commonly downplay the debate 
on Europe (Steenbergen and Scott 2004). Moreover, the electorate is more likely to 
vote on domestic issues and national concerns, most likely because of the perceived 
remoteness of Brussels and European affairs, but also because electoral campaigns 
and even EU-related referendum campaigns often revolve around domestic issues 
(Franklin et al. 1994). Another reason there can be no automatic relationship between 
mass-level support for Euroscepticism and electoral support for Eurosceptic parties 
is that there is wide variation in where party-based Euroscepticism has been able to 
break through. As national contexts and variations of Euroscepticism differ 
massively, it is not very surprising that the nature and make-up of Eurosceptic 
parties in the different European party systems are highly heterogeneous (Taggart 
1998; Brinegar et al. 2004). This is because electoral, institutional and cultural 
variables facilitate the growth of party-based Euroscepticism in some countries, but 
put constraints on the use of the issue in others.55 Hix (2005) believes that the 
European issue is more likely to be of more political relevance in countries with 
exceptionally large or small welfare states (e.g. in Scandinavia because of socialist 
worries about the welfare state) (also see Brinegar et al. 2004), in countries which are 
net contributors to the EU budget (e.g. in Britain because of protests against the size 
of the country’s budget contributions and in the Netherlands and Germany around 
2004 as the budget-related EU hostility surfaced), in countries with strong foreign 
policy links outside the EU (e.g. in Switzerland because of the left’s concerns about 
neutrality), and/or in countries that are about to join or are new members. The five 
member states (of the EU15) harbouring the strongest Eurosceptic forces in terms of 
votes cast in parliamentary elections are Denmark, the UK, France, Austria and 
Sweden (Taggart and Szczerbiak 2002). Interestingly, this largely corresponds with 
the countries which according to opinion polls harbour the highest aggregate levels 
of Eurosceptic popular attitudes (as stipulated above). 
55 For an account of the French and British case, see Harmsen (2005). 
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Moving on to the discussion of how Euroscepticism manifests itself in European 
party systems, Taggart and Szczerbiak (2000, 2002) argue that mainly protest parties 
adopt hard Eurosceptic stances (with the exception of factions), as they commonly 
use Euroscepticism as a means of distancing themselves from the party mainstream. 
Nevertheless, they find that when these parties move closer to the mainstream, they 
tend to soften their Eurosceptic rhetoric from hard to soft. Mainstream parties, on the 
other hand, are not usual agents of hard Euroscepticism, but may at times engage in 
“soft Eurosceptic rhetoric to maintain or advance their position within their domestic 
party system” (Taggart and Szczerbiak 2000: 8). However, Hix (2005, also see Marks 
2004) believes that this model of Euroscepticism (which holds that Euroscepticism is 
mainly found in protest and peripheral parties) has become redundant; he argues 
that the model now only applies to Ireland, the Netherlands, Portugal, Denmark and 
Austria. He suggests that there are another two models of EU party positions 
complementing the “dissent model”: the “right pro-EU, left anti-EU” model, which 
includes Spain, Greece, Sweden and Finland; and the “left pro-EU, right anti-EU”, 
which he argues applies to Luxembourg, Italy, Belgium, Germany, France and the 
UK.56 
Sitter’s (2001, 2002, 2003) argument that party-based Euroscepticism is the “politics 
of opposition” largely corresponds with the dissent model (Taggart 1998; Taggart 
and Szczerbiak 2000, 2002), as both essentially expect Euroscepticism to be adopted 
by peripheral parties as a means of opposing the party mainstream. Sitter argues that 
because Euroscepticism is mainly adopted by parties in opposition, party positions 
are heavily reliant on strategy and dynamics of inter-party competition as well as 
ideology. In addition, he believes that the way in which parties use Euroscepticism 
depends on their position in their respective party system, in other words, whether 
they are competing along the mainstream dimension, the territorial dimension or the 
flank dimension of their system. Kopecky and Mudde (2002), on the other hand, 
maintain that ideology is the key variable explaining party-based Euroscepticism 
56 For an overview of different models of political conflict over the European issue, see Steenbergen 
and Marks (2004). 
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and that strategy only influences EU policy-specific opposition (i.e. soft 
Euroscepticism).57 Moreover, Conti (2003) combines three of the main causal theories 
of party-based Euroscepticism, contending that party-based Euroscepticism is 
shaped by a combination of ideology, party centrality (in the party system), and 
government participation aspirations. However, Crum (2007) and Kriesi (2007) are in 
agreement with Kopecky and Mudde’s contention that parties emphasize ideological 
preferences more than strategic concerns when forming their stances on the 
European issue. Taggart and Szczerbiak (2003) argue that because of the malleability 
of both party ideologies and the issue of Europe, it is impossible to determine a 
party’s stance on the EU purely from its ideological orientation. They also refute 
Sitter’s contention that strategy is the main determinant for party-based 
Euroscepticism; they believe that strategy and tactics are merely related to the party 
emphasis on a Eurosceptic stance. Szczerbiak and Taggart (2008a: 256) thus argue 
that the main predictors for Eurosceptic positions are ideology and the perceived 
interests of the party’s voters, but that they are also influenced by the party’s 
government participation aspirations and its emphasis on ideological concerns. 
However, Hooghe et al. (2004) disagree with Szczerbiak and Taggart’s view that 
ideology is not a sufficient predictor of a party’s stance on Europe. They believe that 
a party’s stance on the European issue can indeed be predicted if knowing its 
position on two scales: the left/right ideological continuum (according to the party’s 
desire for more or less regulation) and a new politics GAL/TAN scale (ranging from 
Green, Alternative and Liberalitarian to Traditional, Authoritative and Nationalist). 
They believe that the latter dimension “powerfully structures variations on issues 
arising from European integration” (p 140) as they find it has stronger correlation to 
party stances on “Europe” than the left/right dimension. It is worth noting, however, 
that their results also correspond with the “dissent model”, as Eurosceptic parties are 
mainly found on the hard left and right (i.e. the extremes). In a later study, Marks et 
al. (2006) confirm this thesis of causality and apply it to the CEE member states. 
However, they find that although the structure of party-based Euroscepticism is the 
Kopecky and Mudde’s “specific support” dimension can arguably be translated into soft 
Euroscepticism, as it is largely based on policy support or opposition. 
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same (according to the GAL/TAN model), in CEE, all the Eurosceptic parties are 
concentrated on the hard left (i.e. they show both high GAL and high TAN scores).58 
In sum, the existing research on party-based Euroscepticism shows that there is a 
clear majority of peripheral parties adopting Eurosceptic stances and that 
Euroscepticism rarely appears in mainstream parties (Taggart 1998; Sitter 2003). In 
other words, most European mainstream parties are pro-European (Mair 2000; Ray 
2004b; Marks 2004). The two main reasons for this are that Euroscepticism is 
considered to be incompatible with the common catch-all strategies of mainstream 
parties (Sitter 2001, 2002) and that Euroscepticism is widely thought to be conflicting 
with government office, considering the vital role of governments in participating in 
and shaping the EU. However, if Euroscepticism does appear in the party 
mainstream, it is mainly in the form of factions or the engagement of soft Eurosceptic 
rhetoric (the latter mainly employed in the pursuit of electoral advantage) (Taggart 
and Szczerbiak 2000; Sitter 2002). There is not a consensus in the literature regarding 
Euroscepticism causality on the party level either, but the main theories are that it is 
caused or influenced by one or several of the following factors: ideology (in terms of 
left/right and new politics), strategy/tactics, competition/opposition politics and 
office-seeking, polity and electoral system and party system centrality (whether in 
the core/mainstream or on the periphery of the party system). 
2.6 Conclusion 
In this chapter, five core issues from the existing literature on Euroscepticism were 
reviewed: definition, motivation, historical development, the theories of public 
Euroscepticism causality and the manifestation of Euroscepticism in European party 
systems. The objectives of the chapter were to review the state of affairs in the 
literature on the conceptualization of Euroscepticism; get an impression of what 
arguments dominate the Eurosceptic discourse across Europe; assess the historical 
development of Euroscepticism; and review the theories and models of public and 
58 Also see Hooghe (2007) for her support for this argument. 
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party-based Euroscepticism in order to contextualize the research on Norway and 
find a model which can assist in the research design of the thesis. 
In the first section, the chapter argued that because Euroscepticism is so diverse and 
different stances do not necessarily fit into specific categories of Euroscepticism, the 
hard/soft distinction, where different stances can be located along a continuum, is 
preferred over other, more intricate typologies when analysing Euroscepticism. This 
does of course not mean that other typologies, such as the 
rejectionist/reformist/revisionist categorization are redundant; arguably, Flood (2002a) 
and Taggart and Szczerbiak’s (2001) typologies are analytical tools that complement 
each other. However, in the case of Norway, where Euroscepticism is, almost 
without exceptions, cast as opposition to EU membership, it makes most sense 
differentiating between harder and softer types of EU-rejectionism. 
The second section reviewed the most common criticisms levelled at the EU across 
Europe, and the third section provided a summary of the main developments of 
Euroscepticism across the last five decades. These two sections provided a basic 
foundation for comparing Norway with other European countries so that it will be 
possible to make some inferences about Norwegian Euroscepticism’s uniqueness, i.e. 
the extent to which the discourse and phases of Norwegian Euroscepticism follow 
the same patterns as those found in other European states. 
Moreover, the chapter showed that the postmaterialist, economic interest and the 
identity theses are among the most influential theories explaining the rise of public 
Euroscepticism. Other prominent theories of public Euroscepticism, party cueing 
theory and proxies, were also discussed, but it was argued that this approach takes a 
rather simplistic view of political opinion formation, as the causal relationship 
between elites and public opinion remains unclear (Milner 2000; Ray 2003b; 
Inglehart 1977). 
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In the final section which reviewed the literature on party-based Euroscepticism, the 
chapter demonstrated that to be able to understand the rise of Euroscepticism in 
European party systems, a range of factors require consideration. These are related 
to ideology (left/right and new politics), strategy, party system position (mainstream 
versus periphery), institutional factors, inter-party competition and oppositional 
politics. The main model of Eurosceptic party positions posits that the European 
mainstream is largely pro-European and that party-based Euroscepticism is mainly 
found in the protest dimension or the periphery of European party systems. 
However, the Norwegian party system does not fit into this model, as in Norway, 
party-based Euroscepticism is found across the party system and the party bordering 
on the far-right, the PP, has not embraced a Eurosceptic stance. A review of the 
literature on Norway follows in the next chapter. 
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Chapter 3

A Review of the Norwegian Euroscepticism Literature: 
Definition, Causality and Manifestation 
As mentioned previously, Norway is rarely included in the EB-based comparative 
research on public Euroscepticism. Nevertheless, there is a substantial separate body 
of literature on Norwegian opposition to European integration. This part of the 
literature review looks at how Norwegian Euroscepticism has been explained by 
existing research in order to identify potential gaps in the treatment of the subject to 
date and contextualize the research of the thesis. Firstly, it looks at how Norwegian 
Euroscepticism is defined in the literature. Secondly, it reviews the explanations of 
Norwegian EU opposition, the majority of which focuses on geographical, historical, 
political and cultural (values and/or identity) factors. Finally, it explores the 
literature on party-based Euroscepticism to shed light on how Euroscepticism 
manifests itself in the Norwegian party system. 
3.1 Defining Norwegian Euroscepticism 
Within the body of literature on Norwegian opposition to European integration, the 
use of the term Euroscepticism is not very widespread. Extremely few observers use 
the term to denote negative attitudes towards European integration (or EU 
membership); in both the English and Norwegian language literature there is a 
propensity to use alternative terms and prefixes such as “anti-EU”, “opposition” or 
simply “no” to describe Eurosceptic sentiments (e.g. Saglie 2000a; Sciarini and 
Listhaug 1997; Valen 1994). Only in the party-based Euroscepticism literature is the 
utilization of the term prevalent (Eliassen and Sitter 2004; Sitter 2004, 2005a), where 
it conforms to the definition established by Taggart (1998: 366). Archer (2000) and 
Hille (2007) are two of the few observers who consistently apply the label 
Euroscepticism to the Norwegian case. 
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The relative absence of the term Euroscepticism in the Norwegian language 
scholarly literature is not very surprising, as even in the popular media, the usage of 
the corresponding Norwegian terms “EU-skepsis” (EU-scepticism) and 
“euroskepsis” (Euroscepticism) is still very limited.59 Nevertheless, in some of the 
early Norwegian literature the word “scepticism” frequently appears; for example, 
both Eriksen (1977) and Pharo (1988) use the term to describe the Norwegian elite’s 
attitudes towards European integration up to the 1960s, as does Tamnes (1997) about 
the 1990s. 
A point worth noting when considering the definition of Norwegian Euroscepticism 
is that the public debate on European integration in Norway has revolved around 
the question of membership. Hagen and Sverdrup (2003) argue that “Norwegian EU 
debates have revolved around Norway [and] what is good or bad for the democratic 
national state, business or individuals” (p. 19),60 and that there has been little focus 
on the Norwegian public’s attitudes towards the integration process itself. Their 
analysis of a 2003 opinion poll probing EU attitudes suggests that Norwegian 
popular attitudes towards the EU have become increasingly nuanced. They argue 
that positions on the EU can be divided into the following four stances: 1) Norway 
should join the EU; 2) Norway should not join the EU; 3) European integration is good for 
Europe, but not for Norway; and 4) the EU is more relevant to Norway now than before. 
Hagen and Sverdrup’s findings indicate that Norwegians are generally positive to 
the development of the EU, especially in the areas of justice and immigration policy, 
eastward enlargement and a common foreign policy, but that the scepticism prevails 
when there is mention of a European constitution or developments in the direction 
of a federation. Thus, it seems that Pharo’s (1988) characterization of Norwegian EC-
scepticism still applies, that one of the cornerstones of the phenomenon is a strong 
aversion to surrendering “parts of Norwegian sovereignty through mutually 
binding agreements” (p. 54). In other words, although generally positive to 
59 When the term is used in the Norwegian press and online, “EU­skepsis” and “Euroskepsis” are used 
interchangeably, but the term “euroskepsis” is also used to denote reservations about the single 
currency. 
60 All Norwegian language sources quoted in the thesis are translated by the author, and any errors and 
misinterpretations of the contents of these are the sole responsibility of the author. 
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international cooperation in for example human rights, the United Nations (UN), 
disarmament and European integration, the Norwegians back away from the 
question of EU membership or what is perceived as concrete, binding agreements 
(Hagen and Sverdrup 2003). The next section considers the explanations most 
commonly used to account for the Norwegian unwillingness to commit fully to 
European integration. 
3.2 Theories of Causality 
Some observers of Norwegian EU opinion have in recent years borrowed theoretical 
frameworks from the Eurobarometer-based literature (e.g. Munkejord 2006; 
Grünfeld and Sverdrup 2005), but no single publication has offered a systematic 
discussion of the aptitude of various models of public Euroscepticism to explain 
variation in support for EU membership in Norway. The body of literature 
attempting to explain Norwegian Euroscepticism focuses on different explanations 
from the literature on EU support in member states. This section of the paper 
outlines and discusses the theories that have been put forward to explain Norwegian 
Euroscepticism, namely the innovation thesis, the economic interest thesis, the 
geography/Atlanticism thesis, the geo-historical thesis, the rural identity thesis, the 
exceptionalism thesis and finally the political effect thesis (cueing and partisanship). 
3.2.1 The Innovation Theory 
The application of the innovation theory to the case of Norwegian Euroscepticism 
was prominent in the 1970s. The theory holds that new ideas will first be accepted in 
the centre of a society and with time spread to the peripheries. Here, “centre” refers 
to either where the power lies/decisions are made or high social status (Hellevik and 
Gleditsch 1973). 61 Gleditsch (1972) refutes the innovation theory because of the 
stability of the negative opinion among people with low social position between 
61 Hellevik et al. (1975) utilize Johan Galtung’s Social Position index, where respondents are given a 
rank according to their score on eight different variables: geographical position (centre vs. periphery), 
ecological position (urban vs. rural), income (high vs. low), sector of occupation (secondary and 
tertiary vs. primary), occupational position (high vs. low), gender, age (middle aged vs. young and old) 
and education (higher education vs. no higher education). 
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1961 and 1972. Although Hellevik and Gleditsch’s 1973 data supports the innovation 
theory, in a later publication, the same authors dismiss the innovation theory as they 
argue that the Norwegian peripheries’ “no” was not a result of ignorance, but a 
conflict of interests and values (Hellevik et al. 1975). 
3.2.2 The Economic Interest Thesis 
The economic argument has frequently been used to explain Norway’s reluctance to 
participate in European integration as an EU member (e.g. Ingebritsen 1998, cited by 
Neumann 2002: 89; Ingebritsen 1997; Matlary 2000; Wallis et al. 2002). The theory 
holds that the healthy state of the Norwegian economy and the country’s economic 
independence, which is by and large due to the wealth accumulated through the 
petroleum sector, are important reasons why the majority of Norwegians do not 
deem EU membership necessary (e.g. Ingebritsen 1997; Matlary 2000; Gstöhl 1996). 
Furthermore, it assumes that economic interest related to the primary sector, in other 
words protection of the agricultural and fisheries sectors, is another important 
reason for Norwegian opposition to EU membership (e.g. Ingebritsen 1998, cited by 
Neumann 2002: 89; Hille 2007). However, Neumann (2002) emphatically refutes this 
argument. He points out that in 1972, when the Norwegian oil wealth had yet to 
show its extent, the oil argument was not a significant feature of the debate on EC 
membership. Furthermore, Neumann argues that the strong Norwegian desire to 
protect the primary sector can hardly be put down to economic interest. The sector 
was small in size in 1972, when it employed only 12 percent of the workforce, and 
was even more economically insignificant in 1994, when it accounted for only 6 
percent of total employment62 (Pettersen et al. 1996: 262). Egeberg (2003) also believes 
that the economic argument should not be over-emphasized because of the 
remarkable stability of the voting pattern and its clear centre-periphery dimension. 
As the extent of Norwegian oil fortunes was not yet discovered in 1972 and the 1994 
referendum was a near duplication of 1972, he believes that there is more to the vote 
than economic considerations. Additionally, as economic interest is a considerable 
more prominent feature of the pro-EU side’s argumentation than of the anti-EU 
62 The figure is from 1990. 
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side’s (Aardal 1983), it has been suggested that in Norway, economic considerations 
rather explain Norwegian EU-enthusiasm than Euroscepticism (Sciarini and 
Listhaug 1997). These contestations notwithstanding, one cannot deem the economic 
thesis completely irrelevant, as the debates on EU membership have traditionally 
centred on what is best for the country, and economic concerns arguably form a very 
central part of domestic interest considerations. Economic arguments have often 
been the main feature of the “yes” campaigns in most countries’ debates on the issue, 
as EU membership has been regarded as an economic necessity by many states 
(Lawler 1997). In Norway, however, it has been argued that the country’s fortunate 
economic position has allowed the Norwegian debate to centre on cultural and 
political issues rather than economic ones (Sciarini and Listhaug 1997). In effect, it 
could be argued that Norway’s beneficial economic position is not the direct reason 
for the persistence of Norwegian Euroscepticism, but that it has, in Lawler ‘s (1997: 
587) words, “effectively crippled the pro-EU case”. Or as Gstöhl (1996: 4) aptly puts 
it: “Being rich is not the reason for [Norway’s] reluctance but it allows [her] to 
cherish national peculiarities much longer.” Thus, the question is whether the public 
would be more receptive to economic interest-based arguments in the event of 
economic recession, or whether these “peculiarities” would still prevail as the 
Norwegian electorate’s primary concerns in a future debate (Lawler 1997; Gstöhl 
1996; Ingebritson and Larson 1997). 
Some research has been conducted on the relationship between Norwegian attitudes 
towards the EU and fluctuations in the national economy. In a study of opinion polls 
from 1989-2004, Grünfeld and Sverdrup (2005) test the national economy thesis on 
public attitudes towards EU membership, i.e. the impact fluctuations in 
unemployment, GDP growth, inflation, interest rates, trade and oil prices have on 
EU attitudes. Their analysis suggests that support for EU membership declines when 
the economy is performing well63 and that unemployment (positively related to 
63 The “national economy” thesis holds that for an EU member state, support for the EU will increase 
when the economy is doing well and decline when it is underperforming. However, in a non­EU 
member state, like Norway, the opposite effect is expected because of the notion that change (EU 
membership) is undesirable when the status quo (non­membership) is working well. 
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support) and GDP growth (negatively related) are particularly strong predictors of 
EU membership support in Norway. 
There is a general lack of empirical studies applying the economic voting model to 
the Norwegian case in the literature, and those observers who have conducted 
studies in this area (e.g. Jenssen et al. 2004; Moses and Jenssen 1998) base their 
research on the 1994 referendum study and conclude that economic voting is of little 
relevance to the Norwegian case, particularly egocentric economic voting. 
Conversely, Bjørklund (1997a: 147) suggests that in some instances economic interest 
might be an important factor of Norwegian EU opposition, as the 1994 no votes were 
mainly drawn from the farmers/fishermen group (94 percent voted “no”) and the 
public sector (53 percent).64 Furthermore, the only two municipalities that voted 
“yes” in the “no” region of the west were Årdal and Sunndal, export-based industry 
communities which were thought to benefit economically from EU membership 
through the free market. Other commentators (Pettersen et al. 1996; Sciarini and 
Listhaug 1997; Jenssen et al. 1995) also report results that correspond to Gabel’s 
(1998a) utilitarian thesis: young and female voters as well as primary65 and public 
sector employees and people with low levels of education are more likely to be 
against membership. While these findings all support Gabel’s (1998a) 
utilitarian/economic interest thesis, social class, on the other hand, does not seem to 
have had any bearing on the vote in 1994 (Sciarini and Listhaug 1997). However, in 
1972 there was a relatively clear relationship between the traditional working class 
and the “no” vote (Jenssen et al. 1995). 
3.2.3 The Geography/Atlanticism Thesis 
Norway’s geographical position on the periphery of the continent is another feature 
of the country which has been cited as an explanation for the nation’s reluctance to 
commit herself to European integration through full membership (e.g. Bjørklund 
64 According to the economic interest thesis, these groups are thought to be the economic losers of 
European integration, due to loss of subsidies (in the case of the former) and job security. 
65 Primary sector occupation in Gabel’s model is positively correlated to a ‘yes’ vote, but in Norway, 
where farmers and fishermen are expected to lose out from European integration, the hypothesized 
relationship is negative. 
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1997a, b; Matlary 2000). This argument acquires more credibility when the country’s 
geography is coupled with its traditional international political orientation. Not only 
is Norway positioned away from the European continent on the northernmost 
periphery, she also has an exceptionally long coast line, which faces west towards 
the UK and the United States (US). These geographical features are by and large the 
reasons for her traditionally strong Atlanticist orientation in both trade and security 
(Bjørklund 1997b). Several observers provide this Atlanticist orientation as the 
background to a Norwegian scepticism towards the EU specifically as well as the 
European continent in general (Pharo 1986, 1988; Ørvik 1972a; Archer 2000; Svåsand 
and Lindström 1996; Matlary 2000; Rieker 2006a). Most studies of elite attitudes 
towards European integration in the first decades after the war focused on this issue: 
the Norwegians were “uneasy” about European integration because of the 
incompatibility of the living standards, social security levels and economic policy in 
Norway and on the continent (Ørvik 1972a; Pharo 1986). In 1972, Ørvik (1972a: 12) 
stated that “there is an ingrained element of insularity in the Norwegian attitude to 
the European Continent, [Europe] meaning something remote and different”. 
According to Hille (2007: 67), the slogan “A long way to Oslo, but even further to 
Brussels”,66 which was used by the “no” side in 1994, signifies two conceptions of 
distance: geographical distance as well as the distance between just and democratic 
Norway and the distant and bureaucratic EU institutions. The 1994 slogans 
“Environmental Protection or Union”, “Solidarity or Union” and “Participatory 
Democracy or Union” (Jenssen 1995b: 18) also illustrate the “no” camp’s conception 
of the differences between Norwegian and European values and their 
incompatibility. 
This lack of identification with the European continent is illustrated by data from the 
1990 European Values Survey. In the survey, only six percent of Norwegians 
reported geographical identification with Europe (as opposed to 25 percent of the 
French and 12 percent of Swedes), and when asked about their attachment to other 
nations, their preferences clearly pointed to their two Scandinavian neighbours and 
66 In Norwegian: “Langt til Oslo, men lenger til Brussel”. 
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subsequently across the Atlantic, and not towards the continent. 50 percent of 
Norwegian respondents listed the Swedes as their first choice; 25 percent listed the 
Danes, and the only two nationalities which scored more than 2 percent were the 
Americans and the British, with 9 and 6 percent respectively (Huseby and Listhaug 
1995: 143, 148). Huseby and Listhaug (1995: 148) argue that “these geo-attachments 
may also play a role in feeding Norwegian Euroscepticism, as the dominant and 
driving powers of the European Union are not those of the peoples that we feel 
easily and strongly attached to.” 
3.2.4 The Geo-Historical Thesis 
Norway’s territorial peculiarities have also been frequently used to account for 
Norway’s reluctance to join the EU (Matlary 2000; Wallis et al. 2002). Especially 
through empirical testing of Rokkan’s (1967) cleavage model, the relevance of the 
country’s dispersed settlement pattern and the periphery’s strong political tradition 
to the voting pattern in the Norwegian referenda has been established (e.g. Valen 
1973; Bjørklund 1997a, b; Jenssen et al. 1995). Rokkan and Valen (1964) identified five 
traditional conflict dimensions in the Norwegian political system: the territorial, 
socio-cultural, religious, commodity market and labour market cleavages. However, 
the cleavages are perhaps more appropriately divided into six conflict dimensions 
(Rokkan 1967; Valen 1976; Jenssen et al. 1995). These are presented in Table 3.1 
below. 
The three socio-cultural movements, also called the “countercultures”, have 
traditionally drawn strong support from the South-Western periphery. Thus, the five 
first cleavages in Table 3.1 either have a centre/periphery or an urban/rural territorial 
dimension. 
Although the historical cleavages had become largely irrelevant to voting patterns in 
Norwegian politics by the 1960s, Rokkan and Valen (1964: 171) suggest that all the 
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traditional cleavages were reactivated in August 1961 when the decision whether or 
not to apply for EC membership had to be made:67 
“The Southerners and Westerners again stood out as the defenders of the 
cultural autonomy of the provinces against the encroachments of the centre: 
this time the enemy was not just in Oslo, but, what made it much worse, in 
the distant bureaucratic centres on the European continent.” 
Table 3.1 Norway’s six traditional political cleavages 
Cleavage Definition 
1 Territorial: 
Centre vs. Periphery 
Territorial-
cultural 
Between Oslo/the Eastern Centre and the two 
peripheries (the South-West and the North) over 
national independence and representative 
democracy 
2 Socio-cultural: 
Linguistic policy 
Territorial-
cultural 
Between the defenders of the Danish-influenced 
established standard riksmål (the educated, 
Europeanized officials) in the cities and the 
promoters of the rural language nynorsk (the 
increasingly status-conscious and nation-oriented 
peasants) in the rural districts 
3 Socio-cultural: 
Teetotalism 
Territorial-
cultural 
Conflict between the liberal alcohol policy 
promoted by central Norway and the prohibition 
movement in the periphery 
4 Socio-cultural: 
Religious 
Territorial-
cultural 
Between the secularism and tolerant liberalism of 
the established urban population and the 
orthodox and fundamentalist Lutheranism of 
large parts of the rural and recently urbanized 
population 
5 Commodity market: 
Urban vs. Rural 
Functional-
economic 
Between the producers and consumers of 
agricultural products over prices. 
interest 
6 Labour market: Left 
vs. Right 
Functional-
economic 
Between employers and wage-earners/ salaried 
employees 
Source: Adapted from Rokkan and Valen (1964: 166) and Valen (1976: 50). 
The salience of all of the six traditional political cleavages in both the referenda has 
been widely established (Valen 1973; Jenssen et al. 1995; Bjørklund 1997a, 1997b; 
Pettersen et al. 1996; Sciarini and Listhaug 1997). Both in 1972 and 1994, affiliation 
67 It was the 1962­1963 debate on EC membership which inspired Stein Rokkan’s original contribution 
to the model (Jenssen et al. 1995). 
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with the countercultures was positively correlated to a “no” vote and research 
indicate that the countercultures were even more important to the referendum vote 
in 1994 than in 1972 (Jenssen et al. 1995: 159). 
The reasons why there are such stark contrasts between the preferences of the 
peripheral and central populations are mainly historical, as the inhabitants of the 
peripheries have traditionally been the defenders of Norwegian democracy, culture 
and values against forces of centralization, urbanization and Europeanization. In 
other words, they have been extremely central to the country’s political and social 
development. The Norwegian society’s agrarian heritage, Norwegian farmers’ 
history of independence68 and collective experience of economic asperity in the 
nineteenth century are important aspects of the background to the historical struggle 
against the centralizing urban forces (Rokkan and Valen 1964; Rokkan 1967; 
Ingebritsen 2006). Additionally, the exceptionally strong mobilization of the 
periphery is firmly rooted in the three counter-cultures, the lay, prohibition and 
rural language movements, as well as the egalitarian structure of the Norwegian 
society, embodied by Norwegian regional policy, the welfare state and a preference 
for folkestyre (local participatory democracy) (Bjørklund 1997a, b; Gstöhl 1996). On 
the party political level, it was the LP and its descendants, the CP (previously 
Bondepartiet, the Farmers’ Party) and the CDP who represented these interests. 
Additionally, the periphery was the driving force in the battle for parliamentarism in 
the 1880s as well as in the independence movement in 1905, when Norway cut loose 
from the 90 year-long union with Sweden (Bjørklund 1997a). Its main objective then, 
like in 1972 and 1994, was to defend its ideal of folkestyre. Neumann (2009: 421) 
emphasizes the importance of this part of history to why Norway is not a member of 
the EU, as he argues that 
“the main point is that the later representations of 1905, without exceptions, 
emphasized that the dissolution of the union came […] as a result of the 
people’s battle for independence [original italics], expressed through a part of 
68 During the serfdom period, Norwegian farmers were comparatively more independent and retained 
greater control over their land than elsewhere in Europe (Ingebritsen, 2006: 23). 
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the state – the Storting. As a result of the nationalists’ initiative and the 
leading role they had played in the battle for independence […] a central 
connection between the concepts people, democracy and independence 
[author’s italics] was established”. 
Neumann’s key argument is that because of their “conceptual power” (begrepsmakt), 
these concepts (people, democracy and independence) are at the roots of Norwegian 
EU opposition. Norway’s history of union (or foreign rule) and status as a young 
independent nation is commonly brought to the fore when scholars try to account 
for its population’s reluctance to join the European Union (e.g. Ingebritsen 1997; 
Matlary 2000; Gstöhl 1996, 2002a, b; Bjørklund 1997a and 1997b; Lie 1972). The 
historical element is also linked to the periphery’s strong political tradition. As 
Gstöhl (1996: 17) argues, the 
“psychological heritage of 500 years of governance of foreign powers [has 
made] the victories over those hegemons69 […] important elements in 
Norwegian nation-building. They make it rather unattractive to the 
Norwegians to restrict their hard-won sovereignty by joining a 
supranational union.” 
The importance of the sovereignty and democracy element in the formation of 
attitudes on EU membership is further illustrated by the prevalence of the political 
culture-driven arguments of the “no” campaigners and voters in the referendum 
(Bakke and Sitter 2004; Hille 2007; Kvalvåg 2008; Sciarini and Listhaug 1997: 429). 
The remarkable stability of the Norwegian electorate’s Euroscepticism, as illustrated 
by the nearly identical 1972 and 1994 referenda’s regional vote pattern (see Figure 8.6 
in Chapter Eight), is another reason why the territorial cleavages cannot be ignored 
in any study of Norwegian Euroscepticism. 
69 Gstöhl refers to the year 1814, when Norway broke away from Denmark, 1905, when the union with 
Sweden was dissolved, and 1945, which marked the end of the German WWII occupation. 
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3.2.5 The Rural Identity Theory 
The fifth theory attempting to explain Norwegian Euroscepticism, namely the rural 
identity theory, overlaps with the latter two explanations discussed above, as all 
three hold that Norwegian culture and values are important to Norwegian 
Euroscepticism. The rural identity theory, which embraces the notion that 
Norwegian identification with the countryside and peasants’ culture is at the core of 
Norwegian Euroscepticism and the two “no” votes (Gstöhl 1996; Ingebritsen 1997; 
Neumann 2002; Hille 2007), has captured a fundamental element of the Norwegian 
identity, one which is irreconcilable with EU membership because of the inevitable 
damage it would cause to Norwegian agriculture.70 This theory claims to explain the 
reason why the agricultural and fisheries sectors were able to rally so many voters to 
their cause, despite their limited size and scope. Employing discourse analysis, 
Neumann (2001, 2002) argues that that the concept of “Norway” as embodied by the 
territory and the people and how these two interlink are extremely central to 
understanding Norwegian Euroscepticism. He believes that the whole idea of 
Norway relies upon population of the whole territory of Norway. Put differently, 
without its rural population, Norway can no longer be Norway. Neumann (2002: 
115) states that 
“[…] agriculture and fisheries are about much more than simply money. 
Inasmuch as they uphold current demographics, they are institutional 
mechanisms which sustain a certain representation of Norway. This 
representation is endangered by EC membership, which must therefore be 
fought tooth and nail. This explains how two parts of the economy which in 
terms of productivity were rather peripheral to an already heavily 
industrialized country could become so central to the debate about the EC.” 
Gstöhl (1996) agrees that as the EU and the application of the CAP would result in a 
mass exodus from the peripheral regions, EU membership would be detrimental to 
70 Contending with a short growing season and extreme weather conditions, Norwegian farmers are 
among the most subsidized in the world (Bjørklund 1997a). EU membership would entail large cuts in 
subsidies for farmers and the demise of the agricultural sector in Norway. 
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“the important role of peasant culture” in the Norwegian identity, as well as the 
country’s security and food supplies. Hille (2007: 67) also contends that the centre-
periphery dimension has more to do with “the background of a national romantic 
idealization of the peasants and the countryside”, ingrained in the Norwegian 
identity and values, and less to do with Norwegian political and economic rural 
interests. In this context it is worth noting that in Norway, territorial identities are 
not tied to specific regions, but rather to the idea of a peripheral location (Aarebrot 
1982: 103, 107). 
3.2.6 The Exceptionalism Thesis 
The exceptionalism thesis is also value- and identity- based. The thesis holds that at 
the very core of Scandinavian exceptionalism lies the ideal of social democracy and 
“the commitment of citizens to taking care of everyone in the society” (Ingebritsen 
2006: 23), and that this ideal is inseparably intertwined with the national identity. 
This exceptionalism implies that there is a dominant Scandinavian perception that 
social democracy and its institutions upholding the values of solidarity (in both 
domestic and foreign policy), egalitarianism and environmentalism constitute a form 
of society superior to that of the continent (Lawler 1997; Ingebritsen 1997; Pharo 
1988; Archer 2000). European integration is thus seen as a threat to the Norwegian 
way of life as “it would accelerate the erosion of a superior form of society” (Lawler 
1997: 566, also see Ingebritsen and Larson 1997). Moreover, EU membership also 
signifies a threat to Norwegian internationalism, such as her tradition of foreign aid 
and international peace-keeping role. In other words, it is feared that if joining the 
Union, Norway’s role as a “global advocate for human rights, solidarity, peace, the 
environment and equality” would be undermined (Ingebritsen 2006: 21; also see 
Lawler 1997: 580). The idea of a Nordic feeling of superiority is also echoed by 
Wæver (1992: 84), as he states that Nordic exceptionalism (or “nostalgia”) implies 
“being part of Europe, but being a little better off than the rest. In what respects? In 
being more peaceful than Europe and in having more social and global solidarity”. 
The notion of a collective Scandinavian identity is backed up by evidence that the 
Scandinavian identities are primarily attached to each other and that they lack 
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identification with the rest of Europe. Drawing on data from the 1990 values survey, 
Huseby and Listhaug (1995: 148-9) report that 74 percent of Norwegians list their 
Scandinavian counterparts as the people they feel most strongly attached to, 
compared to 59 percent of Swedes and 60 percent of Danes. Norway was also the 
country in the survey which showed the least support for the idea that national 
identities and European integration can coexist. Norway’s reported weak 
identification with Europe is arguably also a central part of this thesis, as it illustrates 
the importance of value differences between the Norwegian exceptionalist state and 
an EU which “runs counter to the traditions and policies of Nordic social 
democracy” (Ingebritsen 1997: 253). In effect, “Scandinavian Euroscepticism could be 
viewed as a familiar mix of collective nostalgia and nationalism” (Lawler 1997: 566). 
3.2.7 The Cueing Thesis 
Finally, the widely acknowledged success of the “no” movement in both referenda 
(Archer 2000 and 2005; Ingebritsen and Larson 1997; Bjørklund 1997a, b; Gsthöl 1996; 
Jenssen and Listhaug 2001; Neumann 2001, 2002) suggests that the political cueing 
thesis could be relevant to the study of Eurosceptic opinion formation. According to 
a survey conducted after the 1994 referendum, 28 percent of respondents stated that 
the ad hoc organization NtEU had had an impact on their vote (Bjørklund 1997b: 217). 
Neumann (2002) believes that the “no” movement was very central in forming 
Eurosceptic opinion at the time of the Norwegian referenda, stating that it captured 
“the heart of the nation”. He asserts that through utilizing identity politics and a 
national discourse (employing the terms “state”, “nation”, “people” and “Europe”, 
terms which carry historical connotations), the “no” camp and primary sectors were 
able to mobilize sympathizers to their cause (p 90). 
Jenssen and Listhaug (2001) argue that the Norwegian political parties were 
important cue-givers in the Norwegian 1994 referendum and that voters are more 
likely to change position on policy issues according to party cues in referenda than 
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in elections.71 Furthermore, Sciarini and Listhaug (1997) and Pettersen et al. (1996: 
270) found, in their studies of the 1994 Referendum Study, that partisanship was a 
strong predictor of the “no” vote, as the vote for “no” parties in the 1985, 1989 and 
1993 elections carried a correlation of 0.51, 0.57 and 0.86 respectively to the “no” vote 
in the referendum.72 Conversely, in his study of the 1994 referendum data set, Saglie 
(2000b: 243) argues that “a simple cue-taking model, whereby citizens adopt EU 
attitudes that reflect the positions of their preferred parties, is not appropriate in the 
case of the Norwegian referendums”. 
3.3 The European Issue and the Norwegian Political 
System 
The relationship between the Norwegian political parties and the EU is naturally 
different to that of parties in EU member states, as Norwegian parties do not 
participate in European politics to the same extent as their EU counterparts. For 
example, the Norwegian government is not represented in the European Council or 
the Council of Ministers, and the country’s political parties do not compete in 
European elections.73 Nevertheless, the extremely strong politicization of the EU 
issue in Norway in the early 1990s (Valen 1994; Saglie 1998) and the massive impact 
it has had on party politics, in particular with regard to coalition formation, has 
attracted much attention to this area of study. 
It is quite clear that the EU issue has had a significant impact on Norwegian politics. 
First, this is demonstrated by the division it caused in the party system as early as in 
1961, both on the inter-party and intra-party levels. The Labour splinter group and 
71 The authors argue that parties are, contrary to widespread belief, active in the politics of referenda, 
as they influence the institutional elements of the referendum through deciding the timing of the 
referenda; they provide leadership and activists to the ad hoc organizations and allocate financial 
resources for the campaigns; they take clear stances on the issue and become cue­givers; and finally, 
they implement the referenda results. 
72 Although it is important to note that very many of the 40 percent of the voters in the 1993 election 
who either changed their party preference or participation/abstention status in the 1993 election, did so 
due to the European issue (Aardal and Valen 1995). 
73 However, the Norwegian parties are part of the pan­European family groupings. For example, the 
Labour Party is a member of the Party of European Socialists and Miljøpartiet de grønne is a member 
of the European Greens. 
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other left-oriented anti-EC politicians who went to form the SPP and SEL in the 
1960s and 1970s as a response to the EC issue exemplify this impact perfectly (Bergh 
and Pharo 1977). Secondly, in the early 1970s, the non-socialist government (1971) as 
well as the LP split over the issue. In addition, the 1972 election saw the LP’s vote 
plummet from 46.5 to 35.3 percent (Aylott 2002: 443), and the 1972 referendum 
forced the Labour government to step down as a result of having stipulated a vote of 
confidence. Moreover, both the 1973 and 1993 general election results show that the 
issue has contributed to the loosening of party ties and increase in electoral volatility. 
Valen (1998) argues that the EU issue continued to dominate Norwegian politics 
long after the 1994 referendum, and that in the 1997 election, large parts of the 
electorate were still alienated by the long referendum campaign. Grünfeld and 
Sverdrup (2005: 39) contend that “The EU issue is today one of the most important 
political conflict issues in Norway, and constitutes one of the clearest cleavages in 
Norwegian politics”. Furthermore, the EU issue has complicated coalition formation 
in Norway since the early 1990s; it has diffused government alternatives and in 
periods suspended the traditional Norwegian two-bloc system (Valen 1998). The 
intra-governmental disagreement over the issue which caused the Syse government 
to collapse in 1990 is a case in point. Commenting on the coalition dilemma, Sitter 
(2004) describes coalitions on both the socialist and non-socialist sides as “hostages” 
to the EU issue. One could also hypothesize that the EU issue has indirectly 
facilitated changes in some parties’ alliance-orientation, as the case of the CP 
illustrates. The party terminated its history of coalition cooperation with the 
Conservative Party in 1990 and is currently participating in a red-green coalition 
with fellow hard Eurosceptic party, the SLP, and the divided Labour Party. Ray and 
Narud (2000) find that the CP and the SLP’s positions on the two main Norwegian 
cleavages have converged: the CP has moved closer to the left, i.e. towards the SLP’s 
position, on the left/right continuum, and the SLP has become more pro-rural on the 
territorial dimension. This, they argue, could be a result of their alliance in the 
referendum campaign. 
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Sitter (2001, 2004, 2005a, b) examines “Euroscepticism as the politics of opposition” 
in the Norwegian party system and draws on the general European comparative 
literature to a larger extent than other scholars studying the Norwegian case. Sitter 
(2005a) contends that the Norwegian case of party-based Euroscepticism does not fit 
into Taggart’s (1998) “dissent” model, because Eurosceptical positions feature across 
the political system and have remained more or less stable during the last almost 
five decades. He believes that party-based Euroscepticism is a result of party system 
and party strategy, and his “politics of opposition” model contends that parties 
compete along three dimensions of competition and choose the corresponding 
strategy to this dimension. These are the catch-all (left/right) dimension, the 
territorial/interest dimension and the flank dimension. The Labour Party and 
Conservatives are allocated to the first dimension as they are the two mainstream 
parties of the left and right that aim for a broad voter appeal. Second, the three 
middle parties are labelled territorial/interest parties, as their Euroscepticism is 
based on defending the interests and values of their target electorates. Finally, the 
SLP and the PP are located in the flank dimension of electoral competition, because 
of their peripheral positions in the system as well as their protest dimensions. 
Sitter emphasizes that when dealing with coalition politics, all parties face incentives 
to modify their positions. An illustration of this is the PP’s abstention from using 
Eurosceptic sentiment, as it would be incompatible with the party’s recent attempts 
to improve relations with their desired coalition partner, the Conservative Party 
(Sitter 2005a, c). Coalition strategies notwithstanding, Sitter (2004: 29) observes that 
“at the moment, all the major players prioritise their position on EU membership 
over coalition games”. This is excemplified by the design of the suicide clause. Sitter 
(2005a) finds Norwegian party-based Euroscepticism to be particularly unique in 
three ways: first, it is remarkably persistent; second, it is, unlike elsewhere in Europe, 
found in the centre of the party system as opposed to on the far right; and third, in 
Norway, the pressure to moderate the party’s stance on European integration when 
faced with coalition politics has been on the Conservative Party, as opposed to the 
Eurosceptic coalition parties. 
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3.4 Conclusion 
In order to identify gaps in existing research on the phenomenon and inform the 
research design of the current research, this chapter reviewed three key strands of 
the literature on Norwegian Euroscepticism: the issue of definition, theories of why 
Norway voted “no” in 1972 and 1994 and the EU issue in Norwegian politics. It was 
pointed out that the issue of what defines Norwegian Euroscepticism has not been a 
major topic in the literature and that the concept of Euroscepticism is not commonly 
applied to Norway. Although the national debate has traditionally revolved around 
the question of membership, Hagen and Sverdrup (2003) suggest that the Norwegian 
public do consider European integration in other terms than “yes” and “no”. They 
put forward a categorization of EU attitudes which divides Norwegian 
Euroscepticism into two categories: 1) Opposition to the European integration 
process and to Norwegian EU membership; and 2) Support for European integration 
as a project, but opposition to Norwegian EU membership. Notwithstanding, this 
categorization does not reveal what Norwegian Euroscepticism is really about, that 
is, what aspects of European integration Norwegians object to. Besides, the two 
categories are, in essence, merely a hard and a soft version of rejectionist 
Euroscepticism, to use a combination of Flood (2002a) and Szczerbiak and Taggart’s 
(2008a) typologies. In the following chapters, the thesis will investigate the nature of 
Norwegian Euroscepticism further, seeking to find a more refined 
definition/classification of the phenomenon. 
The chapter also reviewed the theories used to explain the Norwegian reluctance to 
join the EU, finding that it is usually put down to one or more of the following 
characteristics: the country’s unique natural resources and correspondingly 
favourable economic position (i.e. protection of the fish resources and the oil wealth 
and its facilitation of heavy subsidisation of the agricultural sector); its geographical 
position, which is related to a lack of identification with the European continent and 
a tradition of strong Atlantic ties; its periphery, which has a strong tradition of 
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mobilization against the forces of centralization and Europeanization in defence of 
folkestyre and national independence; two elements of the Norwegian identity, the 
first of which is characterized by strong affective ties to the countryside and is highly 
dependent on the comprehensive Norwegian regional policy, and the second of 
which is concerned with Scandinavian exceptionalism and its social democratic 
values of solidarity and egalitarianism, embodied by a strong welfare state; and 
finally, political effects: the importance of elite cueing. 
Furthermore, it was argued that the European issue has had a significant impact on 
Norwegian politics, as the question of membership has broken up governments, split 
parties, created voter volatility and complicated coalition formation since it appeared 
on the political agenda in the 1960s. Sitter (2001, 2004, 2005a, b, 2009) argues that 
Norwegian party-based Euroscepticism is a matter of party strategy and tactics; he 
contends that parties emphasize their stance on the EU depending on whether or not 
they stand to gain from it in electoral, policy or office-seeking terms, and that the 
parties’ strategies differ according to what opposition dimension they compete 
along. But many party-based Euroscepticism scholars like Sitter fail to make an 
important distinction in their analysis of the phenomenon, between parties’ position 
on the EU (i.e. why they adopt Eurosceptic stances) and to what extent and how the 
EU issue is used in inter-party competition. In the vast majority of cases, a party’s 
underlying position on the EU diverges from whether and how the party articulates 
this position, and as Szczerbiak and Taggart (2008a: 256) correctly point out “these 
two distinct phenomena have different causal mechanisms”. More to the point, the 
body of literature focusing on party strategy can only explain why some parties give 
priority to their position on Europe and others do not. In effect, in the Norwegian 
case, Sitter’s politics of opposition theory can only explain the different parties’ 
motivation for emphasizing or playing down their Euroscepticism. It cannot explain 
the motivation behind parties’ Eurosceptic attitudes, which is the focus of the thesis. 
Therefore, the analysis that follows in the subsequent chapters uses a framework for 
analysis derived from the literature on EU support in Norway and EU member 
states, focusing on values, identity and interest. It assumes that although the media 
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and political elites play an important part in shaping public attitudes, the three levels 
(media, parties and public) are linked in a relationship characterized by 
multidirectional causal mechanisms. The next four chapters report on the 
documentary analysis of Norwegian Eurosceptic argumentation through the five-
decade period under study. The following chapter looks at the 1960s period. 
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Chapter 4

The First Phase: the 1960s 
Norway’s relationship to the EU has, from the early talks of European cooperation in 
the late 1940s up until the present day, been more complicated than those of most 
other European states. To enhance the understanding of Norwegian Euroscepticism, 
it is essential to know the history and background to the case: how the country’s 
relationship to the EC/EU has evolved over time; how the issue of Europe played 
itself out in the party system in the different periods; when and in what parts of 
society opposition to European integration was strong, and what economic and 
societal forces were at work during the different periods. Therefore, alongside the 
analysis of Eurosceptic argumentation between 1961 and 2010, the next four chapters 
provide a chronology of the political and societal developments in Norway from 
1947 to the present day, in order to contextualise the documentary analysis. 
Additionally, this kind of approach has the potential benefit of identifying and 
eliminating any explanatory factors of Norwegian Euroscepticism which the 
integrated research design does not account for. Thus, for the purposes of coherence, 
the next four chapters are chronological; each chapter deals with a phase of 
Euroscepticism. The first three, the 1960s, 1970-2 and 198974-94, were periods of 
heightened debate, which started with new developments in the EC and culminated 
in the 1972 and 1994 referenda. The 1995-2010 period, in contrast, can be 
characterized as a period of muffled debate and latent Euroscepticism, as the EEA 
agreement prevented the issue from being completely removed from the agenda, 
unlike the period between the referenda when it was considered dead and buried. 
Thus, this chapter aims to investigate the nature and causality of Norwegian 
Euroscepticism in the 1960s, in the phase that the phenomenon started to form. The 
first part of the chapter, section 4.1, is based on a survey of secondary sources; first, it 
focuses on the party system and foreign policy prior to the first debate on 
74 Between 1973 and the late 1980s, the EC issue was considered settled by the 1972 referendum, and 
there was extremely little debate about the issue. Therefore, the period does not warrant the attention of 
a separate chapter, but will instead be commented on in Chapter Six. 
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membership in 1961,75 and second, on the events and developments of the 1960s. 
Subsequently, section 4.2 reports on the findings from the 1960s newspaper and 
party analysis. 
4.1 Going Back to the 1960s Debates and Beyond 
4.1.1 The Norwegian Party System and Foreign Policy before 1961 
In the early part of the twentieth century, after the dissolution of the union with 
Sweden in 1905, the Norwegian political system underwent substantial changes, as 
the Labour Party gradually took over the LP’s position as the Conservative Party’s 
main political contender. After the First World War, political competition took on a 
stronger class profile, and as a result, the centre-periphery cleavage which had 
traditionally structured political opposition in Norway was weakened. In 1920, a 
faction of the LP left to form the Farmers’ Party, later renamed the Centre Party,76 
and in 1933, another Liberal splinter group formed the CDP, a party concerned with 
protecting Lutheran values against the secularizing forces from the centre.77 
In addition to the religious counterculture championed by the CDP from 1933, in the 
second and third decades of the twentieth century, the issues of teetotalism and the 
rural language nynorsk were politicized. The main defenders of the countercultures 
were the Liberal party and its splinter parties, which drew their main support from 
the peripheral areas, whereas the Conservative Party, with its main electoral 
stronghold in Oslo and the surrounding area, supported a more liberal alcohol 
policy and the Danish-influenced bokmål language. Another important element of 
Norwegian politics established in the mid-1930s is the cross-party commitment to 
regional policies and the will to give rural areas a special place in national policy. 
This included protection of the primary sector, and gradually (particularly from the 
75 For readers unfamiliar with the Norwegian party system, an overview can be found in Appendix B. 
76 The party will hereafter be referred to as the CP. 
77 For details on electoral results between 1906­1936, see Table B2 in Appendix B, which clearly 
illustrates the changes the Norwegian party system underwent in this period, with the LP 
gradually losing out electorally to the Labour Party (and the CP) in the first part of the 20th 
century. 
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1970s) also welfare policies, and the result of this “policy-mix” has been 
decentralized settlement (Frøland 1998: 4). All of these changes were to prove 
significant to the battle over European integration in Norway. Not only were new 
political parties created, new lines of political conflict which could be mobilized as 
part of the EU battle between the centre and the periphery were also drawn up. 
Norwegian foreign policy in the late 1940s and 1950s saw a break with the 
Norwegian pre-war commitment to neutrality and her immediate post-war bridge-
building policy.78 The policies were conceived as unsustainable in light of the 
experience of the German invasion during WWII and the emerging Cold War. 
Because of the country’s geographical position and the close economic, political and 
military cooperation with the UK before and after the war, as well as the UK’s 
position as Norway’s primary trade partner before, during and after the war, it was 
only natural for Norwegian decision-makers to follow the British line of foreign 
policy after 1945. Consequently, Norway adopted an Atlantic foreign policy 
orientation as opposed to a continental one. In other words, up until the 1960s, “the 
diplomatic and political contact with the continental states meant less for Norway 
than the contact with the Nordic states and the UK/USA” (Eriksen 1977: 256). This 
orientation was reflected by voting in the UN (Eriksen 1977: 256) as well as in 
departmental proposals and position papers and speeches made by members of the 
Norwegian Labour government in this period (Pharo 1986). 
On April 4, 1949, Norway became one of the founding members of the North 
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), a move which set the country’s security 
orientation for the remainder of the century (Archer 2005: 31). Norway also joined 
the Council of Europe when it was formed in 1949, but among Norwegian elites, 
there was little enthusiasm for the forum and its functions (Pharo 1986). Throughout 
the 1950s, there was a broad cross-party consensus on the Norwegian preference for 
Nordic and Atlantic cooperation in both the security and economic spheres (Hanssen 
and Sandegren 1969; Eriksen 1977; Archer 2005). Attempts to create Nordic security 
For more about the bridge­building policy, which characterized Norwegian foreign policy in the 
period between 1945­1948, see Eriksen (1977). 
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and economic cooperation structures were made, but they were unsuccessful in 
outcome.79 
In the early 1950s, Norwegian decision-makers tried to push for a north-Atlantic 
cooperation alternative consisting of NATO, the Organization for European 
Economic Cooperation (OEEC) and the Council of Europe. None of the Nordic 
countries or the UK desired at this time to be part of a Western European customs 
union or any kind of supranational organization. An Atlantic council was therefore 
consistent with the Norwegian (and British) preference because it would first, be too 
vast and diverse to foster any comprehensive integration, second, prevent 
Norwegian isolation, and third, guarantee a satisfactory distance between Norway 
and the continental states (Pharo 1988), some of which had an “immediate past 
[which] was still alive in [people’s] minds” (Hanssen and Sandegren 1969: 48). 
However, as the US had started advocating more intra-European liberalisation and 
independent European integration both on the political and economic level, the 
British and Norwegian preference of an Atlantic-European cooperation solution did 
not win through (Pharo 1999: 18, 20; see also May 1999; George 1998). 
The common view in the Norwegian government at this time, as reflected by a 
variety of speeches made by the foreign minister, Halvard Lange, was that the 
distance between the economic and social policies of the countries on the continent 
and Norway was too vast for comprehensive integration to be feasible (Eriksen 1977; 
Pharo 1986). The free market orientation of the “six” was seen as incompatible with 
the Norwegian goals of full employment, decentralised settlement, central planning 
and state control (Eriksen 1977: 257; Pharo 1988; Hanssen and Sandegren 1969). 
For example, there were attempts to set up a Nordic customs union called NORDØK, but 
negotiations collapsed in March 1970 when the Finns pulled out. The Finnish government did not 
consider their policy of neutrality compatible with membership in NORDØK in light of the other 
participating countries’ future affiliation with the EEC (Ørvik 1972a). The Finnish u­turn 
notwithstanding, throughout the early stages of planning Scandinavian cooperation it was the 
Norwegian aversion to any kind of deep integration which signified the major obstacle to progress 
(Pharo 1986). Despite the dead ends on Scandinavian and Nordic economic integration, the Nordic 
parliamentary cooperation organ, the Nordic Council was set up in 1952, and in 1954 the Nordic 
Passport Union was formed. See Pharo (1986, 1988), Archer (2005) and Eriksen (1977) for more on 
Nordic cooperation and Fullerton and Knowles (1991) on Scandinavian cooperation. 
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Additionally, there was a general aversion to the idea of giving up national 
sovereignty to a supranational institution. Hence, the Norwegian policy throughout 
the 1950s was to support “intergovernmental trade schemes which promoted 
Norwegian exports and net capital imports and still allowed for protection of 
domestic sectors” (Frøland 1998: 6). 
The signing of the Treaty of Rome in 1957, which established the EEC, did not get 
much attention in Oslo because of the organization’s continental character and its 
perceived limited relevance to the country (Archer 2005; Pharo 1986). As long as the 
UK did not partake in the different initiatives, the European Coal and Steel 
Community (ECSC), the European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom) and the 
EEC were perceived as irrelevant to Norway. However, this situation was to change 
rapidly in 1961, when the British government submitted their first application for 
membership of the EEC. 
4.1.2 The Establishment of EFTA and the First Applications 
As a result of a 1959 British initiative, the EFTA was founded in 1960 by Austria, 
Denmark, Norway, Portugal, Sweden, Switzerland and the UK. There was little 
political opposition to participation in the EFTA cooperation, due to the 
organization’s lack of supranational functions and its exclusion of agriculture and 
fisheries, and the perceived necessity of economic cooperation. All of Norway’s main 
trading partners were members of the trading bloc, it provided a solution to the 
Nordic integration problem and it gave Norwegian businesses a better negotiation 
position with the EEC (Eriksen 1977; see also Frøland 1998). It was considered a 
more or less ideal solution to the integration dilemma by all the political parties, 
whereas membership of the EEC required the Norwegian constitution to be 
amended to allow the transfer of power from the Norwegian state to the EEC (Ørvik 
1972a; Archer 2005). Only one MP voted against the EFTA treaty, and there was also 
little opposition to (or interest in) it among the public. A 1959 poll shows that 28 
percent were positive towards EFTA, 10 percent were negative, and 62 percent had 
no opinion (Frøland 1998: 8). 
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Nevertheless, the inter-party consensus on foreign policy in the first decade and a 
half after the war was not to last into the 1960s. Not long after the establishment of 
EFTA, three months before the 1961 Storting election, the British changed their 
course and on 3 July 1961 applied for full EEC membership, compelling the Storting 
to take a stand on the issue. This was because of the widespread perception that 
remaining on the outside if the UK joined “would be directly contrary to Norwegian 
trading, shipping, and political interest” and disastrous for trade (Hanssen and 
Sandegren 1969: 49). Unlike the Danes, who managed to make a swift decision to 
follow suit, Norwegian decision-makers struggled to issue a prompt response to the 
British application. This was due to significant forces of resistance among the public 
and within the Norwegian parliament, as well as the problem of constitutional 
change (Ørvik 1972a; Archer 2005). 
Both the Conservative and Labour leadership came out in favour of applying for 
entry. The main rationale behind this change in policy was economic growth; it was 
thought that EFTA would be marginalized without the British and that exclusion 
from the EEC’s Common Market would leave Norway’s economy lagging behind. In 
addition to the two largest parties, Landsorganisasjonen (the Norwegian 
Confederation of Trade Unions, LO), the main industry, trade and shipping 
organizations and the majority of the press were in favour of EEC membership 
negotiations. It should be noted, however, that there is very little evidence to suggest 
that the decision to apply for membership equalled clear and unambiguous support 
for EEC membership in the “yes” constellation. Frøland (1998), for example, argues 
that “the short application of 2 May 1962 signalled nothing more than a will to take 
up negotiations in order to clarify conditions for possible membership.” 
Conversely, the opposition against entry was strong within the Labour Party, and it 
took the party leadership several months to achieve general agreement on the 
decision to apply for membership. In addition to the left-wing EEC opposition 
consisting of the Labour Party faction, the SPP and Norges kommunistiske parti 
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(Communist Party of Norway, NKP), the CP and considerable factions of the LP and 
the CDP were against entry. The interest organizations of the fisheries and 
agricultural sectors, although sceptical towards EEC membership, did not state their 
preferences in the 1960s’ debates (Eriksen 1977; Bjørklund 1982). Analysing the 1962 
Storting debate on the EEC, Heradstveit (1972) argues that while the left-wing anti-
EEC constellation in the Storting was opposed because of the capitalist element of 
European integration, and the bourgeois anti-EEC parties’ motivation was protection 
of the primary sector, both coalitions were equally concerned about national 
sovereignty. 
Table 4.1 Storting votes on the EC membership application by party 
Party 
April 
1962 
July 
1967 
Against For Against For 
SPP/SLP 2 0 2 0 
Centre (CP) 15 1 4 14 
Liberal (LP) 2 12 0 18 
CDP 7 8 3 10 
Labour 11 63 4 64 
Conservative 0 29 0 31 
Total 37 113 13 135 
Source: Gleditsch and Hellevik (1977: 310-11); Ørvik (1972a: 13). 
It took almost eight months from when the British application was submitted until 
the Labour government put the issue to the vote in the Storting. The reason for this 
delay, Frøland (1998: 12) argues, was not that it was too difficult for the government 
to weigh the costs against the benefits, as this had increasingly been done since the 
mid-1950s, but that it was a conscious tactical choice “as the issue carried 
considerable potential for escalating domestic political conflicts”, related to the 
socio-political cleavages in particular. On 28 April 1962, the vote came out as 113 in 
favour and 37 against the EC application (Ørvik 1972a: 11), with all the 29 
Conservative MPs and 63 of 74 Labour MPs voting for. Dissent was widespread 
among SPP, CP and CDP MPs, whereas in the LP and Labour Party, the dissenters 
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were in minority (see Table 4.1 above).80 It is important to note that parliament did 
not view the application as synonymous with wanting membership per se, but as an 
application for membership negotiations so that it could clarify the terms of a 
prospective relationship (Frøland 1998: 12). The EC membership application was 
submitted to Brussels on 2 May 1962 (Lambert 1962: 352). 
De Gaulle’s veto on British membership in January 1963 marked an abrupt end to 
the accession negotiations for all the four applicant countries.81 This was one of the 
reasons why the question of membership was not an issue for discussion in the 
election campaigns in the 1960s, but a more important reason was the divisive 
impact the issue had on inter- as well as intra-party relations in the Storting, as 
neither of the parties faced any incentives to play it up (Gleditsch and Hellevik 1977). 
Between January 1963 and 1966 there was little public political debate on the issue of 
Norwegian participation in EEC integration, but in January 1966 a Cabinet 
committee was set up to look into the problems surrounding Norwegian EEC 
membership (Hanssen and Sandegren 1969). The first report resulting from this 
committee, published in February 1967 provided, according to Hanssen and 
Sandegren (1969: 57), “a rational basis for discussion; a situation quite different from 
that of 1962”.82 So in May 1967, when the UK government’s new application for entry 
put the issue back onto the Norwegian political agenda, it “only” took the 
Norwegian government two months to respond. The Storting vote returned 135 to 13 
in favour of new negotiations for EC membership (Ørvik 1972a: 13), after a 
parliamentary debate mainly focused on economic interest and the desirability of 
80 A similar outcome (115 to 35) was achieved on the vote on the constitutional amendment, held a 
month before (Eriksen 1977: 262). The constitutional amendment enabled the Storting, if obtaining a 
three­fourths majority in favour, to apply for membership of the EC and join the Community if they so 
desired. 
81 Ireland, the UK and Denmark applied in 1961 and Norway in 1962. De Gaulle vetoed British entry 
on the grounds that the UK was too different from the EC member states and argued that she would be 
like an American Trojan horse, and the remaining three because of their free trade affiliation to the UK 
(Archer 2005; May 1999). 
82 It should be noted that this was not a view held by all. The information material originating from 
Norwegian governments was widely criticized by the “no” side as being propagandistic or incomplete 
(e.g. Bergo n.d.; Berg and Rostad, n.d.) 
96 
international cooperation on the pro-EC side and concern for national sovereignty 
and democracy and anti-capitalism on the opposing side (Vefald 1972). The vote 
seems to reflect more cohesion in all the parties compared to 1962, but the drop in 
parliamentary votes against membership from 37 in 1962 to 13 in 1967 (and 17 in 
1970) is somewhat misleading in terms of measuring the number of Eurosceptic MPs 
in the Storting at the given points in time. Solhjell (2008: 243-44) points out that the 
decision to put the issue to the public in a referendum83 led to weaker polarization, 
and besides that “in the [pro-application] majority [in the CDP], there were many 
who knew with themselves that they would vote against membership when the 
negotiation result was known.” Centre, CDP and LP MPs also had to take loyalty to 
the coalition government they were part of into consideration when casting their 
votes. This is illustrated by the change in CP MPs’ “no” votes from 4 (of 18) in 1967 
when in government to 20 (of 20) in 1971, when free from governmental ties. 
The interest organizations’ positions on the issue (or their lack thereof) were more or 
less the same as in 1962, the only change being that the political atmosphere was 
different in 1967, due to less pressure being put on the government particularly by 
Norges Bondelag (the Norwegian Farmer’s Union) (Hanssen and Sandegren 1969). 
Whereas a small minority of significant newspapers had been very critical to the 
EEC application in 1962, such as the Liberal paper Dagbladet (the second largest 
Norwegian newspaper), the CP press, primary sector press and a few minor left-
wing and Labour Party newspapers, no major newspapers opposed the 
government’s policy this time around (Hanssen and Sandegren 1969). Moreover, the 
fact that de Gaulle was still a force to be contended with within the EEC certainly did 
not heighten the perceived urgency of the situation either, and surely enough, his 
second veto ensured another suspension of the negotiations. It was not until the 
French President’s resignation in 1969 that the application could be reactivated. 
83 All the parties agreed that the issue should be put to the public vote in a referendum, and although 
“the vote was in theory consultative, in fact all the political parties accepted that the result would be 
binding” (Archer 2005: 47). 
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4.1.3 A Note on the Differences between pre-1961 and post-1961 Euroscepticism 
The sea change in elite attitudes towards cooperation with the continental states 
from the 1940s and 50s to the early 1960s lends credibility to Pharo’s (1986) 
Atlanticism thesis in terms of explaining pre-1960’s Norwegian Euroscepticism. At 
least for those of the political elite whose main argument against getting involved in 
the integration efforts of the “six” pre-1961 turned into their main argument for EEC 
entry in 1961, that is, mirroring Britain’s EC policy, it is reasonable to conclude that 
Atlanticism was at the core of their Euroscepticism. Conversely, that implies that the 
scepticism of those Labour, CP, CDP and LP representatives who remained 
unconvinced about the EEC’s benefits even after the British had applied for entry 
were rooted in other concerns from the start. Protests against giving up national 
sovereignty and the incompatibility of the continental value system with the 
Norwegian, as suggested by Eriksen (1977) and Pharo (1986) are more plausible 
explanatory factors of the Norwegian Euroscepticism which went beyond the 1950s. 
It is clear that opposition to European integration has existed in Norway since the 
1940s and 50s. However, there was a watershed in attitudes towards participation in 
the EEC in the early 1960s, due to the changed British orientation towards 
membership. In other words, present day Euroscepticism in Norway can only be 
traced back to the early 1960s, as pre-1960s attitudes were heavily characterized by 
Atlanticism – a preference for cooperation with the UK and the US (and the Nordic 
countries) over the continental states. Moreover, the early 1960s also signifies a 
watershed in terms of the spread of Eurosceptic attitudes: the 1961-2 debate marked 
the beginning of Norwegian grassroots opposition. Public opinion polls show that 
up until 1961, the issue of European integration failed to capture the public interest 
(Rokkan and Valen 1964; Hanssen and Sandegren 1969).84 Besides, prior to 1961, 
there was no wide-ranging public political debate on the issue either (Hanssen and 
Sandegren 1969). Next, the chapter turns to the methods and results of the 
documentary analysis. 
84 See section 8.1.1 of Chapter Eight for more on public opinion in the 1960s. 
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4.2 The 1960s Documentary Analysis 
The existing literature offers some insight into the Eurosceptic argumentation used 
in the 1960s: the parliamentary debates have already been subjected to scrutiny 
(Heradstveit 1972; Vefald 1972) as has the ad hoc organizations’ material (Bjørklund 
1982). However, the objective of this part of the chapter is to carry out an 
investigation into what kind of argumentation was expressed in the 1960s public 
debate, focusing on the Norwegian national newspaper Aftenposten and available 
party material. More specifically, it aims to find out how the anti-EEC arguments 
used in the public debate fit into categories based on six theories of Euroscepticism 
discussed in the two previous chapters. The next two sections present the data, 
methods and theory used in the analysis. 
4.2.1 Data and Methods 
Unfortunately, availability of the target data from the 1960s period was very limited. 
Party manifestos from the 1960s were shorter than today’s, and parties generally 
devoted very little space to the EEC issue. The latter was most likely because the 
British applications were always submitted after the general elections,85 something 
which made it relatively easy for the politicians to keep the highly divisive 
membership issue off the electoral agenda. Moreover, anti-EEC speeches from this 
decade were hard to locate, as neither the Eurosceptic political parties nor NtEU 
keep systematic records of speeches. Book collections of political speeches were 
therefore the main source of this data. The final type of documentary data targeted 
was readers’ letters from the early 1960s in Aftenposten. However, in the years 
surveyed (1960-62) it was almost exclusively the Oslo-focused evening edition which 
contained readers’ letters and these were largely focused on local issues. For 
example, only 10 out of the 1,049 readers letters surveyed in the 1962 newspapers 
mentioned the EEC, but none of them argued for or against membership. Therefore, 
it became clear that the sampling strategy had to be broadened to include anti-EEC 
letters or commentaries printed outside the readers’ letters column, as well as any 
85 Or only weeks before, as in 1961. 
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other news items or editorials reporting or commenting on Eurosceptic 
argumentation. Table 4.2 below shows the data which met the criteria and which 
were subsequently included in the study. 
Table 4.2 Data used for the 1960s documentary analysis 
NUMBER TYPE OF DOCUMENT TIME PERIOD PARTIES COVERED 
15 Manifestos 1961, 1965, 1969 CP, LP, CDP, SPP, Labour 
1 Speeches 1962 Labour 
12 Letters/commentaries 1961-62 
13 Articles or other 
newspaper items 
1961-62 CP, CDP, SPP, Labour 
Source: Author’s study. 
Albeit somewhat limited in scope compared to the later periods, the 41 sources used 
arguably provide an adequate base for gaining some insight into which concerns 
were most prominent during the first debate on EEC membership in Norway. A 
benefit of the material used is that it is quite evenly balanced when it comes to the 
Eurosceptic parties; only the Liberal party suffers from underrepresentation. 
4.2.2 Theory 
Three theories from each body of literature were selected to form the predefined 
categories according to which the data were analysed.86 From the comparative 
literature on Euroscepticism, the reverse postmaterialist thesis (Inglehart 1977; Gabel 
1998a); the utilitarian thesis (Gabel 1998a; Anderson and Reichert 1996); and the 
identity thesis (Carey 2002; McLaren 2002) were singled out on the basis of fulfilling 
three separate criteria: first, they were theoretically relevant to Norway (as a non-
member state); second, they were well-established in the literature; and third, they 
had not already been tested on Norway. From the Norwegian literature, the geo-
historical, exceptionalism and rural society87 theses were chosen. This was because, 
86 New themes were allowed to emerge from the analysis. 
87 Adapted from the rural identity theory, as discussed below. 
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as explanatory theories, they had not been subjected to empirical testing before.88 
Moreover, Atlanticism was excluded because it was not a theoretically feasible 
explanation for Norwegian Euroscepticism beyond 1961 because of the UK’s entry 
application. 
As is illustrated in Figure 4.1 below, utilitarianism (economic interest), political 
culture (geo-historical factors), rural society and national identity stood alone as 
separate categories, and the exceptionalism (EX) and postmaterialism (PM) theories 
were grouped into a political values category. 
Figure 4.1 Pre-defined coding categories 
Political Values 
PoM/EX 
Rural Society Political Culture 
Utilitarianism National Identity 
Source: Author’s study 
The first component of the coding model was based on the reverse postmaterialist 
thesis. It holds the assumption that people with postmaterialist values, i.e. people 
who rate values such as morality, environmentalism, quality of life, equality and 
peacefulness highly, are more likely to be opposed to European integration, which in 
Scandinavia is seen as having goals different to these. As all of the ideals connected 
to exceptionalism or the Nordic “superior form of society” are rooted in solidarity 
and equality (Lawler 1997: 556; Dahl 1984), and thus, morality, exceptionalism was 
treated as a sub-category of postmaterialism. Argumentation which could be 
classified as ideologically left-wing was also treated under this heading, because, as 
Dahl (1984: 97, 106) observes “the appeal of social justice and equality in party 
88 Although the applicability of the territorial cleavage to public opinion on the EU has been widely 
established through statistical testing, Rokkan’s cleavage model does not explain why Norwegians 
voted “no” in the referenda (see also Neumann 2002). 
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politics” is no Social Democratic or socialist invention, but “goes back to at least the 
1890s [… when] it was propelled into the bodies politic by the Liberals” and has 
since then been pursued by all the traditional parties, from the left to the right. 
Secondly, the political culture category was based on the geo-historical thesis, the 
idea that Norway’s short history as an independent country and the periphery’s 
strong political tradition are central to Norwegian opposition to EC/EU membership. 
The code encompassed argumentation which cast opposition to the European project 
as a furthering of the Norwegian struggle for democracy and independence which 
started in the 19th century. It holds that folkestyre and independence are closely 
interlinked and extremely central to Norwegian political culture; the dominant view 
is that the people (folket) should rule, not bureaucrats and elites in a distant centre. 
The third coding category covered the more diffuse concept of rural society, that is, 
the desire to maintain rural Norway as it is. In the academic literature on Norway, 
much emphasis has been put on the ability of the primary sector to rally 
sympathisers to its cause, a phenomenon which some scholars explain with the 
concept of a rural identity: Norwegians’ attachment to nature, the countryside and 
peasant culture (Gstöhl 1996; Hille 2007; Neumann 2002). Initially, the rural identity 
concept was tested on the 1960s data, but it quickly became clear that it was doubtful 
that all primary sector argumentation could be put down to identity concerns. 
Nevertheless, as both the literature and the documentary data confirmed that the 
rural society dimension of Norwegian opposition to European integration is 
important, the solution was not to scrap the category, but to broaden it. In Norway, 
there is certainly agreement that maintaining a decentralized society is desirable; all 
the parties in the Storting recognize this as a central political goal.89 As a means to 
achieve this, there is consensus on the need to maintain Norwegian agriculture and 
coastal fishing, protect nature and cultural landscapes, keep the decentralized 
settlement and promote thriving districts. The data analysed showed that these 
objectives were shared by the vast majority of the rural society patrons, but it was 
89 Although it is questionable how committed the PP is to upholding the settlement structure. 
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clear that the motivation behind the patronage varied. For some, material 
considerations, such as food quality, security and/or economic utility, were at the 
core of their concern for upholding decentralised Norway. For others, 
postmaterialist considerations were key: focus on quality of life, environmental 
protection and responsible administration of resources, and/or a moral duty to feed 
one’s own population in an overpopulated world. The third grouping was primarily 
worried about nature, the cultural landscapes and cultural diversity. However, it 
was not possible to make inferences about the motivation of all rural society related 
argumentation, as very few commentators explained why they think it is important 
to protect Norwegian agriculture, coastal fishing or the settlement pattern. 
Nevertheless, although the motivation behind the desire to protect the rural society 
in Norway will be commented on when appropriate, it is of secondary importance to 
and beyond the scope of this study. In other words, the thesis asks what role rural 
society concerns plays in Eurosceptic argumentation in Norway, not why 
Norwegians want to uphold a decentralized society. The rural society category was 
linked to political values because the notion of “leftishness”, as associated with post-
materialist values, is “a cluster of values that [speaks] to the ideals of nearly all rural 
factions” (Dahl 1984: 98). Additionally, the territorial dimension of the rural society 
concept connects it with the geo-historical category. 
The fourth category, economic interest, covered economic and material concerns. 
The economic interest thesis holds that economic cost/benefit considerations 
determine people’s attitudes toward the EU, i.e. that people who believe that they 
personally or the country as a whole will lose out economically due to European 
integration are more likely to oppose EC/EU membership. Therefore, Eurosceptic 
argumentation focusing on economic utility is coded to this category. 
Finally, the national identity theory holds that people who are particularly worried 
about threats to the nation state and the national identity are more likely to oppose 
European integration. Therefore, the category captures the argumentation which 
reflects hostility towards other cultures or nationalities, hesitation about cooperating 
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with nations with different cultures and/or values, perceived cultural threat, and/or 
strong national attachment and pride. Further details about the coding protocol can 
be found in Appendix G. The next section communicates the findings of the analysis. 
4.2.3 Findings of the 1960s Documentary Analysis 
Most of the arguments found in the source material from the 1960s fit into four of the 
five broad categories outlined above. The first is the geo-historical category, which 
accommodates arguments based on the principle of self-rule, in other words concern 
for Norway’s independence and traditional form of participatory democracy 
(folkestyre). The second category concerns political values and is representative of 
postmaterialist, exceptionalist and/or left-wing ideological value-based arguments. 
The data confirms that these three sub-categories are not always easy to separate, 
with all sharing the same desire to prioritise equality, fairness, internal (and external) 
solidarity and high social standards over economic growth and material gain. As a 
result, the umbrella term “political values” is used. Rural and cultural elements form 
the basis for the third and fourth categories: worries about the districts, identity and 
culture, both national and rural, are additional motivators for the Euroscepticism of 
the 1960s in Norway. Utilitarian considerations, on the other hand, did not generate 
convincing results, at least not as first order concerns. Notwithstanding, the findings 
of all of the five groupings are reported below. It should be noted that all the quotes 
from the second part of each of the next four chapters (i.e. the documentary analysis) 
and any interview quotation used in the thesis are translated from Norwegian into 
English by the author.90 All the different newspaper items (letters, articles, 
commentaries) are referenced with surname and the date the item was printed (e.g. 
Olsen 29/12/61) to ensure transparency and enable the reader to check up on any 
original source material of interest. The complete list of the material analysed can be 
found in Appendix F. 
90 Any errors resulting from this are the sole responsibility of the author. 
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4.2.3.1 Political Culture: History, Independence and Democracy 
The geo-historical category generated the most results in the study, unsurprisingly 
perhaps, because it is home to the “sovereignty” variable. With 20 references91 from a 
variety of sources, it is clear that concerns about independence and sovereignty were 
central to Norwegians’ opposition to European integration in the 1960s. Berner 
(08/01/62) asks: “Is it unwarranted to consider a purely emotional need for freedom 
and independence as part of our living standard?” and Rolfsen (19/01/62) points out 
that the Constitution’s first paragraph stipulates that “Norway is free, indivisible 
and inalienable.” Furthermore, both the SPP and the CP’s manifestos from this 
decade note the importance of safeguarding national sovereignty, and so do news 
reports of the argumentation of the EEC-opponents in the CDP and the Labour 
Party. Careful not to affiliate the urge for maintaining the right to be “masters of 
one’s own house”, as one commentator puts it, with isolation, Trygve Bull (Labour) 
argues in his 1962 speech that “what many of us today fear is not international 
cooperation. It is not binding international cooperation either; but it is to issue 
general authority for all the future.” Accordingly, there can be no doubt that 
sovereignty and independence was at the very heart of Norwegian Euroscepticism at 
the time. 
Norway’s history and traditions of participatory democracy also feature prominently 
as a theme; anti-EEC politicians from all of the parties under investigation underline 
the need to preserve as much as possible of the country’s traditional form of 
folkestyre so that everyone can partake in deciding the country’s development. Bull 
(1962 speech) states that “the idea of people sovereignty (folkesuverenitetstanken) is in 
a particularly intimate way tied to democratic-radical traditions in our people” and 
argues that the trend seen on the continent, de-democratisation and centralisation of 
power, is not something Norway needs to be affected by. He said, “It is not written 
in the stars that small states will be stricken by this to the same degree as the large 
ones. […] We avoided, to a large extent, feudalism in the middle ages. And we need 
not be overtaken by this new trend, if we are vigilant”. Although this strong 
91 In total, 39 references were coded to this category, but 20 of these related directly to sovereignty or 
independence. 
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opposition to continental traditions of centralisation is only clearly visible in Bull’s 
speech, several letter authors cast the ways of “the continent” as something negative 
and alien to Norwegian political traditions. According to these sceptics, it is not in 
Norway’s interest to become involved in “the complicated games between the 
leading continental powers” (13/04/62 news report) and cooperation with “a Europe 
which is responsible for acquisition wars, empires and suppression, economically 
and socially” (the 143 02/01/62). The contrast between the aversion to the power-
driven continental European states and people and democracy-driven Norway is 
aptly captured by the following quote from Bull’s speech: “While the nation state 
and the ‘nation feeling’ on the Continent all too often has been used in the service of 
chauvinist and reactionary powers, in our country it has, in a distinctive way, been 
tied to the interests and trends of the people.” The lack of identification with the big 
continental states is also confirmed by the interview findings, as Dag Seierstad from 
the SLP, Odd Jostein Sæter from the CDP and Odd Einar Dørum from the LP, who 
all were active in the 1960s and/or 1970s debates, mention the negatively charged 
terms “colonial powers” and “bloc politics”92 as a reason for their scepticism towards 
the EEC in the early years.93 
It is clear from the analysis that arguments linked to history and political culture 
were utilized from the very beginning of Norway’s dealings with the EEC. The 
people’s right to govern and the country’s independence rank very high on the list of 
arguments; they cast the EEC as a system of government which is not compatible 
with the Norwegian model of folkestyre and membership as synonymous with 
Norway losing control of its own destiny. 
4.2.3.2 Political Values: Postmaterialism and Exceptionalism 
As early as in 1961, Norwegian Eurosceptics, socialists (SPP and Labour) as well as 
representatives from the bourgeois bloc (LP, CP and CDP), identified the free market 
92 The organization of countries into blocs, i.e. bigger entities, which was in keeping with the politics 
of the great powers (stormaktspolitikk). Bloc politics was criticised for exacerbating East/West 
tensions and creating a divide between Europe and the developing world (see the 143 02/01/62). 
93 The interviews took place in Oslo, 18 September 2009, 22 September 2010 and 13 January 2010 
respectively. 
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ideology set out in the Rome Treaty one of the main reasons not to join the EEC. 
According to an Aftenposten editorial (16/11/62), the whole debate started with the 
EEC being branded by the anti-EEC camp as “the ignorant money power”, an 
organization whose overarching concerns revolved around material values and 
economic gain. Some left-wing opponents of membership from the period are clearly 
motivated by the socialist ideology, as they use anti-capitalist rhetoric and display 
the belief that a planned economy generates higher economic prosperity. Most 
commentators’ argumentation, however, is characterized by a slightly different 
conviction: the idea that welfare, internal and external solidarity should be 
prioritized over economic growth. These arguments come together under the themes 
postmaterialism and exceptionalism, where the latter is a sub-theme of the former 
because of their overlapping nature in their focus on peacefulness and solidarity. 
One recurring theme in the newspaper items in the study is criticism of the “yes” 
side’s exaggerated focus on material and economic benefits. Research Fellow Giæver 
(05/12/61) seeks to discredit what he terms the most important “yes” argument, 
namely “we cannot afford to be on the outside”. He argues that political, not 
economic considerations are more important and that “by entering the Common 
Market, we reduce the possibility of directing an economic policy which is as 
congruent as possible with our own value rankings.” 
Over half of the newspaper items include one or several arguments related to 
equality, anti-discrimination, peace, quality of life, morality and/or solidarity. The 
SPP’s manifesto, for example, argues against the EEC on the basis of it being an 
“economic bloc [which] is a barrier to creating a peaceful, democratic world” and it 
exacerbating “the economic inequality between rich and poor countries.” Moreover, 
the exceptionalist variety of the value of external solidarity is also found in multiple 
items: here, the idea of the internationalist sovereign state as the promoter of 
equality, democracy and peace is essential. The anti-EEC appeal with 143 signatories 
printed in Aftenposten on January 3, 1962 provides an excellent example of this. They 
write the following: 
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“Today it is only by safeguarding our political freedom that we can secure 
the democratic ideals within our own territory and simultaneously try to 
make these ideals dominant in the world. Only in this way can we make a 
real contribution to the cause of peace. 
The small nations have not outplayed their role. Norway has a 
responsibility both to itself and to the world. As an independent state, our 
country must strengthen the work which through the worldwide 
organisations is done to bring all peoples closer to each other for mutual 
understanding and cooperation. The new west European union, which the 
Common Market will become, does not have those kinds of goals.” 
Internal solidarity is another reasonably large group of arguments which doubles up 
as postmaterialist and exceptionalist. An example of this is the CDP and CP MPs’ 
desire to retain sovereignty so that “our natural resources can be exploited in a form 
and a tempo which serves both those who live here today and future generations 
living in Norway” (article 13/04/62). Politicians and commentators also use 
exceptionalism when pointing out the country’s distinctive economic structure and 
unique outlook on society; “the 143” (03/01/62) argue that “economic and social 
policy, [coordinated] according to the wishes of the people and to the benefit of the 
people, will be lost under the Rome Treaty” (emphasis added). Internal solidarity is 
about safeguarding the interests of the disadvantaged in society and promoting 
equality, and a main aspect of it concerns gender equality and more left-wing ideals 
such as welfare and redistribution. However, the idea also extends to the districts 
and those employed in the primary sectors, as illustrated by a quote from 
Buttingsrud’s letter (08/03/62): 
“There is an old expression which goes roughly like this […]: ‘He who has a 
lot, he shall be given more, but he who little has, he shall be robbed of what 
he’s got.’ […] I know for a fact that the income situation is far worse and 
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much less secure in agriculture and fishing than in industry and other 
professions. And I am afraid that we, by entering the Common Market, will 
make this expression come true, [this expression] which has always 
occurred to me as bitterly unfair and cynical.” 
As illustrated by this quote, it is clear that sentiments of exceptionalist internal 
solidarity, which centre on social protection for all, play into the Euroscepticism of 
the 1960s. However, these findings also make the exceptionalist thesis a contender to 
the rural identity thesis, as protection of the primary sector could potentially have 
more to do with the value of solidarity than attachment to rural society. 
4.2.3.3 Rural Society 
The rural society category yielded some results, but coding to this category was not 
as widespread as expected. Agriculture employed more than 20 percent of the 
workforce in the 1950s, compared to 2.3 percent in 2007, and the number of 
fishermen declined from approximately 100,000 to 13,300 during the same time 
period (SSB 2009a). Because of the larger size of the primary sectors in the early 
1960s, it was expected that concern for the primary sectors would be among the most 
noticeable elements of the early anti-EEC argumentation. Nevertheless, only seven 
out of the 37 items analysed draw on argumentation related to the protection of the 
primary sectors, Norwegian nature, the settlement pattern or rural culture. This is 
much less than expected, considering the academic literature has put heavy focus on 
this aspect of the EEC opposition since the 1960s (e.g. Lambert 1962; Neumann 2002). 
The underrepresentation could, however, be due to the uncertainty surrounding the 
government’s ability to negotiate exemptions for the country’s primary industries if 
becoming a member. Many news articles suggest that there was widespread belief 
among at least proponents of membership, but also some opponents, that in the 
event of membership negotiations, the EEC would respect firstly, the need to shield 
Norwegian farmers from competition in an open European market, and secondly, 
the Norwegian fishermen’s rightful claim to their traditional fishing territories. 
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Nevertheless, arguments about retaining the concession laws, the regulations and 
supportive measures set up for the agricultural sector and fisheries are most central 
in this category, and so is the wish to prevent depopulation of rural Norway (utkant-
Norge) and shield the country’s “glorious nature” (naturherligheter). The reasons for 
resisting structural change are for the most part not divulged; predominantly, it is 
taken for granted that the survival of the primary sectors, the settlement pattern and 
Norwegian nature is a desirable goal for the whole of the country. However, CP and 
CDP MPs do note the psychologically negative effect the demise of food production 
could have on the nation in terms of security arrangements. Additionally, there is 
some evidence to back up the existence of a rural component of Norwegian culture 
which is seen as under threat by European integration. Labour’s Bull notes the 
psychological and the social readjustment problems EEC membership would entail: 
“[If becoming members] we renounce – at least after a short while – the 
right […] to uphold traditional economic activity, which from a purely 
rational point of view is not lucrative, but which has its deep roots in the life 
of all of our people.” 
The concept of farming and fishing as something which is deep-rooted in the 
Norwegian people’s lives implies that rural culture is an important aspect of wanting 
to protect the primary industries. Magister Langslet (17/10/62) supports the idea that 
the EEC opponents’ rationale behind protecting agriculture is more about protecting 
culture than material concerns, arguing that it is about preserving “Norwegian 
farmer’s culture and the culture-creating work which has its roots there.” 
4.2.3.4 Identity: Incompatibility and Threat 
Identity-related 1960s argumentation aside from the rural dimension was also 
present in the data. Ten separate sources touch on issues of identity, primarily 
covering lack of identification with and antipathy towards continental cultures. Two 
letters, both written by Rolfsen (19/01/62, 26/01/62), stand out in their blunt hostility 
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towards the cultures of the “six”. Explaining his reasons for opposing EEC 
membership, the letter writer states, 
“… we do not want to see Norway under political guardianship of a France, 
whose strong fascist forces are currently bombing themselves forward 
towards military dictatorship. And of a Germany where Nazism smoulders 
in the best of health and could feasibly break out in flames, stimulated by 
border regulation demands. With these historical currents, we feel no sense 
of community.” 
It has to be noted that this is an example from the extreme end of the scale. However, 
other sources back up this notion that anti-German sentiments stemming from the 
occupation (1940-45) played a part in shaping opposition to the EEC in the 1960s 
(Lambert 1962). Dag Seierstad, for example, says in an interview with the author94 
that he thinks that anti-German feeling was a part of the scepticism towards the EEC 
back then, especially in Northern Norway. Nevertheless, the majority of items coded 
to this category show scepticism towards the dominance of Catholic countries in the 
Community, or the “Catholic danger”, as it was scathingly termed by some pro-EEC 
commentators. This concern does not, however, only involve distinctive religious 
traditions, but links back to the political culture of individualism and resistance to 
authority. Bull contrasts Catholicism and the Pope, the perfect technocrat, with the 
Norwegian Protestant religion which is based on “the democratic idea that every 
man is responsible to his God” and presupposes that “there is no authority here on 
earth that can say that it’s like this and it’s not like this.” In his letter, Professor, dr. 
theol. Hygen (25/10/62) argues along similar lines. He believes that “the Roman 
Church intervenes in politics in a whole different way than Protestant churches” and 
“a change in our position from an independent protestant country to a province in a 
Catholic-dominated association will [not] benefit the country, the people or the 
church.” These findings indicate that independence and folkestyre are not confined to 
94 Oslo, 18 September 2009. 
111 
political issues, but cross over into the cultural sphere. All aspects of Norwegian 
culture, even religion, reflect individualism, and the EEC represents a threat to this. 
Despite this, little evidence of strong attachment to the nation state is found in the 
data. Only one direct reference to the state as the appropriate carrier of the nation is 
made. When it comes to national pride, the findings are more diffuse. Exceptionalist 
value-driven arguments could potentially fit here, because they imply positive 
identification with the Norwegian and Nordic culture of solidarity. 
4.2.3.5 Utilitarianism: a Second Order Concern 
Strikingly little of the argumentation against membership from the 1960s is of a 
utilitarian nature. Nevertheless, a limited number of commentators do express 
concern about the parts of the national economy which would suffer from open 
competition in a common European market, such as agriculture, the fisheries95 and 
the domestic industries. Contrary to the expectations of the sociotropic economic 
interest thesis, the recurring economic theme of all the newspaper items analysed is 
the acknowledgement that on the whole, the national economy would benefit from 
membership. In effect, rather than arguing that non-membership would be more 
economically beneficial for the country, the trend is that Eurosceptic letters to the 
editor play down the magnitude of these economic benefits. The tactic here seems to 
be, in order to focus on other, more important issues such as independence and 
political values, to discredit the “we cannot afford to be on the outside” argument of 
the “yes” side. This is done by using phrases such as “economic growth will be 
modest” (Svendsen96 20/11/61), “it is possible that our total economic growth will be 
stronger with membership” (news report about cabinet minister Bøe’s views 
02/03/62), and “the national economic loss [if opting for non-membership] is 
considerably lower than has been claimed” (Giæver97 05/12/61).98 In other words, the 
95 Concerns about the fisheries were mostly about keeping foreign trawlers out of Norwegian fishing 
waters (as they would rob many small scale Norwegian fishermen of their livelihoods) and in some 
cases, worries about fish refinement being outsourced to foreign firms in the event of membership. It 
was commonly accepted that the export industry would benefit from the abolition of tariff barriers 
membership would entail. 
96 Reader. 
97 Research Fellow. 
112 
1960s’ Eurosceptics do not appear to have been motivated by national economic 
interest, as there seems to be widespread belief that non-membership is the least 
lucrative option for the country’s economy.99 However, the EEC-opponents do argue 
in favour of the protection of certain sectoral economic interests, but in its disregard 
for the strong export industries and emphasis on solidarity with the weaker 
economic sectors, the tendency to focus on the disadvantaged economic sectors 
rather supports the postmaterialist or exceptionalist thesis than the utilitarian thesis. 
The following quote from CDP MP Kjell Bondevik (news report 25/10/61) provides 
an illustration of this idea: 
“If one is to put the main emphasis on economic considerations and 
primarily aim for a higher standard of living, then a country with high 
industrial standards […] would yield the largest advantages with full 
membership. If one is to choose to retain as much national independence as 
possible, political and social, then the association alternative would be 
preferable.” 
Bondevik, who was part of the “no” minority in the Storting, clearly prioritised 
political and social independence over a higher standard of living. Quite a few other 
commentators from the period argue along the same lines. This indicates that the 
applicability of economic interest as a main explanation for early Norwegian 
Euroscepticism is limited. Economic interest is perhaps best described as a second 
order concern, as one cannot deem it completely irrelevant to the Eurosceptic case of 
the 1960s if it really was so that people did not believe that the negative impact of 
membership would be too significant. 
98 All italics are added.

99 This is backed up by the academic literature, as Hanssen and Sandegren (1969: 51) note that “hardly

anyone disagreed on this point, even though there was disagreement as to how much Norway would

lose in economic terms by remaining outside”.
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4.3 Conclusion 
This chapter analysed the secondary literature on, and documentary data from the 
1960s in order to provide a comprehensive coverage of the EEC-opposition from the 
period. The analysis showed that Norwegian opposition to European integration can 
indeed be traced back to 1961 and the first real debate on membership, or even 
further back - to the late 1940s, as the secondary literature suggests. However, it was 
argued in the first part of the chapter that the roots of current day Norwegian 
Euroscepticism do not transcend the 1960s, as Eurosceptic attitudes prior to 1961 
were only widespread among the elites, and potential other motivations than 
Atlanticism did not come to the fore due to the general consensus on non-
participation. Furthermore, it is unlikely that the pre-1961 Euroscepticism extended 
to the general public, as public opinion polls show that it was not until 1962 that the 
general population were educated enough about the EEC to state a preference on 
Norwegian membership (Rokkan and Valen 1964; Hanssen and Sandegren 1969). 
The documentary analysis, reported on in the second part of the chapter, looked at 
the extent to which different news items and commentaries from the newspaper 
Aftenposten, one speech and the “no”’ parties’ manifestos drew on arguments related 
to political culture, postmaterialist/exceptionalist values, rural society, national 
identity and economic interest. 
Figure 4.2 below broadly illustrates the distribution of the coded arguments in the 
analysis according to the five categories.100 It makes it very clear that political culture 
and postmaterialist/exceptionalist value-based arguments were most widely used in 
the debate. The analysis showed that in Norwegian political culture, independence 
and democracy are intertwined in the concepts folkestyre (people’s rule) and 
folkesuverenitetsprinsippet (the principle of people sovereignty), and the opposition to 
“binding our people’s right to decide their own fate on an indefinite basis” (CDP and 
Centre MPs, news report 13/04/62) was one of the most frequently recurring themes 
100 The quantification of results from qualitative coding, albeit methodologically unsound to use as a 
basis for analysis, is only used here to illustrate the general tendencies in the data. 
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in the data analysed. Furthermore, references to continental political traditions and 
mention of historical junctures for Norway’s democracy and independence, like 1814 
(when the Constitution was created), 1905 (the year of the dissolution with Sweden) 
and 1940 (the German invasion) further contributed to establishing the relevance of 
“the wounds left by a history of foreign rule” (Gstöhl 2002a: 214) as an explanation 
for Norwegian Euroscepticism. 
Figure 4.2 The distribution of arguments according to category101 
Political culture 
Political values 
Rural society 
Economic interest 
National identity 
Source: Author’s documentary analysis 
The analysis also showed that political values was of great relevance to motivations 
for opposing the EEC. Interestingly, the “no” letters in the study almost exclusively 
cast membership as the most economically lucrative alternative, but they argued that 
other issues were more important, such as welfare, looking after disadvantaged 
groups in society and the districts, and promoting peace and equality internationally 
as well as nationally. Exceptionalist sentiments, that is, viewing Norway and the 
values championed in Norway as essentially different and morally superior to the 
EEC, certainly shone through many of the postmaterialist arguments relating to 
internal and external solidarity. 
101 Number of news items or party documents coded to each of the categories In the economic interest 
category, the arguments merely playing down the significance of economic issues and the ‘yes’ side’s 
economic arguments are not included. 
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The lack of indication that Eurosceptics in the 1960s viewed the non-membership 
alternative as economically more beneficial, impacts negatively on the economic 
interest thesis’ explanatory power of 1960s’ opposition. However, that is not to say 
that many farmers, fishermen, employees in the home industries or other social 
groups that would have lost out economically as a result of membership did not 
oppose EEC entry on egocentric utilitarian grounds. The findings of this part of the 
study only showed that sociotropic considerations cannot be deemed to be among the 
main driving factors for opposition to the EEC in the first round. 
On the level of rural society arguments, a couple of commentators mentioned 
concern for farmer’s culture and Norwegian nature, but otherwise there was little 
evidence that attachment to the countryside played a large part in the “no” side’s 
arguments against membership. On the contrary, there was surprisingly little focus 
on the primary sectors and the settlement pattern, considering the considerable role 
played by these sectors in later campaigns and their size in the 1960s compared to 
later periods. It was argued that this discrepancy could be due to the uncertainties 
surrounding the EEC’s entry terms: it is possible that both proponents and 
opponents of membership were more optimistic about obtaining special 
arrangements for the country’s special interests, such as agriculture and the fishing 
territories in 1962 than a decade later, when both the CAP and the Common 
Fisheries Policy (CFP) were firmly in place. 
Finally, national identity as a driver of EEC opposition found some support in the 
data, albeit not as strong as the political culture and values variables. Lack of 
identification with, and in some instances outright hostility to continental European 
culture were themes that emerged from the data, concomitantly with perceived 
cultural threat, as theorized by Carey (2002) and McLaren (2002). The most common 
sub-theme of these categories was the dominance of Catholic countries in the EEC, 
but also terms such as “chauvinist” and “fascist” were used to describe European 
trends, contrasting the righteous Norwegian people. 
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In conclusion, it is clear that Norwegian Euroscepticism is a phenomenon which 
stretches far back in time, at least to 1961 and the first debate. Although the identity 
and rural society theories cannot be entirely discounted, the political values and geo-
historical theses evidently have stronger explanatory power in relation to Norwegian 
Euroscepticism in its first phase. The utilitarianist thesis, on the other hand, did not 
stand up to the first order concern test, and cannot be put down as one of the 
determining factors of 1960s elite opposition to the EEC. The next chapter reports on 
the trends and tendencies in the second phase, the early 1970s. 
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Chapter 5

The Second Phase: 1970-72 
Norwegian Euroscepticism entered a new phase in the 1970s; the decision of the 
“six” at the Hague summit in December 1969 to invite the four applicant countries 
back to the negotiating table marked the start of a new period of opposition to 
European integration in Norway. As will be shown in this chapter, although 
continuity can be seen in many areas of the debate between the 1960s and the early 
70s, such as the constellations for and against membership and, to a large degree, the 
arguments, there are also significant differences between the two periods, such as 
increased polarization, knowledge and participation. These changes make it 
necessary to distinguish 1960s Euroscepticism from 1970s Euroscepticism. 
The objective of this chapter is to ascertain the characteristics of Norwegian 
Euroscepticism in the period between 1970-2 and draw up some conclusions about 
its influences. Similarly structured as Chapter Four, the first part of the chapter gives 
a short outline of the main events and developments of the early 1970s and the 
characteristics of the referendum campaign, based on a review of secondary sources. 
The second section of the chapter turns to the documentary analysis and the 
examination of the argumentation found in newspaper commentaries, speeches and 
“no” campaigning material from the second period. 
5.1 The Constellations and Campaign 
5.1.1 Developments in the Parties and Storting 1970-1972 
In 1961, the Labour party was re-elected to office, and the Gerhardsen government 
was therefore in charge of the first EEC membership application, which was 
submitted to Brussels on 2 May 1962. The 1965 election, however, produced the 
second non-socialist government since the war. This government, which consisted of 
the Conservatives, CDP, LP and CP and was led by Prime Minister (PM) Per Borten 
(from the CP), survived the 1967 application, the 1970 Storting vote and much of the 
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negotiating phase in the 1970s. As in the 1967 Storting vote on EEC negotiations (see 
Table 5.1 below), the majority of the governing parties’ MPs voted in favour of 
negotiations in June 1970. Among the 17 dissenters were only seven of the 20 Centre 
MPs102 and three of the 14 CDP MPs. The remaining seven were Labour MPs. 
Despite increasing opposition to the EC in the party already in the early 1970s, the 
CP supported membership negotiations to keep the coalition together (Madsen 2001; 
Archer and Sogner 1998), and presumably, loyalty to the coalition played a part also 
to Eurosceptic LP and CDP MPs when they cast their votes in 1970. 
Table 5.1 Norwegian MPs against EC membership by party 
Party 
June 
1970 
June 
1971 
December 
1972 
Against For Against For Against For 
SPP/SLP103 - - - - 1 0 
CP 7 13 20 0 20 0 
LP104 0 13 5 8 4 9 
CDP 3 11 4 10 7 7 
Labour 7 67 8 66 11 62 
Conservative 0 29 0 29 0 29 
Total 17 132105 37 113 43 107 
Source: Gleditsch and Hellevik (1977: 312-4). The 1970 and 1971 data are from parliamentary 
votes, the 1972 data are based on information gathered by Gleditsch and Hellevik from the 
mass media and other sources. 
However, keeping the coalition together was to prove to be a real struggle. The 
membership negotiations with the EC were resumed on 30 June 1970 (Preston 1997: 
11), but in March 1971, almost mid-way through the negotiations, the Borten 
government resigned because of internal disagreement on the issue. The catalyst for 
the resignation was a controversy about the PM’s disclosure of secret negotiation 
documents to Folkebevegelsen’s leader, Arne Haugestad.106 A new minority Labour 
Archer and Sogner (1998: 33) argue that the remaining 14 CP MPs, who were also opposed to 
membership, “hoped to achieve this end [non­membership] without destroying the coalition”. 
103 The SPP lost Storting representation in the 1969 election, but regained representation when Labour 
MP Arne Kielland joined the SPP in 1972. 
104 The 1972 figures include the MPs from the Liberal People’s Party (Det Nye Folkeparti), the splinter 
party from the LP. 
105 132 MPs backed the decision to apply (Archer 2005: 46), i.e. one MP abstained. 
106 Because of the divisions between the coalition partners on matters arising in Brussels, particularly 
between the progressively Eurosceptic/anti­market CP and the pro­EC Conservatives, the split was 
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government, headed by Trygve Bratteli, assumed office and took over the 
negotiation reins in Brussels, as well as the main responsibility of convincing the 
public to vote “yes” in the referendum. Although the Labour government’s 
leadership and negotiating team managed to sell most of the outcomes in Brussels 
as victories or good compromises, in January 1972, the Norwegian Fisheries 
Minister, Knut Hoem, resigned and caused the government and “yes” camp 
considerable embarrassment and harm. He resigned because he could not accept the 
accession agreement on fisheries policy (Allen 1979).107 The agreement was signed on 
22 January 1972. 
The Labour Party decided to refrain from taking a stand on membership until after 
the negotiations were completed,108 and in effect, the “yes” campaign, conducted by 
the Labour government, the Conservatives, the business and industry organisations 
and the trade union leadership, did not commence until the membership 
negotiations were completed in January 1972. In contrast, the “no” campaign, 
consisting of the “no” parties from the 1961-1963 campaign, the ad hoc organizations 
(see below) and the primary industry’s main interest organizations, started in early 
1970. In other words, the “no” campaign had got a head start. 
5.1.2 Non-Parliamentary Opposition 
In the 1960s, “no” movements like “Appeal against the Common Market – The 
143”109 and “the Information Committee” were founded.110 The “no” organizations 
inevitable. By some of his coalition partners, Borten was accused of having planned to break the 
negotiation line from the start (Madsen 2001). 
107 Norway was allowed to retain a 6 mile exclusive fishing belt for 10 years after accession. 
Originally, “[t]he fishermen wanted to keep their exclusive fishing limit and their producer 
organisations’ considerable rights under Norwegian law, including compulsory membership, the 
handling of all sales of landed fish, and price and market regulating powers” (Allen 1979: 120). 
108 This was part of Labour’s tactic of not disturbing the upward trend in support that the party 
experienced in 1970­1971 (Lie 1972). 
109 “The 143” referred to the number of petitioners in the early stages of the founding of the 
organization. The newspaper appeal of this group was also included in the documentary analysis in 
Chapter Four. 
110 Both of these were founded in 1962. In addition to these, there were a few regional ac hoc 
organizations, namely the “Oppland’s Committee”, which was founded in January 1963 and was more 
or less a regional wing of the Information Committee; “Bergen’s Committee”, which was a Bergen­
based independent “no” movement particularly active during the 1961­1963 debate; and the “West 
120 
made their mark on the debate in the early 1960s, but grassroots opposition was 
more anonymous in the 1967 debate. Archer and Sogner (1998: 32) put this down to 
security issues taking up centre stage in 1967, but it is also important to take the “De 
Gaulle effect” into account when considering the reasons why the 1967 debate could 
not match the ferocity of its predecessor or its successor. Frøland (1998: 6), for 
example, argues that the 1967 parliamentary vote is irrelevant because the Storting 
anticipated the French veto. 
According to Bjørklund (1982), it was only after the 1969 summit in the Hague and 
the renewed British application that mobilization of non-parliamentary Norwegian 
opposition to the EC started for real. Unlike in the 1960s, the 1970s grassroots 
opposition to the EC was very well-organized. On 28 August 1970, “the Contact 
Committee”, an organization made up by all the anti-EC youth wings of the political 
parties,111 and Folkebevegelsen were formed (Bjørklund 1982: 106). Other “no” 
organizations founded in the early 1970s were Arbeiderbevegelsens informasjonskomité 
mot norsk medlemskap i EF (the Labour Party’s Information Committee against 
Norwegian membership of the EC, AIK for short), “the Youth Front against the 
EEC”, “the Women’s Movement against the EEC” and AKMED, the latter a left-wing 
anti-EC organization set up to counter Folkebevegelsen. The other three, however, 
were established to increase the appeal and impact of the “no” camp and drew most 
of their financial resources from Folkebevegelsen. Folkebevegelsen, led by Supreme 
Court advocate, Arne Haugestad, brought together representatives from the various 
anti-EC movements from the previous decade and opened up to cooperation with 
the six anti-EC political youth wings. The organization’s primary sources of funding 
were the agricultural interest organizations, especially the milk producers’ 
organizations. Conscious efforts were made by the EC opponents to establish a 
broad cross-political cooperation structure in the fight against the EC; by August 
1970, the anti-EC activists managed to unite behind a policy preference of a joint 
Country’s committee”, founded in the autumn of 1967 (just after the second application had been 
submitted to Brussels) by editor and pietist, Arthur Berg (Bjørklund 1982). 
111 This constituted all the political parties’ youth wings, except the Young Conservatives, who, in 
1970, were the only youth wings to support EC membership for Norway. 
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Nordic trade agreement with the EC,112 and, as in 1962 and 1967, the main “no” 
argument was that of sovereignty (Bjørklund 1982, 1997a), as it was easiest to unite 
behind. 
5.1.3 A Note on the Differences between 1960s and 1970s Euroscepticism 
Despite striking similarities in the constellations for and against membership, there 
are also significant differences between the 1960s and early 1970s periods of 
Euroscepticism. One of the most important differences is that, after 1970, the 
membership application was much more real; there was no longer a Charles de 
Gaulle in the EC who could come to the sceptics’ rescue and veto accession. In 
addition, the EC’s confirmation of its plans to move towards a genuine economic 
and monetary union at the 1969 Hague summit served to make the issue much more 
urgent in many people’s minds (e.g. Madsen 2001: 120). This was particularly the 
case in the CP and the CDP,113 where in 1967 many had expressed support for 
negotiations out of loyalty to the government they were part of, despite being 
generally sceptical about membership (Solhjell 2008; Madsen 2001). The more 
reticent opposition of the 1960s as a result of the French vetoes is further illustrated 
by Hanssen and Sandegren’s conclusions in 1969. They write: 
“The Centre Party still has some reservations. In fact, one may say that the 
idea of European integration has gained full acceptance in the mind of the 
individual and the party. This has come somewhat belatedly, and could be 
open to criticism, since the idea no longer presents serious danger of being 
realized […]”. (p. 59) 
After December 1969, it was to become very clear that this was indeed open to 
criticism. That “the idea of European integration” had “gained full acceptance” 
within the CP in the 1970s could not be further from the truth. Nevertheless, the 
112 However, the trade agreement preference was a conflict issue within the organization. At the annual 
conference in 1971, there was heated debate about leaving the trade agreement out of the 
organization’s mission statement. 
113 and potentially also the LP, although the reviewed literature reveals little about the conflicts within 
the LP. 
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quote illustrates that when an issue does not “present serious danger of being 
realized”, opposition to it may appear deceptively modest. The non-socialist 
government managed to survive the 1967 debate, thanks to De Gaulle’s veto, but in 
1970-71 it became increasingly difficult for the coalition parties to find compromises 
on EC issues. The affair which ended in the Borten government’s resignation on 2 
March 1971 was an inevitable consequence of a crystallization of CP opposition to 
EC membership in the early 1970s.114 
A second element that sets 1960s Euroscepticism apart from 1970s Euroscepticism is 
that in 1961, EC membership was a fresh issue, one that had never been discussed 
and examined in detail before. When the issue came up again in 1969/70, all the 
parties in the Storting had a history on the issue, and people and parties had had 
more time to process what membership would entail for Norway.115 The CDP’s Odd 
Jostein Sæter, explains116 that in principle, the CDP was positive towards 
international cooperation, and this attitude resulted in support for 
clarifications/negotiations. However, 
“when this became more pressing and [something] concrete which one had 
to take a stand on… and one went into what the realities and the 
consequences were, then one started to tighten the conditions and criteria 
for being able to say that a negotiation solution would be satisfactory.” 
Moreover, in the 1960s, the issue was primarily treated as a market issue. Frøland 
(1998: 14), for example, finds that government speeches and public papers from the 
first debate “reveal a tendency to reduce the political implications of membership. 
Arguments state it was primarily a framework for economic co-operation and it 
would in practice work as an intergovernmental machinery”. But when the issue 
resurfaced at the turn of the decade, anti-EC commentators were, to a much greater 
114 and, to a lesser extent, opposition in the CDP and LP.

115 For example, the cabinet committee set up to investigate Norway’s problems with entering the EEC

produced reports on this, the first of which was published in February 1967 (Hanssen and Sandegren

1969).

116 Interview with the author, Oslo, 22 September 2010.
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extent than before, arguing that EC membership would have far-reaching effects on 
other areas of integration outside the economic sphere. This shift is illustrated by a 
1970 quote from the documentary analysis: 
“There are still many people in Norway who walk around thinking that 
membership of the EEC is just a question of a kind of economic contract 
which Norway can benefit from. This misunderstanding is maintained by 
some who still talk about “the market issue”. [...] We now have a completely 
new situation seen in relation to the popular arguments which were 
brought up the last time the issue was up for discussion.” 
(Professor Frisch 10/12/70) 
Additionally, in the early 60s, it was less clear in what direction the EEC would 
develop (Frøland 1998). In 1961, many sceptics, like the LP MP Gunnar Garbo, were 
in favour of negotiations, thinking that the cooperation would be limited to the 
economic sphere and/or “believing that Norway will obtain the understanding 
needed of those provisions which are of particular importance to us, so that we can 
get lasting security for our most important interests” (Garbo 05/02/72). Dag 
Seierstad’s recollection of the debate in the early 1960s also confirms that “there were 
no one then who knew how far-reaching membership would be”.117 But in the 1970s, 
with the EC having put the CAP118 and the CFP firmly in place and plans for a 
common currency announced, this “optimism” was set back. Frøland’s (1998) 
interpretation, that the Labour government’s 1962 and the non-socialist coalition’s 
1967 positions on EEC membership were characterized by policy confusion, that is, a 
lack of clear preferences, supports this contention; in the 1970s, in contrast, positions 
on the EC quickly firmed up. 
117 Interview with the author, Oslo, 18 September 2009. 
Optimism about the Norwegian agricultural sector’s survival with full EEC membership was 
arguably thwarted as early as 14 January 1962, when the EEC agreed on the key principles for the 
CAP. After it became clear that farmers would face substantial income cuts under the CAP, 
agricultural interest organizations and the CP increasingly voiced opposition to EEC membership 
(Riste 1997, cited by Frøland 1998: 14). 
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The increased mobilization of the general public in the debate in the 1970s is a third 
difference between the 1960s and 1970s – a corollary of the first and second points, is. 
The intensity of the campaigning, the size/number of ad hoc organizations and the 
fierceness of the newspaper debates are all elements of the period which cannot be 
compared with the 1960s. Similarly, the massive drop in the number of undecided 
respondents in opinion polls from 1971 to 1972 is unparalleled by the numbers 
observed in the 1960s. In 1961-3, the average number of undecided respondents in 
polls was 38 percent (Hanssen and Sandegren 1969: 56), in 1971, it was 33, in the first 
half of 1972, it was 28, and in the second half, the average was only 14 percent 
(Hellevik and Gleditsch 1973: 227).119 
5.2 The 1970s Documentary Analysis 
The academic literature reveals very little about the dominant discourse in the 1960s 
and 1970s battles over EC membership. The literature reports that the predominant 
arguments of the debate were protection of sovereignty, natural resources, primary 
industries and democratic traditions as well as difference of value priorities, but it 
does not account for the nuances in the argumentation or give any in-depth analysis 
of the public Eurosceptic discourse. This part of the thesis examines the 
argumentation used in the public debate on EC membership between 1970 and 1972 
to get a better understanding of 1970s Euroscepticism. The next section presents the 
data and methods used in the study. Subsequently, the findings of the documentary 
analysis are presented and discussed. 
5.2.1 Data and Methods 
The newspaper sample was drawn from both the Aftenposten editions’ debates pages 
between 1 January 1970 and 31 December 1972. The main focus was on the readers’ 
letters column, where a total of 11,094 letters were surveyed in the three year 
period.120 All the EC-related letters were collected, and with the experience of a 
shortage of data from the 1960s fresh in mind, as were all EC-critical commentaries 
119 A more through account of public opinion in the 1970s period can be found in section 8.1.2 of 
Chapter Eight. 
120 4,028 in 1970, 3,522 in 1971 and 3,544 in 1972. 
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and some EC-positive commentaries and articles/news reports. The data collected 
totalled 1,072 newspaper items, but only the 187 items containing Eurosceptic 
argumentation were included in the analysis. These are displayed in Table 5.2 below. 
Table 5.2 Data used for the 1970s documentary analysis 
NUMBER 
OF 
ITEMS 
TYPE OF 
DOCUMENT 
SOURCE TIME 
PERIOD 
PARTIES COVERED 
150 "No" 
letters/commentaries 
Aftenposten 1970-72 Labour, CDP, LP, SPP 
and CP 
22 "Yes" 
letters/commentaries 
Aftenposten 1970-72 SPP, CP, Labour, CDP 
11 Other 
letters/commentaries 
Aftenposten 1970-72 SPP 
4 Interviews/articles Aftenposten 1970-72 Labour, CP, SPP, CDP 
2 Speeches Virksomme 
ord 
1971, 
1973 
SPP, Communist 
Party 
Source: Author’s documentary analysis 
As there was no general election during the 1970-72 period, manifestos did not form 
part of the 1970s documentary analysis. The party political data sourced for the 
analysis in this time period were limited to speeches, but after searching libraries 
and contacting NtEU121 it was only possible to obtain two speeches, one by the a SPP 
member and one by an NKP member. However, Aftenposten’s debate pages provide 
fertile ground for studying the Eurosceptic discourse of the 1970s, and many of the 
newspaper commentaries are written by party representatives or discuss party 
positions on the EC. In this way, all the different (Eurosceptic) party orientations 
have been covered in the analysis, as indicated in Table 5.2. 
In addition, the newspaper and party analysis is supplemented by an examination of 
“no” campaigning material published by various anti-EC organizations. With the 
exception of Folkebevegelsen’s 1972 pamphlet “Norge og EEC: Hva saken gjelder” 
(Norway and the EEC: What the issue is about), which was accessed online 
121 As well as contacting one of the editors of the collection of political speeches used, “Virksomme 
ord”, for advice. 
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(Cappelen 2011), all the “no” literature analysed was sourced from the Norwegian 
State Archives, Riksarkivet, in Oslo. Only “no” literature which covered a range of 
topics/argumentation122 was included in the analysis in order to get an idea of which 
topics or arguments were prioritized/considered most important when the “no” 
parties and organizations were dealing with the issue of EEC on a general basis. 
Consequently, the following material was analysed: “Argumentasjonsplan vedr. 
EEC” (Argumentation Plan re. the EEC) published by Arbeidernes Ungdomsfylking 
(AUF), the youth wing of the Labour Party (Bergo n.d.); “Vi stemte imot” (We voted 
against), a collection of 13 MPs’ reasons for voting against the proposal of applying 
for membership in July 1967, published by Vestlandsutvalget mot norsk medlemskap i 
EEC123 and Opplysningsutvalget av 1962124 (Berg and Rostad n.d.); the booklet “EEC-
motstand: det vesentligste” (EEC opposition: the most important [issue(s)]), 
authored by political science professor Thomas Chr. Wyller and distributed by 
Folkebevegelsen; and an article collection with contributions from a variety of student 
organizations “Hva er EEC?” (What is the EEC?), published by Folkebevegelsen in 
1971 (Sæther et al. 1971). 
All of the data were coded according to the coding scheme described in part 4.2.2 of 
Chapter Four and Appendix G, which separates between argumentation related to 
political values, political culture, rural society, economic interest and national 
identity. 
5.2.2 The Findings of the 1970s Newspaper Analysis 
Much like in the 1960s, the majority of the argumentation against the EC that is 
displayed in the debate pages of Aftenposten in the early 1970s primarily draw on 
political values and/or political culture issues. However, in contrast to the findings 
on the 1960s, also the rural dimension plays a very central role in the 1970s debate. 
Utilitarianism and national identity, on the other hand, do not stand out as 
122 i.e. was not specific to one subject, for example, EEC membership’s impact on the shipping 
industry or employment. 
123 the West Country Committee against Norwegian Membership of the EEC. 
124 the Information Committee of 1962. 
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fundamental to the Eurosceptics’ reasoning against EC membership, although the 
odd letter writer does make use of economic or cultural elements in defence of the 
anti-membership case. Below the findings are reported, according to category. 
5.2.2.1 Political Culture: At the Heart of the Matter 
Over half of the articles analysed were coded to one or several geo-historical 
variables, and the analysis of the 1970s documents thus confirms the central position 
that the idea of “self-rule” and “people rule” holds in relation to Norwegian 
Euroscepticism. Just within the 39 newspaper items analysed from 1970, a plethora 
of different terms describing the concept of sovereignty and independence is 
introduced: suverenitet (sovereignty), folkesuverenitet (people’s sovereignty), 
selvbestemmelsesrett (right to make own decisions), selvstyre (self-government), 
styrerett (right to govern), selvstendighet (independence), rådighet (right to control), 
frihet (freedom), and uavhengighet (independence). Maintaining Norway’s 
“wonderfully free position in the world” (Tysland 06/04/70) is evidently something 
that is very important to many opponents’ attitudes towards EC membership. 
Bjerkan-Melsom (14/09/70) describes the predicament in the following way: “We are 
faced with a potentially fatal choice. Between Norway’s freedom, the Constitution 
and our own justice system – or the Rome Treaty with appendices decided by the 
EEC”. 
As mentioned earlier, between the 1960s debates and the 1970s debate there was a 
shift in the geo-historical body of argumentation. Whereas the membership 
opponents of both the 1960s and the 1970s are concerned about national sovereignty 
and independence, the rejection of the EC on the basis of its supranational or union-
like character first appears in the 1970s debate. A number of letters printed in 
Aftenposten in 1970, primarily written by sixth form teacher Johan I. Holm (e.g. 02/03, 
16/03, 06/05, 14/05, 29/06, 19/08, 17/11, 25/01/71), but also by other writers (e.g. 
professors Frisch 10/12/70 and Eckhoff 02/01/71), argue against “the EEC’s political 
goal: Europe’s union”, the “new superstate”, “the federal state idea”, “the half 
Europe state” and “the United States of Europe”. Focus is, in other words, much 
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more on the political dimension of European integration in the anti-EC 
argumentation of the 1970s than was the case previously. For example, the chairman 
of the Oslo CP, Godal (14/01/71) asks rhetorically, “Whose voice will count most in 
the future, Sweden’s or that of a peripheral province in a European Union (not to 
mention a Half-European Union)?” and professor Eckhoff (10/03/72) states that “the 
joint government which we had with Sweden between 1814 and 1905 is not even 
close to as comprehensive as that we will get with the EC states if we enter”. 
The case against the EC on the basis of weakening democracy is also elaborated on in 
the 1970s. Arnstad125 (08/08/72) gives perhaps the most thorough account of the logic 
behind this argument: 
“I [have previously] raised the question of to what extent democracy and 
freedom is tied to the EC issue. Just these values are strongly rooted in our 
society [...]. I believe that membership of the EC entails a weakening of our 
traditional democracy and that it will lead to far less freedom for the 
Norwegian people to decide themselves over the fundamental things in 
their lives.” 
With this, Arnstad points out one of the elementary concepts of Norwegian 
democracy or folkestyre: the need for government to be close to the individual so that 
he/she can influence decisions that are made. If decision-making is moved to 
Brussels, the individual will be powerless. He argues: 
“In my view, democracy is not a majority’s right to dictate a minority. Nor 
is it an expert regime and bureaucratic power. Democracy is, quite the 
contrary, the individual human being’s right to govern his/her own destiny 
as directly and closely as possible – in a work situation and in society. 
[...] The point is that Norway as a full member comes under pressure from 
well-intended EC bodies and functionaries, who with their good deeds 
125 Assistant secretary­general (of which organization is not stated). 
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nonetheless deprive us of the freedom to decide fundamental things in our 
existence.” 
Historically, the peripheries were governed by the unelected elites and bureaucrats 
in Oslo; the struggle for the introduction of a parliamentary system of government 
was also a struggle for the rural population’s voice to be heard. Therefore, large 
political units and non-elected decision-makers is something that is very alien to the 
Norwegian tradition of democracy, and opposition to “expert regimes” and 
“bureaucratic power” is in this way ingrained in Norwegian geo-historical 
Euroscepticism. Thus, EC membership is synonymous with disempowerment of the 
individual, as the distance to decision-makers would increase massively with 
membership, entailing a transfer of power from the local to the supranational level. 
The CDP’s youth wing’s leader, Kjell Magne Bondevik (18/12/71), also outlines 
democracy as one of his organization’s key reasons for opposing EC membership 
(the other two being the districts and solidarity with the Third World): 
“Decisive for people’s well-being is the feeling of identity with and 
influence over one’s local environment and life pattern. […] We don’t think 
that these large units give the individual human being the room and the 
influence that is required today”.126 
Around a fifth of the documents analysed argue against EC membership on the basis 
of the people’s diminishing influence over their own lives, but if anti-bureaucracy 
and anti-elite rule sentiments are included, the number goes up to over a fourth. 
Here, “international expert government” is pitted against “national democracy” 
(professor Eckhoff 28/08/71), and the “bigwigs” and “smarty-pants” in Brussels 
against the people (Kristofersen 05/08/72). Døhlie (28/11/70) snorts at the elitism of 
the EC system and the negotiations, saying sarcastically, “I guess we [the people] 
had better capitulate straight away, so that these representatives can shape the new 
This line of thinking is also reflected in the SLP’s argumentation today, as interviewee Dag 
Seierstad also argues that “folkestyre in very large units have a problematic life” (interview with the 
author, Oslo, 18 September 2009). 
130 
126 
community undisturbed”. All of this is congruent with the idea that the historical 
aversion to being governed by bureaucrats and experts a distant centre plays a key 
part in the Eurosceptic motivation of many Norwegians. 
Although the link between history and the reluctance to surrender national 
sovereignty is not made explicit by many letter writers, one of the few who couples 
the two is Sørlie (18/09/72). He points to Norway’s “hard-earned historical 
experiences” with Danish and Swedish rule when accounting for his Euroscepticism: 
“It is not ‘a fear of the unknown’ which makes me react against Norwegian 
membership, it is a fear of the known, for that which is known by all 
Norwegians. We know what dependence is, we know what powerlessness 
is, and we know how it feels to be destroyed in a powerful brotherly 
embrace.” 
In school, all Norwegian children learn about Danish (and Swedish) lack of interest 
in and knowledge of Norwegian circumstances in the union years from 1536 to 1814 
(1905), and the resultant neglect of the country’s development. Also in the author’s 
interview with farmer and CP member Per Ole Lunde,127 this theme came up. Lunde 
believes that 
“The knowledge and the picture which has been drawn for us in relation to 
the union with Denmark and Sweden [is probably very important to many, 
me included]. And […] thus, it is easy to draw a parallel to the EU and a 
new union. I know that when I was in Copenhagen for the first time, then 
you saw some of our prehistory which you kind of… There were buildings 
and monuments which were built from Norwegian raw materials and 
Norwegian resources, maybe at the expense of the development in Norway 
in the time [we were ruled by] Denmark”. 
127 Vest­Torpa, 15 September 2009. 
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Because Norway has been, in the CDP’s Odd Jostein Sæter’s words,128 “the smaller or 
poorer part of a union and felt that it has, in a way, put us in an inferior position”, it 
is not surprising that the view of sovereignty as something extremely valuable is 
ingrained in the Norwegian identity, and that this kind of argumentation, linking 
Norway’s historical experiences with the issue of EC membership, has the potential 
to strike a chord with many individuals. Also the PP’s Ulf Leirstein129 expresses a 
similar sentiment: 
“Yes, I think it is somewhat connected to that… 1905, and… I don’t 
remember [1905], and you don’t either, but what I mean is that… it is part of 
our soul. We learn about it in school […]”. 
In fact, all of the interviewees acknowledge the central role that history plays in 
relation to Norwegian Euroscepticism.130 In the SLP’s Dag Seierstad’s words,131 the 
country’s short history as an independent state and experience with union and 
occupation did and still does matter, as it is all “saved in a kind of collective memory 
which, even if perhaps not much of it was used as active arguments, it lies... it lies 
somewhere and creates the kind of basis which human thought originates from”. 
The CP’s Cathrine Strindin Amundsen132 also thinks that it is obvious that history 
plays a part in relation to Norwegian Euroscepticism, as, she says, 
“We are influenced by the society we grow up in and the context and 
knowledge that we acquire along the way. And Norway is a young nation 
state, and all of the history education in school is in reality a long series of 
building up national feeling.” 
128 Interview with the author, Oslo, 22 September 2010.

129 Interview with the author, Oslo, 12 January 2010.

130 Some even unprompted.

131 Interview with the author, Oslo, 18 September 2009.

132 Interview with the author, Oslo, 13 January 2010.
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5.2.2.2 Political Values: Shared First or a Close Second? 
If not as important to 1970s Euroscepticism as the protection of Norwegian political 
culture, then political values gets a very close second place. Almost half of the texts 
surveyed contain Eurosceptic argumentation which either explicitly states that 
material benefits and/or economic growth are less important than other issues, 
and/or criticize the EC for not sufficiently promoting morality, environmental 
protection, peace, equality, quality of life, and solidarity with the Third World and 
with disadvantaged groups in society. 
The 1970-72 debate confirms the findings from the 1960s; it is clear that already in 
the first two phases of Euroscepticism, a large number of Norwegian Eurosceptics 
were driven by postmaterialist concerns. Also confirming the results from the 1960s, 
the 1970s material brings forward little evidence to suggest that the Eurosceptics 
sincerely thought that non-membership would bring more economic benefits to the 
country. Rather, it is quite clear that a significant number of the Eurosceptics 
consider material concerns subordinate to other matters, when appraising EC 
cooperation. 
Quality of life is one of the key themes of the political values category. Minister for 
Public Health Evang (11/09/72), among others, argues that there is a distinctive 
difference between a “material standard of living” and a “standard of life”, and that 
these must not be confused. Sørlie (09/06/72) argues that, although living standards 
might rise with EC membership, people’s well-being is not likely to increase. The 
concept of life standard, that is, “normal people’s wish for a stabile environment”, is 
commonly juxtaposed to the EC’s economic system, which “leads to extreme 
mobility with commuting and economic migration” (Professor dr. med. Kringlen 
19/06/72). Quality of life is also often contrasted with urbanization, which, according 
to the sceptics, creates social problems and conflicts and does not correspond with 
most people’s choice of environment. Much focus is thus put on the individual’s 
right to choose where he/she wants to live, something which is not seen as 
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compatible with EC membership. Tingstad (20/11/70) contributes to the debate with 
a sarcastic comment on the effects of increased mobility for workers: 
“I’m sure Oslo is prepared to receive more new inhabitants. There is plenty 
of housing, and cheap it is too. […] And the extent of people’s well-being! A 
survey in Oslo showed that only 75 percent would prefer to live in a smaller 
city if they could choose. 
But there are also other opportunities: You can settle down out in the woods 
and become a commuter. That way, you can get a refreshing morning trip 
which lasts several hours before work, and a corresponding outing before 
dinner.” 
A reluctance to give in to the forces of urbanization and centralisation is evident, as 
life in rural communities, with no overcrowding or commuting, is seen as a better 
alternative when it comes to quality of life, than life in the city. 
The EC’s economic policy is also seen as inhumane in other ways, as it is argued that 
the open competition it represents will increase the pressure on the weakest in 
society: not only workers and their families, but also the elderly, disabled people and 
individuals with special needs. This is where the issue of internal solidarity enters 
the equation. The centralisation and structural changes that the Rome Treaty’s 
principles produce, it is argued, lead to undesired “relocation, re-education and 
ruthless rationalization”, which again result in problems, “especially for older 
workers, the disabled, the low skilled and various uncompetitive groups” 
(Aftenposten interview with medical doctor Hanoa 12/05/72). 
The Rome Treaty’s focus on economic growth as its primary goal is further criticised 
in relation to external solidarity, the promotion of peace and the environment; the 
sceptics condemn this economic way of thinking for its lack of long term 
perspectives, for going by the philosophy that “the profit of today is more worth 
than the problems of tomorrow” (Parmann 03/01/72). For example, Opsahl (04/05/72) 
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contends that the EC’s principles and policies “entail a danger for continued 
imbalance in the exploitation of the global resources and of the world’s poor 
people”, prioritizing “its own economic growth over global equalization or 
ecological balance”. Tollefsen (18/08/72) also argues that if the EC retains its goals of 
increased economic growth, it will constitute “a very serious threat against the 
whole of our biological basis of existence here on Earth”. 
When considering exceptionalist political values, it is not prominent as a stand-alone 
category: only 25 of the 189 sources contain arguments that in some way or another 
express a belief that the value system of the EC is inferior to the Norwegian or 
Nordic one. Moreover, if excluding “yes” letter writers, the percentage of sources is 
even smaller. The fact that the proportion of “yes” letters which mention this kind of 
argumentation is twice as large as that of “no” letters (25 versus 12.5 percent) 
suggests that exceptionalist argumentation133 is a branch of the Norwegian 
Eurosceptic discourse that has been magnified by proponents of membership, but 
has limited resonance in the “no” camp. Nevertheless, there are some Eurosceptics 
who engage in this kind of rhetoric, and the areas which they believe Norway would 
be pulled down to a lower level by the EC are internal peacefulness and solidarity, 
trade (and thus solidarity) with the developing world, gender equality and health 
standards. Minister for Public Health, Evang (11/09/72), for example, clearly believes 
that Norway has achieved greater social equalisation than the EC countries, as he 
argues that the EC 
“will disturb, break up and complicate the distribution of the economic 
benefits we have achieved in this country, and which is – even if it’s still not 
good enough – in my opinion far better than in the EC countries, generally 
speaking. The wage policy which is adopted with us, benefitting the low-
paid groups, is not typical within the EC.” 
Conceptualized as promoting the notion that the Nordic/Scandinavian countries have a superior 
form of society. 
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Wiig (18/09/72), too, argues against the EC because of its inferior gender equality 
record: 
“EC women’s dependence on their husbands’ social security arrangements, 
the lacking security for unmarried mothers, the actual wage situation for 
women, women’s minimal representation in the national assemblies and in 
EC bodies, the general attitude to women, and their weak position in civil 
law”. 
She concludes that the position of women in Norway and Scandinavia is stronger, 
and that this is a fact that is accepted internationally. Entering the EC, it follows, 
would entail a step back for gender equality in Norway (and Scandinavia). 
At the centre of all of these political value-based arguments is the belief that the EC 
is not suited to solve the moral issues and the social, structural, environmental 
problems that individual countries and the world are faced with, but that it “will, on 
the contrary, contribute to intensify many of them” (Academic appeal, cited by 
Bilton et al. 18/08/72). 
5.2.2.3 Rural Society: Common Objectives, but Different Motivations 
The arguments against the EC in favour of protecting rural Norway, i.e. the primary 
industries, the settlement pattern, the rural districts, nature and the rural way of life, 
are much more prominent in the 1970s debate than they were in the 1960s. The fact 
that a substantial amount of the documents analysed contains this kind of 
argumentation suggests that the rural sentiment played a significant part in shaping 
Eurosceptic attitudes in the period. 
In the context of the 1970s EC debate, the “no” side’s wish to protect farmers’ (and 
fishermen’s) level of income (by the means of subsidies) is commonly depicted as a 
question of materialism and selfishness by proponents membership. “P.B.” 
(06/07/71), an EC proponent, even goes as far as accusing Norwegian farmers of 
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sponging, saying that Norwegian farmers’ motivation for rejecting the EC is to retain 
their “exclusive right” to “put their hands even deeper down into the consumers’ 
[and the state’s] pockets”. This depiction does not correspond with the way in which 
the Eurosceptics themselves view the situation. Eurosceptic letter writer, “E.S.” 
(19/07/72), writes that when the EC proponents talk about agriculture and fisheries, 
they talk about the farmers and fishermen, while when the opponents talk about 
agriculture and fisheries, they talk about the industries agriculture and fisheries. 
“E.S.” declares that it is not the minority of the Norwegian population who work in 
these sectors that are at the heart of the matter, but the battle “to keep agricultural 
production for the benefit of everyone in this country” (original italics). In 
Aftenposten’s debate pages, most defenders of the primary industries agree that it is 
not the detrimental effects EC membership will have on farmers and fishermen’s 
income that is the key issue, but rather that “it is all of the Norwegian people who 
has to decide whether our country as a whole will benefit or lose out” (Kjøs 
17/12/71). This is also illustrated by Lo (10/04/72), who criticizes the “yes” side for 
ascribing Norwegian farmers egotism as motivation. He refers to a poll in which, he 
claims, 69 percent of respondents were supportive of the agricultural subsidy 
scheme, showing the common man’s “broad understanding of the agricultural 
sector’s place in our economy and our society’s image, and for the conditions the 
farmers work under”. Protecting the primary industries is in other words not a 
straightforward material matter, but rather a multi-faceted issue. 
As noted in Chapter Four, the motivations behind different people’s wish to 
conserve the primary industries and their production levels vary. For example, 
“E.S.” notes the importance of a guaranteed food supply, while Kjøs (04/12/71, 
17/12/71) points out the sectors’ pivotal role in maintaining the settlement pattern. 
Others view upholding food production as a moral duty (e.g. Parmann 03/01/72), 
and the maintenance of thriving districts and decentralised settlement is, as 
discussed above, some times connected to the pursuit of well-being and quality of 
life. 
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As a former agrarian party, the CP’s Euroscepticism is clearly coloured by its strong 
links with the primary industries. But it seems that not even in the CP is the rural 
dimension of its EC opposition primarily about protecting their core electoral 
constituency’s income interests. Rather, Lyngstadaas (24/03/71), the former chairman 
of the Oslo CP, states that 
“The real reason for the scepticism lies in that the Common Market’s 
political structure [...] so fundamentally contrasts [with] the Centre Party’s 
vision of future society. [...] The rural district society and everything it 
represents [is] a fundamental element of the Centre Party’s ideology.” 
The writer asserts that the way of life that the farmer represents is central to the 
party’s vision. Because this way of life is based on the notion that the individual 
should have a maximum level of freedom in relation to the society he is part of, there 
is a political culture element to the Centre Party’s agriculture-motivated 
Euroscepticism. “Centralism and concentration of power have [...] always provoked 
strong reactions in the party”, Lyngstadaas explains. Also Nordhus (29/07/72), who 
identifies himself as a Liberal, points out that “our farmers and smallholders today 
stand for the individuality ideal we are about to lose in our bureaucratic industrial 
society”. 
CP MP Unneberg (11/10/71), emphasizes another dimension of the CP’s belief in the 
rural way of life, the so-called “resource democracy”, which not only touches on 
democracy and the political culture category, but also postmaterialist values. He 
argues that responsible resource management in a global and long-term perspective 
is not compatible with the EC’s core principles, but that this is best achieved by 
establishing “responsibility communities”: “moulding Norway into 450 self-
governed, distinctive and, to the extent that it is possible, economic and culturally 
self-sufficient units”. Unneberg’s (and the CP’s) commitment to maintaining the 
rural way of life, draws on many elements connected to postmaterialism: 
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environmentalism, quality of life, reduction of consumption, and concern about 
inequalities in the world. 
Rural districts argumentation is not confined to the CP and the rural population, as 
representatives from both the left-wing and the middle parties voice concern about 
rural interests.134 That this type of sentiment has resonance even among the urban 
population is illustrated by a reader’s letter written by Gunnleik Seierstad (15/06/72), 
in which he argues that “we Oslo inhabitants” would be better off moving to North-
Norway than to the continent, as in North-Norway “we will most probably find a 
way of life which is not like our own. That would hardly do us any harm”. This 
implies that not only does he consider the way of life in the Norwegian periphery 
preferable to that in EC countries, but also to that in Norwegian urban centres, in 
this case Oslo. 
5.2.2.4 National Identity: Present, but of Limited Relevance 
Some of the documents analysed express worries about the cultural threat posed by 
European integration, and a few even reflect outright hostility towards the cultures 
and value sets of the EC countries. However, these expressions are rare among the 
Eurosceptic writers; much like the findings on exceptionalism, perceived cultural 
threat and identity concerns seem to be more popular as a “no” argument among the 
proponents of membership. 45 percent of the items written by advocates of 
membership reproduce national identity-related “no” arguments, but only 16 
percent of the other items rely on this kind of argumentation. The high proportion of 
“yes” letters highlighting these kinds of arguments is not surprising, considering 
that the “no” side was frequently accused of being nationalist by EC proponents. It 
was in the “yes” side’s interest to play up these “no” arguments, which only a very 
small minority of the “no” camp sympathized with, as it was believed to further the 
“yes” cause. 
134 Also, as mentioned in Chapter Four, there has been a cross­party consensus on maintaining a 
comprehensive regional policy and protect the primary industries since the 1930s (Frøland 1998). 
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Nevertheless, although national identity sentiments did not play a very central role 
in the 1970s debate, it cannot be said that they did not exist. Sørlie (05/05/72, 
19/05/72, 09/06/72, 27/06/72) is one of the usual suspects when it comes to this line of 
reasoning, as is Nordhus (19/07/72, 29/07/72, 26/08/72, 22/09/72). Neither of the two 
writers identify with, or trust, the “European superpowers”, and Nordhus even 
brings up Germany’s nazi and Italy’s fascist past in two of his letters (19/07/72, 
26/08/72). In other words, although not very widespread, some letters display 
outright hostility to the traditions, political culture and values of the EC countries, 
and a couple of letters play on anti-German sentiments. However, the general 
tendency in this body of argumentation is a somewhat softer expression of the 
differences between the EC’s and Norwegian policy, and the implications of these 
differences to alcohol policy and cultural diversity. Unlike in the 1960s, religion does 
not feature as a theme in any of the “no” writers’ letters, although the re-emergence 
of “Dyret” (“the Beast”) in the debate, i.e. the parallel between the EC and the Book 
of Revelation drawn by religious opponents of membership, is brought up by a 
couple of “yes” authors. This was clearly done to ridicule the “no” side’s agitation, 
and was perhaps given more space in the press than its real scope called for.135 In an 
interview with the author,136 the CDP’s Odd Jostein Sæter states that this kind of 
argumentation was rare. It was not something he felt the party experienced in 
meetings or party conferences: it was altogether a rarity, he says. 
When it comes to the strength of national attachment and national pride, conclusions 
are harder to make. This is due to the fact that the geo-historical dimension captures 
many elements which are likely to evoke pride in Norway as a nation, sentiments 
that are not necessarily made explicit. A reader’s letter printed almost a month after 
the referendum reflects the connection between political culture and national pride, 
as the author criticizes another letter writer for being embarrassed that Norway 
Also in the early 1990s, biblical prophecies were used as EU argumentation in some Christian 
environments. Saglie (2000c: 167) notes that “even though biblical arguments had a marginal place in 
the EU debate, they still got quite a lot of attention in the media”. That these types of arguments were 
overrepresented in the media in the 1970s too is very likely, considering their sensational value. 
136 Oslo, 22 September 2010. 
140 
135 
rejected EC membership. He scolds her for her lack of patriotism and national pride 
and for being ashamed that 
“the majority of the Norwegian people proved themselves to have enough 
backbone and will power, and to be so headstrong and proud that they still 
want to have the right to govern themselves and be masters of their own 
house.” 
(Laumann-Olsen 20/10/72) 
Solicitor Rabe (31/07/72), on the other hand, defines his national attachment more 
along the lines of the rural identity thesis, that is, attachment to the countryside and 
Norwegian nature, as he writes that 
“The majority of us have an image of Norway in our hearts. We know that a 
large part of this country is ours, and that we can roam freely in the woods 
and fields and the mountains – both summer and winter. [...] We, who have 
fallen in with a bad crowd,137 cannot make ourselves view Brussels and the 
EC as equal in value to what we will lose.” 
This suggests that to some, national attachment is indeed also interconnected with 
the territory of Norway and its nature, as suggested by the academic literature (see 
e.g. Eriksen 1993b). According to this line of reasoning, the EC poses a threat to the 
culture of “roaming” the woods, fields and mountains – glorious, untouched nature, 
as Norway and the people of Norway would lose control over its territory to 
Brussels if joining the EC. 
In the readers’ letters from the last months before the referendum, this expression was used 
sarcastically by a few anti­EC writers after repeated stabs from EC supporters about the bad company 
on the “no” side: communists, left­wing radicals, religious extremists, the CP and farmers, the latter 
“the most conservative elements in Norwegian politics” and not famous for being very progressive 
(cited by Nordhus 29/07/72). 
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5.2.2.5 Economic Interest: At Best a Second Order Concern 
Economic argumentation certainly plays a significant role in the 1970s debate over 
EC membership, but the form it takes makes one wonder whether it is purely a part 
of the forensics, that is, the art of countering the economic arguments of the “yes” 
side, rather than an expression of Eurosceptic motivation. Like in the 1960s debate, 
there is little or no evidence to suggest that the “no” side sincerely believed that 
Norway as a country would be better off economically outside the EC, but there is a 
subtle difference in the confidence with which the Eurosceptic letter writers now 
argue that non-membership will not be economically ruinous, due to the country’s 
sound economic track record since 1962: 
“Catastrophe was predicted in 1962 if Norway ‘missed the bus in Brussels’. 
As is common knowledge today, things turned out somewhat differently.” 
(Holm138 06/05/70) 
So, little effort is put into arguing that the Norwegian economy would lose out if 
joining the EC, but that is not to say that little effort is put into countering the “yes” 
side’s “we cannot afford to be on the outside” argument. The discrediting of 
economic “yes” arguments is clearly quite central to the 1970s debate; it indicates 
that many viewed it as important to make sure the economic, second order 
arguments did not take over the first order nature of other arguments, those related 
to political values, political culture, rural society or national identity. 
Different strategies are used to obtain this goal. One is to emphasize that any effects 
as a result of membership or non-membership are only presumptions: “the 
contention about the market related benefits remains a contention until it is proven” 
(Haugestad139 26/08/70). Another is to depersonalize the benefits that Norway, 
according to the “yes” side, will get: “It is, on the whole, hard to find any category of 
concrete Norwegians who will profit from the EEC, even if we are constantly told 
138 Sixth form teacher. 
139 Supreme Court advocate. 
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that the abstract term ‘Norway’ will benefit from membership” (Brox140 02/10/70). A 
third method is to use the so-called “counter expertise”, referring to experts who 
have come to a different conclusion than the “yes” side about the economic issue in 
question (e.g. Tingstad 20/11/70; Godal141 14/01/71). Additionally, one of the letter 
writers uses the oil as an argument: he/she thinks that Norway’s economy will be 
strong regardless of EC affiliation because of the North Sea oil, making economic 
utility a second order concern (I.Ø. 03/12/70). The most common strategy, however, 
is to acknowledge that membership would be beneficial to the “big” industries in 
Norway, while simultaneously pointing out that to the domestic and primary 
industries and the individual citizen, the economic benefits of membership are more 
diffuse (e.g. Stokke 15/06/72). 
It is very clear that most of the “no” argumentation in the debate pages is geared 
towards other aspects of the integration process than economic matters. Moreover, to 
reiterate the point made above, the economic argumentation that is present is 
predominantly treated as second order concern, or comes up as a response to 
arguments from the “yes” side. Although there is no doubt that it is easier for 
people to focus on sovereignty, morality and decentralized settlement if they are 
convinced that they will not be worse off economically as a result of joining the EC, 
the evidence does suggest that to quite a few Eurosceptics, the economy is 
completely irrelevant to their opinion on membership. This particularly applies to 
many of the letter writers using postmaterialist arguments, but also to many political 
culture-motivated Eurosceptics it is clear that the issue of economic gain is of no 
pertinence. Besides, whether or not the “no” camp succeeded in undermining the 
“yes” side’s economic arguments is questionable. It is important to remember that 
the “yes” camp did “own” the economic issue and that, according to the 1972 
Referendum Study, only 15 percent of voters thought that non-membership would 
give higher economic growth, compared to 39 percent believing that membership 
140 Social scientist and socialist left politician. 
141 Chairman of the Oslo CP. 
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would have a more positive effect.142 Only 26 percent of “no” voters were of the 
belief that Norway’s economy would benefit from not joining the EC, and 11 percent 
even acknowledged that membership would boost national economic growth.143 It is 
therefore more likely that the “yes” side enjoyed more credibility in the economic 
sphere than the “no” side, although it is doubtful that there was much certainty 
among the population about the effects of membership, as the debate was littered 
with contradicting messages. After all, 16 percent of the voters in the 1972 
Referendum Study stated that they did not know which option would give Norway 
higher economic growth. 
Nevertheless, the interview data as well as many of the readers letters illustrate that 
many retained confidence in the Norwegian economy even without membership. 
Farmer Per Ole Lunde,144 for example, provides the following account of his 
recollection of the 1970s debate: 
“The ‘yes’ side had intense emphasis on that – that we would be isolated 
and wouldn’t have a chance of producing or selling anything at all. [That’s 
what] it sounded like.” 
“And why didn’t you buy it?” 
“Well, I didn’t believe in it, I guess. No... [laughs] I thought that if we were 
clever and arranged things right, there would be demand for what we 
produced.” 
Notwithstanding, there were also quite a few Eurosceptics who openly admitted to 
the adverse economic effects non-membership could entail. For example, CP MP 
Unneberg’s statement that saying “no” to the EC would result in economic strains 
just a few days before the referendum was well-publicized by “yes” commentators 
(e.g. Labour MP Aune 20/09/72; Hanssen 22/09/72). Therefore, it is perhaps more 
142 16 and 30 percent said “don’t know” or that it would be the same, respectively. The question asked

if respondents thought economic growth in Norway would notably increase or notably decrease if

Norway became a member of the EU, or whether it would not make a difference.

143 Among “no” voters 19 and 44 percent said “don’t know” or that it would be the same, respectively.

144 Interview with the author, Vest­Torpa, 15 September 2009.
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likely that people with economic issues as their primary concern ended up on the 
“yes” side, as also indicated by the 1972 Referendum Study results, where 41 percent 
of “yes” respondents listed economic interest as their primary reason for voting 
“yes”. 
The above notwithstanding, there are some recurring economic themes in the 1970s 
Eurosceptic debate which could have coloured some voters’ decisions on how to 
vote. Although the economic arguments are extremely rarely the focus of the letters, 
Eurosceptic writers did identify several problems with EC membership: Firstly, 
Norwegian shipping would be worse off. Secondly, Norway would have to open up 
its fishing territory to foreign trawlers. Third and fourth, unemployment and prices 
would rise. Fifth, Norway would lose control of its natural resources, and sixth, 
some Norwegian industries would struggle in open EC competition. And finally, 
some writers complain that the EC is protectionist and does not promote free trade. 
5.2.3 The Arguments in the “No” Literature 
Folkebevegelsen was, at the time and has been since, accused of preferring to use 
“terse and easy to understand messages” over “sophisticated arguments” (e.g. 
Archer and Sogner 1998: 33). This is not only common to the EC protagonists 
participating in the debate, also the academic literature has a tendency to emphasise 
the less sophisticated elements of the “no” argumentation and campaign. In a style 
familiar from membership proponents’ commentaries from Aftenposten’s debate 
pages, Allen (1979: 106-7), for example, caricatures these messages in the following 
way: 
“all Norwegian fish would be taken by foreign trawlers; agriculture would 
be finished; small industries would be ruined and bought up by foreign 
capital; the north would be depopulated; the country would be invaded by 
foreign workers, catholic ideas, rabies, continental drinking habits; and 
foreigners would buy up mountain huts, lakes and forests”. 
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Thematically, many of these arguments correspond to those found in the “no” 
literature surveyed, but overall, they are exaggerated and have much more in 
common with the adverse portrayal of “no” argumentation by the “yes” side in the 
newspaper debate than that advanced by the Eurosceptics. This indicates that 
Norwegian Eurosceptic argumentation has been somewhat misrepresented in the 
literature. 
The documentary analysis shows that the argumentation in the “no” literature 
follows the same pattern as that in the newspaper debate. Political culture and 
political values arguments come up most often and are the ones emphasised as the 
most important, followed by rural society. National identity, i.e. argumentation 
reflecting for example perceived cultural threat or hostility towards other cultures is 
negligible, and the economic arguments take the same form as in the newspaper 
debate: they mainly focus on playing or putting down the government or “yes” 
side’s warnings about economic isolation and decline as a result of non-membership. 
Wyller’s booklet “EEC opposition - the most important [issue(s)]” argues that “as 
long as the economic arithmetic problem results in such a good balance […], the 
question [of whether] membership will promote or hamper […] values [such as 
democracy, protection of the natural environment, Norwegian agriculture,] general 
human safety, full employment, care for loser groups, [and] an extensive egalitarian 
attitude [...] is the essential problem. The most important [issue]” (pp 2-4). He 
concludes: 
“We are opponents of membership because the EEC’s political value 
standards are not ours, and because the EEC therefore is not a suitable means 
to promote the values that we today and in the future prioritize for our 
country and our people.” 
(p. 11, original emphasis) 
146 
In other words, Wyller emphasizes political culture and political values, particularly 
democracy, egalitarianism, quality of life, the environment and (external) solidarity, 
after having discussed and established that the economic prophecies of the “yes” 
side are unfounded: “If we are outside the Common Market, our living standard will 
doubtfully be reduced. We can possibly speak of a smaller growth tempo” (p. 1, 
original emphasis). He also briefly touches on cultural issues, noting national goals 
such as “language development, religion, teetotalism, [and] safeguarding of the 
people’s cultural distinctiveness” (p. 3); the mention of these goals suggests that he 
believes that they are of relevance to the EC question, but the section in which they 
are mentioned is not particularly emotive. Interestingly, Wyller does not discuss the 
issue of the primary sectors in any detail (the fisheries are not even mentioned), but 
when agriculture is mentioned, it is, like in the newspaper debate, brought up as 
something important to the Norwegian people in more terms than just food. He 
says: “I suppose we can eat our fill of German potatoes, but [we can] not survive as a 
people without Norwegian agriculture” – again indicating that agriculture is much 
more to the Norwegian people than just an economic sector. 
Among the 12145 MPs’ contributions in the “no” publication “We voted against”, the 
most common argument against membership is the loss of sovereignty, followed by 
concern for democracy and opposition to centralization of power. The CDP’s Sverre 
L. Mo, for example, expresses scepticism towards the EEC’s “consummate 
bureaucratic technocracy or expertise rule” and that “the organ which is elected by 
the people […] has absolutely no legislative power” (original italics). After political 
culture arguments, arguments relating to the primary sectors or settlement pattern 
are most commonplace: four MPs, one from each of the parties covered (SPP, 
Labour, CDP and CP), express concern about these aspects of the EEC issue, and 
three MPs from the SPP, Labour Party and CP, use political value arguments, 
specifically external solidarity and/or egalitarianism/internal solidarity. The MPs’ 
contributions follow the overall trend also in terms of economic arguments: they are 
not prominent. Only Labour’s Einar Stavang points out that “the gains are rather 
145 There were 13 contributions in total, but one of them, Erik Braadland, did not, strictly speaking, 
argue against the EEC. 
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uncertain” and CP MP Hans Borgen’s comment suggests acknowledgement of the 
view that membership would lead to a “somewhat quicker increase in our living 
standard”. There were no references to national identity or culture in any of the 
articles in the booklet. 
In AUF’s argumentation plan, the anti-capitalist rhetoric is prominent, as it is argued 
that excessive liberalism and large multinational corporations get in the way of the 
labour movement’s work, greater social equalization, environmental protection, 
gender equality and normal people’s quality of life. These are clearly postmaterialist 
themes, but also democracy features prominently as a theme. National identity 
issues do not feature in the publication, but the “yes” side’s economic argumentation 
is given attention towards the end, in familiar form: “it makes no difference if we go 
in or remain on the outside. The economic consequences for Norway are more or less 
the same” (p. 9). 
The booklet “What is the EEC?” contains nine articles on different topics: invalid 
“yes” arguments; EEC and democracy; EEC – capitalism’s battlefield; what is the 
EEC; the costs of being on the outside; Norwegian agriculture and the EEC; the 
fisheries and the EEC; the nynorsk movement and the EEC; and the developing 
countries and the EEC. With the exception of the second and ninth article, which 
only deal with their main topics, democracy and the developing countries, the 
argumentation in all the other articles are characterized by the same themes as 
above: political culture (sovereignty, democracy and opposition to union and 
bureaucracy), postmaterialism (external solidarity, humanitarianism, 
environmentalism, morality, quality of life, equality and anti-war), rural society 
(protection of the primary sectors, settlement pattern and districts), and a playing 
down or denial of the economic disadvantages of non-membership. Little of the 
argumentation present in eight of the booklet’s articles stands out from what has 
been reported above, but the penultimate contribution, which is written by Ola Svein 
Stugu from Studentmållaget (the Student wing of the Norwegian Language Society, 
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Noregs Mållag146), deserves further mention. His reasoning supports the rural identity 
theory, as he defends the primary sectors, settlement pattern and local communities 
on cultural grounds. He says: “so small and sparsely populated the Norwegian rural 
communities are, even the smallest changes in their economic basis would be fatal 
for the villagers” (p. 51), and “this is about the all-important material basis for they 
who hold up the rural culture and the language variant we claim to represent”. 
Although he cites other reasons for being against the EEC, like the EEC’s strong 
capitalist profile, suppression of the development of the Third World, democracy 
and sovereignty, he also states that as an adherent of the nynorsk language 
movement, his main argument is his opposition to the changes EEC membership 
would impose on Norwegian rural districts. 
The Folkebevegelsen pamphlet, “Norway and the EU: What the issue is about”, is the 
only source analysed which to some degree resembles Allen’s above-cited recital of 
the “no” side’s argumentation as “terse and easy to understand messages”. 
However, it is important to point out that the form of the publication, a short bullet 
point pamphlet, prevents the development of “sophisticated arguments” as found in 
the previous publications analysed. The pamphlet states that “foreigners get the 
right to fish in Norwegian waters”, and this could potentially be understood as “all 
Norwegian fish will be taken by foreign trawlers” (cf. Allen 1979). The review of the 
EEC’s impact of the agricultural sector147 might give out the impression that 
“agriculture will be finished”. “We can’t limit the import of foreign workers; these 
will compete for jobs on the same terms as Norwegian workers” could be read as 
“the country will be invaded by foreign workers”. “Depopulation of large parts of 
coastal and rural Norway” and “rural Norway becomes depopulated” closely 
resembles “the north will be depopulated”. And “According to the Rome Treaty, 
foreigners can buy up and develop our energy and resource sources” comes close to 
Noregs Mållag is the leading member based organisation promoting nynorsk, the language which 
was created in the mid­19th century as an alternative to Danish, which was the written language in 
Norway at the time. 
147 Abolition of subsidies and support arrangements, restructuring towards larger units, reduction of the 
agricultural population by 50 percent in 10 years and financial benefits from shutting down agricultural 
areas. 
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“foreigners will buy up mountain huts, lakes and forests”. That “small industries 
would be ruined and bought up by foreign capital” and that “the country would be 
invaded by catholic ideas, rabies and continental drinking habits” (cf. Allen 1979), on 
the other hand, feature nowhere in any of the “no” literature analysed. 
5.3 Conclusion 
This chapter reviewed the secondary literature and analysed the arguments against 
EC membership between 1970 and 1972. It was argued that the period differs from 
the 1960s period in three ways. First, de Gaulle’s resignation in April 1969 and the 
EC’s confirmation of their plans of economic and monetary union in December 1969 
contributed to intensifying the debate and increase polarization. Whereas in the 
1960s, the EC issue was cast in primarily economic terms, the 1970s saw a much 
more impassioned opposition towards political integration and supranationalism, 
because the EC’s objective of an “ever closer union” became much clearer and more 
real with the objectives of political integration set out at the 1969 Hague summit. 
Second, by 1970, all the parties and political actors had had time to digest the issue of 
European integration to a much larger degree: study circles had taken place and 
more detailed investigations into Norway’s problems with integration had been 
carried out in the 1960s. What is more, the availability of Norwegian language EC 
reports and other literature was much better in the 1970s, also contributing to 
increased knowledge of the Brussels machinery and EC policy. And third, increased 
polarization and perspicacity led to increased public participation in the debate. 
There were more activities on the grassroots level (protests, canvassing, meetings 
and the establishment of local branches of Folkebevegelsen), more activity in the 
newspapers’ debate pages, and polls showed a consistently declining percentage of 
undecided voters from the 1960s debate to the end of the campaign in 1972. These 
differences between the 1960s period and the 1970-72 period made it necessary to 
separate the analysis of the 1960s from that of the 1970s, although they both arguably 
make up the formative period of Norwegian Euroscepticism. 
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The second part of the chapter reported on the findings of the analysis of two 
political speeches, 187 items from Aftenposten’s debate pages and a selection of the 
“no” literature from the period. It showed that the 1970s Eurosceptic discourse 
follows the same pattern as the 1960s discourse, with one exception: the rural society 
category plays a larger role in the 1970s than in the previous period. It is clear that 
political culture and political value variables are at the core of 1970s Euroscepticism, 
as the themes of independence, democracy and foreign rule on the one hand, and of 
morality, quality of life, solidarity and environmentalism on the other, reinforce their 
strong position in early Norwegian Eurosceptic argumentation. Economic interest, 
however, plays only a secondary role, with most arguments only seeking to play 
down the relevance of economic matters in order to focus on other more important 
issues. Furthermore, national identity is only relevant to a limited amount of letter 
writers, and is more commonly played up by proponents of membership seeking to 
brand the “no” camp “nationalist”. Figure 5.1 below shows the distribution of codes 
according to category, giving some indication of how many sources contained 
arguments from the different categories. 
Figure 5.1 Number of news items coded to each of the categories (1970-72)148 
Political culture 
Political values 
Rural society 
Economic interest 
National identity 
Source: Author’s documentary analysis 
148 In the economic interest category, the arguments merely playing down the significance of economic 
issues and the “yes” side’s economic arguments are not included. 
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With the 1970s documentary analysis confirming the centrality of political culture 
and political values to Norwegian Eurosceptic argumentation, also observed in the 
1960s study, the geo-historical thesis and the reverse postmaterialist thesis gain 
added credibility in the context of Norwegian Euroscepticism. In addition, the rural 
society variable also lays claim to motivating Norwegian Euroscepticism. There is no 
doubt that the desire to protect the settlement pattern, the primary sectors, the 
districts and the rural way of life is also a very important stimulus of EC opposition. 
However, rural protection is usually coupled with either postmaterialist values, for 
example for the purposes of environmentalism or providing quality of life, or 
political culture, wanting a local democracy and freedom for the individual to make 
his/her own decisions. Besides, it seems that when the opponents are asked to rank 
the issues in order of importance, the primary sectors argument is not at the top of 
the list. For example, Borgen (14/07/71), a CP MP, states that his position on the EC 
does neither have “its origin nor its fundament in the agricultural sector’s 
circumstances”. When considering membership, he thinks the issue of special 
arrangements for agriculture is subordinate. To him, “the question of our national 
right to make our own decisions (selvbestemmelsesrett) is paramount” (original italics). 
Tingstad (20/11/70) also couples geo-historical and rural society concerns in his letter 
to the editor. Speaking sarcastically about the Rome Treaty, he sums up his distaste 
for the EC’s lack of democratic government and the Norwegian pro-EC elites who 
show no regard for the population’s concerns about EC membership’s assaults on 
rural Norway and the country’s democratic ideals: 
“[...] article 235 in the Rome Treaty [...] stipulates that the EEC’s authorities 
have blanket powers to make decisions on every initiative which ‘seems 
necessary to realize one of the Community’s goals’. That’s the way it should 
be, no democratic nonsense with a division of responsibilities and elected 
bodies. 
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I am so happy that we have newspapers and politicians who can really 
handle this EEC business in a proper way.149 And it is clear: if we are to 
enter an economic and political union of an everlasting character, then I 
think that it should happen as fast as possible, and without attaching 
importance to details such as fishing territories, settlement, folkestyre and 
this kind of hairsplitting.” 
The CDP’s youth wing, Kristelig Folkepartis Ungdom (KrFU), emphasises, like the CP, 
all three of the political culture, postmaterialism and rural protection categories, that 
is, the issues of democracy, solidarity with developing countries and the districts in 
their opposition to the EC (KrFU Chairman Bondevik 18/12/71). 
The combinations are many, but from the documentary analysis it seems that these 
three categories together can account for the motivation behind most of Norwegian 
Euroscepticism. Economic interest, however, is not very prominent as a Eurosceptic 
argument because of the “yes” side’s ownership of the issue. Moreover, the 
commonality of assertions by EC opponents that it is assumed that membership will 
lead to quicker economic growth, and that people in the “no” camp “prioritize other 
values than maximal economic growth and as many material benefits as possible” 
(Bondevik 18/12/71), is not likely to have attracted “hard-line” materialists. 
Notwithstanding, economic considerations cannot be discounted as a second order 
issue, as the “no” side did put in significant effort in convincing the public that the 
economic impact of a “no” would, at least, not be catastrophic. Similarly, the 
national identity thesis appears to have limited explanatory power of 1970s 
Euroscepticism, as the argumentation relating to national pride, cultural threat and 
hostility towards other cultures was limited. The next chapter considers the events of 
the 1973-late 1980s and 1989-1994 period, before moving on to the Eurosceptic 
argumentation of the latter period. 
Criticism levelled at the predominantly pro­European media and politicians’ approach to the EU 
question. 
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Chapter 6

The Third Phase: 1989-94 
Modern day Norwegian Euroscepticism was formed in the 1960s and 1970s and 
consolidated in the 1989-1994 period, the second period of heightened 
Euroscepticism. In the intervening period, from 1973 to 1989, there was a cease-fire 
between the opponents and proponents of EC membership, a period of latent 
Euroscepticism. The bilateral trade agreement with the EC, negotiated by the non-
socialist government on 14 May 1973, came into force in July the same year and gave 
Norwegian industry free access to important Western European markets (Allen 1979; 
Tamnes 1997). With this, the European issue disappeared from the political agenda. 
However, the 1972 public vote only enabled (or forced) the parties to bury the issue; 
Norwegian Euroscepticism (and support for the EC) never disappeared. Although in 
the following one and a half decades, discussion of the EC was a taboo in Norwegian 
politics (e.g. Værnø 1981; Udgaard 2006: 325), when the issue resurfaced in the late 
1980s, it was clear that Euroscepticism had been latent in the parties, the “no” 
organizations from the 1970s debate and the population. The fronts were still there 
and, as would become apparent, the arguments used to defend Norway against 
membership had changed little since the 1960s and 1970s debates, except that they 
were now advanced with more clout and confidence than before. 
This chapter covers the early 1990s, i.e. the second period of heightened 
Euroscepticism, but it also comments briefly on the period which stretched from 
1973 to the late 1980s. In order to contextualize the research into the nature of and 
motivation behind Norwegian opposition to EU membership, the first part of the 
chapter summarizes the developments in the Norway/EC relationship from 1973 up 
until 1994. This is also done to show why it is natural to exclude the 1973-1988 
period from the subsequent analysis. Part two of the chapter then presents the 
findings of the documentary analysis. 
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6.1 A Period of Latent Euroscepticism and the 
Subsequent Period of Heightened Euroscepticism 
6.1.1 The EC Issue Buried: 1973-1988 
In August 1972 the Labour PM Bratteli declared that the Labour Party would not 
continue in office if the population voted “no”. In other words, he made the 
referendum a vote of confidence, and in effect, the Labour government became the 
second government in seventeen months to step down due to the European issue. 
Labour’s misfortune did not end with this however: some of the protagonists from 
the no-organization AIK defected and joined the newly formed SEL, and the 1973 
general election saw the party’s vote plummet from 46.5 to 35.3 percent. The other 
“yes” party, the Conservative Party, also saw a drop in their level of support in the 
Storting election following the referendum, whereas all the “no” parties increased 
their vote shares (see Table B3 in Appendix B for details). There was one exception, 
however: the officially anti-EC LP, which had suffered grave internal disagreement 
on the EC issue during the battle and split in 1972,150 also suffered major electoral 
losses. The party’s vote declined from 9.4 percent in the 1969 election to 3.5 percent 
in 1973.151 Of the “no” parties, the SLP’s predecessor, the SEL, achieved the highest 
gains up from 3.5 percent of the vote at the previous election152 to 11.2 percent in 
1973. It was in other words clear that a “no” stance was a vote winner after the 
referendum, at least more so than a “yes” stance was. 
With the exception of the pro-EC breakaway party from the LP, Det Nye Folkeparti 
(the New People’s Party, NPP), some central figures within the SLP, who in the early 
1980s saw a European foreign and security policy as a possible solution to the 
détente (Værnø 1981; Sæter 1981; Johannessen 1981), and a few EC advocates from 
the Labour and Conservative parties, none of the parties made any attempts to play 
up the EC issue in the one and a half decades after 1972. Thus, little reference to 
150 The party’s pro­European splinter group went formed the NPP in time for the 1973 election. The

party achieved 3.4 percent of the vote in 1973, but their results in subsequent elections were dismal.

The LP was reunited with the splinter party in 1988.

151 The party’s electoral fortunes have not recovered since.

152 when it was still the SPP
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participation in European integration was made in the party manifestos or the 
political discourse of the 1970s and 1980s; the manifestos of the anti-EC parties, the 
SLP, LP, CDP and CP, were restricted to defending the existing arrangements and 
the 1972 referendum outcome, and the Conservatives, united behind a pro-EU 
stance, and the internally split Labour Party played down the issue and merely 
emphasized the need for close cooperation with the EC in their party programmes. 
When asked about her views on EC membership in May 1981, the Labour PM Gro 
Harlem Brundtland declared that she thought it was best to let Norway’s position in 
Europe stay as it was, and to let the EC/Norway relationship be determined by a 
natural development process in the long term (Aftenposten 1981). 
Although the parties played down or ignored the issue altogether during the 1973-
1988 period, their stances remained the same, with the CP, SLP, CDP and LP on the 
“no” side, and the NPP,153 Conservatives and Labour on the “yes” side. The only 
party with an ambiguous stance on European integration was the 1973 newcomer to 
the party system, “Anders Langes parti til sterk nedsettelse av skatter, avgifter og offentlige 
inngrep”, which in 1977 was renamed the Progress Party (PP) and in the coming 
decades was to make a massive impact on the Norwegian party system.154 
6.1.2 Slowly Getting to the Heart of the Matter: 1986-89 
As part of EFTA and as an individual trading partner to the EC, Norway’s relations 
with the EC developed in the 1970s and 1980s. Several consultation agreements in 
areas such as research, the environment, and science and technology were 
negotiated in the 1980s (Tamnes 1997; ECDNI 2008). In the latter half of the decade, 
the Labour government’s foreign policy became increasingly Europe-oriented. This 
policy change has largely been attributed to external factors: firstly, in 1986, the oil 
prices fell sharply, prompting a change in the Norwegian outlook on economic 
policy, as national petroleum revenues declined dramatically. Secondly, the 1986 
SEA signified massive changes in the EC. The new initiatives it introduced, 
especially the plans of a Single Market, were projects PM Gro Harlem Brundtland 
153 In 1980 the NPP was renamed to Det Liberale Folkeparti (the Liberal People’s Party, LPP). 
154 It is today the second largest party in the Storting. 
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and the Labour leadership wanted Norway to be part of.155 The Labour 
government’s tactic was to progress with the EC matter slowly and carefully, in 
order to mature the general public for membership. Mrs. Brundtland wanted to wait 
with reintroducing the membership issue until the timing was right, and in the 
meanwhile, she focused her wholehearted efforts on securing a deal with the EC. She 
wanted an arrangement which would secure Norwegian participation in the 
proposed Single Market until the time was right to apply for full EC membership. 
Archer (2005: 57; see also Archer and Sogner 1998: 49) states that 
“[i]t seems that the Labour leadership had originally hoped that the EEA 
would be brought in from 1 January 1993 and, after a few years of 
‘socialization’ in the single market the public would come more easily to 
accept full membership of the EC”.156 
6.1.3 The Developments Framing the 1990s Debate 
6.1.3.1 The Reactivation of Norwegian Euroscepticism: 1989-1994 
Although the wheels of the Europe debate were put in motion around 1986 and the 
increasingly pro-active European policy of the Labour government, it did not start 
gathering speed until August 1988, when the Conservatives broke the cease-fire by 
expressing their wholehearted support for EC membership (Saglie 2000a; Archer 
2005). This put pressure on the other parties to take a stand on the issue in time for 
the 1989 general election, and in 1989 the EC issue reappeared in party election 
manifestos after a 17 year long absence. The “yes” parties from 1972, the 
Conservatives and Labour (the latter still divided internally), were this time joined 
by the right-wing populist PP, which in the 1989 general election received 13 percent 
155 The collapse of Communism at the end of the decade was also very important to the Norwegian 
change of policy, especially as it enabled the Swedes and Finns to apply for membership of the EU. 
Another significant development within the EC in the 1980s was the enlargements to the south, which 
increased the number of member states from nine to twelve: Greece joined in 1981, and Spain and 
Portugal became members in 1986. For example, the accession of “under­developed states in Southern 
Europe” was noted as a positive development by the SLP leadership in 1986 (Seeland 1986), and also 
made the argument that the EC was a “rich man’s club” less relevant. 
156 But, Archer (2005: 57) adds, “these hopes were dashed when the Swedish Social Democrat 
government, followed by the Finns, submitted applications for full membership in 1991.” 
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of the vote.157 On the other side, the LP, CDP, CP and SLP again joined their forces 
against EU membership.158 The party stances are outlined in more detail in Table 6.1 
below. 
Table 6.1 Official party positions on EU-related issues 
Party EU 
membership 
EEA 
membership 
Intra party 
dissent159 
Use of minority 
veto to block a 
yes 160 
Conservatives Yes Yes None No 
Labour Yes Yes Anti-EU faction No 
PP Yes Yes Anti-EU faction No 
LP No Yes Pro-EU faction & 
anti-EEA faction 
No 
CDP No Yes Pro-EU faction & 
anti-EEA faction 
No 
SLP No No None Yes 
CP No No None Yes 
Source: Adapted from Saglie (1998: 352) 
The pro-EU parties were joined by Næringslivets Hovedorganisasjon (the 
Confederation of Norwegian Enterprise, NHO) to form the basis of the “yes” camp, 
whereas the EC opponents were joined by the primary industry’s interest 
organizations, environmental organizations and LO (Neumann 2002; Sciarini and 
Listhaug 1997). This formation of alliances was more or less the same as that of 1972 
and the “no” camp used the “grassroots versus elites” image to its advantage: it was 
the Labour leadership, Conservatives and Norwegian business elites against the 
people (Bjartnes and Skartveit 1995). 
157 The party did not take a clear stand on membership in its 1989 manifesto, but the party leadership 
and its youth wing were quite uninhibited in their support for membership between 1989 and 1993. 
However, after the 1993 election, the party leader, Carl I. Hagen, expressed regret that the party had 
adopted such a strong “yes” profile. He also declared, and as does the 1993 manifesto, profound 
scepticism about the direction of integration as set out in the Maastricht Treaty (Skinner 2011). 
158 The small party Rød Valgallianse (Red Electoral Alliance) was also anti­membership. 
The intra­party dissent column refers to whether there were any dissenting factions within the 
respective parties, i.e. factions in disagreement with the official party stance. 
160 Prior to the referendum, there was an inter­party debate on whether Norway should go ahead with 
the application if the referendum, which was not legally binding, was to produce a narrow ‘yes’ result. 
The minority veto column refers to whether the various parties were in favour of vetoing membership 
in the event of such an outcome. 
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The 1989 general election caused a change of government, from Labour to a centre-
right Conservative/CDP/CP161 government, but the coalition was not to last long. 
Brundtland’s project, the EEA agreement, was to ensure Norway’s and the other 
EFTA states’ inclusion in the Single Market, and its negotiations officially 
commenced in June 1990. However, on 28 October 1990, the non-socialist 
government was terminated as a result of disagreement between the CP and the 
Conservatives on a number of different issues related to the EEA agreement and its 
negotiations.162 For the second time, a non-socialist government saw no other 
alternative than to resign over their internal disagreement on Europe. As a result, the 
Labour Party and Mrs. Brundtland reassumed office. The negotiations for the EEA 
agreement, which was to form the basis of Norway’s relationship with the EU for the 
next two decades, were concluded by the Labour government in 1991. It was signed 
on 2 May 1992 and ratified by a 130 to 35 majority in the Storting 16 October 1992 
(see Table 6.2 below). It entered into force in January 1994, by which time all the 
EFTA states except Iceland and Liechtenstein had applied for full EU membership.163 
Thus, the next step for the Labour government was to carefully prepare a strategy to 
achieve its policy goal of obtaining EC membership for Norway, and, anxious to 
avoid repeating the mistakes from 1972, combine it with successful management of 
internal dissent and prevent devastating electoral losses. 
The economic recession of the early 1990s did not hit Norway as badly as its Nordic 
neighbours, which one can assume with reasonable certainty is one of the reasons 
why the Swedes and Finns approached Brussels before Norway did. No longer 
constrained by the Cold War and their policy of neutrality, in July 1991, the Swedes 
submitted their application for EC/EU membership, and in March 1992, the Finns 
followed suit. Despite the pro-EU Labour leadership’s preference of delaying the 
161 The LP did not get enough votes in the 1989 election to be represented in the Storting. 
162 Discontent within the CP had been building up since the formation of the coalition in 1989 
particularly over the issue of market adjustment (especially those of the EC’s demands which affected 
Norwegian agriculture), but also the decision to tie the Norwegian Krone to the European Currency 
Unit (ECU). Nevertheless, it was the CP’s unwillingness to agree to the EC’s demands of abolishing 
the Norwegian concession laws which ultimately led to the break­up of the coalition (Tamnes 1997). 
163 Switzerland applied for full membership in May 1992, but in December, the Swiss population 
rejected the EEA agreement, making the Swiss membership application redundant for the time being. 
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application until the EEA agreement had come into force and acclimatised the 
general public to the idea of EU membership, in light of the Swedish and Finnish 
applications, the government saw no other alternative than to apply for membership 
(Archer 2005; Bjartnes and Skartveit 1995). On 16 October 1992, the Storting 
approved a new membership application with 104 votes against 55.164 The breakup 
of the vote is presented in Table 6.2 below. 
Table 6.2 1990s Storting votes on EU-related issues 
Party 
EEA agreement 
Oct 1992 
Membership application 
16 Oct 1992 
Against For* Against For* 
SLP 17 0 17 0 
Labour 2 61 15 48 
CP 11 0 11 0 
CDP 3 11 12 2 
Conservatives 0 37 0 37 
PP 2 20 0 22 
Future for Finnmark 0 1 0 1 
Total 35 130 55 110 
* The “For” columns also include the MPs who abstained 
Source: Archer (2005: 56-7) 
By the end of 1992, the application was submitted (Archer 2005: 57). Norway’s 
accession negotiations began in April 1993 and were concluded in March 1994 
together with those of the other three applicant countries, Austria, Sweden and 
Finland. The main controversies of the negotiation process were the blows the 
Norwegian negotiators suffered in the areas of agriculture and fisheries. The EU’s 
reluctance to agree to special arrangements in these two fields was particularly 
controversial. Other areas Norway had particular interests in were petroleum and 
regional policy; obtaining good deals with the EU in both policy areas were 
considered essential to be able to persuade the Norwegian people to vote “yes”. 
164 It is worth noting that the majority in favour of membership did not exceed the three­fourths 
threshold required by Article 93 of the Norwegian Constitution to join a supranational community. 
However, the Labour leadership decided to go ahead with the application in spite of not having 
obtained sufficient backing for membership in the Storting. The plan was to put the issue to the 
parliamentary vote again after the referendum had produced a positive outcome, by which time, it was 
hoped, many MPs had changed their “no” stance to a “yes”. 
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Whereas the Norwegian negotiators tried to bargain for transition arrangements in 
sensitive areas, the EU went for what was to be known in Norway as the “Big Bang” 
strategy: like all the other member states, Norway had to accept the acquis 
communautaire and only limited transition arrangements were granted (Bjartnes and 
Skartveit 1995). It was to prove hard for the government’s representatives to pass the 
deals on agriculture and fisheries as victories to the primary sector’s interest 
organizations and the general public. Nevertheless, the Labour leadership’s co-
option strategy proved very successful: EU opponent Jan Henry T. “no fish” Olsen165 
was appointed to the Fisheries Minister post and given the task of representing 
Norway’s interests in the fisheries negotiations in Brussels. PM Brundtland thought 
that the only way she could possibly win parts of the fishing community over was if 
the negotiation result was acceptable to someone like Olsen, who was a passionate 
EU opponent. Thus, when “No Fish” Olsen not only ended up recommending the 
fisheries deal to the fishing community, but converted to a “yes” stance, it was a 
major victory for Brundtland and the “yes” side. Conversely, the Danish “no” to the 
Maastricht Treaty in June 1992 was a major blow to the EU supporters, as opinion 
polls in the subsequent months showed significant drops in support for membership 
(Grünfeld and Sverdrup 2005). These events show that throughout the campaign, 
both sides of the debate suffered blows and celebrated victories, all of which had the 
potential to sway significant parts of the electorate to vote in their favour. 
Nevertheless, with the Labour Party in the driver’s seat, it was the “yes” camp which 
had the most resources at its disposal to manipulate the electorate to vote according 
to its preference; this was particularly evident in deciding on the timing of the 
referendum, both in relation to the general election and the other applicant 
countries’ referenda. Additionally, the “yes” camp was backed by most of the 
national press, as all of the 20 largest Norwegian newspapers were declared 
supporters of EU membership (SLP 1993 manifesto). Or, as Kallset (2009: 3) puts it, 
“Brundtland had practically the entire elite in Norwegian politics, organizations and 
media on her side”. 
The Norwegian Fisheries Minister acquired his nickname “No Fish” Olsen because of his 
announcement before embarking on the negotiations that he would refuse to give the Spaniards and the 
EU any of the Norwegian fish quotas in the negotiations. He had “no fish to give”. 
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The Labour government’s strategies in the lead-up to the referendum drew heavily 
on the experience from the 1972 referendum. One of the strategies was to ensure that 
the referendum followed shortly after the general election, and not the other way 
around like in 1972, when the party suffered grave electoral losses. The nature of the 
1993 Storting election campaign and its voting pattern clearly illustrate the massive 
impact the EU issue had on Norwegian politics and electoral behaviour in the early 
1990s. The election, held fourteen months before the referendum on EU membership, 
was heavily coloured by the exceptionally strong politicization of the EU 
membership issue in the early 1990s: 62 and 53 percent of voters in June and 
September 1993 respectively considered the EU issue to be one of the two most 
important issues for their vote in the election (Valen 1994: 172). Moreover, because 
the EU issue had split the non-socialist Syse government in November 1990s, in the 
election, the voters were left with no other realistic government alternative than a 
minority Labour government.166 The 1993 election outcome had a very marked 
urban-rural and centre-periphery dimension, and the main “no” campaigning party, 
the CP, increased its vote by 10.3 percentage points (from 6.5 to 16.8 percent) (Valen 
1994: 173; also see Table B4 in Appendix B). Aardal and Valen’s (1995, cited by 
Bjørklund 1997b: 209-210) study indicates that over 40 percent of the voters in the 
1993 election either changed their party preference or participation/abstention status 
in the 1993 election, many of these due to the European issue. Moreover, Ray (1999a: 
334) finds that 9.5 percent of participants in the Norwegian Referendum Survey 
changed their party preference in the 1993 general election to reconcile it with their 
opinion on EU membership and that 15.3 percent changed their EU preference in 
line with their preferred party’s stance. This illustrates that Norwegian public 
Euroscepticism is not a straightforward matter of party affiliation, and that many 
voters formed their opinions on the EU issue on the basis of other sources than the 
leadership of their preferred party. 
166 In 1993, it was clear that the Conservatives would not have the parliamentary support needed post­
election to form a minority government. Thus, the traditional two­bloc alternative was not present in 
the election. 
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6.1.3.2 The Campaign Fronted by NtEU, the CP and the Labour Government 
The “no” movement was quick to mobilize its forces when it became apparent that 
the issue of EU membership was about to resurface in the late 1980s. 
Opplysningsutvalget om Norge og EF (“The Information Committee about Norway and 
the EC”) was formally founded in November 1988, and in August 1990, it changed 
its name to Nei til EF167 (Bjartnes and Skartveit 1995). From 1989 and through to the 
referendum in 1994, the “no” movement conducted a successful campaign, drawing 
on the legacy and experience from the previous referendum in 1972 (Jenssen and 
Listhaug 2001). At the peak of the campaign, NtEU boasted 140,000 members, 
whereas the main “yes” organization, Europabevegelsen (the European Movement) 
could only show for 35,000 (Jenssen and Listhaug 2001: 172). The “no” camp, like in 
1972, was mainly funded by the Norwegian Farmers’ Union and managed to 
maintain a united front. Within NtEU the EU opponents worked together despite 
their political differences.168 The “yes” camp, on the other hand, struggled not only 
with maintaining intra- and inter-organizational cohesion, it also lacked leadership 
and suffered from well-publicized disagreements with their main source of funding, 
the NHO (Archer 2000; Bjartnes and Skartveit 1995). The “yes” camp was further 
disadvantaged by its late organization and delayed campaigning efforts, the latter 
partly due to the Labour Party’s strategic decision to refuse to debate the issue in the 
months leading up to the 1993 election in order to avoid internal disunity and 
electoral losses. The Labour leadership defended this strategy arguing that an 
electorally strong and united party was essential to the success of their pro-EU 
campaign (Saglie 2000a). Whereas NtEU had been actively campaigning for the “no” 
cause for five years already, the “yes” campaign commenced a mere three and a half 
months before the referendum, on 15 August 1994 (Bjartnes and Skartveit 1995: 211). 
The “no” camp and its various actors faced no incentives to suspend their 
campaigning activities at any point in the years or period leading up to the 
referendum, as the 1993 election result of the main “no” party, the CP, illustrates. 
167 And naturally it changed its name to Nei til EUwhen the EC changed its name to the European 
Union in 1993. 
168 The most divisive issue within the “no” movement was the EEA agreement, but even this was 
successfully overcome in the battle against EU membership. 
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The “no” stance was a clear vote winner for the Eurosceptic parties in this period, 
and it provided the anti-EU parties with an additional incentive to keep the issue on 
the political agenda. Moreover, the “no” parties did not suffer from any notable 
internal dissent, contrary to the Labour Party, to which the EU issue represented 
more concerns than just achieving a “yes” in the referendum. For Labour and PM 
Brundtland, the whole campaign entailed a struggle to achieve the party goals of 
maintaining internal cohesion and ensuring the survival of the party; avoiding 
alienating Labour voters in the 1993 election despite the party’s unpopular “yes” 
stance; and achieving a “yes” in the referendum (Saglie 2000a; Aylott 2002). 
On the “no” side, the CP leader, Anne Enger Lahnstein, was the spearhead of the 
campaign.169 She travelled around the country and was applauded for her successful 
mobilization of the grassroots to the “no” cause. Whereas the pro-European elites 
primarily used the national media and events in central areas to forward their 
message, the “no” camp’s campaigning efforts had at least as much focus on the 
local level as the national level. The “no” campaigners travelled out to the 
peripheries and utilized the local media and grassroots activists in the mobilization 
of membership opposition to a much larger extent than the EU supporters (Bjartnes 
and Skartveit 1995: 125, 235). The CP’s position as the main “no” party is illustrated 
by its 0.84 rating by voters on a 1-10 opposition-support scale in the referendum 
survey (Jenssen and Listhaug 2001: 180). 
On the “yes” side, PM Brundtland and the Labour government headed the 
campaign. The onus of proof was on the “yes” side; they had to convince the 
Norwegian public that EU membership would be more beneficial for Norway than 
non-membership. The highly Europhile and united Conservatives kept a reasonably 
low profile in the campaign. The undecided voters who needed to be won over to 
achieve a “yes” majority were largely Labour supporters, and the Conservatives 
strategically let the Labour Party take the lead role in the “yes” campaign to recruit 
these voters to the “yes” side to secure victory in the referendum (Ray 1999a). 
Tamnes (1997: 232) argues that “she became the ‘no’ side’s First Lady in the battle against 
Norwegian EU membership”. 
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Labour’s position as the major “yes” party is illustrated by its rating as the most pro-
EU party by voters in the referendum survey, more pro-EU than the consistently 
pro-EU Conservatives (Jenssen and Listhaug 2001). 
6.2 The Documentary Analysis 
The chapter now turns to the documentary analysis of the second phase of 
heightened Norwegian Euroscepticism, the early 1990s, when Eurosceptic 
argumentation both intensified and diversified. However, before presenting the data 
used and the results of the 1990s analysis, the 1973-1988 period is commented on to 
fully justify its exclusion from the study. 
6.2.1 A Note on the 1973-1988 Period of Latent Euroscepticism 
The investigation into Aftenposten’s debate pages from the 1980s confirms the 
period’s status as a period of latent Euroscepticism. Knowing from the literature that 
the debating intensity would be limited in this period, 1980 and 1981 was targeted 
because of Tamnes’ (1997) reports of certain actors on the “yes” side trying to raise 
the debate between 1979 and 1981. Having looked through 7,294 readers’ letters plus 
any other commentaries and news reports which featured on the newspaper’s 
debate and politics pages in both the morning and evening editions of Aftenposten in 
1980 and 1981, it was only possible to find 42 items related to the EC or European 
policy, and only five of these items could be considered to contain Eurosceptic 
argumentation. Considering that the debating activity on the EC was expected to be 
even more modest between 1982 and 1985, 1986 was chosen as the third year for the 
1980s investigation. Although the issue of Europe was more topical at this time, due 
to the SEA and the Danish referendum on the treaty, a striking absence of discussion 
of the EC in Aftenposten’s debate and politics pages could be observed. Out of the 
2,775 letters to the editor and other various news items that were surveyed from 
1986, only 69 items were EC-related and 10 items contained anti-EC argumentation. 
This indicates that as long as the Labour government maintained that the EC issue 
was not on the political agenda and none of the parties advocated a new debate on 
membership, the debating activity remained modest. As a result, 1989 marks the 
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beginning of the third phase of Norwegian Euroscepticism, as it was only then that 
all the Norwegian parties were compelled to officially take a stand on membership 
due to the Conservative Party’s announcement of their support for EC membership 
in August 1988. 
6.2.2 The 1989-94 Documentary Analysis: Data and Methods 
For the newspaper study from the period, the sample was drawn from Aftenposten’s 
morning and evening editions from the three years leading up to the referendum: 
from 1 January 1992 to 31 December 1994. Targeting the three-year period before the 
referendum ensured that a large number of newspaper items were included in the 
study. All of the newspapers’ letters to the editor were looked through, 16,424 in 
total, as well as feature articles, news stories and other commentaries. 1,261 items 
were collected and exposed to closer examination. Subsequently, 341 items which 
contained Eurosceptic argumentation were extracted for the study: 282 readers’ 
letters, 23 feature articles/commentaries, 19 interviews and 17 news stories. The data 
was coded according to the same coding model as in Chapter Four and Five, 
differentiating between arguments related to political Values, political Culture, Rural 
society, Utilitarianism and National Identity (VCRUNI) 
For the analysis of the Eurosceptic argumentation used by the political parties, the 
manifestos from the 1989 and 1993 general elections were used. This does not 
include the Labour Party and Conservative Party’s manifestos, as they did not 
contain any anti-EC arguments. However, four documents which were central to the 
“no” faction in the Labour Party (AUF and SME) were analysed to make up for this 
gap in the study. These were the SME’s 1994 conference statement; the LO’s 1994 EU 
resolution; the AUF debate booklet, Det visjonære nei (Kallset and Heinum 1991); and 
SME’s Sosialdemokratisk Alternativ (SALT) (Ottervik et al. 1992). The study also 
employs all of the anti-EC speeches from Johansen and Kjeldsen’s (2005) book 
collection of political speeches from this period. These were 10 speeches by the CP’s 
leader Anne Enger Lahnstein and one by the SLP’s leader Erik Solheim. In addition, 
a CP book publication and secondary literature such as Furre’s (1994) book Nei til 
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EU, Solhjell’s (2008) book about the CDP and Kallset’s (2009) book about the 
Eurosceptic Labour faction are used to complement the primary sources. The PP, LP 
and CDP were underrepresented due to the lack of available speeches and, in the 
case of the latter two, their limited coverage of the EC/EU issue in their 1989 and 
1993 manifestos. The PP’s coverage, albeit limited in 1989, is more extensive in 1993. 
Nevertheless, this is, to a certain extent, a reflection of the visibility of the different 
parties in the debate and therefore does not have any grave implications for the 
research. Besides, the aim of this part of the analysis is primarily to confirm that the 
themes and topics of the newspaper arguments correspond with those used by the 
political parties, and the material examined is adequate for this purpose. The next 
section presents the findings of the documentary analysis from the 1990s debate. 
6.2.3 Findings of the 1989-1994 Newspaper Analysis 
The 1990s newspaper study reaffirms the central part political values and culture 
play in relation to Norwegian Euroscepticism. As Figure 6.1 below illustrates, over 
two thirds of the total number of category codes allocated to the different news items 
were either political values or political culture. The prominence of these types of 
arguments was higher than in the studies of the two previous debates, and this shift 
has happened primarily at the expense of economic and rural society arguments, 
which made up a larger share of the 1960s and 1970s discourse. Notwithstanding, 
this is not to say that there is a lack of continuity in the argumentation pattern from 
the 1960s and 1970s. Quite the contrary, the study shows that almost all the 
arguments that were formed in 1960s and early 1970s had the same relevance two 
decades later. 
Although in the early 1990s the arguments remained more or less the same, but they 
were declared with more confidence and conviction than in previous debates. There 
are many possible factors contributing to this. First is the ability to learn from the 
successes and failures of the previous debates; in the early 1990s, still relevant, tried 
and tested arguments from 1972 could be polished, and previously exposed 
weaknesses in arguments advanced by the opposing side could be exploited. In the 
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same way that the Labour “leadership’s strategies and actions were pervaded by the 
1972 experience” (Saglie 2000a: 110), the various actors on the “no” side took 
advantage of the first and second hand experiences from the previous debate. The 
“no” faction of the Labour Party, for example, used the remaining copies of 
Hellevik’s (1979) book about the 1970s’ “no” faction AIK as a “cookbook” for 
organizing SME.170 There were of course also many people involved in the “no” 
camp (as in the “yes” camp) who had “overwintered” from 1972 and had first hand 
experience of the first referendum battle. In addition, the previous debate had 
contributed to make knowledge of the most typical arguments for and against 
membership more widespread; as a result, arguments could much more easily be 
developed and elaborated on than in the 1960s and 1970s, when public awareness of 
the issue had to be built up from scratch. 
Figure 6.1 Number of news items coded to each of the categories (1992-94)171 
Political Values 
Political Culture 
Rural Society 
Economic Interest 
National Identity 
Source: Author’s newspaper study 
Second, the “yes” side’s economic arguments could now (in 1994), even more 
comfortably than in 1972, be dismissed as scaremongering, due to the Norwegian 
economy’s resilience to the economic recessions in the 1970s and the 1990s. 
170 Author’s interview with Wegard Harsvik, Oslo, 8 January 2010, see also Kallset (2009).

171 In the economic interest category, the arguments merely playing down the significance of economic

issues and the “yes” side’s economic arguments are not included.
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Moreover, as Norway was soon to be part of the Single Market through the EEA, the 
“yes” side’s argument of market access was considerably weakened. Third, and 
perhaps most significantly, in the 1990s, changes in the EC added fuel to the 
Eurosceptic fire. In 1972, the “no” side’s warnings about the union-like character of 
the EC and its future development had been based on mere speculations, and back 
then the “yes” campaigners branded these claims as exaggerations and 
scaremongering. In 1994, however, the union was a fact. In SME‘s Wegard Harsvik’s 
words,172 “that which was scare propaganda from “no” people in ’72 was reality in 
’94”. Additionally, the Single Market and the four freedoms, which encouraged free 
competition and increased consumption, empowered the postmaterialist arguments 
related to equality, solidarity and environmentalism. The agents behind this 
consolidation of Norwegian Euroscepticism were in other words endogenous, 
through the process of learning and experience, and exogenous, in terms of the 
economy, the EEA, the union and the Single Market. 
6.2.3.1 Political Culture: “Why be big when happy being small?” 
Over half of the items analysed display political culture opposition. Opposition to 
bureaucratic or elite rule, reluctance to surrender Norwegian folkestyre to the EU’s 
democratic deficit, attachment to Norway’s independence, parallels to Norway’s 
history of union and dominance by other, stronger states – all these notions are as 
prominent in the 1989-1994 period as in the previous periods. However, on the level 
of argument frequency, there are two elements of the findings that are worth 
mentioning. First, despite the EC’s change to the European Union and the increased 
supranationalism post-Maastricht, the sovereignty and union arguments are less 
pronounced than in 1972 (as a proportion of all references made to the geo-historical 
category in the respective debates). And second, the folkestyre argument is more 
pronounced. In other words, the drop in the proportion of sovereignty arguments is 
made up by a corresponding rise in the display of pro-folkestyre (and anti-
bureaucracy) sentiments. Notwithstanding, the democracy and sovereignty 
arguments are intertwined by the principle of people sovereignty 
172 Interview with the author, Oslo, 8 January 2010. 
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(folkesuverenitetsprinsippet), so the political culture argumentation can certainly be 
said to be characterized by continuity between 1962 and 1994. 
Norway’s independence is just as important to the 1990s discourse as before. As in 
the previous debates, sovereignty/independence is widely treated as a value in itself, 
either on its own or connected to the experience of the war or the history of union. 
Andersen (24/11/93) reasons in the following way: “As individuals, the majority of 
us would rather give up prospective benefits from cooperation than lose our 
independence as individuals. Shouldn’t one react the same way as a people?” Øi 
(03/11/94) explains that “the reason [that the majority of the older generation are no 
voters] is of course that we, who experienced the war, know better than anyone to 
appreciate a free fatherland”. Furthermore, Moen (12/12/94), who also experienced 
the war, writes: 
“I [...] will never forget the feeling of freedom I and everybody else had 
when the war finally was over after five hard years. Norway was again free! 
We have been in a union both with Denmark and Sweden before. To me, 
putting Norway’s constitution aside for a rather dubious and quarrelsome 
union would be sacrilege.” 
Many of the 1990s Aftenposten letters/commentaries illustrate that Norway’s history 
of union is central to Norwegian Euroscepticism. On the day of the referendum, a 
letter pays homage to the people who voted “no” in 1972: 
“They gave our independence and self-government a chance, as the ‘no 
people’ did in 1814, 1905 and 1940. The ‘no people’ have wanted to preserve 
our country against union, foreign rule and remote rule.” 
(Hustad 28/11/94) 
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However, there are other history elements which enter the debate too, ones that 
touch on issues of geography. One letter writer looks back on times of economic 
hardship, times when the peripheries battled with cumbersome bureaucracy to keep 
settlement and trade up (Bjarneson Prytz 25/11/94). Persen (07/11/94), the leader of 
NtEU’s Sami Political Committee,173 also draws on Norway’s history of battle against 
stronger forces in her letter to the editor, talking about knowing “what our ancestors 
did” and “what we ought to be proud of and build on”. She writes: “We shall carry 
our forefathers’ sorrows and powerlessness and fight because we believe and know 
that it makes a difference!” (original italics). The key here is the concept of 
sovereignty, or independence, freedom or self government – the right of Norway, 
the people of Norway to make their own decisions, having spent so many years, 
decades, centuries through history not being able to do just this. The following quote 
captures the very essence of the geo-historical concept, bringing history, 
independence, democracy satisfaction, freedom and the battle for all of these things 
together: 
“Norway has a short, but proud history as a background to our independence. 
To most people, we have achieved something so valuable with [this 
independence] that it takes priority over everything. We are, quite simply, 
happy with our government, symbolized by statements like ‘all power in this 
hall’.174 We have seen how Norway has thrived as a free nation. We don’t 
alter the hard-won (tilkjempet) and established just like that.” 
(Okkenhaug 30/03/94, emphasis added) 
That Norwegians are “happy with their government”, i.e. the way democracy works 
in Norway, and see the EU’s democratic deficit as a large barrier to membership is 
something that is very clear from the analysis of Aftenposten’s debate pages. Criticism 
of the EU’s decision making processes and the defence of the Norwegian form of 
173 
Nei til EUs samepolitiske utvalg 
174 Johan Sverdrup, the Liberal who is considered the “father of parliamentarianism” in Norway, is 
ascribed the expression “all power in this hall” in his fight for parliamentarianism in 1872 (Stortinget 
2009). The expression became a descriptor of the foundation of the country’s representative 
democracy. 
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democracy are even more widespread in the 1989-1994 period than in the previous 
two periods. The democracy sentiment builds on conceptions of people 
empowerment, bureaucracy antipathy, accountability, transparency and, to some 
extent, geographical distance. The EU is cast as the antithesis to the Norwegian 
folkestyre: the EU is “an unelected organization” (Johansen 01/09/94) which 
exacerbates the tendency from participatory democracy to “spectator democracy” 
(Furre175 11/06/94) and dictates decisions to its citizens, decisions which are the 
results of closed/secret meetings in Brussels. Strøm (15/10/94) from the Report Office 
of Agriculture176 criticizes the EU for prioritizing efficiency in decision making over 
democratic legitimacy, whereas another letter writer (Solvang 16/11/94) views its 
“democratic fundament” as “the least thought through [element] of the whole of the 
union’s edifice”. He goes on to ask what the reasons for this “tack” are: 
“Does one choose this method to be able to steer effectively towards an ever 
closer union, without bothersome, democratically established 
arrangements? What guarantee does one in that case have to ensure that the 
EU is not a danger to democracy?” 
In Norway, contrastingly, there is, “on the local and national level, advance 
information, openness, access to a broad debate and participation in all phases” 
(Heffermehl 27/06/94). The EU is the antithesis to this, as it introduces unelected, 
elite rule and damages local democracy. Thus, with EU membership, “people’s 
influence over their own lives is gone, and the desire to participate in decision 
making will disappear. The result is a disintegration of the folkestyre” (Johansen177 
01/09/94). 
The “right to govern ourselves” (Nordbø 15/11/94) is evidently also central in the 
1990s debate; here, the concepts of national sovereignty and folkestyre are linked. A 
letter printed around a month before the 1994 referendum illustrates the writer’s 
175 History professor and former SLP MP and the party’s leader between 1976 and 1983. 
Landbrukets utredningskontor 
177 The LP’s political deputy leader. 
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aversion to the notion that politicians or officials who are not elected by the 
Norwegian people, in a centre away from Norway, should make decisions 
concerning local or national issues: 
“[The issue is] that Berge [Minister of Local Government and Labour] thinks 
that it is OK that a foreign politician, a commissioner, makes proposals 
about support arrangements in a municipality in Northern Troms to a 
commission in Brussels. And that the final decisions are made there. What a 
betrayal! 
If Gro Harlem Brundtland & Co had used the following in an election 
campaign: ‘Transfer power from Storting, government and municipalities to 
Brussels’, they would of course have lost. But it is this they work for, every 
day. This is the greatest betrayal the post-war generation experiences in 
Norwegian politics.” 
In other words, the EU breaks with the principle of people’s sovereignty, the idea 
“that all power of society has its origin in the people”, and other fundamental 
principles of democracy; the EU does not have a public sphere, the general public 
does not have equal access to information as the people who govern, and the lobby 
system favours powerful groups (e.g. CP MP Dale 19/10/94). Furthermore, Professor 
and former SLP MP, Berge Furre (11/06/94), adds another dimension to the 
democracy argument; he pits the free market up against participatory democracy, 
arguing that it is not only the EU’s decision making structures which “thins 
democracy and threatens the vitality” of political debate, but the entire free market 
ideology. He writes: “I fear that the EU with its ‘four freedoms’ and prohibition of 
capital control is part of the disease, and by no means the medicine”. However, 
opposition to economic liberalism as part of the democracy argument is not very 
common; the EU’s commitment to the “four freedoms” usually comes up as part of 
other “diseases”: environmental problems, social problems, inequality, world 
poverty and conflicts. The next section deals with this body of argumentation, the 
postmaterialist arguments. 
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6.2.3.2 Political Values: The EU’s Market Liberalism vs. Social Justice and Environmental 
Responsibility 
“The EU is an undemocratic, neo-liberalist, environment and developing 
countries hostile male union, which makes the rich richer and the poor 
poorer!” 
(Mediaas Wagle 27/10/94) 
The second main feature of the 1990s argumentation, at least equally as important as 
political culture, is the postmaterialist values element. As in the 1970-72 debate, 
arguments related to the value of equality and internal solidarity are most common 
in the newspaper items analysed. The second most used postmaterialist argument is 
concern for the environment. This element is more pronounced in the 1994 debate 
than in the previous debates, presumably because green issues had become a more 
integrated part of the political agenda in the 1990s than had been the case in the 
1960s and 70s. In addition, the concept of external solidarity occupies a relatively 
central place within the postmaterialist argumentation, and also anti-war, quality of 
life and morality related arguments are used to call the desirability of EU 
membership into question. Issues linked to health, i.e. drugs (and alcohol), food 
safety and animal welfare, also appear in the 1994 debate, unlike in 1972, when these 
kinds of arguments were limited to alcohol use and pharmaceuticals. Arguments 
that are mobilized to a lesser extent in the 1990s debate than in the 1970s are those 
more explicitly related to quality of life and morality, but arguably both of these 
elements can be traced in other postmaterialist arguments, such as environmentalism 
and solidarity. 
Common to the vast majority of the arguments belonging to the postmaterialist 
category is rejection of the EU’s market liberalist economic philosophy. It is argued 
that the EU’s prioritization of economic growth is a barrier to progress in the above-
mentioned areas and even exacerbates inequality and environmental damage. Many 
commentators express distaste for this obsession with economic growth and do not 
associate with the idea of “much wants more”; opposition to the EU is a question of 
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morality. In a mini-interview, answering questions of why he has changed from a 
“yes” in 1972 to a “no” in 1994, Professor Asbjørn Aarnes (26/02/94) says: 
“Today, the political and economic development in Europe has become a 
question of conscience for me. […] [Things bought for money] are not really 
that important. […] Europe now resembles a department store where 
everything is about buying and selling, and I care less and less for this 
business culture. […] Inasmuch it is possible, Norway ought to be cut off 
from this development […].” 
Also the writer, Odd Børretzen, explains his conversion from “yes” to “no” in terms 
of needing other solutions to solving social problems than economic growth and 
consumption. In an interview (03/03/92), he says: “It’s not like the human race 
progressively needs more goods and things to be happy”. In this way, the EU is cast 
as not focusing on the “right” or most important things; it is “egotism put into 
system” (Persen178 07/11/94). Thus, there is no doubt that value priorities are very 
central to Norwegian Euroscepticism. Another letter writer asserts that 
“it is a question of which values you cherish the most. If you cherish 
economic growth in Norway and Europe highest, then vote yes to the EC. If 
you think that Norwegian nature, culture and ecological balance on earth 
are more important, then vote no”. 
(Bergholt 09/01/93) 
The logic behind the environmental argument is not very hard to follow; it holds that 
increased consumption equals intensified strain on the world’s already exploited 
resources, and as the EU’s primary goal is economic growth and increased 
consumption, the EU is a threat to the environment. The consolidation of the 
environment argument between the 1970s and the 1990s is assisted by external 
factors; the increased interest in and knowledge about environmental challenges 
178 Leader of NtEU’s Sami Political Committee 
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since the 1970s was clearly beneficial for the “no” camp. For example, Hübert’s 
credibility (25/07/94, 11/08/94) is strengthened because her arguments are backed up 
by ecologists’ expert advice. She writes: 
“What is the point in having common rules for cleaning up when the policy 
and its aims are environmentally harmful? […] If one is among those who, 
like the writer, take ecologists’ reports and predictions dead seriously, then 
a radical turnaround is required, regardless of what it will entail as regards 
less consumption benefits and a lower living standard.” 
It is quite clear that Hübert’s arguments (and many others’) in their advocacy of 
sacrificing economic and material benefits on the altar of the environment (also 
observed in countless other letters) have little power to mobilize economic egotism, 
and thus challenge the economic interest thesis. In essence, the inappropriateness of 
the EU as a solution to environmental problems lies in the contradiction between 
environmentalism and economic growth, namely the EU promoting “environmental 
measures with the left hand, while the right stimulates continued [economic] 
growth” (Hübert 11/08/94). 
Also Dammann, the founder of the organization Framtiden i Våre Hender (the Future 
in Our Hands, FIVH),179 in a commentary (07/11/94) argues against the claim that the 
prioritization of free competition does not affect the consideration of other values, 
terming the notion naïve. In his mind, however, the value conflict is not restricted to 
the protection of the environment; he extends it to equality and solidarity. Dammann 
asserts that “for any person who puts justice and social values higher than free 
competition and growth, [the EU] provides terrifying perspectives”. As noted above, 
the concept of social equality is a very central aspect of the postmaterialist 
argumentation. Professor Berge Furre points out in one of his commentaries 
(15/10/94), “the thought of a society with more or less equal circumstances for 
179 The organization works for environmental responsibility and an equal distribution of the world’s 
resources. Its three pillars are, according to its website, “consumption and quality of life”, “fair 
distribution” and “business ethics” (FIVH 2008). 
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everyone collides head-on with EU membership”. This notion is also reflected by 
farmer Hokland’s (news report 27/04/94) statement that “the worst about EU 
membership is that there could be more inequality among people”. Also actor Jon 
Eikemo (interview 07/06/94) cannot consolidate his ideal of equal distribution of 
benefits with EU membership, as he sees the EU as “an economic structure for the 
strong”. Thus, linked to the attachment to the value of equality is the concern for 
“the weak” and the commitment to look after everyone in society. 
It is evident that the EU’s failure to put the individual human being in the centre is at 
the heart of the problem to very many Norwegian Eurosceptics. However, this 
theme, focus on people, is not confined to the political values category, where it 
revolves around the ideals of equality, solidarity, quality of life and peace; it is also 
extremely central to all the political values concepts (e.g. folkestyre) and to rural 
society, with thriving districts depending on individual responsibility and local self-
government. This “people dimension” is also evident in the earlier debates, and the 
conflict is between the EU’s focus on economic growth and the desired focus on 
people. A letter printed just over a year before the 1994 referendum (08/11/93) 
illustrates this incompatibility of value priorities. The writer, Haldorsen, outlines the 
measures set out in a white paper from the European Commission that are aimed at 
improving efficiency in the EU in the future:180 
“more economic growth (without mentioning the sustainability in this 
growth), more use of part-time work, job sharing and more flexibility in the labour 
market, stricter control with the social security arrangements and expansion of the 
work period for pensions, to make it less attractive for firms to invest outside of the 
EC (where do the developing countries come into the picture here?), more 
remuneration moderation and more privatisation – just to mention but a few of 
the future prospects we will get as possible members of the Union”. 
(all original italics) 
The letter writer does not specify which white paper this is, except that it is about “Growth, 
competitiveness and employment in the EC” and was being prepared at the time (i.e. November 1993). 
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The letter writer’s sarcasm and aversion to these policies, which improve 
competitiveness at the expense of normal people’s stable working lives and well-
being, are expressed more clearly in what follows: 
“I say, there is quite a lot of ammunition here for a debate about values: Is it 
the capital or the human being which is in the centre? Words that cover 
consideration for children, women, security, equality and – solidarity are, 
understandably enough, absent in a white paper of this kind.” 
Furthermore, Øyen (12/06/94), Professor of social policy, draws on the value of 
internal solidarity and ethics in her commentary against membership. The welfare 
state, in which the values of justice, equality and democracy are embedded, is central 
to her argument. However, it should be noted that the majority of newspaper items 
which contain equality/internal solidarity argumentation do not explicitly refer to 
the welfare state, but only bring up the values the model is based on. Øyen argues 
that EU membership is a threat to humanistic values and portrays it as a choice 
between “a society characterized by economic considerations in ethical questions” 
(the EU way) and one “where we choose to pay for the care for the dying out of the 
communal kitty” (the desired way). To illustrate her point, she asks: 
“Should our children be taught the humanistic cultural view which is 
embedded in the welfare state, or should they be taught to just think in 
terms of ECU and private insurance arrangements when the old dear falls 
down the stairs?” 
By framing the issue as what to pass on to “our children”, Øyen draws not only on 
the values of justice, equality and solidarity; she argues that the generation of today 
has a moral responsibility to future generations to preserve this humanism as a 
central part of the society. 
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Many of the letters and commentaries which contain argumentation related to the 
above-mentioned elements, particularly those concerned with environmentalism and 
sustainable development, also express concern for the increasing gap between the 
rich and poor in the world. Because of the EU’s discriminatory trade policies 
(towards third countries) and member states’ limited freedom to make bi-lateral 
trade arrangements with developing countries, it is argued that Norway’s solidarity 
with the Third World would be better exercised outside the EU. Alsos (03/03/94), 
from Studenter mot EU (Students against the EU), wants other issues than the EU’s 
main aims, namely economic growth and low inflation, to be on the agenda. His 
priority is for “Norway to become a pioneering country in environmental protection 
and international solidarity – not just in words, but also in action”. The wish to make 
the world a better place and seeing the EU as part of the problem rather than the 
solution are, in other words, central to 1990s Norwegian Euroscepticism. Although 
limited in spread, occasionally, exceptionalism comes into play here. Alsos’ above-
mentioned letter provides an example of this, in its expression of the belief that 
Norway is able set an example for the rest of the world in environmentalism and 
solidarity. Kloster (17/10/94) is another letter writer who expresses remarkable 
optimism about Norway’s potential normative power outside the EU. He thinks that 
“a rich, little Norway” can “push for a global turnaround” by stopping “material 
over-consumption” and distribute goods “in a new and fairer way”. Put simply, he 
wants Norway to do this “by the power of example”, and does not think that 
Norway in the EU would be “free to think those kinds of thoughts”. Although quite 
a few letters in their commitment to external solidarity, implicitly or explicitly, 
assume that a Norway without membership would serve the world better than a 
Norway with membership whether it is as a trade partner to developing countries, 
an independent voice in international fora or by the power of example, it is clear that 
many also have a sober view on Norway’s influence in the world. Many who use 
this argument acknowledge the limits to Norway’s power to change the world, but 
point out that what the EU stands for conflict with their values and principles. 
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Finally, Norway’s superior standards in animal care and health, food safety and 
quality and narcotics border controls are three themes which are new to the debate. 
The arguments on the subject of health hinge on the notion that the current (high) 
standards will deteriorate as a result of EU membership: the bigger and more 
intensive meat production units typical in the EU breed more disease, necessitates 
increased use of antibiotics and entail a worsening of circumstances for animals; the 
Single Market’s non-discriminatory rules will terminate the current strict restrictions 
on food additives and dye; and random border controls will be prohibited by the EU 
as a part of its commitment to freedom of movement, and as a corollary, drugs can 
enter Norway more freely and cause increased drug-related social and health 
problems. These arguments, particularly those concerned with meat production and 
animal health, also commonly touch on environmental responsibility and 
sustainable development, and protection of Norwegian agriculture. This is because 
the traditional Norwegian regional policy181 encourages production in small units, 
which is considered better for the animals, food quality and the environment than 
production in large units (like in the EU). Put differently, Norwegian agriculture, as 
opposed to EU agriculture, goes hand in hand with good animal care, food quality 
and environmentalism. Compared to EU farms, veterinary Jordhøy (21/05/94) goes 
as far as to characterize the Norwegian livestock system as “a model farm”. In his 
letter about the EU and pig-farming, he argues that “our system ought to be a model 
for a future-oriented livestock production which to a larger degree than at present is 
run on the conditions of the animals and nature.” The antipathy towards the EU’s 
standards in this area is illustrated by the following statement in Dalen’s182 (18/08/94) 
letter: “if you are preoccupied with questions which concern food quality, and link 
these to regulations on the use of poison, medicines and hormones, then EU 
membership is not the solution. Then it is the problem!” 
Regional policy (distriktspolitikk) is the collective term used in Norway to denote the various 
policies aimed at benefitting the peripheries (at the expense of central areas) in order to maintain the 
following goals: that everyone can choose where they want to live; to ensure equal living conditions; 
use the resources all over the country; and maintain the main aspects of the settlement pattern “in order 
to further and develop the historical, cultural and resource­based diversity which is embedded in this” 
(Kommunal­ og Regionaldepartementet 2010). Examples of policies are the selective employers’ tax, 
transport support and innovation support. 
182 2nd deputy leader of Norges Bondelag. 
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6.2.3.3 Rural Society: Not as Widespread, but Still Important 
There are not many changes in the rural society body of argumentation between 
1972 and 1994, except that its magnitude has diminished compared to that of the 
above two categories. Whereas in the 1970s debate, the rural society arguments were 
almost on par with political values in terms of spread, less than an eighth of all the 
items arguing against the EU in Aftenposten between 1992 and 1994 mention the 
primary industries and/or district interests. The other difference between the 1970s 
and 1990s debates is that there is not as much explicit reference to the importance of 
maintaining decentralised settlement. This is linked to the fact that the 
postmaterialist argument of quality of life, much used in 1972, is more or less absent 
from the 1990s debate. It is also important to recognize that the late 1960s/early 1970s 
was a period when there was much general political debate about the value of the 
peripheries and rural districts (see e.g. Klepp and Lutnæs 2004). The (late 1960s/early 
1970s) period witnessed a “change in the Norwegian discourse on regional 
development”, with the dispersed settlement pattern no longer talked about as “a 
‘problem’ that ought to be eliminated, but rather a potential that should be 
developed” (Bryden and Storey 2006: 1, original italics). This can help to explain why 
there is less explicit references to the importance of maintaining the decentralized 
settlement pattern in the 1990s period, when this debate had subsided. However, it is 
still clear that the desire to uphold the settlement pattern is at the heart of the rural 
society sentiment. 
Like the postmaterialist opposition to EU membership, the rural society motivation 
for rejecting the EU is rooted in ideological opposition to the EU’s commitment to 
free market economics and open competition. The EU’s commitment to the four 
freedoms poses a threat to rural society primarily because it puts the settlement 
pattern at risk. It does this through its negative impact on employment in the 
peripheries and the districts by forcing change in Norwegian agricultural, fisheries 
and regional policies. EU membership entails the end of the Norwegian agricultural 
subsidies system, and very few Norwegian farmers would qualify for any 
considerable financial assistance from the CAP because it favours large-scale farming 
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over the small-scale farms most commonly found in Norway. Without subsidies, it is 
assumed that because Norwegian farmers contend with much more severe weather 
conditions than continental farmers, they will not be able to compete in the Single 
Market, and thus, it will not be possible to maintain employment in the Norwegian 
agricultural sector. 
Moreover, the Labour government’s fisheries minister, “No fish” Olsen’s sellout to 
the EU of thousands of tonnes of fish and (in the long term) the 12 mile fishing zone 
would put pressure on coastal and northern settlement because the livelihood of 
coastal fishermen would be taken away. This is because the fishing quotas would be 
consumed by foreign trawlers, and fishing activities would be regulated by the CFP, 
not Norwegian regional policy and concession laws. In addition, regional policy is at 
the heart of the matter: conscious discrimination in favour of the peripheries and 
rural Norway to encourage settlement underpins both Norwegian fisheries and 
agricultural policy and encompasses other positive discriminatory initiatives 
designed to boost settlement in rural and peripheral areas. The policy of reduced 
employers’ contributions in Northern Norway and Nord-Trøndelag is one example 
of this kind of positive discrimination, a policy which is at odds with the EU’s non-
discriminatory principles. 
But what are the motivations for nurturing this aspect of Norwegian society? The 
1990s documentary analysis provides some clarification and strengthening of the 
conclusions drawn in the previous chapter. Firstly, many of the protagonists of the 
Norwegian agricultural sector are not only motivated by the concern for settlement, 
but also by their attachment to agriculture as a central element of Norwegian society. 
Edelmann (09/09/94), the leader of Norsk Bonde- og Småbrukarlag (Norwegian Farmers 
and Smallholders’ Union), points out that the question of yes or no to agricultural 
subsidies is not the issue, as subsidies is just as integral to the CAP as to the 
Norwegian agricultural policy. She further argues that the problem is not economic, 
that is, whether or not Norwegian farmers will survive EU membership, but 
structural. Specifically, Edelmann’s contention is that Norwegian agriculture as it 
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exists today, with its small farms spread across the country, cannot continue with 
membership; the choice is between non-membership and a continuation of 
agriculture as a rural industry on the one hand, or membership and agriculture as an 
industry purely driven by profit on the other. In other words, the threat is not to the 
survival of Norwegian agriculture, but its important societal function. CP MP, Lund 
(12/03/94) approaches the issue from slightly different angle. He notes the 
importance of a Norwegian food production to the foodstuff industry and the 
development of society. Lund thinks that “Norwegian voters […] will understand 
that we, in this country, cannot support ourselves by competing with each other to 
death”. Many commentators argue along these lines, pointing out that the EU’s CAP 
which encourages large scale production in central areas is in direct conflict with the 
traditional Norwegian view on agriculture and its function in society. That it is a 
common view that agriculture plays a significant role in the Norwegian society other 
than in terms of the economy is clear from many newspaper items. This is further 
exemplified by a letter by Halbjørhus (07/10/94), a former dairy farmer; he argues 
that EU membership’s detrimental effect on the agricultural sector is not only the 
farmer’s problem, but the entire Norwegian people’s problem. 
This logic is also extended to the fisheries; like the farmers, the fishermen do not 
only represent an economic group, they play an important role in Norwegian 
society, in terms of settlement, identity and traditions, to name but a few. What 
Professor Berge Furre (15/10/94) describes as “the [Norwegian] aversion to upper 
class behaviour, work free income and the ‘sweet life’”183 is echoed to some extent in 
a letter written by Rakozcy184 (15/09/92). He states that, contrary to popular opinion, 
most of the fisheries’ organisations are against the EEA agreement (and EU 
membership), because they believe in “a bright future outside the EU, based on the 
best traditions in the Norwegian fisheries industry”, and continues, “the banking 
and insurance scandals the last few years ought to have taught us that we don’t earn 
a living from investing and speculating in this country, but from hard, value-
creating work”. This is clearly an expression of aversion to the idea of “work free 
183 Which, according to Furre, was fuelled by religious Puritanism and socialist class rebellion. 
184 The head of administration of Norsk Fiskarlag (the Norwegian Fishermen's Sales Organisation). 
183 
income” and the greed and inequality it represents and positive identification with 
the common man’s work, perfectly exemplified by the primary producer. The 
argument is also very similar to that put forward by CP MP Lund, presented above, 
as they both talk about “we”, “here in this country”, and how “we” made it through 
the hardship in the past because of hard, traditional work and cooperation, not 
because of work free incomes and fierce competition with each other (which the EU’s 
market liberalism represents). It cannot be disputed that many Norwegians identify 
with farmers and fishermen because of their central place in the history of the 
country and the nation building which went on in the 19th century onwards. 
The identification with the farmer and the smallholder comes out in a series of letters 
written in response to a commentary written by EU supporter Nina Karin Monsen 
after the referendum (08/12/94), in which the “no” voters’ “smallholder’s spirit” is 
attacked. The rural traditions of cooperation and sharing and the aversion to “upper 
class behaviour” are reflected in the following statement by letter writer Aall 
(16/12/94): “One can ask oneself if it is more typical for the smallholder to share what 
they have with others – or for big shots and the wealthy.” Like many Norwegians 
with her, Aall obviously identifies more with the smallholder and common man, 
who represent the “no” side, than the rich and powerful, who represent the “yes” 
side. Another letter writer, Kjus (13/12/94), goes into further detail describing what 
she sees as the characteristics of “the smallholder’s spirit”: 
“for example, stamina and the ability to make do with simple and essential 
means. […] People went to each other, thought about each other, could both 
talk behind each other’s backs and help each other. People were in other 
words compassionate in everyday life. The smallholder got by, aided by his 
human qualities – and he frequently became a robust and proud person.” 
The smallholder was, then, a role model in different ways: he was hard-working, 
charitable, helpful, compassionate and proud. However, none of these characteristics 
are seen to be championed by the EU and its neo-liberal agenda or the “yes” side, 
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which was dominated by the Labour Party leadership, the Conservative Party and 
the business and employers’ organizations – i.e. the “big shots and the wealthy”. 
The Postmaterialist arguments are generally more prominent in the 1990s debate 
than earlier, and this is also evident in the rural society argumentation. The EU and 
the CAP crashes head-on with postmaterialist values such as morality, external 
solidarity and environmentalism, and the Norwegian agricultural and fisheries 
policies are often seen as more responsible, ethical and environmentally sustainable 
than their EU counterparts. Arnstad, a CP MP (16/08/94), criticises the following 
recipe for how to deal with food production and labels it “market liberalist”: “It 
would have been cheaper for us and better for the developing countries if we had 
left more of the agricultural production to countries with a more favourable climate 
and better soil for this”. She goes firmly against this idea and the deconstruction of 
Norwegian food production: 
“In my view, free food trade is a time bomb in a world where the demand 
for food is just increasing. In their report, Vital Signs for 1994, Worldwatch 
refers to the fact that grain production per person in the world has been in 
decline since 1984 and that the world’s grain stores are now extremely low. 
The only sustainable solution to the future’s food needs is to cultivate the 
soil locally everywhere that it is possible. If the developing countries are to 
produce food for us because this is cheapest for us, then the question is: 
Who is then to produce food to the developing countries in a world with a 
shortage of food? Or put differently: Who should this be at the expense of?” 
By expressing the desire to take responsibility for own food production and thereby 
enabling the developing countries to feed their own populations, she mobilizes the 
Postmaterialist values of morality, responsibility and solidarity to developing 
countries in her defence of Norwegian agriculture against the market liberalist 
thinking of the EU and its proponents. Another example of the linking of political 
values to the primary industries is provided by the secretary general of Norges 
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Naturvernforbund (Friends of the Earth Norway, FoEN),185 Hareide (09/10/92). He 
expresses the FoEN’s concern about the threat the EU poses to Norwegian coastal 
fishing, which according to the organization “in comparison to Norwegian and 
foreign trawl fishing represents a far more ecological type of fishing, with less 
pollution and less use of resources”. In other words, the FoEN opposes the EU’s CFP 
on the basis of environmentalism because they think that the “fishing ecology and 
culture [of Norwegian coastal fishing] is unique in a European context and ought to 
be developed into being an example of ecological fishing”. CP MP Angelsen 
(22/09/94), also argues against the EU’s fisheries policy on the basis of the 
environment and sustainability, criticizing the EU’s oversized fishing quotas. 
Norway’s fisheries policy’s prioritization of responsible management of the 
resources is contrasted with the EU’s policy which to a much larger extent prioritises 
short-term profit and over-sized quotas. 
The quality of life arguments from the 1970s, albeit less commonplace, are also 
consolidated in the 1990s debate. The key word here is trivsel/trives (noun/verb), 
which in English means well-being, contentment, to be or feel happy/comfortable. 
Put simply, the countryside and rural life offers trivsel, a feeling of comfort, 
contentment and well-being, and the EU is a threat to this. A comment by Hokland 
(news report 27/04/94), a female student who is married to an Englishman, illustrates 
the fear of losing this important element of rural life as a result of EU membership: 
“Just look at the British. If you get out in the countryside in Britain, the 
farmers are noticeably worse off than here in Norway. There they really are 
a lower class with less well-being and contentment [trivsel] and more 
pressure. Here in Norway, it is after all possible to be happy and 
comfortable [trives] in a rural community.” 
Hammer (02/03/92) is another letter writer who identifies his trivsel living in the 
countryside as the reason for his opposition to EU membership. He writes: 
185 Norwegian Society for the Conservation of Nature/Friends of the Earth Norway. 
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“I lived in Røa in Oslo in 1972, and both my wife and I voted yes back then, 
on the grounds that we could not place ourselves on the outside of the 
community in Europe. We now live in Nord-Trøndelag and are now going 
to vote no. We are happier (trives bedre) here than in Oslo, and acknowledge 
the uncivilized primitive instincts as the reason for this. […] Why should we 
with our thirst for liberty make the same mistakes as all other industrial 
countries? […] In material terms we have more than we need, but joy, go-
ahead spirit and optimism are in short supply.” 
As the argument goes, urban living can provide material and economic benefits, but 
only the countryside, with its “peaceful and rural surroundings” can offer true 
trivsel, i.e. true well-being, contentment, comfort and happiness. Like Hammer, 
another letter writer, Østbye (16/10/94), rejects materialist and economic 
considerations. However, she links trivsel not with the peacefulness that the 
countryside offers, but with agriculture, cultivating one’s own land: 
“To reap the fruits of the soil gives a feeling of interdependence which is far 
more deep-rooted than all the world’s profitability considerations. That is 
exactly why we want to ensure that no EC shall be able to come here, now 
or later, and claim that it is not worthwhile to cultivate our own soil, that we 
should close down and rather come up with other things which result in 
more earnings, but rust on our souls. Rural tourism, for example, put 
ourselves on display for money – no, thank you very much.” 
Again, a Norway with EU membership, where everything is driven by money and 
profit is contrasted with a Norway with the freedom to maintain a society and values 
that cannot be measured in monetary terms. “Norway is not for sale” was also one of 
the key slogans from the 1970s, and “No to the sale of Norway” was a campaign 
slogan in the 1990s, further illustrating the centrality and continuity of this notion. 
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The commitment to equality permeates many aspects of Norwegian Euroscepticism, 
from political values and political culture to the rural society category. In the latter, it 
is not only in terms of distribution of wealth to, and solidarity with, farmers and 
fishermen and less prosperous regions, but also when it comes to the attachment to 
nature. This is because of the concession laws which put considerable restrictions on 
the sale of Norwegian properties to foreign investors and nationals and ensures 
national ownership of land and resources which in effect, all Norwegians can enjoy. 
Skonhoft and Kjærvik (11/11/94) argue against EU membership because it will 
weaken the traditional economic base in the rural communities and because the 
market ideology that guides the EU’s principles will put pressure on the Norwegian 
government to sell state property to the private sector. This, they argue, will affect 
those of the Norwegian population who enjoy outdoor pastimes, such as hunting 
and angling: 
“The traditional Norwegian system with great equality between people, 
common land, free traffic, large state properties and so on, has hitherto 
secured low prices and a relatively just access to hunting and fishing in 
Norway. Hunting, fishing and berry picking are indisputably the most 
widespread pastimes in the country to date, and quite a lot end up in 
people’s freezers. This is a great privilege for the Norwegian people.” 
The writers think that this privilege will be lost if the EU with its market principles 
takes over. In other words, EU membership entails greater inequality also when it 
comes to access to nature and the recreational countryside. Interestingly, there is a 
direct parallel between this sentiment and one expressed in a letter from the 1970s 
study: Rabe (31/07/72) also wrote about the importance of knowing “that a large part 
of this country is ours, and that we can roam freely in the woods and fields and the 
mountains – both summer and winter”. The concern about losing control over and 
equal access to Norway’s nature and recreational grounds is evident in a few letters; 
for example, “M.Ø” (04/09/94) asks the following rhetorical question: “We have a 
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country with a unique nature. Do we want wealthy foreigners to be able to freely 
buy up properties – without concession?” 
6.2.3.4 Economic Interest: the Consolidation of its Second Order Concern Position 
All of the themes discussed above, from democracy to the environment to the 
preservation of nature, to a greater or lesser extent incorporate a rejection of 
economic thinking. The scope of the non-economic kinds of arguments implies, even 
before the examination of the economic argumentation, that its significance is 
limited. Like the rural society category, economic interest makes up an even smaller 
proportion of the body of arguments than in the 1970s. Economic interest arguments 
are strikingly inconspicuous in the 1994 debate; they account for only about 10 
percent of all the arguments coded, and two out of five of these are concerned with 
playing down the importance or relevance of the “yes” side’s economic arguments. 
The remaining three are also predominantly concerned with responding to “yes” 
arguments, but more in the sense of countering them. Nevertheless, as mentioned 
above, the vast amount of postmaterialist arguments present in the debate, 
particularly the rejection of economic growth and increased consumption as the 
ultimate goal, consolidates economic interest’s status as a second order concern in 
relation to Norwegian Euroscepticism. 
The economic “no” argumentation of the 1990s is very similar to that of the 1970s in 
that it plays down the significance of economic issues. In fact, it is strikingly so, so 
that one has to admire the “no” side in the 1970s for not faltering in their persistence 
that the economy was a second order concern. After all, back then Norway was in a 
much more uncertain economic situation than it was as a fully fledged oil nation 20 
years later: in 1972, the “no” side had little “hard” evidence that Norway’s economy 
would do well outside an EC made up of nine (or 12) member states. So, considering 
that the 1960s and 1970s opponents developed a practice for brushing economic 
arguments aside to focus on other arguments, it is unsurprising that the 1990s 
Eurosceptics also used this approach. An example of this rejection of economic 
thinking is from a mini-interview with political science Professor Thomas Chr. 
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Wyller (01/04/92). He states that “I am still not very interested in the issue’s 
economic aspects. We have managed well outside the EC. […] A ‘yes’ will not solve 
[today’s problems], and a ‘no’ will not make them worse”. A news report from a 
fisherman’s boat in Vesterålen (23/05/92) also reflects a lack of economic thinking 
among the fishermen onboard. Their focus is on the survival of fishing as a 
profession and traditions much more than it is on personal economic gain; one day’s 
fishing does not yield much profit, but they are happy with the situation as it is and 
do not think that the EU would make a difference to their financial situation. That 
“the EC has no respect for the law of nature and the sea’s silver” seems to be more 
important. Heffermehl (18/10/92) provides another example of this disdain for the 
“yes” side’s economic arguments, as he writes that 
“the positive effects on our business and industry are disputable; the 
domestic market and important sectors are greatly exposed. Are the EC’s 
main goals (increased economic growth and competitiveness in relation to 
the USA/Japan) desirable – and are they compatible with much more 
important goals, such as protection of life environment, resources and 
ecological sustainability?” 
The bilateral trade agreement and later the EEA agreement are used to illustrate that 
the Norwegian economy does not rely on membership; they are depicted as 
alternatives which look after the country’s economic interests well, giving 
Norwegian businesses market access to the EC. 
The marginal position of economic interest arguments notwithstanding, some 
recurring themes exist. Like in the 1970s, some express concerns about 
unemployment (e.g. Haldorsen 08/11/93; Gonzale 18/11/94) or the domestic 
industries and businesses which will not be able to compete in an EU-wide market 
(e.g. Professor Eckhoff 27/07/92; Eidsvig 11/10/94). Others are opposed to giving up 
national control over economic and monetary policy, as they believe that the 
economy would suffer with EMU because Norway, as a producer of raw materials 
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(oil, gas, hydroelectricity, fish and timber), has different interests to the other EU 
countries (e.g. Professor Thonstad 04/05/94; Seip186 28/11/94). Control over the fish 
resources is also quite a common theme,187 but agriculture only comes up in a clear 
economic context once, in conjunction with employment. A couple of letter writers 
argue that Norway will lose out economically because the country will now have to 
pay tariffs, set by the EU, on imports from countries outside the EU; another two 
letter writers are worried about the negative impact foreign acquisitions will have on 
the economy. The last significant theme in this category is the aversion to the direct 
cost of EU membership, that is, the direct transfers from the Norwegian government 
budget to the EU budget. This is of course coupled with criticism of how the EU is 
run and how it spends its money, for example its bureaucracy (Våssgård 07/11/94), 
its structural funds (CP MP Lund 25/11/94) or its policies (e.g. allowing food 
additives): 
“By the way, we have to pay an enormous sum of money to join. Have you 
thought about that – another insane investment of our tax money. And what 
do we get in return for that? A load of food which contains additives which 
have been banned in Norway ages ago due to our strict food controls.” 
(Røysum 21/11/94) 
Yet again, as this quote illustrates, it seems that the issue comes back to the idea of 
being short-changed: in the political culture category it was the idea of swapping a 
well-functioning democratic system with a severely flawed one, or in the political 
186 Lecturer in social economics 
187 Additionally, retaining control over “the natural resources” also comes up a few times, but it is 
unclear whether this is motivated by economic factors or postmaterialist ideas, for example responsible 
and sustainable management of the resources. The latter is something which has featured in for 
example the SLP’s discussions about the country’s natural resources, and which is reflected in Dag 
Seierstad’s comments in an interview with the author (Oslo, 18 September 2009): “intermittently, we 
touch on the thought that there is something absurd about the fact that Norway has such a large part of 
the global oil and gas resources at its disposal, and that we, ourselves, ought to have suggested to put 
them under a kind of UN type of management. At least parts of it”. But if the alternative is that “the 
big, international capital interests” take over, in Seierstad’s view, then national control over the natural 
resources is preferable. A similar viewpoint is put forward by SME’s Wegard Harsvik (author’s 
interview, Oslo, 8 January 2010), who says that “there is nothing that indicates that, if we had given up 
the management of the energy resources to the EU, that it would have benefited the poor in the world 
in any way”. 
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values category, a relatively equal and considerate society with a more unequal and 
indifferent one; in economic terms, it is the idea of paying more money for poorer 
products and services. Sigrid Zurbuchen Heiberg from the organization UmEU 
expresses a similar sentiment. She thinks that if the EU had only been aimed at 
dealing with transboundary problems, then it would have been okay. But, she says 
“the EU is so much more. It is a kind of political union which builds policy in areas 
which are completely unnecessary, and which in addition, has poor policies in those 
areas”. 
Extremely few news items touch on themes related to egocentric utilitarianism: 
higher energy prices as a result of membership comes up once, and so does 
opposition to the EU’s policy of charging value added tax (VAT) on hotel bookings. 
The issue of food prices also comes up once, in a letter by SLP MP188 Kristin 
Halvorsen. However, she does not use food prices as an argument against the EU; 
her letter attempts to invalidate claims from the “yes” side, which she says “makes 
arithmetic problems which gives out the impression that most people will save a lot 
of money on getting EU prices on many foods from day one”. This type of 
argumentation is also the cause of Berg’s (18/11/94) frustration, who considers 
egocentric considerations unworthy of discussion: 
“All the talk about more expensive or cheaper food, cars, alcohol, etc both 
angers and saddens me. […] After all, this is not what it is about. […] If my 
job gets better conditions in the EU, I will still vote no. The question is not 
about whether I get more or less in my wallet. It is not about whether it will 
get easier to travel and some goods will become easier to get hold of. Quite 
simply, I do not want to give up any more sovereignty.” 
Nevertheless, there is one letter which clearly reflects egocentric (and sociotropic) 
sentiments; Paus (18/11/94) is critical of how much it will cost “us”, namely Norway, 
to be in the EU. She does not view the prospect of sharing Norway’s natural 
188 The SLP’s leader (1997­present) 
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resources with the EU favourably and sourly states that “the idea is evidently that 
we are supposed to pay more than we get in return”. Her conclusion is that “any 
possible economic gain is highly hypothetical, while expenses in the billions are 
guaranteed” (original italics). 
The economic themes in the 1990s debate which reflect utilitarian thinking are in 
other words more or less the same as in the 1970s: concern for unemployment; 
disagreement with the transfer of large sums of money to Brussels; that the fisheries 
would lose out; that Norwegian industry would not be able to compete; and fear of 
foreign acquisitions of land189 and industry. The first deflection from these themes is 
the consideration of the shipping industry in the 1970s newspaper items, 190 a theme 
which does not come up at all in the 1990s material. Secondly, oil came up several 
times in the 1970s, but not once in the 1990s; and thirdly, the discussion of food 
prices was more prominent in the 1970s than in the 1990s material. The only 
argument notably more prominent in the 1990s than in the 1970s is that of EMU and 
incompatible economies, and hence, there are only marginal changes in the 1990s 
economic arguments due to exogenous factors. 
In addition to the copying of the 1960s and 1970s strategy of playing down the 
importance of economic issues, the decline in the share of economic argumentation 
as a proportion of all arguments between the 1970s and 1990s also attests the 
consolidation of the “it is not a matter of the economy” and “there are more 
important issues at stake” arguments from the 1960s and 1970s. Moreover, the fact 
that the “no” side predominantly engaged in this kind of argumentation, namely 
counterbalancing the “yes” side’s economic arguments, and not in arguing that non-
membership would be the more economically beneficial alternative is also consistent 
with the trends in the 1960s and 1970s and points to the conclusion that sociotropic 
utilitarianism can not be considered to be a primary determinant of opposition to EU 
189 In the 1970s this was mainly concerning the buying of cabins, which again could have more to do 
with preservation of and access to the countryside and mountain areas. 
190 It should be noted that many of the “no” letters mentioning the shipping industry is written by the 
same author (Johan I. Holm), but it is clear that shipping was debated much more extensively by both 
sides in the 1970s than the 1990s. 
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membership. While non-membership was perhaps not necessarily known as the less 
economically beneficial option, it was certainly not viewed as the more economically 
lucrative option. Professor Furre’s (26/11/94) commentary gives a good summary of 
the debate two days prior to the referendum: 
“I think the debate has done away with the most important economic 
arguments for EU membership. The NHO’s 100,000 jobs191 have met more or 
less unanimous slating in economic specialist environments. The 
speculations about investment drought and rising interest rates have been 
quite effectively punctuated. Our wealth of resources coupled with a good 
economy makes it so that Norway can manage well outside the EU. Even 
voices from business and industry which carry considerable weight verify 
this. Economic issues do not force us into membership.” (original italics) 
The quote is congruent with the conclusions drawn above, but it also suggests that 
economic considerations do matter. “Norway can manage well outside the EU” and 
“economic considerations do not force us into membership” gives out the 
impression that the only reason why the economy does not matter is because it is 
doing well. Therefore, it is important to remember that although the documentary 
analysis shows that economic utilitarianism is of little pertinence to many 
Norwegian Eurosceptics, it could have been of great significance to many “no” 
voters, as the above messages might well have conditioned what issues were given 
priority in the referendum. What is clear, however, is that the idea of “much wants 
more” does not apply to Norwegians in the context of their Euroscepticism. 
6.2.3.5 National Identity: a Marginal Position 
That the national identity category is the least convincing of all five of the categories 
is again made apparent by the 1990s documentary analysis. Not only is it the 
category which fewest items are coded to, it is again questionable whether most of 
the arguments coded to this category can be said to express or mobilize concerns 
191 In a press conference during the campaign, the NHO’s leader, Svein Aaser, famously declared that 
the referendum was a question of a yes or a no to 100,000 jobs. 
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about the threat the EU poses to the nation state and national identity. This is 
because they range from indirect criticism of Dutch drug policy (e.g. Botnen 
25/08/94) to southern Europeans’ (lack of) respect for the law (e.g. Fjeld 28/11/94; 
Holm 22/09/94) to a lack of trust in Italians and the French’s willingness and ability 
to provide (military) security for Norway. Moreover, the fact that many letters and 
commentaries use arguments which completely defy the notion of cultural threat, 
nationalism and hostility towards other cultures also contributes to consolidating the 
marginal position of national identity sentiments, at least as it is conceptualised here. 
Nevertheless, although not prominent or widespread, there are some examples of 
expression of cultural threat in conjunction with membership of the EU in some of 
the newspaper items. Noregs Mållag for example advises people to vote “no” on 
account of that “the indirect and the direct effects of Norwegian membership will 
harm Norwegian language and culture” (Faye192 20/08/94) because of French, English 
and German as well as bokmål dominance and concerns that “many of the political 
subsidy schemes for culture that [exist] today can be perceived as distorting 
competition and therefore judged illegal in the EU”. Bergholt (09/01/93) takes a 
different perspective on the problem; he believes that closer cooperation in the EC 
which is very diverse in terms of ethnic groups, cultures and religions is more likely 
to cause conflicts. Besides, he argues, the increased centralisation and urbanisation 
that results from EU membership will cause much of Norwegian culture to be lost, 
and replaced by the American “city culture”. His appeal is: “If you value Norwegian 
nature and culture […] the highest, then vote no”. 
Some hostility towards the former great powers of Europe is visible in some letters, 
although the sentiment is not as commonplace as it was in the 1960s and 1970s 
debates. Hübert (01/12/92), Østbye (16/10/93) and Slåtten (17/08/94) are all opposed 
to enter an EC/EU dominated by the former “colonial powers”, and both “G.K.” 
(28/10/93) and Klemetsen (31/10/94) clearly display antipathy towards Germany. 
Østbye criticises the Labour leadership for uncritically admiring “these European ex-
192 the head of Noregs Mållag. 
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colonial powers with their greedy market orientation and persistent patriarchal 
structure. It is in direct conflict with ancient Norwegian values and Norwegian 
identity” (emphasis added). Through the rejection of the EU countries’ “greed” and 
“patriarchy” and the adherence to external solidarity, postmaterialist values are 
linked with identity in the battle against EU membership. Also actor Eikemo 
(interview 07/06/94) expresses distaste for Europe’s colonial history, notably a 
history which Norway has not been part of, as reflected in the use of “they”: 
“I can’t understand that [being European] is something to adorn oneself 
with. Look what they have done in Africa, Asia and America. Has anyone 
been more greedy than English, French and Belgian colonists? They have 
suppressed people all over the world.” (emphasis added) 
The above quotes can be said to express some hostility to other European cultures, or 
alternatively the idea that Norway is different to the EU countries and thus 
incompatible with the EU if the identity of Norway as a peaceful and solidarity-
minded nation is to be preserved. Thus, through history, identity is also connected to 
political culture, and its costly experiences of foreign rule, which have formed 
national identity and values. Christensen (18/04/94) writes: 
“Perhaps it is the battle against a dominating union which in turn has 
intensified the cultural identity of people who want their freedom. When 
we were in union with Denmark and Sweden, it was because we had kept 
our identity, yes, developed and made ourselves conscious of it, that we 
wanted to be masters of our own house!” 
This suggests that Norwegians’ sense of identity is the reason for their thirst for 
freedom and independence, and that this freedom remains integral to the national 
identity. Put simply, there is a very strong link between the national self-image and 
the high regard for the concept of independence. A further illustration of the idea 
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that national attachment and patriotism is tied to the idea of liberty is found in a 
letter written in response to Monsen’s criticism of the “smallholder’s spirit”: 
“The children were raised in fear of God, respect of (not subservience to) 
authority, and love for people and fatherland. The latter also entailed a 
great thirst for liberty and will to defend this liberty if it was under threat.” 
(Solberg 23/12/94) 
The letter writer touches on four of the categories used in the study: rural society, in 
her defence of the smallholder’s role in history and society; political values (equality) 
in her endorsement of “respect of (not subservience to) authority”; identity and 
national attachment through “love for people and fatherland”; and political culture 
and independence in the “great thirst for liberty” and defence of this liberty. Again, 
it is clear that the motivation behind opposing EU membership criss-crosses several 
or all of the categories. In effect, although one can safely say that hostility towards 
other cultures and cultural threat, as theorised by McLaren (2002) and Carey (2002), 
play only a minor part in the newspaper debate through the decades, it could be that 
the VCRUNI framework prevents other identity-related issues from being registered. 
6.2.4 The Parties’ Arguments 
As Figure 6.2 illustrates, the party manifestos and speeches analysed follow the same 
pattern of argumentation as Aftenposten’s debate pages. The political values and 
political culture arguments are clearly the most dominant also among the 
Eurosceptic parties, while economic and rural interest play a secondary role in the 
parties’ argumentation, and national identity a very marginal role. Although Figure 
6.2 suggests that rural society and economic interest play a more significant role in 
the party discourse, this is only a reflection of the way in which the arguments have 
been quantified and measured for the purposes of visual presentation.193 Also in the 
193 If the number of arguments or references to each of the codes was to provide the basis of the figure, 
then political values, in particular, would be heavily overrepresented due to its diverse and plentiful 
sub­themes. 
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party discourse, the dominant position of political values and culture arguments is 
clear. 
Figure 6.2 Party arguments (left) vs. newspaper arguments (right)194 
Political Values 
Political Culture 
Rural Society 
Economic Interest 
National Identity 
Source: Author’s documentary analysis 
6.2.4.1 The Face of the “No” Camp: Anne Enger Lahnstein and the Centre Party 
As the main “no” party, the CP, fronted by its leader, Anne Enger Lahnstein, was a 
key opinion leader in the 1990s debate. The 10 speeches and two manifestos 
analysed, as well as Lahnstein’s (1993) book “The EC and the Norwegian 
Constitution” (EF og Grunnloven), confirm that the themes picked up by the 
newspaper analysis can be extended to the party political arena. In her book, 
Lahnstein’s alternative to membership revolves around the following 10 issues, to 
which the EC/EU is cast as the antithesis. Saying “no” to membership, she says “yes” 
to: 
a thriving folkestyre

national control over natural resources

respect for honest work

full employment

decentralization

a policy of wealth distribution

194 Number/proportion of sources containing arguments from each category 
198 
a society in ecological balance

own food production

sensible and fair international trade

a global wealth distribution and environment commitment

(Lahnstein 1993: 96-7)

The main focus is on postmaterialist values, such as the environment;195 internal 
solidarity, equality and focus on people;196 and external solidarity.197 Political culture 
arguments are also present through the themes of democracy198 and sovereignty.199 
Moreover, rural society comes up in focus on decentralization and defence of 
agriculture and fisheries.200 And finally, economic interest is present through the 
focus on employment and control over the country’s natural resources, as they are 
the basis of economic activity throughout the country. 
The CP’s manifestos and Lahnstein’s speeches generally follow the same pattern of 
argumentation as Lahnstein’s book; the postmaterialist themes of the environment, 
social equality and international solidarity and the political culture themes of 
sovereignty, union and democracy are most prominent, but also themes like 
morality, quality of life and focus on health standards feature in the postmaterialist 
argumentation. Morality comes up in the commitment to fair distribution of wealth, 
responsibility to future generations (natural resources and the environment) and the 
“fight against egotism” (Lahnstein speech 01/05/91). The 1993 manifesto stipulates 
that quality of life should be a higher priority than economic growth, and Lahnstein 
links this to the maintenance of decentralised settlement and rural society (speech 
01/05/91). The health theme is about Norway’s ability to have higher standards in 
195 “ecological balance” and “global environment commitment”. 
196 “full employment” – work opportunities for all, “national control over natural resources” as the 
basis for employment, “a policy of wealth distribution” and “respect for [common people’s] honest 
work”. 
197 “sensible and fair international trade”, “a global wealth distribution” and “own food production”. 
198 “a thriving folkestyre” and “decentralization” through dispersing power. 
199 national control in all areas. 
200 “own food production”, “national control over natural resources” and “respect for [the] honest 
work” of common people, such as the farmer and fisherman. 
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health and safety: animal health, pesticides, food additives, the work environment 
and restrictions on medicines. Outside the focus on high standards in health, safety 
and the environment, there is little evidence of exceptionalism; only a couple of 
references are made to Norway’s position as an example for other countries in 
projecting international solidarity (1993 manifesto) and “the high profile [Norway 
has] in the international society” (Lahnstein speech 12/03/94). 
In addition, the political culture argument’s interconnectedness with 
postmaterialism, as also found in the newspaper debate, is evident in the following 
quote from Lahnstein’s speech to the CP’s national committee on 17 October 1992: 
“It is my belief that the good society is not governed by big business, elites 
and bureaucracy far away. The good society is created where people live, 
have their roots and the basis of their existence. If we are to manage to 
create a society with room for everybody, with a fair distribution of wealth 
and with a better environment, then it depends on a thriving folkestyre and a 
diffusion of power and capital. It is also the best foundation for healthy and 
true economic activity.” 
Opposition to bureaucracy and elite rule and the empowerment of the individual is 
here tied in with equality, solidarity, fairness and concern for the environment. But 
rural society sentiments are also implicitly added to the concoction, through the 
emphasis on “healthy and true economic activity”, best represented by farmers and 
fishermen, and where “the good society is created”, namely in the districts – “where 
people live, have their roots and the basis of their existence”. 
The rural society arguments are conspicuously absent in both the CP’s manifestos 
and Lahnstein’s speeches; considering the party’s agrarian roots, it could be expected 
that they would occupy a more central place in its discourse on the EU.201 
Notwithstanding, the EU’s impact on agriculture and fisheries are only mentioned in 
201 This is discussed in more detail in section 7.2.3.2 of Chapter Seven. 
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three of the speeches (and not at all in the manifestos) and although concern for the 
districts and regional policy is expressed in both the manifestos and six of the 10 
speeches, it is mostly in passing, or, as in the quote above, as an undercurrent of a 
different theme. Lahnstein’s speech to the party’s national committee on 12 March 
1994 is the only time that elaborate rural society arguments are advanced. She says 
that the reasons why it is important to maintain agricultural production are 
settlement, the environment and self-sufficiency, “not only for the food producers 
themselves, but for all of the Norwegian society”. “Thriving rural communities” and 
“food production” are the key concepts linked to the defence of the agriculture and 
fisheries sectors, as are “meaningful work”, “honest work” and “pride”,202 as well as 
“small units” and “ecological production” in particular with regards to fisheries. 
Economic interest arguments are not very dominant in the discourse, and the 
economic themes predominantly revolve around those mentioned above: full 
employment and control over the natural resources. This also includes defence of the 
concession laws restricting foreign ownership and the ability to discriminate against 
foreign businesses in the name of regional policy and other government objectives. 
The national identity argumentation is even more marginal. The only culture or 
identity issues to come up in the CP data are Lahnstein’s characterization of the 
coastal culture as “the thing which gives Norway a public face” (12/03/94) and her 
reference to Rolf Jacobsen’s poem Annerledeslandet (the Different Country) as 
“expressing something important about our [Norwegians’] self-understanding” 
(speech 16/10/93).203 By the latter, she means that submission to the union and the 
four freedoms is not in the Norwegian nature because “we do not bow as deep as 
our neighbours, it was too steep here”. 
202 These concepts are based on the conviction that to Norwegian farmers and fishermen the issue is 
about being able to carry on with food production as a meaningful economic activity, and not merely 
an issue of financial transfers. 
203 Additionally, affirmations of the threat the EU poses to the strict alcohol policy and drug border 
controls are made, as well as reference to many EU countries’ liberal drug policy. 
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6.2.4.2 The Socialist Left Party 
The SLP’s discourse on European integration follows the same pattern as the CP’s, 
with its clear emphasis on postmaterialist value-based arguments, followed by 
political culture (folkestyre), rural society and economic interest. The SLP’s emphasis 
on postmaterialist arguments is not very surprising, considering that, as part of the 
New Left, postmaterialist issues like anti-militarism, anti-hierarchy and solidarity 
with the developing world have been among the party’s priority issues (Christensen 
1996: 527). In both the 1989 and 1993 manifestos, membership of the EC/EU is 
opposed on the basis of the party’s commitment to social equalisation, the 
environment, internal and external solidarity, health and safety and peace, but the 
EC/EU is also mentioned under the headings of economic, agricultural and fisheries 
policy. Political culture-arguments are not used in the 1989 manifesto, but 
democracy makes up a central part of the argumentation in 1993, and the themes of 
sovereignty and opposition to the EC/EU’s development into “an economic and 
political superpower” are also present. The party leader, Solheim’s closing appeal in 
the televised leaders’ debate on 25 November 1994 confirms that at the heart of the 
SLP’s Euroscepticism are postmaterialist values and political culture. He ranks the 
environment as the most important reason to vote “no”, followed by equality and 
solidarity, which improve people’s quality of life, and finally, democracy, which is 
also motivated by left-wing/postmaterialist values: 
“The most important issue […] for me is the environment. […] Therefore we 
ought to say no to a union which is based on unrestricted economic growth. 
After that it is to create a society with small social differences – because it is 
a society which with less crime. That means better quality of life. There are 
better relations between people in a society like that. Therefore we ought to 
say no to the strongly right-wing dominated economic policy that the EU is 
based on. 
And after that it is democracy, for democracy is the best protection for the 
weak groups in society […].” 
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Like the CP, the SLP also defends the agricultural and fisheries industries; this is 
explained by the party’s commitment to maintaining the decentralised settlement 
pattern and ecological and responsible management of the resources, and its belief 
that every country should have the right to secure its own food supply (1993 
manifesto). Even the SLP’s economic arguments, which are few and far between, are 
rooted in political values-concerns; they are about Norway’s ability to have an 
independent economic policy, promoting redistribution, employment and 
environmental requirements. 
6.2.4.3 The Eurosceptics in the Labour Movement 
The Labour Party Eurosceptics (hereafter referred to as LEs), represented by the 
SME, and the majority in the LO204 and the Labour Party’s youth wing, AUF, express 
an aversion to EU membership which is very similar to the SLP. This is not very 
surprising, considering that most of the LEs were, ideologically speaking, located on 
the left wing of the Labour Party (Geyer and Swank 1997; Kallset 2009: 86-7, 143). 
The political values of environmentalism and a “human friendly” or “good” society 
permeate the faction’s argumentation, whether the focus is on supranationalism, the 
economy or the preservation of local communities. The LEs identify the EU’s market 
liberalism as a major barrier to achieving their goals for not only making Norway a 
better place, but making the world a better place. They argue that to achieve this 
goal, it is necessary to hold onto the Scandinavian social democratic model and not 
giving in to the EU’s market liberalism and the forces of capitalism. The argument 
holds that if the Norwegian social model is preserved, it can serve as an example for 
other countries in terms of fair distribution of wealth, full employment, local 
democracy, environmentalism and small class differences. SALT, the debate booklet 
which effectively became the political programme of the SME (see Kallset 2009: 126), 
concludes the following: 
204 The “no” side won the 1994 vote in the LO by an extremely small majority. Four votes was what 
separated the “no” vote from the “yes” vote on the LO’s resolution on EU membership. 156 voted “no” 
and 152 voted “yes” (Kallset 2009: 170­1). 
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“Our vision is not tied to Norway as a nation or Norwegians as a people. 
Nor is it tied to the EC as an institution or the EC citizens as a people. Our 
vision is neither Norwegian nor European. Our vision is social democratic.” 
(SALT/Ottervik et al. 1992: 58) 
As the quote illustrates, Scandinavian Exceptionalism clearly plays a part in the LEs’ 
Euroscepticism. The LEs believe that the Norwegian/Scandinavian/Nordic way of 
doing things can and should serve as a model for other societies, as it has done in the 
past. The LO’s EU resolution, for example, states that 
“The Nordic countries have played an important role. We have taken the 
poor countries’ side and been a motor for peace and the environment. 
Perhaps the most important influence we have had internationally is 
through the social model we have created. We have showed that it is 
possible to create a society with a more equal distribution, less 
unemployment and more security than market liberalism gives us, a society 
which has served as a model for many who fight for the same as us.” 
This type of argumentation expresses not only optimism about Norway’s potential 
to influence the international community, it also expresses a substantial portion of 
idealism – wanting Norway to act as an example in terms of internal and external 
solidarity, environmentalism, equality and local democracy. This idealism is more 
prominent in the Labour movement’s discourse than any of the other parties. 
Another characteristic which sets the LEs’ argumentation apart from the other 
parties (except perhaps the SLP) is that there is, quite naturally, more focus on 
typical Labour issues such as unemployment and workers’ rights. Clearly, it is not 
argued that the EU is for unemployment, but the LEs take issue with the EU’s 
priority of price stability over unemployment and that unemployment has 
“gradually disappeared from the [EU’s] agenda and [that] an ‘acceptance’ of that an 
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effective economy requires a certain level of unemployment has taken over” 
(Ottervik et al. 1992: 11). 
Another difference is that there is much less focus on political culture issues in the 
Labour discourse. Most notably, there is virtually no argumentation in defence of 
national sovereignty as an independent value in any of the documents analysed 
(totalling 96 pages). The word “sovereignty” (suverenitet) is only mentioned once, 
and words like “self-determination” (selvbestemmelsesrett), “self-government” 
(selvstyre) and “self-determination” (selvråderett) are completely absent. When 
sovereignty is defended, less charged words like “freedom of action” (handlefrihet) 
and “independent decisions” (selvstendige beslutninger) are used, and in addition to 
being able to conduct social democratic policy at home, particular weight is assigned 
to the value of having the freedom of speech in international organisations so that 
Norway can ally herself with the world’s poorer countries, for example in the fight 
against global warming (e.g. SALT/Ottervik et al. 1992: 39). In effect, even the 
sovereignty dimension of the arguments is coloured by the postmaterialist, idealistic 
discourse. This is further confirmed by the fact that the principle of supranationalism 
is not rejected, but seen as just the means to a goal, i.e. market liberalism and 
economic growth. It is argued that if the goal was to protect the environment and 
promote equality and a social democratic society, the means would be acceptable 
(Kallset and Heinum 1991: 21). The limited spread of the democracy argument 
contributes further to enhance the dominance of the political values aspect of the 
Labour movement’s Euroscepticism compared to political culture. Although the 
documents all protest against the EU’s negative effect on popular participation, both 
in the workplace and in terms of local democracy, it is crystal clear that the LEs’ 
main focus remain on the conflict between economic growth on the one hand and 
environmental protection and a more equal distribution of wealth on the other: 
“It is impossible to create equalization by moving the whole world up to 
our living standard. If we are to achieve equalization, then we in the rich 
part of the world have to reduce our consumption. Still, [the EU’s] goal is 
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growth; a growth which increases our consumption of resources and result 
in more pollution. The demand for growth in the rich part of the world is 
the motor of the world’s environmental damages and makes equalization 
between the north and south impossible.” 
(SALT/Ottervik et al. 1992: 28) 
The rural society component of the LEs’ anti-EU ammunition is definitely present, 
but it does not make up a very central part of its arsenal. None of the SME’s 1994 
conference statement, the LO’s 1994 EU resolution or the AUF debate booklet from 
1991 argue in defence of the primary sectors. And although the SALT booklet from 
1992 contains separate sections on regional policy, agriculture and fisheries, rural 
society argumentation cannot be said to surface to any great extent in any other areas 
(like it does to a much greater extent in the other parties’ argumentation). 
Nevertheless, decentralisation and upholding local communities and the settlement 
pattern are no doubt part of the LEs’ vision for a “good society”, because “in 
Norway, it is viewed as an intrinsic value that people can continue to live in small 
local communities across the country” (SALT/Ottervik et al. 1992: 21). The 
argumentation in SALT shows that the LEs share the same concerns as the other 
parties when it comes to the rural society aspect (effect on primary sectors, 
settlement, local communities), but the modest space devoted to this type of 
argumentation in the campaigning material suggests that, like political culture, rural 
society arguments are somewhat more peripheral to their Euroscepticism than 
political values. The same goes for economic interest, which is hardly mentioned at 
all outside the realm of unemployment. The only exception is argumentation 
(particularly in the LO congress’ resolution) which points to past experiences with 
the “yes” side’s scaremongering about the catastrophic effects a “no” would have on 
the economy and a trade agreement’s and (eventually) the EEA’s ability to secure 
access to the Single Market for Norwegian businesses. To sum up, the LEs share the 
three central features of Norwegian Euroscepticism, political values, political culture 
and rural society, but it stands slightly apart from the other parties and the 
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newspaper debate in their much stronger focus on values compared to the other 
categories. 
6.2.4.4 The Liberal Party and the Christian Democratic Party 
The LP also draws on political values and political culture argumentation, as well as 
rural society and economic interest. The 1993 manifesto’s main emphasis is on 
independence and “the nation state’s democracy resources” (political culture) and 
the ability to maintain an independent policy of solidarity towards developing 
countries (political values), but it also expresses concern about the primary 
industries and regional policy (rural society), the environment (political values), and 
the ability to have an independent economic policy and retain control over Norway’s 
natural resources (economic interest). The party devotes only marginally more space 
to political culture arguments in the manifesto than political values, and rural society 
and economic interest are not far behind, so it is hard to make any strong inferences 
about the LP’s issue priorities. However, a commentary printed in Aftenposten on 16 
November 1992, written by the party leader at the time, Odd Einar Dørum, suggests 
that the LP’s main reason to oppose EU membership is political culture, as he 
expresses concerns about democracy and opposition to supranationalism. This is 
also backed up by Saglie (2000c: 173-4, 178), who notes that in the early 1990s, 
opposition to the EC’s plans for a political union was a particularly strong motivator 
for the party’s “no” stance as well as EU membership’s negative consequences for 
the democracy in Norway. Among the “no” minority in the party’s youth wing, the 
issues of folkestyre, environment and decentralisation were the most prominent 
arguments (Saglie 2000c: 176), more or less echoing those displayed in the mother 
party’s manifesto. 
The CDP is the party with the most limited coverage of the EC/EU issue in its 
manifestos; the 1993 manifesto is only coded to political values (exceptionalism), as it 
emphasises the need for Norway to be able to set higher standards than the EU in 
environmental and health policy. The CDP does not mention sovereignty or folkestyre 
in its manifesto(s) and that makes the party the odd one out when it comes to the 
207 
political culture category, as all of the other parties draw on political culture 
arguments in their manifestos. Of course, this is not to say that political culture 
arguments are not a central feature of the CDP’s Euroscepticism; in the 1970s, there 
was a chain of letters printed in Aftenposten that were written by Kjell Magne 
Bondevik, the leader of the CDP from 1983 to 1995, and one of the key arguments 
against the EC in these letters was that of folkestyre (the other two were the districts 
and international solidarity). Besides, from Solhjell’s (2008) comments on the party’s 
main reasons for rejecting membership in 1994, it can be deduced that political 
culture (union and sovereignty), postmaterialism (welfare, external solidarity, 
exceptionalist internationalism) and rural society (farmers and fisheries) are central 
to the party’s Euroscepticism. Similarly, Saglie (2000c: 162, 166) identifies 
Maastricht’s restraining impact on the ability to conduct independent foreign policy 
and economic policy, the EU’s lack of democracy, environmental issues and concerns 
about regional policy and fisheries policy as the main CDP arguments, very similar 
to those of the LP. Thus, in terms of the broad categories, both the LP and the CDP 
follow the general pattern of Norwegian Euroscepticism and Eurosceptic discourse. 
However, keeping the socialist and middle parties’ different stances on the EEA 
agreement in mind, there are some notable differences between their Eurosceptic 
argumentation. The CP and SLP’s Euroscepticism is heavily based on opposition to 
the four freedoms and argue that the EU’s free market orientation poses a serious 
threat to an equal and fair society based on solidarity and compassion for fellow 
human beings. With the exception of the CDP’s preference for keeping welfare a 
national matter, neither the CDP nor the LP use any of the anti-neo-liberalism, 
internal solidarity or equality/people focus arguments that are so central to the CP 
and SLP’s205 Eurosceptic discourse.206 But apart from this difference in the parties’ 
political values argumentation, the structure of their Euroscepticism is strikingly 
similar. 
205 and to the degree this anti­neo­liberalism does not conflict with the EEA agreement, the LEs.

206 It is important to note, however, that significant factions within both the CDP and the LP are against

the EEA agreement (see Table 6.1 above) and potentially identify with the anti­free market

argumentation of the SLP and CP.
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6.2.4.5 The Progress Party 
Although the PP adopted an official “yes” stance on EC membership in the early 
1990s, for the 1993 election it was modified to “Yes to EC, no to union” and its 
election manifesto shows clear signs of soft Euroscepticism. The similar structure of 
the socialist and middle parties’ Euroscepticism cannot be extended to the PP’s 
Euroscepticism. With the exception of the political culture arguments of democracy 
and sovereignty,207 seemingly a uniform feature of Norwegian Euroscepticism, the 
party’s arguments stand out from those of the other parties. Instead of using 
postmaterialist and rural society arguments, the PP’s scepticism to and reservations 
about the EU are mostly economically motivated and characterized by the party’s 
commitment to neo-liberalist economics; the party opposes the “unrealistic” EMU, 
the social dimension, structural funds and EU regulations and the restrictions the EU 
puts on free world trade.208 Thus, the PP appears to be the odd one out in terms of 
Norwegian Euroscepticism; its Euroscepticism is more similar to that of parties such 
as the Swiss People’s Party (Schweizerische Volkspartei, SVP) and the British 
Conservative Party’s Euroscepticism than any of the Norwegian Eurosceptic parties. 
The PP indeed resembles Statham’s (2008: 37) description of the British 
Conservatives’ Euroscepticism as opposing “political and monetary union by 
defending national sovereignty and advocating a free market” and viewing the EU 
as “potentially re-introducing regulatory state-interventionism”. 
6.3 Conclusion 
The chapter argued that Norwegian Euroscepticism, having gone through its 
formative phase in the 1960s and early 1970s, only entered its third phase in 1989 
because the 1972 rejection of EC membership served to suspend the issue throughout 
the remainder of the 1970s and most of the 1980s. The changes in the EC and the 
international environment in the late 1980s put the issue back on the Norwegian 
political agenda, and the early 1990s witnessed a battle over European integration 
207 Anti­bureaucracy and anti­union arguments also feature prominently in the 1993 manifesto.

208 This could potentially be linked to external solidarity, but considering the party’s track record of

advocating cuts in foreign aid and peace­keeping missions, the motivation here is likely to be primarily

of an economic nature.
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which was as fierce, if not fiercer, than its predecessors. There was one newcomer to 
the battle, the PP, which came out in favour of membership despite its scepticisms 
about the Maastricht Treaty, but otherwise, the constellations for and against 
membership were largely the same as before. 
In the second part of the chapter, which reported on the findings of the documentary 
analysis, it was argued that there is no doubt that the Euroscepticism found in 
Norway in the years leading up to the referendum in 1994 was a perpetuation of the 
phenomenon which was formed in the 1960s and 1970s. The findings confirmed that 
Norwegian Euroscepticism is firmly rooted in political values and culture, as well as 
the desire to uphold rural society. Economic interest, on the other hand, came again 
out as a second order concern,209 and as in the 1970s argumentation, national identity 
was only marginally represented through the lens that the VCRUNI framework for 
analysis provides. 
Political values was the strongest element in the debate in terms of issue frequency. 
Like in the 1970s, it had its basis in the incompatibility of the EC/EU’s primary goal 
of economic growth with other, more important values. The most common 
arguments in the 1990s newspapers were those linked to equality and internal 
solidarity, followed by the environment and then external solidarity. Explicit 
references to quality of life and morality were less widespread than in the previous 
period, but there were some new themes in health and safety, such as animal health 
and welfare, drugs policy and food safety. This pattern was more or less echoed in 
the left and middle parties’ Euroscepticism, with the exception of the pro-EEA CDP 
and LP’s lack of anti-market liberalist/pro-equal society argumentation. It was 
argued that the PP, on the other hand, with its anti-social dimension argumentation, 
does not share the postmaterialist dimension of Norwegian Euroscepticism. 
This is likely to be at least partly due to the (in relative terms) healthy state of the Norwegian 
economy, so it is important to note that economic interest might have played a larger role in less 
economically beneficial circumstances. 
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Political culture, conversely, seems to be the defining feature of Norwegian 
Euroscepticism, as all the parties were united in their opposition to the effects of the 
EU on Norway’s folkestyre and emphasis on national control and independence. Also 
in the newspapers, the key terms sovereignty, union, bureaucracy and democracy 
remained extremely central to the debate. It appeared that the meaning behind and 
importance of Norway’s independence has remained practically unchanged through 
the three phases; parallels to history and war were drawn in the 1990s debate, as in 
the 1960s and 1970s, and it seemed like the threat to Norway’s sovereignty was felt 
just as strongly (if not more strongly) in the 1960s and 1970s before the EC developed 
into a political union than in the 1990s when the EU was a reality. However, the 
democracy argument was definitely more prominent in the 1989-1994 phase than 
before, both in terms of letter writers’ and parties’ emphasis and in terms of its 
structure. This part of the Norwegian Eurosceptic argumentation was undoubtedly 
strengthened in the 1990s. 
The chapter also argued that rural society is another feature of Norwegian 
Euroscepticism which is shared by all the Eurosceptic parties except the PP. Like the 
postmaterialist opposition, the EU is rejected because of its free market philosophy. 
However, in the rural society context, it poses a threat to agriculture, the fisheries 
and regional policy and, as a corollary, the maintenance of a decentralized society 
and the values and traditions it embodies. The reasons why it is so important for 
Norwegians to retain the primary industries and a rural society are plentiful; they 
range from identification and solidarity with farmers and fishermen, a sense of 
solidarity with threatened social groups and/or geographical areas, a preference for 
Norwegian primary producers’ more ecological traditions of production, moral 
opposition to the EU’s butter mountains and discriminatory trade policy towards 
developing countries, the view that rural living equals well-being and contentment 
(trivsel), to attachment to nature and equal access to woods, fields and mountains. 
None of these themes are unique to the 1990s, as they all came up in the 1970s phase 
too. However, the 1990s debate did serve to consolidate these arguments; 
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particularly the postmaterialist element of the rural society argumentation was 
strengthened (e.g. environment and external solidarity). 
Economic interest and national identity arguments took up an even more limited 
position in the 1990s debate than before. As already mentioned, the comparatively 
strong economy and the EEA agreement enabled the Eurosceptics to abandon their 
economic argumentation to an even larger extent than they had done in previous 
periods. Moreover, like in 1972, there was little evidence to suggest that sociotropic 
utilitarianism was a major factor contributing to the “no” vote in 1994, as practically 
none of the newspaper items or party documents expressed the belief that non-
membership would be more economically beneficial for the country than 
membership. So, although the healthy economy might have conditioned many 
Eurosceptics’ priority rankings, economic utility cannot be said to be the defining 
feature of Norwegian Euroscepticism, perhaps with the exception of the PP, which 
bases its opposition/scepticism almost exclusively on economic argumentation. 
Similarly, this applies to national identity issues. It cannot be dismissed as 
completely irrelevant to the debate and Eurosceptics’ motivation, as the 
documentary analysis indicated that the EU issue did mobilize sentiments of cultural 
threat, hostility and national attachment in some parts of the electorate and even the 
elites. However, this part of the argumentation was very limited, and it had dropped 
in significance compared to the 1960s. Besides, it did not come up as prominent in 
the party discourse either. 
The next chapter deals with the post-1994 period: developments and events relating 
to the Norway/EU relationship are covered in the first part of the chapter, followed 
by the findings of the post-1994 documentary analysis. 
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Chapter 7

The Fourth Phase: post-1994 
To the extent there was a debate on Europe in Norway in the late 1990s and 2000s, it 
revolved around the shortcomings of the EEA agreement which came into force in 
January 1994 and Norway has been part of since. Other EU-related issues, such as 
the eastward enlargement, the proposed European constitution and the Lisbon 
Treaty, were also discussed in the media, by NtEU, Europabevegelsen and some 
politicians. This clearly sets the post-1994 period apart from the latent period (1973-
1986), when discussion of the EC and Europe was practically absent. Sitter (2004) 
argues that the reason why the two sides were not able to bury the EU issue after the 
1994 referendum was the existence of the EEA agreement. However, it is arguably 
more appropriate to hold developments in the EU responsible for the difference 
between the debate levels in the two periods: whereas in the 1970s and early 1980s 
the EC was hit by “eurosclerosis”,210 the post-1994 period was preceded by the SEA 
and the Maastricht Treaty, which set out ambitious integrative projects to be 
implemented in the years to come. In other words, there was little debate in the 
1970s and early 1980s because of the relative lack of progress in European 
integration, while post-1994, the acceleration and diversification of integration made 
debate inevitable. The history of Norway’s debates on Europe shows that discussion 
levels are heightened when major developments happen on the EU level, such as the 
SEA, the introduction of the Euro and the 2004 eastward enlargement. The form of 
association, however, whether based on bilateral agreements or the EEA, had less 
impact on the debate level in the two latent periods. This is because the past 
referendum(s) and the principal view that only the people can reverse the “no” put 
constraints on the Norwegian EU proponents’ ability to restart a new debate. It is 
harder to argue that the premises for Norwegian EU membership have changed 
because of the EEA agreement (which arguably was the same in e.g. 2002 as in 1994) 
than it is to argue that they have changed due to changes in the EU (which e.g. since 
Eurosclerosis is the term commonly used to describe the stalling of integration between the late 
1960s and early 1980s, which was due to member states’ reluctance to give up sovereignty and their 
use of protectionist measures to deal with the economic recession (Awesti 2006). 
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May 2004 has been very different than the EU of 1994). Besides, because of the use of 
referenda, there is little difference between how the proponents dealt with the 
question in the two post-referendum periods. In both periods, the “yes” side was 
characterized by a general acceptance of the people’s “no” and thus the status quo: 
after 1972, the trade agreement (negotiated in 1973), and in 1994, the EEA agreement. 
Nevertheless, because discussion of EU-related questions post-1994 has not been a 
taboo, unlike the 1973-1986 period, and it has been characterized by muffled debate 
rather than silenced debate, the post-1994 period emerges as a separate phase of 
Euroscepticism – the fourth phase. 
This chapter looks at Norwegian Euroscepticism in its fourth phase. The first part of 
the chapter gives an account of how the relationship between Norway and the EU 
developed and how the Norwegian debate on the EU played out after 1994 in order 
to contextualize the documentary analysis. The documentary analysis is reported on 
in the second part and aims to ascertain if fourth-phase Norwegian Euroscepticism 
follows the same pattern as its precursors. 
7.1 Norway and the EU after 1994 – an Overview 
7.1.1 “As Close as Possible without Full Membership” (Archer 2005: 188) 
The main implication of the public “no” in 1994 is naturally that the country 
remained on the outside of the EU, unable to partake in Brussels decision-making as 
an equal to the other EU member states. However, Norwegian decision-makers 
managed, in spite of non-membership, to keep an active and adaptive attitude 
towards European integration through the country’s quasi-membership (Eliassen 
and Sitter 2004), or “EEA+”, as Sverdrup (2009) calls Norway’s form of association. It 
has been argued that a policy of “eager adaptation” has been adopted by all parts of 
the political and administrative elite, more or less irrespective of which party they 
belong to (Claes and Tranøy 1999b; Fossum 2010). The Bondevik governments (1997-
2000 and 2001-2005) as well as the Stoltenberg governments (2000-2001 and 2005-
present) pursued an active European policy, aspiring to maximal participation in EU 
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initiatives as far as non-membership allowed. It may seem a paradox that 
Norwegian governments are unable to raise the membership question but are in the 
position to consistently pursue closer cooperation with Europe on a non-
membership basis, but this can be explained by party system dynamics: whereas in 
government the pro-EU parties are tied to a suicide-clause by their Eurosceptic 
coalition partners which prevents them from raising the membership question, 
approval of EEA regulation and participation in EU initiatives requires a majority in 
Parliament, normally obtained by the pro-EU Conservatives and Labour Parties, as 
well as the variable support of the PP (Eliassen and Sitter 2003, 2004). 
The main components of the Norway/EU relationship are the EEA agreement and 
the Schengen protocol, arrangements which have functioned as a compromise for 
the country’s EU supporters and opponents since the 1990s.211 The EEA agreement, 
which entered into force on 1 January 1994, gives the EFTA countries and thus 
Norway access to the Single Market on the same grounds as full EU members, with 
the exception of agricultural and fish products. In line with the agreement, Norway 
has to adopt and comply with any EU legislation related to the four freedoms, such 
as certain aspects of social policy, consumer protection, environmental policy, 
business policy and statistics, but without having any formal influence on decisions. 
The EEA agreement also promotes EFTA cooperation in areas unrelated to the Single 
Market, such as research and development, technology, IT, environment, education, 
social policy, consumer affairs, small and medium-sized enterprises, tourism, the 
audio-visual sector and civil defence (ECDNI 2008).212 Norwegian governments have 
pursued maximal participation also in the Common Security and Defence Policy 
(CSDP) dimension in spite of the fact that their influence in the policy area is even 
more limited than in the EEA (Rieker 2006a). 
211 The Schengen agreement was signed in December 1996, and came into force on 25 March 2001 
(NMTTE 2010a). 
Additionally, Norway’s participation in European integration includes aspects of JHA, EMU and 
the CFSP (Archer 2005: 5). 
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Norway, as an EEA agreement signatory, has extremely little formal decision-
making power or influence on EEA legislation, but Norwegian decision-makers have 
the right to veto any EEA directive. This veto, however, has never been used, and it 
is commonly argued that it is unlikely to ever be used as it would effectively put the 
whole EEA agreement in danger.213 The way in which the Storting has allowed its 
influence in the EEA setting to be constrained has been likened to a “voluntary 
abdication as a legislative authority” (Andersen 2000: 11). This has been an 
important element of the debate on the (in)adequacy of the EEA agreement as the 
cornerstone of the Norway/EU relationship, as the veto is, as long as it remains 
unused, in practice only a symbolic instrument of Norwegian sovereignty and self-
determination. Fossum (2010: 74) argues that Norway’s current arrangements with 
the EU “might even be construed as a kind of self-chosen ‘farming out’ of much of 
Norwegian democracy”. He finds this ironic, “given that the main reason for 
rejecting EU membership was to protect Norwegian democracy and Norwegian 
sovereignty” (p. 74, original italics). Against this backdrop, it is curious that 
Norway’s eager EU adaptation has not prompted more widespread criticism and 
protest than it has since 1994. However, it is important to remember the point made 
earlier, that the EEA agreement has functioned as a national compromise between 
the supporters and opponents of EU membership.214 
To Norwegian pro-European elites and anti-membership/pro-EEA elites, who make 
up the majority of the political establishment, the EEA is very important: it enables 
Norway to follow and take part in developments in the EU without formal 
membership, and it gives Norwegian businesses access to the Single Market – of 
vital importance, as the EU is Norway’s main trading partner. As Fossum (2010: 83) 
puts it: “Many of the reasons for Norway’s present incorporation in the EU relate to 
the recognized need to manage the close interdependence that a small and open 
West European economy and society experiences in a rapidly integrating Europe”. 
Nevertheless, threats to use it have been made in the past. In the late 1990s in particular, the 
Bondevik government faced several controversies concerning several issues, most notably food 
additives and genetic patenting (Andersen 2000; Eliassen and Sitter 2003). 
214 The chapter will return to this issue later. 
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As an EEA signatory, Norway make considerable contributions to the EU budget.215 
Between 1994 and 1999, Norway’s yearly contribution to the EU’s structural funds 
was approximately 12 million Euros,216 and between 1999 and 2003, they were 
increased to 24 million217 (around 94 percent of the total EFTA contribution) 
(Sverdrup 2004: 9). Subsequently, the 2003 enlargement negotiations entailed a 
tenfold increase in the total Norwegian EEA contributions to economic and social 
development in the enlarged EEA, a staggering 235 million Euros per year (97 
percent of the total EFTA contribution) between 1 May 2004 and 30 April 2009 
(Sverdrup 2004: 11). Added to this, between 1 January 2007 and 30 April 2009, 
Norway also contributed a total of 135.8 million Euros towards the second EEA 
enlargement (NMTTE 2010b). This means that Norway has been a larger financial 
contributor to the process of eastward enlargement than many of the “old” EU 
member states (Sverdrup 2004: 2). 
The 2003 EEA enlargement negotiations illustrate the power imbalance in the 
Norway/EU relationship. Norwegian demands for compensation for loss of free 
trade with the ten new EU members were altogether ignored by the Commission, 
and the EFTA countries had little choice but to accept the EU’s financial demands.218 
This implies that the onus of maintaining the current arrangements is entirely on the 
EFTA side. In other words, Oslo’s compliance with EEA regulations is extremely 
important to the future of the agreement, as the EU has the power to punish Norway 
for non-compliance, which in turn could lead to the collapse of the whole EEA 
agreement. Because of indications from the Commission that the EEA agreement’s 
future would be in danger in the case of significant disagreement, Sverdrup argues 
215 It also has additional non­EEA “buy­ins”, which amount to tens of millions of Euros every year 
(Eliassen and Sitter 2003: 132). 
216 Earmarked for Greece and certain regions in Spain, Portugal, Ireland and Northern Ireland 
(Sverdrup 2004: 6). 
217 Earmarked for Portugal, Spain and Greece (Sverdrup 2004: 6). 
218 Norway’s willingness to comply with the demands could also be put down to a desire to show 
solidarity to the new member states, the Norwegian government’s desire to avoid attracting “free 
passenger” criticism, and the absence of public constraint on the decision to accept the terms. Very 
little attention was awarded the negotiations, both in the media and the public domain in Norway. 
There was a broad support for the EU expansion to the east in the Norwegian public, and there was no 
indication from the population that the suggested contribution was above the threshold (Sverdrup 
2004). 
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that “the [2003] enlargement negotiations were in reality negotiations about the 
continuation or liquidation of the EEA agreement” (2004a: 14). The asymmetrical 
relationship between Oslo and Brussels, has been termed a “fax democracy” by 
several commentators and politicians alike; it refers to Brussels faxing new EEA 
directives and legislation to Oslo for implementation without protest (Eliassen and 
Sitter 2003). 
On the policy level, the area where the EEA agreement perhaps made its most visible 
mark in Norway is the speeding up of deregulation and privatisation. Examples are 
reforms of the public monopolies on medicines and alcohol and in Norwegian 
regional policy, such as the cutting back on subsidies for the coastal express 
(Hurtigruten) and the selective employers’ tax (Andersen 2000). Furthermore, the 
EEA has had an impact on Norwegian policy “in typical infrastructure areas, that is, 
areas the European Community itself gave high priority when the Single Market was 
to be implemented between 1986 and 1993” (Claes and Tranøy 1999b: 291). In 
environmental policy, for example, Dahl (1999) argues that Norwegian authorities 
have, since 1995, become more passive in raising protection levels on their own 
accord and have instead waited for developments at the EU level. However, she 
points out that the EU’s leading role in environmental legislation post-1995 is not 
due to declining Norwegian standards compared with EU standards, but rather that 
the adaptation line that Norway has had to pursue since the Single Market and EEA 
processes started in the late 1980s has been irreconcilable with taking a pioneering 
role in environmental policy. Nevertheless, some environmental legislative measures 
have been perceived as having strengthened Norwegian protection levels, for 
example regulations for refuse depots and air quality, while there are concerns for 
reduced protection levels as a result of EU adaptation in others areas, such as 
genetically modified foods and the Life Patent Directive (Dahl 1999: 148). It has also 
been claimed that standards have been raised in other areas where Norwegian policy 
has traditionally been viewed as more advanced, such as health, safety and 
consumer interests (see e.g. Traavik 2003, cited by Archer 2005:190). 
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However, the broadest study of Norway and the EEA agreement to date (Claes and 
Tranøy, eds 1999a) concludes that, except in security,219 EMU, fisheries and 
agricultural policy, there has been little difference between the policies pursued in 
EU countries and those pursued in Norway since 1994. In other words, in policy 
terms outside the abovementioned areas, Norway has kept up with the 
developments on the European level. When considering the national economy, it is 
difficult to evaluate the effects of non-membership and the EEA agreement, as 
economic fluctuations depend on the global economy as well as the Single Market. 
As a result of this, economic arguments from both EEA supporters and opponents 
have subsided (Andersen 2000). Besides, the healthy state of the Norwegian 
economy since 1994 has effectively proved that the EU membership proponents’ 
economic arguments and the 1994 warnings about economic isolation were 
unfounded.220 
The Norwegian “no” to EU membership and continued participation in EEA 
structures have, as intended, enabled the country to retain autonomy in the areas of 
special interest, such as agriculture, fisheries, petroleum and the welfare state,221 
while at the same time avoiding economic isolation from the continent. Nevertheless, 
although the EEA agreement has largely circumvented the areas of energy, 
agriculture, fisheries and regional policies, there are other international 
organizations which have exerted pressure on Norway in these sectors and policy 
areas, such as the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and the World 
Trade Organization (WTO) (Eliassen and Sitter 2003, 2004; Claes and Tranøy 1999b: 
287-90). Experts argue that changes on the WTO level are more significant to the 
development of and challenges to the agricultural sector and policy than a 
219 Since the study was conducted in 1999, Norway has become more integrated into CSDP 
cooperation, as the country “contributes with troops and personnel to ESDP [CSDP] operations, 
participates in a battle group and has an association agreement with the European Defence Agency” 
(Rieker 2006a: 281). 
220 In terms of GDP growth, the Norwegian economy outperformed the EU’s in 10 out of the 16 years 
between 1994 and 2009. Only in 1998­2000, 2003, 2006 and 2007 did the EU economy do better than 
the Norwegian economy (World Bank 2010). 
221 See Veggeland (1999), Hoel (1999), Claes and Eikeland (1999) and Hagen (1999) for a detailed 
analysis of the effects of the EEA agreement on each of these sectors. 
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prospective membership of the EU (Veggeland and Mittenzwei 2003; Veggeland 
1999). 
Claes and Tranøy (1999b) differentiate between two aspects of the EEA agreement’s 
impact on Norwegian politics. The first is political content, the essence of which is 
that Norway is part of the Single Market and has to adapt to the EU’s rules for trade 
liberalisation and a more open market. They argue that, except in alcohol policy,222 
the EEA agreement has not introduced any dramatic changes to Norwegian policy, 
although it has perhaps served to speed up the liberalisation process in some areas. 
On the other hand, they argue that the second aspect, namely the relationship 
between content and political procedures, is problematic because of the asymmetry 
between the EU and Norway in the decision-making arena and its grave 
implications for Norwegian sovereignty and democracy. However, Narud and 
Strøm (2000: 147) argue that 
“The problem is less that Norwegian authorities lack power vis-à-vis their 
EU counterparts, but rather that they do not have access to the information 
they need to make informed and timely decisions. A longer and more 
complex chain of delegation increases informational demands, while the 
short deadlines under which the EEA decisions are made exacerbate them.” 
In other words, Narum and Strøm think that the main democratic problem is not 
necessarily Norwegian authorities’ lack of decision-making power in Brussels, but 
rather the information deficit in the Storting and furthermore, reduced 
parliamentary control as a result of European affairs being treated as foreign affairs 
in the Storting (Narum and Strøm 2000: 139). The fact that EEA/EU affairs are treated 
as foreign affairs is important because foreign affairs constitutionally belong to the 
prerogatives of the executive branch. Put differently, because EEA/EU matters are 
treated as foreign affairs, the Storting is reluctant to instruct cabinet on EEA/EU 
related issues. Nevertheless, it is perhaps most likely that little time and resources 
222 The state’s 75 year old monopoly on import, export and wholesale of alcohol had to be abolished 
because of the EEA agreement. Vinmonopolet’s retail monopoly survived (Bræin 1999). 
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and the definition of EU affairs as foreign affairs combined with awareness of the 
limited influence Norway has on EU decisions have made Norwegian 
parliamentarians passive in relation to EEA business. The (absence of) debate on 
Norway’s affiliation to the EU and the degree of adaptation is discussed in more 
detail in the next section. 
7.1.2 The State of the EU Debate post-1994 
In the 1994 Referendum Study, respondents were asked the following question: “in 
your opinion, how many years should we wait before we have another 
referendum?” The answers to this question averaged seven and a half years (Jenssen 
1995a: 200), but in spite of this, a new referendum has not been on the agenda in the 
16 years that have passed since then. Although there has been periodic discussion on 
individual EEA directives and there were some signs of a new membership debate in 
the early 2000s, wide-ranging public debate on the big issues of the Norway/EU 
relationship has been absent since 1994. Fossum (2010: 75) notes that “Norway’s 
active adaption to the EU has taken place together with a virtual ban on discussion 
of EU membership amongst the political elite”. What there has been of debate on 
EU-related issues has taken place outside the Storting and without the conventional 
political actors; since 1994, mainly the “yes” and “no” organizations have been active 
in the debate on Europe (Sverdrup 2009). Fossum (2010: 86) points out that in the 
parliamentary arena, “[o]pponents recurrently and consistently refer to the 
referendum results as the authoritative statement on the membership issue, and 
most proponents defer to this”. 
7.1.2.1 The Parliamentary Arena 
Five different governments have been in office since the 1994 referendum. Before the 
1997 general election, the Labour PM Thorbjørn Jagland indicated his intention to 
resign if the party did not improve on its previous election result. This it failed to do 
(it went from 36.9 to 35 percent), and as a result, the three small middle parties, the 
CDP, the LP and the CP, assumed office in October 1997 (with a total of 26.1 percent 
of the vote and only 42 out of 165 seats in the Storting). This government (Bondevik 
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I) stayed in office until March 2000, when it was replaced by a minority Labour 
government, headed by PM Jens Stoltenberg.223 After the 2001 election, a CDP, LP 
and Conservative coalition government (Bondevik II) relieved the Stoltenberg 
government of its duties, and since the 2005 election, a red-green majority coalition 
government made up of the SLP, CP and Labour Party has been in office (see Table 
B5 in Appendix B for details on the election results from the post-1994 period). 
Table 7.1 Governments since 1994 
Year Government Pro membership 
governmental parties 
Anti membership 
governmental parties 
1993 Labour (minority) Labour -
1997 Centre (minority) - CDP, LP, CP 
2000 Labour (minority) Labour -
2001 Centre-right (minority) Conservatives CDP, LP 
2005 Centre-left (majority) Labour CP, SLP 
2009 Centre-left (majority) Labour CP, SLP 
Source: Author 
Table 7.2 Government alternatives in post-1994 elections 
Year Centre left alternative Centre right 
alternative 
Other alternative 
1997 Labour CDP, LP, CP 
2001 Labour Conservatives, CDP, 
LP 
CDP, LP, CP 
2005 Labour, SLP, CP Conservatives, CDP, 
LP 
2009 Labour, SLP, CP Conservatives, CDP, 
LP 
Conservatives, PP 
Source: Author 
Table 7.1 above shows the make-up of governments post-1994, according to their 
stances on EU membership, and Table 7.2 the main government alternatives in the 
last four general elections.224 The tables illustrate how central the Eurosceptic parties 
(the CDP, LP, CP and SLP) have been to coalition formation in Norway in the last 15 
years, putting the relative silence on the EU issue in the electoral arena in this period 
The Labour government replaced the Centre coalition after it lost a vote of confidence in the 
Storting. 
224 To illuminate the ubiquity of the anti­membership parties, they are in bold. 
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into perspective. Only between 1993-1997 and 2000-2001 has Norway had a 
government free from Eurosceptic parties, and pro-EU government alternatives have 
been the exception rather than the rule. 
The EU issue did not feature as a significant issue in either of the 1997, 2001, 2005 or 
the 2009 general elections (Valen 1998, 2003). A 2001 election exit poll showed that 
only 1.5 percent of voters considered the EU question the most important issue in the 
election, ranking eighth on the list (Valen 2003: 181).225 However, the issue typically 
received more attention in the media during election campaigns. Issues concerning 
Norway/EU relations made up 13.4 percent of campaign-related issues in the media 
in the 2001 campaign, ranking fourth after tax issues, education, and health (Valen 
2003: 182).226 Party manifestos offer additional evidence for the relative insignificance 
of the European issue in Norwegian electoral politics. In a study of party manifestos 
of 15 western European countries,227 Norwegian parties had the least mention of the 
EU and its impact on domestic policy since 1994 (Pennings 2006). Of linkages per 
policy domain, Norwegian parties’ references to Europe averaged 1.4 percent 
between 1995 and 2003, whereas in EU member states the average was 4.3 percent 
and in Switzerland 3.1 percent.228 
The public rejection of EU membership in two consecutive referenda has had a 
significant effect on how politicians from all parties view and cast their role in the 
context of the EU debate. Since 1994, Fossum (2010: 84) argues, they have operated 
225 The four most important issues to voters were tax reductions (22.9%), health issues (22.2%), 
education (17.4%) and family policies (10.5%). 
226 There are a few factors that serve to explain at least some of the discrepancy between the media’s 
and the electorate’s priorities in elections. One is that generally the Norwegian media tend to cover 
general European issues and events as opposed to issues directly concerning Norway and the country’s 
relationship to the EU (Andersen 2000: 8­9; Wallis et al. 2002), and thus they do not necessarily 
actualize issues that Norwegian voters would consider relevant to them and the election. Moreover, as 
all the main Norwegian newspapers are unambiguously pro­European (Grünfeld and Sverdrup 2005), 
it is not surprising that the media outlets put more focus on EU issues than the voters do, the majority 
of the latter favouring the status quo. 
227 The pre­2004 EU fifteen, except Luxembourg and Greece, and non­members Norway and 
Switzerland. 
228 Norwegian party manifestos appear under­Europeanized also when comparing the 1960­2003 
averages for the three; whereas the results for the thirteen EU member states and Switzerland show 
scores of 3.03 and 1.97 respectively, Norway scores significantly less with an average of 1.01 
(Pennings 2006: 262). 
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“as receivers of already shaped popular opinion” as opposed to “leaders who 
actively shape popular opinion”. Although the PP is the only party which explicitly 
requires a change in public opinion before the membership issue can be brought 
back onto the agenda, in reality, this requirement is shared by all the parties. Because 
the commitment to hold a referendum has developed into “a constitutional 
convention” (Fossum 2010: 84), neither the Labour Party nor the Conservative Party 
would want to set a new membership application in motion unless there are 
indications that the people are positive to the idea. Kallset (2009: 253) asserts that 
“the only thing that can measure up to the [Labour EU proponents’] desire for EU 
membership [and the Conservatives’, author’s addition], is the fear that the people 
will say ‘no’ a third time” (also see Strandhagen 2004; Vermes 2010a). This 
perspective is further illustrated by the following quote by a Norwegian 
commentator: “no Norwegian politicians in their right minds would want to start a 
new debate on this until there is a clear and prolonged majority for membership in 
the population” (Five 2008). Moreover, the Conservative Party’s deputy leader, Jan 
Tore Sanner, confirmed in July 2010 that the precondition for bringing the EU issue 
back onto the agenda is that the people want another debate (cited by Vermes 
2010a).229 The Eurosceptic parties, on the other hand, obviously do not desire a 
rematch on membership, as their policy preference is maintaining the status quo 
(non-membership). 
Sverdrup (2009) puts forward three possible reasons for the standstill in the 
Norwegian EU debate. First, he points out that because the EEA agreement offers 
few, if any, opportunities to influence or change regulations, neither the media nor 
politicians have any incentives to raise debates about EU-related issues. The lack of 
consequence does not stimulate debate, as it makes it irrelevant which arguments 
win or lose. A second reason is the “suicide clause”, which Fossum (2010) calls 
Norway’s European “gag rules”. These rules have been vital preconditions for the 
229 SME’s Wegard Harsvik also confirmed this (interview with the author, Oslo, 8 January 2010). 
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formation of both centre-left and centre-right coalition governments since 2001.230 
The essence of the suicide clause is that if any party in a coalition government opens 
up for a new debate on EU membership, the coalition will break up. The coalition 
governs on the basis of the EEA agreement,231 and internal dissent is acknowledged 
and accepted. These gag rules effectively stifle any meaningful debate about the 
Norway/EU relationship on the parliamentary arena, and Fossum (2010: 75) even 
argues that they “have greatly facilitated an active process of adaptation” to the EU 
without membership. Third, Sverdrup (2009) puts the absence of a proper debate 
down to the fact that no major economic or political crises have made it necessary to 
reconsider Norway’s form of association to the EU; there is general contentment 
with the situation on both sides. Sverdrup (2009: 432) argues that “there are few, if 
any, political leaders – both among those who want closer and those who want a 
looser form of association to the EU – who are willing to bring in a discussion about 
[Norway’s] form of association in the ongoing debate on European policy”. In simple 
terms, the EEA agreement represents an acceptable alternative to both the 
proponents and opponents of membership: 
“One the one hand we find the ‘no’ side’s preferences which can be ranked 
in the following way: they want a looser form of association, can live with 
EEA+, and they fear Norwegian membership – while the ‘yes’ side on the 
other hand prefers full membership, can live with EEA+, and they fear 
Norwegian outsider status. EEA+ is the equilibrium.” 
(Sverdrup 2009: 435) 
Nevertheless, it cannot be said that the will to reintroduce the issue onto the political 
agenda has not been there. Kallset (2009: 252) reports that the Labour leader at the 
time, Thorbjørn Jagland, started talking about a rematch as early as 15 days after the 
230 The Bondevik II coalition’s political platform included an EU “suicide clause”. A similar solution 
to that of the previous non­socialist government was chosen to manage the inter­ and intra­party 
disagreement on the EU issue also by the red­green coalition which took office in 2005. 
231 This is the case on the centre­left too, even though the Labour Party’s coalition partners, the SLP 
and the CP are against the EEA agreement. The two parties voted against e.g. free movement of 
capital, but since they have accepted the principle and acknowledged that the battle is lost as long as 
Norway is member of the EEA (Interview with Dag Seierstad, Oslo, 18 September 2009). 
225 
1994 referendum, and that since 1994, central Labour figures have spoken up in 
favour of a new EU application more or less every year – in addition to every time 
European integration has been widened or deepened. Furthermore, the Conservative 
Party adopted an “EU guarantee” for the 2009 election, where the party leader, Erna 
Solberg, promised to actively promote and encourage an EU membership debate 
even if in government with Eurosceptic coalition partners (see Solberg 2009). The 
previous leader (1994-2004), Jan Petersen, by contrast, was criticized for his passive 
approach to the issue (see e.g. Strandhagen 2004). 
The EEA agreement and its shortcomings in decision-making has been the main 
topic for discussion on both the “no” side and the “yes” side, but at the turn of the 
millennium also the introduction of the Euro and the progress made towards the 
eastward enlargements, made the proponents of membership eager to bring the 
membership issue up again. The EU wind in Norway was particularly noticeable 
before the Swedish rejection of the Euro in September 2003, as the EU was widening 
and deepening its integration efforts and Norway was looking increasingly isolated 
(see e.g. Traavik 2003; Kallset 2009: 239). This was further fuelled by the relatively 
clear “yes” majority which had dominated the public opinion polls since the summer 
in 2002. With the Labour leadership flirting with the idea of prioritising a new EU 
membership application over government cooperation with the SLP and CP in 2003, 
the Norwegian EU debate was, in other words, brewing (Kallset 2009). However, by 
early 2004, public opinion had turned, and in March 2004, the Labour leader, Jens 
Stoltenberg, announced his party’s intentions of entering talks with the SLP and CP 
about forming a majority government alternative for the 2005 election. The EU issue 
was thus removed from the party’s agenda. Only months before it had been much 
more important to the party than government cooperation, but now, as the PM 
candidate stated, it was not to be allowed to stand in the way of a centre-left majority 
government (Stoltenberg cited by Kallset 2009: 239-241). 
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7.1.2.2 The EEA Agreement and Controversial Directives 
Considering that the EEA agreement was originally intended to be a stepping stone 
to full EU membership and never a long-term basis of any one country’s relationship 
with the EU, it is not surprising that it has been deemed inadequate as the 
“backbone” of Norway’s relations with the EU (Wallis et al. 2002; Claes and Fossum 
2002). The future of the EEA agreement and the structures the current Norway/EU 
relationship is based on have been continuously questioned in the last decade, 
although it has not resulted in a full-blown debate on Norway’s form of association 
to the EU. As mentioned above, especially current arrangements’ shortcomings in 
decision-making and their implications for democracy have dominated discussions 
on both sides. On the “no” side, among EEA opponents, there have been calls to 
replace the EEA agreement with a trade agreement, but predominantly, post-1994 
EU-related discussion has revolved around individual EEA directives and 
promotion of the use of the national veto. The campaign to use the veto has been led 
by NtEU, and nearly all interventions in the European Consultative Organ (ECO)232 
in the Storting have been initiated by CP, SLP and CDP members (Narud and Strøm 
2000: 137). 
When looking at the total number of directives and laws that Norway has adopted 
since entering the EEA agreement, it looks as though the workings of the EEA 
agreement have been largely free of controversies. By the end of 1998, Norway had 
fully implemented 1,168 out of 1,224 applicable directives (95.4 percent) (Narum and 
Strøm 2000: 145), but in the same time period, only in the areas of oil, gas, food 
additives and salmon exports were disagreements between Oslo and Brussels of any 
significance (Andersen 2000). In 1996, the “food cosmetics directive”,233 which 
permitted certain artificial sweeteners, colourants and other additives to be added to 
foods, caused controversy because it effectively lowered Norwegian environmental 
standards (Narud and Strøm 2000: 135). When the Storting voted on it, the SLP and 
232 EEA matters belong to the domain of foreign relations in the Storting. The ECO (also called the

EEA Commission) consists of the Foreign Affairs Committee and the six Norwegian representatives to

the EEA Joint Parliamentary Committee.

233 In fact, Norway tried to get exemptions from three directives on food additives (Andersen 2000).

These were on food cosmetics and adding of vitamins and medicines in food (Aale 2010).
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the three middle parties opposed it, while Labour, the Conservatives and the PP 
supported it (Svåsand 2002: 332). Furthermore, in November 1998, four of the six CP 
ministers in the centre government voted against the “veterinary directive”, which 
reduced controls on imported animals (Andersen 2000; Politiskanalyse.no 2002). The 
“gas directive” was another problematic directive because it “put Norway at a 
competitive disadvantage compared to gas suppliers outside the EEA, such as 
Russia and Algeria” (Narud and Strøm 2000: 135). The SLP and CP’s MPs went 
against the directive in the Storting vote on 18 June 2002 (Stortinget 2002). Moreover, 
in January 2003, the PM of the centre-right government, Kjell Magne Bondevik, his 
fellow CDP ministers and the LP ministers went against their government’s proposal 
to accept the “life patent directive”, a directive which attracted controversy across 
Europe (Kristoffersen 2003).234 The 2006 “services directive”, which decided that a 
service provider which is legally established in one EEA country can deliver services 
across the EEA, prompted fears about its impact on public services and social 
dumping. The directive created not only protests from the “no” side and numerous 
trade unions, but also dissent in the government; the SLP and CP MPs made up the 
minority that voted against the directive in the Storting on 23 April 2009 (Nergaard 
2009; Aale 2010; Ødegård 2010).235 
EFTA figures show that in total, Norway had implemented 99.6 percent of 1,734 
directives in 2010. Only seven directives remained (Aale 2010). At the end of 2010, 
controversial directives included the EU’s third “post directive” and the “data 
retention directive”. It was argued that the post directive, which harmonizes 
regulation in the EEA and entails liberalisation of European postal services, would 
make postal services in Norway (and everywhere) poorer (e.g. less frequent 
deliveries and poorer provision in the districts) and more expensive – and increase 
problems with social dumping (see e.g. Werner 2009; Øverland 2010).236 At the end 
234 The SLP and CP MPs also voted against the directive in the Storting (Stortinget 2003). 
235 For a full list of the consultation statements on the services directive, see Nærings­ og 
Handelsdepartementet (2010). Also see the anti­services directive website: www.tjenestedirektivet.no, 
run by a number of youth organizations. 
236 Also see the anti­post directive website: www.postdirektivet.no, run by the postal workers’ trade 
union Norsk Post­ og Kommunikasjonsforbund (Postkom). 
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of 2010, it was expected that both the SLP and CP would go against the directive, but 
the Labour Party’s position was still unclear (Nationen 2009). The data retention 
directive (DRD), which harmonizes legislation on the retention of electronic 
communication data and requires traffic and location data to be retained for six to 24 
months, was widely opposed on the basis of legal/data protection principles.237 The 
SLP, the middle parties and the PP all officially advocated using the veto against the 
directive. Even the Conservative Party expressed the view that they were very 
critical to the DRD (Aspaker 2010), but at the end of the year, they had still not 
decided on a position. Although there were speculations in the spring of 2010 that 
the PP might take a u-turn (Nrk Nyheter 2010), this was refuted by the party 
(Birhane and Hverven 2010). Thus, it remains to be seen whether the data retention 
directive will be the first directive that Norway uses its EEA veto on. This will be the 
case if the Labour Party, which is the only party in favour of the directive to date, 
fails to get support from the Conservatives and/or the PP. However, an editorial in 
Dagens Næringsliv in November 2010 made the following comment: 
“To use the veto requires that Norwegian politicians have the backbone to 
go ahead with a new open battle over Norway’s relationship with Europe. 
They hardly have that. Unfortunately.” 
(Dagens Næringsliv 2010) 
7.1.2.3 Nei til EU since 1994 
To the extent there has been a debate on the EU and the EEA agreement since 1994, 
NtEU has played a central and active role (Sverdrup 2009). The purpose of the 
organization’s work post-1994 has been twofold: firstly, to provide criticism of the 
EEA agreement’s consequences on Norwegian politics and society, and second, to 
keep the “no” movement in a state of preparedness for a new debate on EU 
membership (Seierstad 2006). In addition to the above-mentioned directives, NtEU 
237 On 3 November 2009, a non­partisan campaign organization against the DRD was established. It is 
called simply “Stop the data retention directive” (Stopp DLD). See its website for more information: 
www.datalagringsdirektivet.no. 
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also demanded that the veto be used to stop the “oil directive” (approved in 1995), 
all three of the food cosmetics directives and the “children’s food directive” 
(approved in 2002), and also campaigned against the Schengen agreement, which, it 
was argued, conflicts with privacy and legal protection (Seierstad 2006). NtEU’s 
membership has, quite naturally, decreased since 1994, when it totalled 140,000 
members. After dropping to 25,096 members in 1995, it has remained quite stable. In 
2005, the organization had 26,076 members, and in 2009 the number had increased to 
over 29,000 (Seierstad 2006; Nei til EU 2009a). 
7.1.2.4 The Financial Crisis, Iceland’s Application and the Lisbon Treaty 
The onset of the global financial crisis in 2007 resulted in speculations about whether 
it was going to be the external shock that would bring Norway into the EU (e.g. 
Aasen 2008). Particularly the news of the Icelandic banking crisis and Iceland’s 
imminent application for EU membership made many commentators predict (and/or 
call for) a new debate on membership. After all, every time Norway applied for 
membership in the past, it was in the wake of its EFTA partners’ decisions to apply. 
Furthermore, the prospect of Iceland leaving the EFTA side of the EEA agreement 
prompted discussion on the viability of the EEA agreement with only Norway and 
Liechtenstein left as signatories. It was argued, by some, that the EFTA Surveillance 
Authority (ESA), which ensures that the EFTA countries carry out their EEA 
obligations, will lose its credibility and legitimacy if Iceland leaves – as, in practice, 
only Norway would be left to oversee its own policy implementation (see e.g. 
Sverdrup 2008). The Norwegian government denied that this was the case, as the 
foreign minister, Jonas Gahr Støre, declared in November 2009 that the government 
position was 
“that the EEA agreement remains the basis of our relationship to the EU, 
also if Iceland is to go from EFTA to the EU. The agreement is, as is well-
known, not dependent on a set number of members”. 
(cited by Norge EU-delegasjonen 2009) 
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Although Støre’s acknowledgement of the effects Iceland’s prospective EU entry 
would have on the EEA agreement was limited to ”technical changes in the 
workings of the agreement” (Norge EU-delegasjonen 2009), it cannot be denied that 
if the EEA agreement is to be revised, it is likely that Norway will have a new debate 
on the association form on her hands: as Sverdrup (2008) points out, “if the EEA 
agreement is opened – then it is almost impossible to avoid that the EU debate is 
opened too”. 
The prospects of Iceland entering the EU also raised issues related to fisheries policy. 
Iceland’s large fisheries sector is likely to give the country considerable influence in 
the development of the EU’s fisheries policy if the country joins, and this could 
potentially be at odds with Norway’s interests (e.g. Elsebutangen 2008; Sverdrup 
2008). As one commentator argued in 2008: 
“With Iceland on the EU side of the table, we face a huge challenge. If the 
Norwegian fisheries sector changes sides in the Norwegian EU debate [from 
‘no’ to ‘yes’], the situation around Norwegian EU membership will be 
different than today. Then we will have a new membership debate before 
we know it”. 
(Aasen 2008) 
Sverdrup (2008) agrees with this view, as he also thinks that the fisheries issue has 
the potential to sway many voters from “no” to “yes”, especially in western parts of 
Norway. 
It cannot be said that the Lisbon Treaty had a significant impact on the Norwegian 
debate, although it is possible that the Irish “no” might have had an indirect impact 
on the debate through putting the magnifying glass on things that do not work in the 
EU. As the chairman of Europeisk Ungdom (“European Youth of Norway”), Anne 
Margrethe Lund, stated in August 2010: when the media “focuses on the things that 
don’t work in the EU, then we struggle to explain why membership is a good idea” 
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(cited by Roshauw 2010). Nevertheless, the Foreign Ministry’s analysis of the Lisbon 
Treaty’s impact on Norway returned the following conclusions: 
“The immediate consequences for the Single Market and thus for the EEA 
agreement will not, in all likelihood, be of significance. [...] This is based on 
that all parties in the EEA agreement intend to continue building on the 
obligations and well run cooperation arrangements that exist in the EEA, 
and that prospective new issues that emerge as a result of the Lisbon Treaty 
can be solved in a practical and good way.” 
(Utenriksdepartementet 2009: 16-17) 
The “no” side also maintained that the effects of the Lisbon Treaty on Norway were 
negligible. This is understandable as it was in its interest that the status quo was 
upheld. By Norwegian Eurosceptics, the treaty was viewed as another post-1994 
development which only served to confirm that the EU was not something they 
want Norway to be part of. At NtEU’s annual conference on 12 March 2010, one 
speaker declared that the Lisbon Treaty only strengthened the “no” side’s arguments 
against membership, as the treaty only served to widen the gap between EEA and 
EU membership (Harper 2010a). Disagreeing with one of the Labour Party’s devout 
EU proponents and now Secretary General of the Council of Europe, Thorbjørn 
Jagland’s statement that the Lisbon Treaty is ”good for everyone, except Norway”, 
the speaker proclaimed that the treaty is “bad for the EU, [but] irrelevant to 
Norway”. 
Iceland submitted its application for EU membership to Brussels on 16 July 2009. 
However, at the end of 2010, the much hoped-for “Iceland suction” had yet to show 
its effect. The financial crisis, instead of prompting higher support for EU 
membership, seemed to have a negative effect on public opinion in Norway. Based 
on the assumption that Norwegian voters change their preference on the EU 
according to sociotropic utilitarianism, Sverdrup (2009) puts this down to the fact 
that the EU was worse hit by the financial crisis than Norway. Furthermore, in 2010, 
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the unrest in the union surrounding the Greek economic crisis was also a commonly 
cited cause of the high “no” majorities in the polls (see Moe and Strand 2010; Graven 
2010). Besides, the Conservative and EU-proponent, Astrup’s (2009) logic is hard to 
abnegate: “If the Swedish suction appeared like a light breeze, then the Iceland 
suction will seem like ripples in the seashore a warm summer’s day”. Moreover, 
Professor of comparative politics, Frank Aarebrot, declared in May 2010 that “there 
is no reason to revitalize the EU debate at present”; the EU debate in Norway could 
not get any more “stone dead”, he said (cited by Moe and Strand 2010). However, 
there are indications that the debate might be resurrected in 2012. On 7 January 2010, 
the red-green government appointed a research based committee which was to 
undertake a thorough examination of the effects of the EEA agreement on 
Norwegian politics, law, the economy and society. The committee’s report is due at 
the end of 2011 (Vermes 2010b), so it is reasonable to expect that the EU debate will 
be revived, at least to some extent, in its wake. 
7.2 The Post-1994 Thematic Analysis 
So, the question remains: does the Eurosceptic argumentation used in the 15 years 
since the last referendum follow the same pattern as that which went before it? Did 
the themes of political values, political culture and ruralism retain their dominant 
position in the Norwegian Eurosceptic discourse between 1994 and 2010? The data 
used and the methods employed to obtain these differed slightly from the previous 
chapters. This is due to the fact that the 1994-2010 period was not a period of 
heightened debate, unlike the previously analysed periods (and as a corollary, EU-
related documents were less abundant). Besides, a wider range of methods were 
available for current-day research. The next section outlines the data and methods 
used for the post-1994 documentary analysis, and the subsequent sections present 
the results. 
7.2.1 Data and Methods 
The main part of the post-1994 thematic analysis was, like the analyses of the 
previous periods, the newspaper study. The data sample was collected from the 
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debate pages in Aftenposten’s morning and evening editions, from three separate 
years when debating activity was expected to be the highest (the early 2000s). In 
addition, the morning editions of Aftenposten in 2009 were included, to make the 
study representative of the whole decade and to increase the data sample.238 To 
supplement the Aftenposten data, internet searches for online commentaries, debates 
and other news items were also conducted, and only items containing Eurosceptic 
argumentation were retained for the analysis. This resulted in a total sample of 96 
items for the newspaper study, of which 59 were letters to the editor or 
commentaries systematically sourced from the paper edition of Aftenposten from the 
years 2000, 2002, 2004 and 2009,239 and the remaining 38 items were articles, 
interviews, commentaries or online debates resulting from random online searches, 
and a few letters to the editors from other papers than Aftenposten. The online data 
was taken from a wide range of Norwegian websites, mainly online newspapers, but 
also websites belonging to e.g. Mission of Norway to the EU and NtEU.240 All the data 
were coded according to the coding scheme set out in section 4.2.2 of Chapter Four 
and Appendix G, to sub-themes of the categories postmaterialist values, political 
culture, rural society, economic interest and national identity. 
For the party analysis, the Eurosceptic argumentation in each of the Storting parties’ 
(excluding the Conservative Party’s) manifestos from 1997, 2001, 2005 and 2009 were 
analysed, as were a 2008 parliamentary debate and qualitative responses from two 
surveys of Norwegian MPs conducted by the author (in 2006 and 2010, see 
Appendix D for details on the questionnaires and methodology). Attempts were 
made at sourcing additional data on the LP, CDP and PP due to their limited 
coverage of the EU issue in their manifestos, but this was only successful with regard 
to the CDP, on which two documents, one speech and one debate booklet, were 
The reason why only the morning edition was included was that the national library micro film 
archive, which logged both the morning and evening editions on the same micro film, did not stock 
newspapers as new as 2009, and therefore, the 2009 papers had to be searched on its online avis2 
system, which was much more time consuming. 
239 Seven from 2000, 15 from 2002, 29 from 2004 and eight from 2009. 
240 The websites the items were taken from are: idag.no, aftenposten.no, morgenbladet.no, neitileu.no, 
nytid.no, nationen.no, eu­norge.org, vg.no, dagsavisen.no, forskning.no, handelskampanjen.no and 
e24.no. Moreover, letters to the editor from the paper editions of the following newspapers were 
added: Klassekampen, Oppland Arbeiderblad, Dagbladet, VG and Nationen. 
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added to the analysis. Moreover, an analysis of a selection of NtEU documents241 
complemented the party-based study. Like in the 1970s study of Folkebevegelsen and 
other “no” literature, only documents which covered a range of 
topics/argumentation242 were included in the analysis in order to get an idea of 
which topics or arguments were prioritized/considered most important when 
covering the EU issue on a general level. Specifically the coded data for the 
party/NtEU analysis were 26 documents, four speeches, two NtEU songs, nine 
replies from a 2008 parliamentary debate and 44 qualitative survey responses to the 
question “what are your own feelings about Norway’s future relationship with the 
EU” (2006 survey) and “what are your main arguments against the EU (and 
Norwegian membership)” (2010 survey). Of the 44 qualitative responses to the 
survey questions, 8 were returned by SLP MPs, 10 by Labour, eight by CP, three by 
CDP and 15 by PP MPs.243 
In addition, the three argument books from the period were used to fill in gaps in the 
documentary analysis. These were Hei, verden! Et solidarisk og internasjonalt nei til EU 
(“Hi, world! A solidarity-based and international no to the EU”) from 2000, edited by 
Oen, Larsen and Moen from the Labour “no” movement and published by AUF; 
Hvorfor nei? (“Why no?”), authored by former sociology professor and SLP 
politician, Ottar Brox; and Et nytt nei (“A new no”), authored by four former SME 
members (Moen et al. 2004). The latter two were both published in 2004, the former 
by NtEU and the latter by Spartacus publishers. Furthermore, ten semi-structured 
interviews with “no” activists and politicians from each of the Storting parties244 (see 
list of interviewees in Appendix E) were conducted to supplement the research. 
Quantitative data from the two above-mentioned elite surveys (conducted by the 
author in 2006 and 2010) were also used to triangulate the findings from the 
This includes the 2006 Organisation handbook (Nei til EU 2006), Election information 2009: 
“Standpoint” Oppland (Nei til EU 2009b), a 2010 Flyer: “Four reasons to say no to the EU” (Nei til 
EU 2010), and the July 2010 “EU guide” (Harper and Matland 2010), as well as two speeches made by 
the current leader, Heming Olaussen, and one by the former NtEU leader, Kristen Nygaard. 
242 i.e. was not specific to one subject, for example, EEC membership’s impact on the environment. 
243 Further details on the data included in the study can be found in Appendix F. 
244 Except the Conservative Party. 
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qualitative study. The next section presents the findings of the newspaper/online 
study. 
7.2.2 Findings of the Newspaper/Online Study 
In the post-1994 period, political culture and political values continued to dominate 
the Eurosceptic discourse in Norway. Nearly seven out of ten and six out of ten of 
the news items, letters or commentaries analysed, contained political culture and 
political values arguments respectively. This dominance is also illustrated in Figure 
7.1 below, which shows that these two themes made up almost three fourths of all 
category codes in the newspaper study. Rural society arguments also continued to 
play a noticeable role in the debate, and economic interest remained a quite 
marginal, albeit stable, feature. National identity, on the other hand, had 
disappeared almost completely off the surface of the “no” side of the debate. 
Figure 7.1 Number of news items coded to each of the categories (post-1994)245 
Political Culture 
Political Values 
Rural Society 
Economic Interest 
National Identity 
Source: Author’s study 
When comparing the 1994-2010 argumentation to that of the previous periods of 
Norwegian Euroscepticism, it is clear that its structure remained exceptionally stable 
between 1961 and 2010. Nevertheless, when it comes to nuances in arguments within 
245 In the economic interest category, the arguments merely playing down the significance of economic 
issues and the “yes” side’s economic arguments are not included. 
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the categories, there were of course changes from the 1970s debate to the 1990s 
debate, and this has naturally also been the case between 1994 and the late 2000s. 
Category by category, the next sections of this chapter explore the qualitative 
findings from the newspaper study and these nuances in more detail. 
7.2.2.1 Political Culture: The EU’s Problems – Structural, not Cosmetic 
As mentioned above, 67 out of the 97 news/debate items analysed contain political 
culture argumentation. Like in the 1960s, 1970s and the 1990s, the main themes in the 
post-1994 political culture argumentation are sovereignty and democracy. Gone are 
the references to the German occupation during the second world war and the post-
war feeling of freedom that characterized some early Eurosceptic 
sovereignty/independence argumentation. Nevertheless, the analysis shows that 
aversion to the notion that Norway should give up the right to control its own 
destiny is as relevant to Norwegian Euroscepticism in 2010 as it was in 1961 or 1972. 
Even Norwegian 21st Century Eurosceptics view the surrender of control over the 
Norwegian people, territory and resources unacceptable. However, there are some 
slight variations in how the sovereignty aspect is expressed compared to previous 
periods. There is little use of the word frihet (freedom) and there are fewer emotive 
arguments that emphasize sovereignty as a value in itself. This is possibly because 
the effect of this kind of argumentation has declined due to the fact that the 
percentage of the population who lived through WWII has dropped, and because in 
the current political climate, the possibility of occupation and territorial acquisitions 
in Western Europe seems remote. Naturally, some reference to the importance of 
suverenitet (sovereignty), selvstendighet/uavhengighet (independence), 
selvbestemmelsesrett (right to make own decisions), selvstyre (self-government) and 
selvråderett (right to self-government) remains, but the arguments more commonly 
specify exactly why or in what areas it is important to retain handlefrihet (freedom of 
action) and control. Examples are freedom of action in foreign affairs, control over 
military missions, and sovereignty over natural resources and economic policy/the 
budget. 
237 
Moreover, there are some interesting developments in the anti-union argumentation. 
Antipathy towards the way in which the EU has developed since 1992 seems to have 
increased, in particular after the plans of a European Constitution were announced. 
To be sure, references to “the United States of Europe”, a “European state” and a 
“federal Europe” were made in the 1990s debate too, but in the 2000s, they are much 
more commonplace, with two out of ten commentators arguing that the EU has 
moved (or is moving) in this direction. 
As before, not only do the Eurosceptics reject the idea that the Storting no longer is 
to decide how national affairs should be run, but being governed by unelected 
officials from Brussels makes it all the worse. According to the Eurosceptics, 
willingly swapping Norwegian folkestyre with Brussels’ technocracy would be a 
ludicrous idea to any Norwegian with his/her democratic ideals intact. “Why should 
[we] enter a Union and surrender the right to govern [our] own country to a remote 
elite in Brussels?” Refusing to join is not egotism, it is common sense (Olaussen 
2010a). The democracy argument is commonly cited as the most important argument 
against the EU. Skaara (02/09/00), for example, declares in her letter to the editor that 
the Norwegian EU opposition above all is about “the fight against the increasing 
powerlessness to a bigger and more remote power”, as does sociology Professor and 
SLP politician Brox (2004; Aftenposten 16/12/02), the CDP leader from 2004 to 2010 
Dagfinn Høybråten (Haslien 2004; Nei til EU 2005) and many more. 
Høybråten is also dejected with the EU’s way of governing which, he argues, reflects 
the French thinker, Paul Valery’s definition of politics as “the art of preventing 
people from busying themselves with what is their own business” (cited by Haslien 
2004). The rejection of the EU due to its elitist and thus undemocratic nature is 
echoed by several Eurosceptic commentators. Ørnhøi (2009a) is another example. He 
complains that the Norwegian EU supporters “continue to worry about the fact that 
the majority of the people lack sense, and that we do not understand our own good”. 
Sarcastically, he continues: 
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“For good democrats [i.e. the EU elites] who work for the good of everyone 
are naturally always right. This is how the logic works in Oslo and Brussels, 
this is how the logic works in all of Europe’s capitals. While the EU project’s 
popular anchor withers away. [...] It is authoritarian to continue to insist 
that the majority of the people do not understand.” 
Both Ørnhøi’s and Høybråten’s comments reflect disgust with and disbelief at the 
EU’s top-down view of politics. Brox (2004) also argues: 
“The union is constructed to prevent politicians elected by the people from 
interfering in economic matters. [...] The EU is the European technocracy’s 
solution to the problem that the ballot can be used to influence economic 
policy.” 
This democracy argument is clearly linked to left-wing opposition to the EU’s 
market liberalist ideology. All in all, the complaints about EU democracy up to the 
present day are echoes of those voiced in the early 1990s and even, to a large degree, 
in the 1960s and 1970s, although time and developments in the EU have served to 
strengthen them. This is because, as one letter writer puts it, in 2010, “it is still as 
logical that the degree of an active folkestyre decreases with the [increasing] size of 
the state or union and the distance to the people with the power” (Staale 02/09/00). 
The population of the EC/EU has increased by 163 percent between 1972 and 2010, 
from the EC “six”’ 190 million (1972) to the EU27’s 501 million (2010) (Eurostat 2011), 
and therefore, the democracy argument is, according to this line of reasoning, even 
more robust today. Additionally, in 2010, there are many more examples of the EU’s 
lack of respect for the voice of the people than there was in 1972 or in 1994; now, the 
Dutch and French rejection of the European Constitution in 2005 serves as an 
example of the EU’s dismissive attitude towards its citizens. This is because the 
Lisbon Treaty, which was put into force in 2009, “is almost identical to the European 
Constitution which was rejected both in France and the Netherlands in 2005” and 
because only the Irish were able to vote on the Lisbon Treaty, due to the elites’ fears 
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that the European public would reject it again (Harper and Matland 2010; also see 
Haga 2007). This is also criticized by the LP’s Odd Einar Dørum,246 who thinks that 
“it is a coruscating weakness with the project that they don’t dare to mobilize for 
themselves among their own citizens. If a project is to have strength, it has to have 
the citizens’ support”. Further examples are the Irish referenda on the Nice Treaty 
(2001) and Lisbon Treaty (2008) because they returned responses that the EU and the 
elites “did not like”, and therefore resulted in follow-up referenda with extremely 
powerful “yes” campaigns, which “forced” the people to vote “yes” (Harper and 
Matland 2010; see also Dagsavisen 2009b). SME’s Wegard Harsvik247 also comments 
on this “worrying practice” of “going round and over and past what the population 
has said” when the public has rejected “the union and an ever closer union”. 
But what about the EU’s efforts in making its institutions more democratic in the 
years after Maastricht? Have the changes within the EU’s policy and decision 
making structures in recent years, for example the strengthened position of the 
directly elected European Parliament (EP) or the Citizens’ Initiative introduced by 
the Lisbon Treaty (2007), served to quieten down criticism of the EU’s democratic 
deficit? It seems a select few Eurosceptics have accepted that progress has been made 
in some aspects of the area since 1994,248 but overall, the argument still stands tall: 
“Norwegian EU opponents do not want to be members of a society where it 
does not matter what the majority of people thinks and where we cannot 
unseat a government which governs against the interests of the majority”. 
(Brox 16/12/02) 
In other words, the Norwegian Eurosceptics believe that the EU’s democratic 
problems are not cosmetic; they are structural and no change in the balance between 
the various institutions can remedy them. Gåsvatn (2009), for example, points out 
that in parallel with the EP’s increase in influence on EU policy making, public 
246 Interview with the author, Oslo, 13 January 2010.

247 Interview with the author, Oslo, 8 January 2010.

248 This was at least a point made by the LP leader, Lars Sponheim, in 2004 (Storvik 2004).
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interest in EP elections has dropped, something which indicates, she argues, that the 
EU is a faulty construction. 
7.2.2.2 Political Values: Some Variation Due to EEA Directives 
The postmaterialist values element, as a proportion of all arguments, remained 
relatively stable throughout the 50 year period under study. Naturally there was 
some variation in emphasis of different arguments or themes across the periods, and 
argumentation activity in this category was perhaps affected the most by individual 
policy developments within the EU. This was especially the case in the last 15 years 
of the 1961-2010 period because Norway had to adopt EU legislation through the 
EEA agreement which touched on typical postmaterialist concerns such as ethics, 
human rights, animal welfare and equality and because the EU’s military capabilities 
developed and prompted anti-war concerns.249 
In particular, the recent DRD attracted widespread criticism on the basis of human 
rights concerns (privacy and legal protection), but also the Schengen agreement, 
which is accused of shutting out refugees in need and creating a “fortress Europe”, 
was very unpopular among human rights champions. This was one of the LP’s main 
arguments against the EU; the LP’s current party leader, Trine Skei Grande, stated in 
2005 that “there is nothing that cuts a liberal heart as much as seeing people being 
shot as they are crossing a barbed wire fence. We do not want a Fortress Europe” 
(cited in Nei til EU 2005). The 2010/2011 leader of UmEU, Tale Marte Dæhlen (2010), 
argues in her letter to the editor that “the EUs attempts at standardizing European 
asylum and immigration policy would have been favourable if the goal was to get a 
treatment of asylum seekers that is as humane and fair as possible”. However, she 
concludes that this is far from the case, as conditions for asylum seekers only seem to 
be getting worse, and the walls around Europe higher. 
Besides, outside times of heightened debate (like the other periods), specific issues of current 
interest are more likely to be the topic of letters and commentaries than a more general discussion of 
the EU and membership. This is illustrated by the relatively high frequency of peace­related arguments 
in the 2000s, which was undoubtedly due to the ongoing debate on Norway’s participation in the 
CSDP at the time. 
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Anti-EU argumentation as peace promotion is also prominent in the 2000s debate, 
and like in the early 1990s, Norway’s role as a peace negotiator is put forward as an 
important reason to why it is essential that Norway retains its “independent 
position”. Moreover, opposition to the EU’s “military cooperation which includes 
wars that are illegal by international law” (Hassel 2010) also features quite 
substantially in the data. The desire for Norway to “only participate in military 
operations which have an unequivocal UN mandate” is quite widespread (Solhjell, 
cited in Nei til EU 2005).250 
Health and environment issues are less widespread in the post-1994 discourse than it 
was in the previous debate. However, it is possible that health/environment issues 
have been underrepresented in the study due to a sampling bias; the debates 
surrounding the controversial food cosmetics directives and the veterinary directive 
took place primarily in the second half of the 1990s, a time which the sample did not 
account for. Nevertheless, the CDP’s commitment to a restrictive alcohol policy, 
250 Traditionally, the developments in the EU’s security dimension have “been viewed through the 
prism of Atlanticism” in Norway; the main concern has been that a European CSDP should not weaken 
NATO’s role (Miles 2006: 81). However, this discourse changed somewhat after the Norwegian 
application for EU membership was reality in 1992, “towards a more balanced view of the EU and 
NATO, emphasizing the EU’s role as a soft security actor, with a special emphasis on its role in the 
Barents Euro­Arctic Council” (Rieker 2006b: 306). The Norwegian preference for participating in the 
EU’s CSDP, despite its non­membership, stems from the Norwegian government’s fear of 
marginalization in European security after the St. Malo summit of December 1998 (Rieker 2006b: 
308). This fear translated into a more pragmatic approach to participation in the CSDP, with the 
CDP/CP/LP government proposing a notable contribution to the EU’s 1999 Helsinki Headline Goal. In 
2004, the Minister of Defence, Kristin Krohn Devold (Conservative Party) successfully argued against 
isolation and remaining “on the sidelines as passive spectators while watching European security 
policy cooperation take shape without us”, offering 150 soldiers to participate in a Swedish­led rapid 
reaction force from 2008 (cited in Ministry of Defence 2004). Some disagreed with this decision, 
arguing that participation in the EU’s new Headline Goal 2010 was in conflict with the Norwegian 
constitution. Others opposed participation because of Norway’s non­membership of the EU and 
resulting lack of influence on decisions (Rieker 2006b: 308, 312). Nevertheless, most Norwegian 
politicians agree with the government’s “troops for influence” strategy (Rieker 2006b: 308), at least as 
long as the CSDP does not undermine the role of NATO. This might help to explain why the issue of 
Norway’s CSDP participation has not been more controversial and more widely debated. Another 
potential reason is the high support for humanitarian and crisis intervention and management among 
both the public and elites in the Nordic countries. Because of long­established traditions in foreign 
policy in this area, the contribution of resources to the EU’s efforts in this dimension is relatively 
uncontroversial in Norway (Kite 2006: 108). Moreover, there is also a possibility that the 
government’s emphasis on the country’s right to veto any proposal to use the forces (Udgaard 2006: 
326) had a calming effect on the debate; this gave out the signal that the decision to contribute 150 
soldiers was not was not binding. A final point worth noting is that the red­green coalition, prior to 
entering government in 2005 did agree on tightening the conditions under which Norway would take 
part in military operations (Udgaard 2006: 327), to meet concerns which mirror those found in the 
newspaper/online analysis about needing “an unequivocal UN mandate” (Solhjell, cited in Nei til EU 
2005). 
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which clashes with the EU’s priority of open competition, is an example of the health 
argument’s continued relevance to Norwegian Euroscepticism (e.g. Høybråten 
11/11/04).251 The trend towards “fake foods” which have questionable health effects 
and the “global market of cheating” is the topic of another commentary. The EU is 
criticized for approving this negative trend; poor quality foods with potential health 
risks are brought into the Norwegian market through the EEA agreement 
(Geelmuyden 08/12/09). 
The variations in the content of the above sub-categories of postmaterialism 
notwithstanding, stability can be seen in the structure of the arguments which build 
on opposition to the right of way granted to market concerns in the EU. This 
includes the arguments pertaining to the sub-categories environment, external 
solidarity and internal solidarity (including protection of the welfare state and 
workers’ rights). Environmental and external solidarity arguments (and their 
position in the debate) in particular, remained very constant, from the 1970s up until 
2010. The following citation from a 2010 commentary could just as easily have been 
taken from the 1970s debate: 
“Outside the union, Norway can play an alternative role in relation to the 
South [... and] aspire to conduct an international trade policy which gives 
South countries the opportunity to use the same developing policies which 
we once used during the building of the Norwegian welfare state”. 
(Lundeberg 2010) 
That the Norwegian Eurosceptics’ environmental arguments remain unaffected by 
the changes in the EU and the EU’s expanding competence in environmental policy 
is reflected by a statement the youth movement Natur og Ungdom (Nature and Youth, 
Young Friends of the Earth Norway), issued after their annual conference in 2004: 
“the EU has changed since 1994, but the environmental movement’s arguments 
against Norwegian membership are strengthened” (cited by Moen et al. 2004: 106). 
251 This was also confirmed in the interview with CDP’s Odd Jostein Sæter. 
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The statement follows the same logic as before: while the EU’s market liberalism 
produces increases in 
“economic indicators like investments, production and trade [...] the most 
important environmental indicators become progressively more negative: 
the forests are dwindling, the groundwater level is sinking, the soil is 
eroding, the wetland is disappearing, the fisheries are collapsing, the 
pastures are being impaired, the rivers are drying up, the temperature is 
rising, the coral reefs are dying, and plant and animal species are 
disappearing”. 
(Moen et al. 2004: 106) 
Brox (2004: 40) focuses on a more specific aspect of the conflict between the 
environment and market liberalism, as he argues that “the goods transport which is 
generated by market liberalism might be the most serious threat against Europe’s 
environment”, as goods produced in more cost-effective parts of the EU, such as 
agricultural products, have to be transported across Europe, e.g. from Spain to 
Finland (or Norway). Similarly, an online commentary (Dagsavisen 2009a) reflects 
disgust at this development: 
“A very sick example of this is people by the coast who through thousands 
of years have been able to buy fresh fish on the pier from the fishermen. An 
abrupt end was put to this a few years ago when a new EU directive 
decided that it was against the law [to sell fish on the pier]. And then it 
appeared that the frozen cod at Rimi252 on the pier had been caught a few 
months before in the same place. And then transported down to China for 
packaging... And subsequently back to Rimi on the pier some place in 
Finnmark.253 [...] In other words, the consumption of fossil products and 
global warming isn’t exactly reduced by this... [...] Stupid EU directives 
have a ditto origin, I suppose... And strong forces in the Labour Party and 
252 A Norwegian supermarket chain. 
253 The northernmost county in Norway. 
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Conservative Party have imposed this [stupidity] on us for almost four 
decades as something ‘superior and intelligent’...!” 
All of these examples show that opposition to the EU’s trade policy and its goal of 
economic growth at the expense of the environment brings the environmental 
argumentation into the 2000s. But it is not only the EU’s trade policy which is being 
branded an “ecological catastrophe” (Moen and Harsvik 2005), so is the EU’s 
fisheries policy. The EU’s fisheries policy continues to be used as a horror story. The 
EU is also criticized for being too passive in environmental policy – for dragging its 
feet in climate conferences. 
7.2.2.3 Rural Society: Agriculture, Fisheries and Districts Still Important 
The position of rural society sentiments in the debate has, like the political culture 
and values dimensions, remained very stable. Fifty years after the first debate on 
Norwegian membership of the EC, rural society arguments are still a central part of 
the Eurosceptic discourse. A quarter of the letters and newspaper/online items 
analysed put forward defence of the districts or the need to retain national control 
over the fish resources and/or agricultural policy as reasons to remain outside the 
EU. 
Keeping national control over the fisheries is the most common argument in this 
category, probably because it is important on two levels. The fisheries are not only 
important to the (coastal) districts, it is also important to Norway as a nation: “the 
fishing industry is supposed to contribute to that Norway also in the future shall be 
a good country to live in” (Teige254 15/03/04). In other words, the fisheries are still 
perceived as important both in economic terms and in societal terms, maintaining 
coastal settlement and contributing to government revenues. Additionally, as noted 
above, the desire to keep national control over the fish resources are also connected 
to environmentalism, like in previous debates, as the EU’s fisheries policy continues 
to be compared unfavourably to the Norwegian policy. 
254 Chairman of Fiskebåtredernes Forbund (the Fishing Boat Shippers’ Association). 
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Also agricultural argumentation appears often enough in the debate to judge the 
maintenance of the sector of importance also to 21st Century Norwegian 
Euroscepticism. Brox (2004: 31) writes that “there is little we know as sure about the 
EU issue as the fact that all activity in the rural industries will be severely affected if 
our country joins the union”. This is not only because of the competitive 
disadvantage Norwegian farmers have to contend with, i.e. the harsh climate, but 
also the high salary and cost levels in Norway. Without the subsidies, no farmer 
would be able to afford goods and services on the Norwegian market, and thus the 
agricultural sector would not be able to recruit a work force. The following quote 
from the interview with Per Ole Lunde,255 a farmer from Eastern Norway, illustrates 
this well: 
“At the moment [... at the farm] we need carpenters and [...] electricians […]. 
And a carpenter earns at least twice as much as we do per hour, and an 
electrician earns four times as much per hour. Or, the firm we use costs us 
easily over four to five times as much per hour as what we earn working on 
this farm.” 
So, the Norwegian farming sector is at a competitive disadvantage in the EU context 
in more than one way; it would not be able to compete with European farmers in an 
open European market or with Norwegian employers for manpower without 
subsidies. 
In the newspaper debate, readiness for emergencies and maintenance of cultural 
landscapes are two cited reasons for nurturing the national agricultural sector. 
Global responsibility and solidarity is another. Hanssen (20/03/04), chairman of 
Forum for utvikling og miljø (Forum for development and environment), argues that 
the world is rapidly approaching a “critical point with a large-scale global food 
shortage” and believes that in this perspective “keeping an agricultural structure, 
255 Interview with the author, Vest­Torpa, 15 September 2009. 
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both in Norway and all other places in the world which secures the family farm and 
the thriving local communities, [is] a future-oriented, responsible policy”. In other 
words, he believes that western countries should take responsibility for feeding their 
own population, and like Lundeberg (2010, cited above), he thinks that developing 
countries should, like Norway “and other western countries at the time when we 
needed it”, be able to protect and develop their own industry until they are ready to 
participate in the global market. 
Eurosceptic argumentation related to the protection of rural settlement and the 
districts is also present. The CDP’s Høybråten (11/11/04) reflects aversion to the idea 
that market considerations should take precedence over districts considerations, as 
he wants to have “a regional policy originating from the desire to make use of the 
whole country”. Opposition to the EEA’s attacks on the selective employers’ tax and 
to the EU’s third post directive are additional examples of additional district-related 
argumentation, as these EU initiatives are a threat to rural jobs and thus, the 
dispersed settlement in Norway. 
7.2.2.4 Economic Interest: Not a Motivating Factor 
As Figure 7.1 above shows, utilitarian considerations make up a small part of the 
Eurosceptic body of argumentation. What there is of economic argumentation in the 
newspaper/online debate primarily revolves around opposition to EMU and losing 
sovereignty over natural resources and economic policy. Additionally, like before, 
there are a number of commentators who play down the validity or importance of 
the EU proponents economic arguments or explicitly reject economic interest as an 
argument for either side of the debate. The general view is that economic arguments 
are considered less relevant to the membership question than ever before, as the EEA 
has given Norwegian businesses open access to the Single Market. 
Nevertheless, there is one clear case of expressed utilitarianism in the 
newspaper/online debate. In an online debate (VG Nett Debatt 2003), the following is 
put forward: 
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“Norway will not manage without the oil; in the course of only a few 
decades, we have made ourselves dependent of the oil. And without that 
income, Norway would not have been as rich as she is today. [...] If we had 
joined the EU, we might as well have given up the oil straight away because 
it is not Norway who is allowed to regulate how much oil we are allowed to 
pump up.” 
This shows that Norway’s wealth could, by some, potentially be viewed as 
threatened by EU membership and loss of sovereignty over resources such as oil or 
fish. However, these kinds of messages are not part of the mainstream of the debate. 
Rather, expressed economic considerations are on the whole characterized by 
sentiments like “Norway should retain sovereignty over our fish and energy 
resources”, “Norway should be free to conduct an alternative economic policy” or 
“the Euro would not work for us”. Although the EMU-related arguments have a 
clear economic, utilitarian profile, the other two types of arguments seem to be 
predominantly driven by either district concerns or the desire to conduct a different, 
more humane and egalitarian economic policy. 
Furthermore, the arguments “time has proved that we don’t need membership to do 
well” or “the economy is irrelevant to the question of EU membership” are well-
used. However, it is important to reiterate that this does not necessarily mean that 
the economy is unimportant to Norwegian Euroscepticism. It could be argued that 
its healthy state has allowed and still allows the Eurosceptics to successfully shift 
focus onto other issues, namely political Values, political Culture and Rural society 
(VCR) issues. This was also reflected in the interview with the farmer, Lunde.256 
Lunde points out that the fact that Norway is not in the position that she needs the 
EU to prosper economically, unlike Ireland in the 1970s or Sweden in the early 1990s, 
is a significant factor in Norwegian Euroscepticism: 
256 Interview with the author, Vest­Torpa, 15 September 2009. 
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“[...] It is evident that this about economy and egotism is a factor which we 
can’t ignore. That we suddenly control so large economic resources [...] is 
one of the three, four [or] five main ‘no’ arguments. I think we have to be as 
honest as to say so.” 
But even if the economy plays a role in Norwegian Euroscepticism, it is crystal clear 
that it is not the driving force, as the ownership of the economic interest argument as 
regards “the big picture”, i.e. the national economy, did and still do belong to the 
“yes” side. It was aptly put by one commentator: “We ought to know after two 
referenda that the economic arguments for membership do not carry enough 
weight” (Johansen 23/12/04).257 
7.2.2.5 National Identity Sentiments: Practically Non-existent 
Arguments that express sentiments that could be considered to reflect perceived 
cultural threat, hostility to other cultures, strong national attachment or national 
pride are practically non-existent in the items analysed. This is consistent with the 
trend observed from the 1960s to the early 1990s, where the number of national 
identity arguments declined decade by decade. The only items using sentiments 
which border on nationalism are a letter about Norwegian participation in EU 
military operations and an online commentary which refers to how 17 May, the 
Norwegian Constitution day, is celebrated and how Norwegian elites, by adapting 
Norway to the EU, are attempting to break this tradition. In the first item, the writer, 
MP for Kystpartiet (the Coast Party), Steinar Bastesen, argues that “Norwegian 
soldiers should die for the King and the Fatherland”, not for the EU (20/11/04). The 
second item is written by representatives from Folkeaksjonen MOT EU-medlemskap 
(the People’s Action against EU membership). It argues that the 17 May celebration, 
when “[w]e put on our greatest and proudest clothes, our bunader,258 and greet each 
other with a resounding ‘hurrah for 17 May’”, is under threat by EU membership. 
However, it could also be argued that Sweden did not need EU membership to prosper 
economically either, as she too had, like Norway, access to the Single Market through the EEA 
agreement. 
258 National costumes. 
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Other than in these two items, national identity feeling is not found in any of the 
argumentation. Two letter writers are concerned about threats to the Norwegian 
restrictive alcohol policy, and eight letter writers are worried about the effect 
Norwegian participation in the CSDP will have on Norway’s relationship to the US. 
Two of the eight also express disapproval of anti-American sentiment within the 
EU.259 However, it is more likely that health, social and security concerns 
respectively are at the heart of these arguments, rather than feelings of perceived 
cultural threat or lack of identification with Europe. 
7.2.3 The Parties’ Arguments 
The analysis of the party and NtEU material shows that political culture arguments 
are most prominent also on this level. Out of the 85 responses/documents analysed, 
68 bring up issues related to sovereignty and democracy in their rejection of EU 
membership. Furthermore, the political culture dominance persists regardless of 
party, and is most prominent in the PP, illustrated by the fact that 12 of the 15 
Eurosceptic PP MPs who responded to the qualitative survey questions gave 
bureaucracy, lack of democracy and/or loss of sovereignty as their main reason(s) to 
oppose EU membership. However, in all the other parties and NtEU, political value-
related arguments are (nearly) as common as political culture ones. In the PP by 
contrast (see Figure 7.2), economic liberalist argumentation on the one hand and 
concern for the country’s natural resources on the other, particularly the fish (which 
makes up the rural society slice in Figure 7.2), compete for second place. In other 
words, if isolating the PP, then NtEU and the parties’ argumentation follows, like in 
1994, the same trend as that which is observed in the newspaper debate.260 Ruralism 
makes up the third most common theme, and is closely followed by economic 
arguments. Also here, the national identity category continues its trend of decline. 
259 Note that these letter writers are (or in the case of Gundersen, was) Progress Party politicians 
(Christian Tybring­Gjedde and Fridtjof Frank Gundersen). 
260 This is not very surprising considering that it is primarily representatives from Nei til EU or 
politicians who write letters to the editor, especially outside the periods of heightened debate. 
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Figure 7.2 The Progress Party’s argumentation261 
Political culture 
Political values 
Rural society 
Economic interest 
Economic liberalism 
National identity 
Source: Author’s study

Figure 7.3 Norwegian parties’ argumentation (excluding the PP)

Political culture 
Political values 
Rural society 
Economic interest 
National identity 
Source: Author’s study 
Figure 7.3 above shows the structure of the centre and left-wing parties/factions’ 
argumentation, which is very similar. If comparing it to the arguments in the 
newspaper debate (illustrated by Figure 7.1 above) and NtEU’s argumentation (see 
Figure 7.4 below), there is somewhat more emphasis on economic issues in the party 
discourse than in the newspaper and NtEU discourse. This is likely to be because the 
261 Number of documents coded to each of the categories. 
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parties and their politicians need to appear as credible and responsible government 
alternatives, capable of maintaining the interests of the Norwegian people, whereas 
NtEU can afford to be more ideologically oriented.262 Or as SME’s Wegard Harsvik263 
puts it, “it is not forbidden for Norwegian politicians to think about what is best for 
the Norwegian population”. 
7.2.3.1 Nei til EU 
NtEU’s “pillars” revolve around opposition to “power centres without effective 
democratic control”, protection of national sovereignty, viable local communities, 
the welfare state, full employment and the Sami people’s rights, and the battle 
against increased consumption and environmental destruction (Nei til EU 2006: 10). 
Moreover, its “Four reasons to say no to the EU” (Nei til EU 2010) are folkestyre, 
international solidarity, the environment and handlefrihet. Figure 7.4 shows how 
these arguments fit into the model. 
Figure 7.4 Nei til EU’s argumentation 
Political culture 
Political values 
Rural society 
Economic interest 
National identity 
welfare and 
employment for all 
(internal solidarity) 
external solidarity 
Human rights 
environment 
­ democratic control/ 
folkestyre 
­ national sovereignty 
handlefrihet Viable local 
communities 
Source: Author’s study 
262 This was arguably also a difference between the parties and the LEs’ argumentation in the 1990s

period.

263 Interview with the author, Oslo, 8 January 2010.
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7.2.3.2 The Parties 
With the exception of one PP MP and three Labour MPs, all the MPs who responded 
to the qualitative question in the 2010 survey264 said that their main issue with the 
EU and membership was its impact on Norway’s sovereignty (råderett, suverenitet, 
selvstyre), democratic deficit and/or its “excessive bureaucracy”.265 As part of the 
democracy argument, representatives from all the parties used distance between the 
power and the people to illustrate the democratic problem. One PP politician 
responded that the “the EU has become a large bureaucratic organisation where 
decisions are taken far away from the inhabitants”, and a CDP MP expressed worries 
about the repercussions the trend towards remote democracy could potentially have 
more generally: 
“Centralisation of decisions does, to a much too high degree, create an 
enormous distance from the decision maker to the citizen. Over time, it 
creates great powerlessness which weakens democracy and creates 
favourable conditions for growth of populism and different unhealthy 
currents”. 
In addition to the political culture reasoning, several Labour, CDP and CP MPs cited 
the view that “the market has too high a priority” as one of their main arguments 
against the EU (and Norwegian membership). The MPs connected this “weakness” 
with postmaterialist values, as some argued that the four freedoms are promoted at 
the expense of solidarity with the weak in society (internal solidarity) or with the 
developing countries (external solidarity). For example, a CP MP stated “I am 
against the four freedoms which, in my opinion, lead to exploitation. They benefit 
only those who are strong at the point of departure”, and a Labour MP (among 
others) declared that the EU is “to a too large extent a fortress against the poor part 
of the world”. Other postmaterialist arguments put forward were the opportunity to 
have an independent position in environmental negotiations (CDP and SLP MPs), 
criticism of the EU’s “scandalous” fisheries policy, i.e. “massive overfishing of all 
264 Question 8 (see Appendix D for details).

265 Eight SLP MPs, 10 Labour, eight CP, three CDP and 15 PP MPs
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stocks” (PP MPs), and Norway’s position as a peace negotiator. Additionally, a SLP 
MP produced a slightly different peace-oriented argument: 
“My main argument against is that I think it is unfavourable to organize the 
world in a bunch of large unions. It creates a concentration of power that I 
believe to be unfavourable both in terms of democracy and security policy. I 
have a stronger belief in ‘many nations in more balanced cooperation’.” 
Very few MPs stated that agriculture, fisheries or the districts were among their 
primary arguments against the EU and membership. Considering the CP has its 
basis in the primary sectors, it is striking that none of the party’s six respondents 
mentioned any rural society arguments against the EU. In fact, only one SLP MP (out 
of six), two Labour MPs (out of eight), one CDP MP (out of two) said that the EU 
posing a threat to the rural industries and districts was very important to their 
positions on the EU.266 In an interview with the author,267 the CP’s Cathrine Strindin 
Amundsen explains the relative absence of the agricultural issue in the party’s 
literature with that 
“there are some things that don’t have to be said as often as other things, 
because they are a given. You know, people know that [we think that the 
agricultural sector is important …], but there are also very many other 
things that the CP thinks are important. […] So, which message is it most 
important to spread? What is it people don’t know? [...] And people feel that 
they know that the CP is preoccupied with agriculture. And internally in 
the party, people are more preoccupied with agriculture, it could be, than 
what is reflected by the time spent talking about it, because it is… that 
bedrock, we know lies at the base”. 
266 In addition, another Labour MP and two PP MPs referred to fish in opposition to the EU’s fisheries

policy or to losing sovereignty over the fish (seemingly more economically motivated).

267 Oslo, 13 January 2010.
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“”
This suggests that even if the CP and its politicians, and potentially politicians from 
the other middle and left-wing parties too, do not put much emphasis on the rural 
aspect of their argumentation, the argument is very much there, embedded in the 
base of their position against the EU. The diminishing focus on the agricultural 
argument against the EU is more likely to be a reflection of strategy than declining 
relevance; the Eurosceptics shift focus onto less widely known “no” arguments, as it 
is believed that the public knows that Norwegian agriculture would face problems if 
Norway joined the EU. 
Table 7.3 Norwegian Eurosceptic MPs’ perceptions of the EU268 
Which five of the following give the most accurate description of what you think 
the EU stands for? 
- Bureaucracy 25 
- Democratic Deficit 23 
- Centralisation 20 
+/- Free trade and liberalism 19 
- Loss of Sovereignty 16 
+/- EMU 14 
- Barriers to the rest of the world 10 
- Federal Europe/a European superstate 8 
+ Economic community 7 
+/- CFSP 5 
+ A peace project 4 
+ A Europe of regions 4 
+ A Europe of independent states 3 
+ A higher form of democratic governance 1 
+ Principle of subsidiarity 0 
- Insufficient focus on the environment 0 
+ Environmental protection 0 
+/- Structural funds 0 
Source: Author’s 2010 elite survey 
This interpretation is supported by the 2006 quantitative survey data, which show 
that almost nine out of ten Eurosceptic left-wing and centre MPs agree with the 
agriculture and fisheries argument and five out of ten agree with the argument that 
268 From question 5 in the 2010 survey (see Appendix D for details of the question). The figure shows 
only the top eight. n=32. The – and + stand for positively or negatively charged descriptors. 
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EU membership would be detrimental to Norwegian regional policy.269 Moreover, 
data from the 2010 survey show that almost two thirds of the Eurosceptic MPs 
associate the EU with centralisation, which could also indicate the desire to maintain 
a decentralised society in Norway in addition to resistance to concentration of power 
in Brussels. 
Figure 7.5 Eurosceptic MPs’ support for “no” arguments270 
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Source: Author’s 2006 elite survey 
The quantitative data from both surveys back up the findings of the documentary 
analysis. Table 7.3 shows that to Norwegian Eurosceptic MPs, the EU most 
commonly signifies bureaucracy, democratic deficit, centralisation and loss of 
sovereignty, as well as free trade/liberalism and EMU (primarily the MPs from the 
red-green parties, who oppose the four freedoms and EMU). Furthermore, Figure 7.5 
above shows the prevalence of political culture (green bars), rural society (orange 
bars) and postmaterialist arguments (purple bars), and the less central position of 
economic cost and cultural threat. The anti-bureaucracy argument is the most widely 
269 The PP is left out because of the dissimilar structure of its Euroscepticism compared to the other

parties. This is also evident here, where only two and one out of ten PP MPs agreed with the

statements respectively.

270 From question 6 in the 2006 survey (see Appendix D for details of the question). n=40.
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supported arguments in all the parties.271 Otherwise, in the left-wing and middle 
parties, the argument most MPs agree with next is that of agriculture and fisheries. 
This is an interesting finding because the ranking of the primary sectors before 
postmaterialist values does not correspond with the frequency with which rural 
society arguments appear in the documents analysed. 
This could mean that the primary sectors do play a larger part in Norwegian 
Euroscepticism than the arguments in the public debate indicate. This could be due 
to a carefulness on the part of the “no” side to avoid criticism for being “too narrow” 
in their outlook on the question, as it has been (and arguably still is) accused for 
defending only narrow interests. Third, fourth and fifth are sovereignty, foreign 
policy (indicator for external solidarity and peace promotion) and regional policy 
which over half of the MPs from all the centre and left-wing parties identified with. 
By contrast, the PP’s MPs show a different structure in their argument support. After 
bureaucracy, PP MPs are most worried about losing sovereignty and the cost of 
membership. The PP was also the party with the highest proportion of MPs linking 
cultural threat to EU membership. Most commonly, the Eurosceptic PP MPs 
associated the EU with bureaucracy, centralisation and loss of sovereignty and 
except the CP, the party had a higher proportion of MPs viewing the EU as a federal 
Europe/a European superstate than the other parties.272 
7.3 Conclusion 
Unlike the previous periods of Norwegian Euroscepticism, the post-1994 period was 
not a period of heightened debate. Between 1994 and 2010, there was little debate in 
the public sphere in Norway on the big questions concerning the Norway/EU 
relationship. Except a period between 2002 and 2003 when opinion polls indicated 
that the majority of the public had a positive attitude towards membership and there 
271 It is worth noting that many of the supporters of membership also agreed with this argument in the

survey.

272 For a more detailed discussion of the differences between the individual parties with reference to

findings from the 2006 survey, see Skinner (2010: 305­9).
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were signs of a new membership debate brewing, discussion of Norway’s form of 
association to the EU was practically absent. Many factors have been pointed to in 
order to explain the stalemate in the EU debate, but the “suicide clause”, which was 
designed to enable coalition cooperation between pro- and anti-membership parties 
(now used by governments on both sides of the left/right spectrum), and the fact that 
the current form of association, aptly termed “EEA plus” (Sverdrup 2009), represents 
the equilibrium for both the proponents and opponents of membership, were 
arguably the most important factors. 
Notwithstanding the relative silence on the EU in the parliamentary arena, NtEU 
remained active in its protests against the EU adaptation participation in “EEA plus” 
has entailed; EEA directives such as the “gas directive”, the “food cosmetics 
directives”, the “life patent directive” and the “data retention directive” were 
particularly controversial. Among the most eager supporters of EU membership and 
the opponents of the EEA agreement, the current arrangements’ impact on 
Norwegian democracy has also been a topic of discussion. In addition, to the 
proponents, the lack of influence on decision-making in Brussels has been a massive 
issue, and to the anti-EEA Eurosceptics, the fact that the EEA veto has never been 
used is problematic. But outside these controversies, “EEA plus” seems to have 
worked well for Norway, and the plentiful EEA directives appear to have caused 
relatively few problems. Research into the impact of the EEA agreement concludes 
that in terms of policy since 1994, outside the areas of agriculture, fisheries and 
EMU, a “yes” instead of a “no” would have made little difference (Claes and Tranøy 
1999b). Moreover, research also suggests that overall, EEA agreement or no EEA 
agreement would have made practically no difference in most Norwegian policy 
areas, except in typical infrastructure areas related to the Single Market (Claes and 
Tranøy 1999b) and that it has served to speed up deregulation and privatisation 
(Andersen 2000). 
The second part of the chapter reported on the thematic analysis from the 1994-2010 
period. It confirmed that the continuity observed in Norwegian Eurosceptic 
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argumentation from the 1960s and 1970s up until the 1990s can be extended to the 
2000s. The analysis showed that the EU’s lack of democracy and the loss of 
handlefrihet are just as central to 21st century Norwegian Euroscepticism as 1960s, 
1970s and 1990s Norwegian Euroscepticism, especially because many think that the 
EU’s “structural problems” have been exacerbated as the EU has developed. In the 
SLP’s Dag Seierstad’s words: “Yes, in my opinion, the development is negative. 
There is a… There is more of the things we don’t like, both on the democracy side of 
things, and the market liberalist side”.273 The criticism of the EU’s market liberalism 
remained as tightly linked to the political values and rural society argumentation as 
in the earlier periods, through its emphasis on internal and external solidarity, 
environmentalism and protection of the primary sectors and the districts. 
Additionally, human rights and Norway’s role as a peace nation were themes which 
featured prominently in the postmaterialist body of argumentation. Economic 
interest arguments, on the other hand, were marginal in the debate, and national 
identity argumentation was practically non-existent. Thus, it is unlikely that 
utilitarianism or national identity can be said to carry any weight as first order 
motivators for 21st century Norwegian Euroscepticism. 
Furthermore, the chapter argued, like the chapter before it, that the structure of the 
argumentation in the newspaper/online debate, with its focus on VCR issues, mirror 
the Eurosceptic discourse found in the middle and left-wing parties/factions and in 
NtEU. The triangulation of qualitative and quantitative data in the party research 
showed that the Euroscepticism of the middle and left-wing parties/factions and 
their MPs are motivated by political values, political culture and ruralist concerns 
(VCR), but that the PP represents a different type of Euroscepticism. The 
documentary and survey data validated the tentative conclusions drawn in Chapter 
Six, namely that the Euroscepticism found in the PP is motivated by political culture 
and economic concerns. The nature and causality of Norwegian Euroscepticism will 
be discussed further in Chapter Nine, but first, the next chapter looks at public 
Euroscepticism across the decades. 
273 Interview with the author, Oslo, 18 September 2009. 
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Chapter 8

Norwegian Public Euroscepticism 1961-2010 
Since 1961, the majority of politicians, business elites and the media in Norway have 
been in favour of joining the EC/EU. However, after fifty years of pro-European 
elites striving for Norwegian membership, Norway is still not a member of the EU, 
all thanks to the population’s rejection of membership in the 1972 and 1994 
referenda. If the Norwegian public had not been given a say on the matter, it is not 
only likely, but as good as certain that Norway would have been a member of the 
EU. Together, the Labour Party, Conservative Party and the PP (with the dissenters 
in the Eurosceptic parties) would have been able to achieve the three fourths 
majority required in the Storting to transfer sovereignty to a supranational 
community. For this reason, no comprehensive study of Norwegian Euroscepticism 
can be complete without an appraisal of public Euroscepticism, the scepticism which 
has ensured Norway’s outsider status for so long. Moreover, the findings from the 
documentary analysis, presented in Chapters Four to Seven, bid the question: to 
what extent are the concerns expressed in the public Eurosceptic discourse mirrored 
in public opinion? It is important to establish whether the political Values, political 
Culture and Rural society (VCR) concerns are as central to the motivations of the 
common voter as they are to the Eurosceptic argumentation found in the political 
and newspaper debate, and whether economic interest and national identity 
concerns are as marginal. Thus, the purpose of this chapter is to account for this 
third level of Norwegian Euroscepticism, and investigate whether the findings of the 
documentary analysis can be extended to the mass level. 
The first part of the chapter deals with the development of public opinion on EU 
membership through the last fifty years, phase by phase from the 1960s up until the 
1994-2010 period. The second part reports on the empirical testing of the theories 
derived from the literature and the documentary analysis on the 1994 referendum 
survey. 
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8.1 Public Opinion across the Decades: 1961-2010 
8.1.1 Public Opinion in Phase One: the 1960s 
Before the first debate on EEC membership started in 1961, the vast majority of the 
Norwegian population did not know much about European integration and thus, 
most voters had no opinion on either EFTA or the EEC issue (Allen 1979; Rokkan 
and Valen 1964; Hanssen and Sandegren 1969; interview with Dag Seierstad). In fact, 
in opinion polls in the autumn of 1961, nearly a third of respondents declared that 
they had not heard of the EEC (Allen 1979: 50; Rokkan and Valen 1964: 236), and a 
1959 poll on public attitudes towards EFTA revealed that 62 percent had no opinion 
(Frøland 1998: 8). 
Table 8.1 Public opinion on Norwegian EEC membership (percent)* 
Month & Year of Poll Yes No No opinion 
Rokkan and Valen (1964: 236) 
September 1961 31.5 27.5 41 
February 1962 34.3 42.5 23.2 
Hanssen and Sandegren (1969: 56) 
October 1961 36 18 46 
March 1962 37 31 32 
September 1962 36 32 31 
*Percentage of respondents having heard/read about the EEC 
Table 8.2 Voters against EEC entry (percent, no opinion excluded) 
Party September 1961 poll February 1962 poll 
Socialist People’s Party 80 86 
Labour Party 33 38 
Liberal Party 35 58 
Christian Democrats 45 59 
Centre Party 39 60 
Conservative Party 21 22 
Source: Rokkan and Valen (1964: 236) 
At the peak of the EEC membership campaign in 1962, however, two-thirds of 
participants in an opinion poll were able to state a preference on the issue, and the 
majority of these did not want membership (Rokkan and Valen 1964). Hanssen and 
Sandegren (1969) report slightly different results from 1962 opinion polls, with 
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marginal majorities in favour of the “yes” side (see Table 8.1). These inconsistencies 
notwithstanding, all the polls show that by the spring of 1962, public opinion had 
formed to a much larger degree, and although the increase in opposition to EEC 
membership was particularly noticeable among the middle party voters, all the 
parties saw their electorate grow more Eurosceptic (see Table 8.2). 
In their study of public opinion data, Rokkan and Valen (1964) found that the voters 
of the CDP and LP had contrasting preferences on the EEC issue according to the 
urban/rural cleavage: rural CDP voters and urban Liberal voters teamed up in 
opposition to EEC entry and vice versa. They further argued that the southern and 
western regions mobilized their opposition to the EEC in defence of territorial and 
cultural autonomy. The only party in the southern and western regions without a 
“no” majority was the LP, but as Rokkan and Valen point out, this could be because 
the main liberal newspaper in the west advocated entry and the radical newspaper 
in Oslo, Dagbladet, ended up on a “no” stance. Among Labour Party voters, EEC 
opposition was fiercest in the largest cities and the sparsely populated areas, and 
among Conservative voters, the only groups which mobilized against membership 
were the self-employed and rural employers. It is likely that these groups feared 
negative economic consequences of membership (Rokkan and Valen 1964). 
However, Rokkan and Valen (1964: 200-1) argue that for 
“Liberals and Christians [...] the motives for resistance were clearly cultural 
and ideological rather than economic: they continued an ingrained tradition 
of opposition to central authority. [...] The old alliance of the 1880s tended to 
reaffirm itself: the urban radicals aligned themselves with the farmers and 
with religious dissidents in the countryside in their attack on central 
bureaucracy.” 
Although only argumentation of the section of the Norwegian population which 
engages in letters to the editor was analysed in Chapter Four, interestingly, it does 
not seem unreasonable to extend the applicability of the findings to the general 
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public. If one accepts Rokkan and Valen’s (1964) conclusions, it seems that a mix of 
political values and cultural, geo-historical/political and utilitarian factors were at 
play in shaping public opposition to EEC membership in 1962. 
The poll data presented above indicate that in 1961-62, i.e. the early stages of the 
national debate on Europe integration, wide-ranging popular mobilization was yet 
to take place. Nevertheless, Frøland (1998: 6) argues that if negotiations had been 
initiated in 1962 and/or 1967 and put to the public vote, “no-vote majorities on both 
occasions are not only imaginable, but quite likely” even if Britain and Denmark had 
become members. Hanssen and Sandegren’s observations also support this view, as 
they highlight the increasing intensity of the debate after the Storting’s decision to 
apply for EEC membership in 1962: 
“[…] the announcement that a referendum would be held did not calm the 
waters. On the contrary, it served as a challenge to both sides to continue 
the heated debate. It became more important than ever to engage public 
opinion, to secure the support for the policy advocated by the two sides.” 
(1969: 54, original italics, see also Allen 1979: 51) 
This indicates that had the issue been allowed to mature in the population beyond 
January 1963 when De Gaulle put an end to the negotiations, a referendum 
campaign would have been likely to prompt popular mass mobilization on par with 
that seen in the 1970-2 period. 
8.1.2 Public Opinion in Phase Two: 1970-1972 
When the issue of EEC membership resurfaced in 1967, few people believed that a 
new round of negotiations would get under way at all,274 and because of the 
“theoretical character” this gave the issue, it “aroused little public debate and only 
feeble extra-parliamentary opposition” to membership (Allen 1979: 55). The issue 
came back onto the agenda with the Hague summit in December 1969, but the 
274 This was due to the anticipation of a second French veto of British membership. 
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debate on the issue of membership “seriously picked up only toward the end of 
1970” and polling activity on the issue only saw a notable increase from the 
beginning of 1971 (Hellevik and Gleditsch 1973: 228). As Figure 8.1 shows, the “no” 
majority persisted in the 12 months from September 1971 up until the referendum. 
However, the gap between the two sides did narrow, particularly up until January 
1972, when the negotiations were completed. After this, opinion seemed to stabilize, 
although research show that individual-level changes were more commonplace than 
the aggregate-level data suggest (see Hellevik and Gleditsch 1973: 228). 
Figure 8.1 Intention to vote “no” (percentage, no opinion excluded)* 
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* The question asked in the polls was not identical for the whole period, but always referred 
to a dichotomous choice between “yes” or “no” to full membership (see source for details) 
Source: Hellevik et al. (1975: 38) 
As Table 8.3 shows, polls conducted in the early 1970s unveiled that people living in 
the peripheries and/or in rural areas, the lower educated, the under 29s, people on 
low incomes, primary industry employees, industrial workers, the self-employed, 
pensioners/ students and left-wing and middle party voters were more likely to be 
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Table 8.3 “No” voters in percent of those who had taken a stance 
Period 
I II III IV 
Category Autumn Jan April May Sept Oct Dec 
1971 1972 1972 1972 
Total 68.8 59.9 56.2 47.3 
Region 
Oslo, Akershus 53.4 42.1 40.1 33.7 
Østf., Vestf., Buskerud 60.3 52.4 48.2 38.4 
Telem., Agder, Rogaland 70.0 59.1 56.3 45.0 
Oppl., Hedm., Trøndelag 81.2 68.4 64.6 55.2 
Hord., Mø. og R., S. og F. 76.8 66.4 63.3 53.9 
Nordl., Troms, Finnmark 85.9 82.9 73.0 66.8 
City/countryside 
City 59.9 48.7 46.7 36.7 
Countryside 77.5 68.8 63.8 56.2 
Gender 
Men 67.5 56.8 53.0 47.0 
Women 72.6 63.6 59.8 47.7 
Age 
15-19 75.0 61.7 63.2 49.5 
20-29 69.6 64.2 61.2 50.2 
30-44 67.0 57.4 53.7 47.6 
45-64 70.5 58.9 55.5 45.1 
65+ 71.7 60.1 50.6 46.9 
Education 
Compulsory ed. 73.8 63.1 59.0 49.0 
Upper secondary ed. 51.1 46.5 43.5 36.1 
Higher education 42.9 38.3 40.7 46.0 
Income (NOK) 
up to 12 000 78.7 73.7 69.6 55.7 
12-19 000 84.2 71.2 67.1 60.7 
20-29 000 79.4 72.3 68.1 58.1 
30-39 000 75.2 61.3 57.8 51.1 
40-49 000 63.5 58.2 54.7 44.3 
50 000+ 51.8 43.8 42.0 33.1 
Profession 
Self-employed 77.0 69.0 65.2 56.7 
Functionary 56.1 46.0 44.0 38.5 
Worker 78.2 66.5 63.5 50.2 
Pensioner, student 71.9 63.7 55.5 49.0 
Sector of employment 
Primary 91.7 84.5 82.1 77.6 
Industry 70.5 58.7 56.8 44.9 
Transport and Commun. 72.0 60.2 55.0 46.6 
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Retail 53.9 43.0 40.8 34.2 
Services 64.0 54.8 52.2 44.5 
Pensioner, student 71.6 64.1 55.4 48.9 
Party today 
Communist Party 96.4 87.2 92.0 88.7 
Socialist People’s Party 94.2 93.2 94.1 91.7 
Labour Party 70.2 52.3 43.7 31.7 
Liberal Party 61.7 56.0 58.9 60.2 
Christian Democrats 82.0 79.6 73.4 76.3 
Centre Party 94.5 94.3 94.6 91.8 
Conservatives 25.1 16.8 13.4 7.7 
Number of polls 
(N) 
7 
7,642 
7 
7,923 
9 
11,499 
5 
7,104 
Source: Translated from Gleditsch and Hellevik (1977: 316-7). The category “party 1969” is 
left out, as “party today” is more relevant to the period in question. 
opposed to EC entry. Gender, on the other hand, did not seem to have a significant 
impact on the vote. 
In the months following the referendum, for the first time in history, the polls 
consistently returned “yes” majorities. The only group with a higher percentage of 
“no” voters after the 1972 referendum compared to one year before was the highest 
educated, and the only groups with relatively stable “no” percentages across the 
period were the officially Eurosceptic parties’ voters, particularly the SPP, LP and CP 
voters. The Labour Party over halved its proportion of “no” voters and the 
Conservative Party’s “no” voter percentage dropped by almost three quarters in the 
same period. 
The referendum was held on 25 September 1972. With a turnout of 79 percent, the 
Norwegian citizens ignored the government’s plea for a “yes”; 53.5 percent voted 
against membership, and only 46.5 percent voted in favour. According to Valen’s 
(1973) analysis of the referendum result, the referendum breathed new life into 
cleavages which had not been active in national elections for years. The 
centre/periphery and urban/rural cleavages were particularly salient, but also the 
three counter-culture cleavages (teetotalism, pietism and rural language) and the 
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Figure 8.2 The 1972 referendum: the geography of the “no” vote

Central Rural East South West North­west/ North 
Middle 
Source: ElectoralGeography.com (Kireev 2010) 
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left/right cleavage were reflected in the result.275 As Figure 8.2 above shows, the 
central counties of Oslo, Akershus, Vestfold and Buskerud, were the only counties 
with “yes” majorities, and the peripheries, particularly the North and North-
west/Middle, were strong in their opposition. All the three Northern counties, 
Nordland, Troms and Finnmark, achieved over 70 percent “no” votes, as did the 
north-western county Møre and Romsdal. The more modest “no” percentages in 
Hordaland and Sør-Trøndelag illustrate the salience of the urban/rural cleavage, as 
these two counties are home to the second and third largest Norwegian cities 
respectively, Bergen and Trondheim. In Sogner and Archer’s (1995: 393) words: 
“[s]upport for membership increased with urbanization and in densely populated 
areas, while it decreased in smaller and sparsely populated communities and in 
those dependent on the primary sector.” The contrasts were strong: whereas only 6.5 
percent of the inhabitants of the northern fishing island Røst and Træna voted yes, in 
the Oslo region and the cities of Moss (by the Oslo Fjord), Stavanger and Bergen 
(both on the west coast) the “yes” votes were 67, 66, 60 and 59 percent respectively 
(Brox 1972: 771). In addition to Rokkan’s (1967) six traditional territorial, commodity 
market, labour market and socio-cultural cleavages, the referendum (and preceding 
opinion polls) revealed another divide: the gap between the mass and the elite. This 
becomes very apparent when the above 1971 opinion poll results (68.8 percent “no”) 
are compared with the 83 percent who stated a preference for membership (out of 
three alternatives) in an elite survey in 1967 (Gleditsch 1972: 797) or the 25 percent of 
the MPs who voted against membership in June 1971, or when the public “no” vote 
of 53.5 percent is compared to the 30 percent of MPs who it was thought were 
against entry in September 1972 (see Table 5.1 in Chapter Five). According to 
Hellevik and Gleditsch (1973: 234), the anomaly was particularly evident in the trade 
unions and the Labour Party, as the leadership failed “to realize how its position on 
the EEC issue ran directly counter to established interests and ideologies” 
The 1972 Referendum Study, conducted by SSB in two parts (the first just before and 
the second just after the referendum, N = 2,662), confirm most of the tendencies 
275 See Table 3.1 in Chapter Three for more details on the six cleavages. 
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found in the opinion polls before and after the referendum (as displayed in Table 8.3 
above); apart from the parts of the population living in the peripheries and rural 
areas, people employed in the primary sector, students and the supporters of the CP, 
SPP and CDP were the strongest “no” groups in the referendum. All these groups 
had “no” proportions in excess of 80 percent. In addition, industrial workers and LP 
voters had more modest “no” majorities (55 and 56 percent respectively), education 
levels and income were negatively correlated to a “no”, and there were no significant 
gender differences in the vote, as 51.8 percent of men and 51.5 percent of women in 
the referendum survey had voted “no”. The only group which returned different 
results in the Referendum Study compared to the opinion polls was the self-
employed, of whom only 37 percent voted “no” in the referendum compared to an 
average of 67 percent in the polls. It should be noted that this discrepancy is most 
likely to be due to differences in categorization of profession groupings.276 
8.1.3 Public Opinion in Phase Three: 1989-1994 
As mentioned above, immediately after the referendum in 1972, the stable “no” 
majorities in the lead-up to 25 September turned into “yes” majorities in the polls. 
However, this was only a passing trend; when the trade agreement with the EC 
entered into force on 1 July 1973, less than a year later, the “no” side reclaimed its 
leading position in the polls. Allen (1979: 182) writes that within a year of the 
parliamentary vote on the trade agreement on 24 May 1973, “the debate had almost 
ceased, in public at least […] and by the time most industrial trade had been freed in 
July 1977 the debate belonged to history for most people”. With the EC issue 
removed from the public agenda, support for EC membership declined throughout 
the 1970s and 1980s, up until the issue came up again in 1989 with the end of the 
Cold War and the commencement of the EFTA states’ negotiations with the EC 
about access to the Single Market. An element of public opinion in the period from 
1972 to 1993 worth noting (see Figure 8.3 below) is that the proportion of undecided 
voters was low during the period of when the EC issue was not salient (1973-1981). 
In other words, voters were less hesitant to express a preference on membership 
276 All the data in this paragraph are taken from Knudsen’s (1989: 47­9) tables, except those on gender, 
which were taken directly from the Referendum Study data set. 
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when they considered the issue unimportant, or when they knew that their 
decision/answer would of little consequence. However, as soon as the issue came 
back onto the agenda (1989-1991), uncertainty became more widespread. 
Nevertheless, the proportion of undecided voters decreased again as the referendum 
approached, with only 11 percent not turning out to vote on 28 November 1994.277 
Figure 8.3 Public opinion on EC/EU membership (1972-1993)* 
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* The data are from the 1972 referendum and 1973-93 election surveys. The question asked 
how the respondent would vote if there was a new referendum on membership tomorrow. 
Source: Aardal and Jenssen (1995: 33). 
Figure 8.3 makes it clear that the “yes” side gained ground in the polls in the late 
1980s and early 1990s. Support almost doubled from 1981 to 1989, and the opinion 
climate was particularly favourable for the “yes” side in the autumn of 1991 and 
spring of 1992, before the Danish referendum on the Maastricht Treaty (Aardal and 
Jenssen 1995: 32). According to Bjørklund (1994), the Danish “no” to Maastricht gave 
the Norwegian “no” side an advantage. In Aardal and Jenssen’s (1995: 32) words, the 
Danish “no” gave the Norwegian EU opponents “a definitive and – as was to 
become apparent – final upper hand”. 
Note that the “don’t know” percentage from the 1993 election survey (17.1 percent, showed in 
Figure 8.3) does not correspond to the results from opinion polls from the same period (Figure 8.4), 
which indicate that the “don’t know” proportion throughout 1993 was between 20 and 25 percent. 
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Although public opinion was divided into three nearly equal parts (no/yes/don’t 
know) in 1991 and the first half of 1992, from June 1992, the “no” side assumed a 
leading position in the polls. As Figure 8.4 illustrates, this position was further 
consolidated in the autumn of 1993 (Bjørklund 1994: 94-6), when the “no” parties 
firmly put the EU issue on the agenda in the general election campaign, much to the 
dismay of the incumbent Labour leadership who tried to avoid any discussion of the 
EU and insisted that it was not a relevant topic for the election. 
Figure 8.4 Public opinion poll results on EU membership (1993-1994)* 
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Source: Aardal and Jenssen (1995: 35) 
Before the referendum, the trends in opinion data showed few changes in the 
opposition levels of different groups from 1972. Socio-economic variables, such as 
education, income and profession had the same “effect” on membership preference 
as they did 20 years earlier, as did region and party affiliation (Bjørklund 1994: 99-
102). Nevertheless, there were some changes; there were new gaps in the gender, 
public/private sector and age groups. Whereas there were no significant differences 
between the preferences of men and women and public and private sector 
employees in 1972, by the early 1990s, women and public sector employees 
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(regardless of gender) were much more likely to be Eurosceptic than men and 
private sector employees (Bjørklund 1994: 99). In age, the opposite development 
could be observed, from a significant relationship between the young and a “no” in 
1972 to a lack of relationship in the early 1990s, with only a higher percentage of 
sceptics in the “70 plus” category (Bjørklund 1994: 97). Curiously, survey data also 
show that in 1989, support for the EC was higher among first-time voters than any 
other age group, but as Aardal and Jenssen (1995: 32) write, “the pro-EC wind 
among the youth must nevertheless have subsided quickly. A nationwide survey 
[…] showed that EC opposition had gained considerable ground in the relevant age 
group”. One possible explanation for this pro-EC wind among the youngest voters 
in 1989 could be that it was an immediate response to the changes in the 
international environment, an almost idealistic “yes” to a unified Europe after the 
fall of the iron curtain, without further reflection on what EC, let along EU 
membership entailed. Wegard Harsvik, who had a central position in the Labour 
Party’s youth wing, AUF, in the early 1990s and was later active in SME, explains 
how he went from a “no” to a “yes” position in 1989 and back to a “no” in the early 
1990s:278 
“Many of us who were a part of a very intense EU debate in the beginning 
of the ‘90s in AUF went… we went through a kind of development where 
you… you started with a kind of involuntary reflex: ‘well, the EC, we are 
against that’, you know? And if you are a socialist and a northerner, then 
you are definitely against the EU. But then the wall fell and Pink Floyd 
plays in Berlin and so on, and at one point I was personally an EU 
supporter, and I was just about to join [the] organization ‘Young European 
Federalists’ […]. And it was in a way based on a kind of emotional ‘but we 
have to take part and go in and influence’. And then you had a phase when 
we… we... many were genuinely in doubt, and we had study circles and we 
read treaties and so on […]. Then you had the ‘yes, but we will not join a 
beautiful thought, we shall prospectively join a concrete organization, 
278 Interview with the author, Oslo, 8 January 2010. 
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which has this and this and this as its foundation, which is moving towards 
an ever closer union’. […] There were many of those who later became 
central figures on the ‘no’ side in AUF and the Labour Party who went 
through exactly this development. […] In other words, when the EU debate 
started, you were originally opposed, and then you were excited and 
fascinated by the vision and the spirit of the age, and then you had a review 
of what this… what the EU actually was, and then you ended up becoming 
an EU opponent.” 
Harsvik’s account of his experience with the process within the Labour Party and its 
youth wing seems to suggest that early on in the 1989-1994 period, many people who 
were “no” voters at heart were, in his words, “emotionally attracted to the idea of a 
united Europe”, but that as they learned more about the EU, they doubled back on 
their “yes” position. Maastricht and the developments towards a European Union 
became perhaps particularly hard to swallow, as indicated by the “no” side’s 
persistent lead in the polls after the Danish referendum in June 1992. 
The Norwegian referendum on membership took place on 28 November 1994, at a 
time when the Norwegian economy had already started recovering from the 
economic recession of the 1990s (Jenssen and Listhaug 2001; Bjørklund 1997b). The 
referendum was the last of the four referenda on EU membership held that year, 
with the Austrians going to the ballot box first, followed by the Finns, the Swedish 
and finally, the Norwegians (see Table 8.4). 
Table 8.4 Results of the 1994 referenda on EU membership 
Country Date % Yes % No 
Austria 12 June 66.6 33.4 
Finland 16 October 56.9 42.1 
Sweden 13 November 52.3 46.8 
Norway 28 November 47.8 52.2 
Source: Fitzmaurice (1995: 226) 
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The order of the referenda was not coincidental; it was a strategic decision made by 
the Nordic governments to synchronize the referenda so the countries considered 
most likely to achieve a positive result would go first, and ultimately create a 
“domino-effect” of “yes” outcomes (e.g. Saglie 2000a; Jahn and Storsved 1995). The 
domino strategy, which was designed to play on voters’ concerns about isolation 
and the future of Nordic relations, was successful to some extent, in spite of its 
failure to produce the desired fourth yes to membership; in Norway, the domino 
effect, which acquired the term “the Swedish Suction”, is thought to have boosted 
the “yes” vote by four percentage points (Aardal and Jenssen 1995: 38). 
Comparisons of referendum surveys from the three Nordic countries which voted on 
EU membership in 1994 show that Norwegian voters were better informed about the 
EU than the populations of Sweden and Finland (Jenssen and Listhaug 2001). Saglie 
(2000b) believes that this could be due to Norway’s history of a previous campaign 
and referendum, the fact that the Norwegian campaign lasted longer than the 
Swedish and the Finnish, and the issue’s high degree of politicization and salience in 
Norway.279 The fact that 62 and 53 percent of voters in June and September 1993 
(respectively) ranked the EU issue as the most important or second most important 
issue for their vote in the 1993 election (Valen 1994: 172) indicates that the majority of 
Norwegians did not form their opinions on EU membership according to party 
preference or other proxies (see Anderson 1998), but regarded the EU issue a definite 
first-order issue, one which, quite the contrary, had the potential to determine party 
preference. The strong politicization of the EU issue also runs counter to Inglehart’s 
(1970, 1977) cognitive mobilization theory, which holds that people who have more 
knowledge about European integration and are more politically involved, are more 
likely to support the EU. Data from the referendum survey show that the differences 
between “yes” and “no” voters in terms of political interest and involvement were 
negligible; “yes” voters were marginally more likely to consider themselves very 
interested in politics generally and to have engaged in political persuasion more 
The latter is linked to high levels of voter interest in the subject (Jenssen and Listhaug 2001). 
274 
279 
’’
frequently than “no” voters, while “no” voters were more likely to have signed a 
campaign list or taken part in a demonstration (see Table 8.5). 
Table 8.5 Correlations between EU vote and political interest/involvement 
Spearman s Correlations 
General 
political 
interest 
Tried to 
convince 
someone 
politically 
Signed a 
petition/ 
campaign 
list 
Partaken in a 
political 
demonstration 
Written 
about 
politics in 
the paper 
What did 
you vote? 
.069** .064** -.100** -.125** -.007 
** Significant on the .001 level. 
Source: 1994 Referendum Study 
Moreover, the survey displays even weaker correlations between the vote and 
knowledge about the EU. As Table 8.6 shows, although the correlation between basic 
knowledge about the EU and the “no” vote is negative and statistically significant 
(i.e. “no” voters were more likely to get the questions about the EU wrong), the 
coefficient is very low – indicating a weak relationship. Furthermore, the correlation 
between self-reported knowledge and the vote is non-significant. Besides, the 
aggregate results in the Nordic applicant countries could be taken as further 
evidence against the cognitive mobilization thesis, as the countries with populations 
less educated about the EU were those that returned “yes” majorities whereas 
Norway, apparently with a better informed population and a higher degree of 
politicization of the issue, voted “no”. 
Table 8.6 Correlations between EU vote and EU knowledge 
Spearman s Correlations 
Basic knowledge about EU Self-reported knowledge 
What did you vote? -.044* -.012 
* Correlation is significant at the .05 level. 
Source: SSB’s 1994 referendum study 
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Figure 8.5 Breakdown of the 1994 vote according to region

In spite of the “yes” camp gaining ground in the last few months before the 
referendum,280 the 1994 referendum outcome was the same as in 1972: the people 
said “no” to EU membership. 52.2 percent of the 89 percent who used their suffrage, 
voted “no”, and as illustrated by Figure 8.5, again the strongest opposition to EU 
membership was found in the northernmost counties of Norway as well as in 
sparsely populated areas. Like in 1972, the pro-EU sentiment was only dominant in 
the major cities,281 Oslo and the surrounding region, showing the clear centre-
periphery and urban-rural contrasts in the popular vote,282 once more reflecting not 
280 Of which, the last month’s gains have been mainly attributed to the effects of the “Swedish 
Suction” (Aardal and Jenssen 1995). 
281 Bergen and Trondheim also had “yes” majorities, but with smaller margins than the Oslo area (51.1 
and 53.7 percent respectively compared with Oslo’s 66.6) (Bjørklund 1997b: 178; SSB 1995). 
282 The only exception to this clear centre­periphery pattern were a limited number of rural, export­
dependent and industry­dominated municipalities, such as the Årdal and Sunndal municipalities 
(Pettersen et al. 1996; Bjørklund 1997b; SSB 1995). 
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only the strength of the pro-EU sentiment in and around Oslo, but also the 
dimension of territorial opposition in Norwegian society and politics. 
As Figure 8.6 below shows, the fluctuations in the different counties’ results were 
minimal: only five counties saw the yes vote increase by more than four percentage 
points (Akershus, Møre og Romsdal, Østfold, Oppland and Nord-Trøndelag), and 
two decrease by the same (Hordaland and Finnmark). This stability could also been 
seen on the sub-county level: an astonishing 95 percent of the “no” municipalities283 
from 1972 produced the same outcome in 1994, 80 percent of those who voted in the 
1972 referendum voted the same in 1994, and 95 percent of those who stated a 
position on the issue before the campaign started in August 1994, did not change 
their stance (Pettersen et al. 1996: 272). 
Figure 8.6 Change in the vote from 1972 to 1994 
283 435 municipalities in total. 
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The stability in the voting pattern from 1972 to 1994 has made observers call the 1994 
vote “a carbon copy” or “a blueprint” of the 1972 referendum (e.g. Bjørklund 1997a: 
154). This stability is quite a remarkable feature of Norwegian public Euroscepticism, 
considering the substantial rotation of the electorate which takes place during the 
course of 22 years. It seems that the changes that occured in the Norwegian 
electorate, Norwegian society284 and the EU itself between the two referenda did not 
have any significant impact on the development of Norwegian Euroscepticism. 
However, the stability of public Euroscepticism is perhaps not so surprising when 
taking the continuity in the public debate into account; exactly the same issues 
dominated the Eurosceptic discourse in the 1990s debate as in the 1960s and 1970s 
debates, and many of these were issues of principle (e.g. not giving up sovereignty) 
which would not change over the course of 22 years, and others were issues that 
tend to mobilize specific parts of the population, most specifically the in the labour 
movement, the peripheries and rural areas. 
8.1.4 Public Opinion in Phase Four: 1994-2010 
Opinion polls between the 1994 referendum and the end of 2010 did for the most 
part return “no” majorities. Only sporadically, most notably a couple of short 
periods in 1998 and 1999-2000 and a lengthy period in 2002-2003, there were “yes” 
majorities in the polls (see e.g. Grünfeld and Sverdrup 2005: 41). In contrast to the 
aftermath of the 1972 referendum when support for EC membership rose, 
immediately after the 1994 referendum, the “no” side consolidated its position in the 
polls. Between 1995 and 1997, over 60 percent said that they did not want 
membership and less than 30 percent said they were in favour of membership. The 
proportion of undecided voters decreased from the 11 percent who abstained in the 
referendum to around or below five percent for the remainder of the 1990s (Svåsand 
2002: 343). 
284 Between 1972 and 1994 Norway had become more urbanized, the primary sector had declined 
(from 12 percent to 6 percent of the workforce employed in the sector), the 1970s had seen a rapid 
development of the petroleum sector, education levels had increased as a result of the expanded 
Norwegian education system (Pettersen et al. 1996: 262), and the public sector had expanded 
significantly (from 27.5 percent of total employment in 1972 to 40.7 percent in 1990) (Bjørklund 
1997a: 146). 
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In the last two years of the decade and the early 2000s the “yes” side made some 
headway in the polls and even took the lead in some periods (see Figure 8.7). One 
explanation for this change in opinion could be that many viewed the developments 
within the EU at this time, namely the opening of negotiations with the Eastern 
European accession countries285 and the introduction of the Euro in a favourable 
light and wanted Norway to be part of them. 
Figure 8.7 Development of public opinion on EU membership, June 1999-Dec 2010* 
* Average of opinion polls

Source: Bernt Aardals hjemmeside (Aardal 2010b)

However, the fluctuations in the polls in the late 1990s and early 2000s have been 
most popularly explained by what Grünfeld and Sverdrup (2005: 40) term “armchair 
knowledge”: that economic downturns equal upturns for the “yes” side. However, 
Grünfeld and Sverdrup’s tests of the economic voting model on time series data 
from 1989-1994 give inconclusive findings. Although they report robust positive 
285 Accession negotiations were opened with Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Poland 
and Slovenia on 31 March 1998, and with Romania, Slovakia, Latvia, Lithuania, Bulgaria and Malta 
on 13 October 1999. The negotiations were concluded in December 2002 and the Accession Treaty 
was signed in April 2003 (European Commission 2010). These events naturally received attention in 
Norwegian media. 
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relationships between EU opposition and employment rates and GDP growth, they 
find no meaningful relationship between EU support and for example interest rates – 
the latter having been the assumed cause of the 1998-99 upswing for the “yes” side. 
Even the long 2002-2003 period with a “yes” majority is inconsistent with the 
hypothesis that support for EU membership is primarily strong during economic 
downturns. Besides, people have limited knowledge of macroeconomics, as critics of 
economic voting models point out, although “the public’s micro-observations pretty 
much square with the macro-facts” when it comes to unemployment (Lewis-Beck 
and Paldam 2000: 118). Nevertheless, it is doubtful that the average voter has 
knowledge not only of the growth rates and unemployment rates of his/her own 
country, but also know how they compare to those in the EU. Alternative 
explanations are therefore needed. 
Some commentators put the increasing support for membership at the turn of the 
millennium down to a “growing awareness of the shortcomings and the limitations 
of the EEA agreement” (e.g. Traavik 2003, also see section 7.1.2 in Chapter Seven), 
while others have pointed to factors such as greater sympathy for the EU in the 
context of the Iraq war, with France and Germany leading the opposition to the US 
invasion and a positive reaction to the opening up to eastward enlargement (e.g. 
Archer 2005: 181). From this perspective, Grünfeld and Sverdrup’s (2005) additional 
finding that support for EU membership increases in periods when there is much 
media focus on EU-related issues is interesting. This is because it is consistent with 
the hypothesis that the Norwegian public becomes more positive towards EU 
membership when big events or developments happen in the EU, such as the 
introduction of the Euro (1999 and 2002) and eastward enlargement (1998, 1999, 
2002-03). As it is hard to imagine EU membership gaining support from negative 
news coverage, the idea that EU support is positively correlated with media 
coverage of EU-related issues suggests that positive media coverage of EU-related 
events and issues is much higher than of negative media coverage in Norway. This is 
not unlikely to be the case, as most Norwegian newspapers are pro-European in 
their orientation. Besides, the media have received criticism for being sloppy and 
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uncritical in their coverage of EU affairs (Harper 2010b; Kristoffersen, cited by 
Harper 2010b). The fact that the “yes” side’s lead in the polls started dwindling after 
the Swedish rejection of the Euro and the EU’s internal trouble in 2003286 and was 
absent in the second half of the 2000s when pro-EU journalists had more EU defeats 
than victories to report287 lends support to this notion. Archer (2005: 186, 194) also 
supports the view that public opinion greatly depends on the image of the EU in 
Norway. He argues that if a third vote again returns a “no”, “it will mirror not just 
Norwegian desire for autonomy, […] but more a reflection on the state of the EU” 
(2005: 186). 
The EEA agreement is an element of Norway’s relationship with the EU which the 
public never has been able to vote on, and polls measuring support for the 
agreement are few and far between. However, the agreement seems to be popular 
among the Norwegian people. An opinion poll, conducted on 24 April 2008, 
indicated that 57 percent would vote in favour of the agreement should there be a 
referendum tomorrow, while only 23 percent would vote “no”. 20 percent were 
undecided (Olaussen 2008; Ryen 2008288). The same poll showed that 52 percent were 
against membership, while 35 percent were for. There are different interpretations of 
these poll results. Ryen (2008), argues that 
”it clearly shows that the Norwegian people, who do not wish to take part 
in such a comprehensive and supranational cooperation as the EU is, see 
that close and predictable relations with the Union is necessary”. 
Conversely, the chairman of NtEU, Olaussen (2008), argues that the poll question 
could have easily have been understood by respondents as a choice between the 
EEA agreement or EU membership, and that support for the EEA would be much 
286 This was over EMU’s stability pact and disagreements over the constitution (Archer 2005).

287 The French and Dutch rejection of the Constitutional Treaty, the Irish voting “no” to the Lisbon

Treaty and the debacle with the Greek economic collapse were some of the main EU headlines in this

period.

288 Ryen’s reports of the poll’s results do not add up (57.7 percent “yes”, 23.1 “no” and 23.1 “don’t

know”), so Olaussen’s figures are used here.
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lower if people were presented with “a third, realistic alternative to the EEA and EU 
membership”. This was also his response to similar poll results at the end of 2010 
(56.2 percent in favour of the EEA). He stated that “I would also have said no to 
abandoning the EEA if I thought that the alternative was EU membership” (cited by 
Brøndbo 2010). 
So the question which is important to a prospective rematch on Norwegian EU 
membership is: which way is public opinion likely to go if the EEA agreement is 
scrapped? To be sure, if the EU membership issue resurfaces as a result of the 
discontinuation of the EEA agreement, the debate has the potential to take on a very 
different character compared to the 1994 debate, when the EEA agreement was there 
to fall back on. Interestingly, Sverdrup (2008) mentions that opinion polls in the 
spring of 2008 showed that Norwegians wanted less, rather than more European 
integration if the EEA agreement was to disappear. However, one year later, a TNS 
Gallup poll indicated that a majority wanted membership if the EEA agreement was 
discontinued (Røen 2009). Whereas the latter poll showed a healthy majority against 
EU membership if the EEA agreement is sustained: 57.3 percent “no”, 33.2 “yes” and 
9.4 “don’t know”; in the event of no EEA agreement, 47.2 percent responded that 
they preferred membership, 41 percent that they wanted a looser association form 
and 11.8 said that they did not know (Røen 2009). Nevertheless, although these 
statistics seem promising for the “yes” camp, it is important to remember the 
difference between the opinion poll context and the referendum context. Responding 
to hypothetical questions about an issue which is not political salient at that 
particular time is very different from voting in an actual referendum on an issue 
which has been debated openly for months preceding that referendum. After all, 
history has shown that the “yes” side only makes headway in the polls when the 
membership issue is off the agenda. As soon as the EU debate makes a comeback, 
opposition to the EU is mobilized (Svåsand 2002: 342). 
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8.2 Norwegian Public Euroscepticism: Testing the Five 
Theories Empirically 
In the foregoing chapters, the thesis showed that political Values, political Culture 
and Rural society (VCR) arguments were extremely central to the Norwegian 
Eurosceptic newspaper and party discourse throughout the 50 year period under 
study. It is in other words clear that the VCR themes are very resilient features of 
Norwegian Euroscepticism, and they are, considering their omnipresence in the 
debate(s) on Europe in Norway, very likely to have had a profound effect on how 
the electorate viewed their own and Norway’s position, how they viewed the EU 
and membership, and how they judged their own value priorities when they voted 
in the 1972 and 1994 referenda. However, to be able to ascertain to what extent the 
electorate was coloured by what went on in the public debate on the issue, or reflect 
the same concerns as were displayed in the party arena and in the largest daily 
newspaper through fifty years of Norwegian Euroscepticism, it is necessary to 
subject the VCRUNI theories to statistical testing on a nationally representative 
sample of the Norwegian population. The theoretical underpinnings of each of these 
five explanations of Norwegian Euroscepticism can be found in section 4.2.2 of 
Chapter Four, and will not be repeated here. However, it is necessary to formulate a 
series of testable hypotheses for the statistical analysis. These are presented in Table 
8.7 below. Details of measurement and a discussion of other methodological 
considerations can be found in Appendix H. 
8.2.1 The Results: VCR, Interest or Identity? 
The results of the regression analysis are reported in Table 8.8.289 They show that the 
sovereignty, folkestyre and federal Europe variables are statistically significantly 
correlated in the expected direction with Euroscepticism, and that concern about 
289 Although both the unstandardized coefficients and the standardized coefficients are reported in 
Table 8.8 and the analysis is based on an interpretation of both sets of coefficents, the results 
discussion will primarily refer to the Beta values (standardized coefficients), because they are all 
measured in standard deviation units and are therefore directly comparable. The Beta values reveal 
“the number of standard deviations that the outcome will change as a result of one standard deviation 
change in the predictor” (Field 2005: 193). The unstandardized coefficients will be commented on in 
the instances this is appropriate. 
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Table 8.7 Regression analysis hypotheses

Hypothesis 
Political culture 
Formulation 
H1 (sovereignty) The higher a citizen’s concern for national sovereignty, 
the more likely he/she is to be Eurosceptic. 
H2 (folkestyre) The higher a citizen’s concern for the Norwegian 
folkestyre, the more likely he/she is to be Eurosceptic. 
H3 (federal Europe) The more strongly opposed a citizen is to the EU turning 
into a Federal Europe, the more likely he/she is to be 
Eurosceptic. 
Postmaterialist values 
H4 (environment) The higher a citizen’s concern for the environment, the 
more likely he/she is to be Eurosceptic. 
H5 (gender equality) The higher a citizen’s concern for gender equality issues, 
the more likely he/she is to be Eurosceptic. 
H6 (income equality) The more reluctant a citizen is to accept income equality, 
the more likely he/she is to be Eurosceptic. 
H7 (external solidarity) The more concerned a citizen is about external solidarity, 
the more likely he/she is to be Eurosceptic. 
H8 (neo-liberalism) The more opposed a citizen is to neo-liberalist economic 
thinking, the more likely he/she is to be Eurosceptic. 
Rural society 
H9 (districts protection) The higher a citizen’s concern for the districts, the more 
likely he/she is to be Eurosceptic. 
H10 (agriculture and 
fisheries, AGFI) 
The more negatively a citizen assesses the effects of 
membership on the agriculture and fisheries sectors, the 
more likely he/she is to be Eurosceptic. 
Utilitarianism 
H11 (egocentric 
utilitarianism) 
Citizens who believe that their personal economic 
situation will worsen as a result of joining the EU are 
more likely to be Eurosceptic. 
H12 (sociotropic 
utilitarianism) 
The more negatively a citizen assesses the effects of 
membership on the employment and the national 
economy, the more likely he/she is to be Eurosceptic. 
National identity 
H13 (national 
attachment/pride) 
Citizens with a strong sense of attachment to and pride in 
their country are more likely to be Eurosceptic. 
H14 (xenophobia) Citizens who exhibit xenophobic attitudes are more likely 
to be Eurosceptic. 
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Table 8.8 The impact of VCR on Norwegian Euroscepticism290 
Unstd. Coef. 
Theoretical 
Variable 
Empirical Variable 
B Std. 
Error 
Beta 
(Std. 
Coef.) 
t 
Constant -6.554 .603 -10.87** 
Political Culture Sovereignty .620 .051 .220 12.17** 
Folkestyre .510 .054 .169 9.41** 
Union (federal Europe) .159 .021 .108 7.39** 
Political Values Environmentalism .034 .028 .017 1.21 
Equality (gender) -.138 .087 -.022 -1.59 
Equality (income) .049 .037 .020 1.32 
External solidarity .071 .046 .024 1.54 
Anti-neo-liberalism .101 .028 .056 3.55** 
Rural Society Districts protection .078 .019 .065 4.05** 
Agriculture and fisheries .429 .045 .179 9.56** 
Economic Interest Egocentric utilitarianism .559 .128 .070 4.38** 
Sociotropic utilitarianism .492 .043 .221 11.32** 
National Identity National attachment -.017 .025 -.010 -.68 
Xenophobia .024 .026 .015 .93 
Control Variables Age .001 .004 .005 .33 
Gender (woman) .345 .105 .045 3.17** 
Income -.001 .000 -.044 3.19** 
Left/right self-placement -.079 .030 -.040 -2.67** 
Primary sector -.004 .228 .000 -.02 
Public sector -.029 .134 -.003 -.22 
Rural location .063 .038 .025 1.67 
Peripheral location .262 .104 .035 2.51* 
N 1,716 
Adjusted R² .703 
F 185.73** 
** Significant at the .01 level; significant at the .05 level. 
Source: 1994 Referendum Study regression analysis 
sovereignty is the strongest predictor of Norwegian Euroscepticism out of all those 
included in the model.291 The high coefficients for all the political culture variables 
suggest that political culture concerns are not only very central to the public 
290 The statistical package used was PASW 18. 
291 Although the standardized coefficients for sovereignty and sociotropic utilitarianism indicate that 
the two variables have a similar effect, their unstandardized coefficients reveal otherwise. If 
multiplying he standard deviation of the independent variables by their regression coefficients (this is 
done to see what the impact is on the dependent variable if an average change in an independent 
variable is made), 1.827 and .831 is returned for sovereignty and sociotropic utilitarianism 
respectively. 
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Eurosceptic discourse in Norway, as established in the previous chapters, but that 
they are one of the key elements also of Norwegian popular Euroscepticism. The 
same goes for rural society concerns; the model shows strong support for both H9 
(districts protection) and H10 (AGFI), elements which were also very visible in the 
public debate. 
Nevertheless, when it comes to postmaterialist values, the VCR model is not 
confirmed. The regression analysis rejects all the political values hypotheses: none of 
H5 (gender equality), H6 (income equality), environmentalism (H4) or external 
solidarity (H7) seem to be supported by the regression results.292 The anti-neo-
liberalism hypothesis (H8), on the other hand, is confirmed by the research. It is the 
only variable connected to political values which is strongly and statistically 
significantly correlated to Euroscepticism. The fact that the model endorses the anti-
neo-liberalism hypothesis and rejects the other political values hypotheses suggests 
that neo-liberalism opposition is an attitude which does not necessarily go hand in 
hand with postmaterialist values in the population, even if these two are linked in 
the public debate. One should, in other words, be careful with labelling this 
sentiment “postmaterialist” when it stands alone. 
Aside from the political culture variables, the strongest relationship revealed by the 
regression analysis is between Euroscepticism and sociotropic utilitarianism, and 
also the egocentric utilitarianism variable’s coefficients are positive and statistically 
significant. Consequently, Hypotheses 11 and 12 are supported. These results 
diverge from those from the documentary analysis, as the previous chapters showed 
that economic interest argumentation was not a very central part of the newspaper 
and party argumentation through the decades. However, when interpreting the 
results, it is worth keeping in mind the word of warning given in the methodology 
It should be noted that a orderd probit regression (with yes/no to membership as the dependent 
variable), was also run on the data in parallel to this study. The results of the probit model confirmed 
all the results from the OLS regression reported here, except that it confirmed the latter two 
hypotheses, suggesting that high environmental and external solidarity concern contribute to 
explaining public Euroscepticism in Norway. Sciarini and Listhaug (1997) also found that 
environmentally­oriented voters were more likely to vote “no” in the referendum. 
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discussion in Appendix H: H11, H12 and the variables used as indicators of 
egocentric and sociotropic utility only encompass cost/benefit evaluations; people 
who believed the EU to have an adverse effect on the economy or their personal 
economic situation might not necessarily have given the issue high priority, and as 
Jenssen (1998: 207) rightly points out, it is also likely that many voters made a 
judgment about the economic consequences of joining the EU after they took a stand 
on the EU issue, or that they formed their opinion on both as part of the same 
attitude.293 After all, this is what was argued in the newspapers and the parties 
throughout the whole period: that economic interest was and is a second order 
concern. 
One theory which can safely be rejected according to the evidence showed by the 
two regression models is the national identity theory. There is no support for either 
H13 (national attachment/pride) or H14 (xenophobia), as the coefficients for these 
variables are not only small, but also statistically non-significant. Out of the control 
variables, only household income, gender, left/right self-placement and peripheral 
location have a clear “effect” on Euroscepticism when all the variables are included, 
and they are all related to Euroscepticism in the expected direction. Although the 
coefficient for left/right self-placement in the model is quite low, it is plausible that 
the anti-neo-liberalism variable accounts for some of the left/right difference. The 
unique effect of gender on Euroscepticism is also very limited; this could be due to 
gender differences in the values/concerns expressed by other variables. 
8.3 Conclusion 
The first part of the chapter examined the developments in public opinion on EU 
membership across the fifty-year period under study. When the EEC issue came up 
for the first time in Norway in 1961, public opinion was characterized by a lack of 
knowledge of and opinion on the EEC, and many had not even heard of the EEC. 
However, as the public debate on the issue intensified at the beginning of 1962, there 
293 Jenssen (1998: 204) actually argues that due to the strong associations between economic 
assessment and the EU vote in the three Nordic referenda, economic assessment cannot be considered 
an independent variable. 
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was a marked increase in scepticism towards EEC membership among all the 
Storting parties’ voters, and by February, the majority of SPP, CP, LP and CDP 
voters expressed a preference for non-membership (Rokkan and Valen 1964). The 
intensified public debate and increase in public Euroscepticism in 1962 have made 
scholars suggest that if the debate had been allowed to mature in the early 1960s, 
then opinion would have developed in the same way as it did in 1971-2. Because the 
development in anti-market attitudes in the 1960s was cut short by De Gaulle’s veto 
in 1963, public scepticism in this period is commonly viewed as somewhat softer 
than in later periods. However, the chapter pointed out that this is not necessarily 
the case. 
At the start of the 1970-72 period, the “no” side was ahead with good margins in the 
polls. Notwithstanding, the gap between the “yes” and “no” side narrowed in early 
1972, with the negotiations in Brussels completed in January, but subsequently 
stabilized, never to catch up with the “no” side’s lead: 53.5 percent voted “no” to EC 
membership on 25 September 1972. Both the polls and referendum survey conducted 
in this period showed that all the six cleavages defined by Stein Rokkan were 
reactivated with the EC vote, with the peripheries, the countercultures, primary 
sectors and workers mobilizing against membership. Moreover, age, education, 
income and active employment (i.e. non-students and non-pensioners) were 
positively correlated with EC support. 
The chapter also showed that immediately after the referendum in 1972, for the first 
time ever, the public opinion polls returned stable majorities in favour of 
membership. This seemed to indicate a kind of panic in the population, perhaps 
fears of isolation, a feeling that the wrong choice had been made, but these feelings 
must have been quickly depressed, as when the trade agreement was in place less 
than a year later, the “no” side was ahead again. For the rest of the 1970s and most of 
the 1980s, when the EC issue completely removed from the public agenda, there was 
little support for EC membership in the population. The 1977 and 1981 election 
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survey results represent the lows of EC support; only 17.3 and 18.2 percent of voters 
declared their support for membership respectively. 
The gap between the two sides closed between the late 1980s and the autumn of 
1991/spring of 1992; particularly among young voters was there indication of a more 
favourable mood towards the EC in the immediate aftermath of the fall of the Berlin 
wall. However, this favourable mood was not to last, as the Danish “no” to the 
Maastricht Treaty in June 1992 propelled the “no” side into a leading position in the 
polls, and the Storting election in September 1993 further served to consolidate this 
position. The Labour government’s various strategies and the “Swedish suction” 
notwithstanding, on 28 November 1994, Norway repeated its “no” to EC/EU 
membership with a 52.2 majority. In fact, the “no” was almost literally repeated; 
minimal changes in the results both in terms of geography and on the individual 
level contributed to the branding of the 1994 referendum as a “carbon copy” of the 
1972 referendum. The socio-demographic/socio-economic make-up of the “no” vote 
in both the polls and the referendum survey was also almost identical compared to 
the 1970-2 period; the only differences was the new public/private sector and gender 
gaps, and the disappearance of the age relationship from 1972, when the youngest 
voters were more likely to be against membership. 
Polls from the most recent period under study, the post-1994 phase, have given 
conflicting indications about the Norwegian population’s attitudes towards 
European integration. At the turn of the millennium, with the realization of EMU 
and eastward enlargement, the Norwegian public seemed to be more favourably 
inclined towards EU membership. Aside from the post-referendum panic in 1972-3, 
1998-2004 is the only period in which there has been a majority of respondents in the 
polls expressing a preference for membership over a consecutive number of months. 
However, paradoxically, 1995-2010 is also the period which holds the record for the 
highest “no” percentage ever: in 2010, polls returned “no” majorities of over 70 
percent. Thus, it seems that the “yes” mood which came about in step with the EU 
developments of the late-1990s/early 2000s was a passing fancy. It is clear that 
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Norwegian public Euroscepticism was in 1962, 1972, 1994 and is today a force which 
the pro-European elites in Norway have to contend with and that the strength and 
resilience of Norwegian popular Euroscepticism is more than a myth. The 
phenomenon has persisted through five decades, and today it is, if we are to believe 
the opinion polls, stronger than ever. 
How can Norwegian Euroscepticism be explained? Are the concerns reflected in the 
public debate mirrored in public opinion? To find answers to these questions, the 
second part of the chapter tested the VCRUNI theories on a nationally representative 
sample of the Norwegian population, using multiple regression analysis. The 1994 
referendum survey data set was chosen for the regression analysis for several 
reasons, the most important of which was that it was the most representative option 
in terms of the time periods, as the purpose of the study was to be able to make some 
general inferences about Norwegian Euroscepticism, i.e. extend the conclusions 
beyond the 1994 “no” vote. 
There are of course numerous limitations involved in using statistical methods to 
analyse political attitudes, such as categorization and question bias; respondents’ 
differing approaches to or assumptions about different questions, topics and 
categories; and missing data. On top of these more general weaknesses of survey 
research, differences in question wording in particular were flagged up as a source 
of potential bias in this study (see Appendix H). The fact that some of the attitudinal 
indicators used were based on questions about evaluations of effects of membership 
(AGFI and economic benefit) instead of attitudes towards a specific argument, 
statement or proposal, limits the ability to generalize about the relationship between 
agriculture/fisheries and economic interest concern on the one hand and Norwegian 
public Euroscepticism on the other. Notwithstanding these weaknesses, the 
regression analysis returned some robust relationships and interesting results. First, 
there is no doubt that the political culture elements which are so central to the public 
Eurosceptic discourse, especially sovereignty and folkestyre, have resonance in the 
Norwegian population. Although idea of the EU developing in the direction of a 
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federal Europe also seems to trigger somewhat more aversion among the 
Eurosceptics, this is not an idea which is very popular on either side of the pro-
EU/anti-EU divide. Postmaterialist values, such as commitment to equality, 
environmentalism and external solidarity, on the other hand, do not seem have 
much explanatory power in relation to public Euroscepticism. The income equality 
and gender equality hypotheses, as well as the environment and external solidarity 
hypotheses were rejected, because the relationships between the respective 
independent variables and the dependent variable did not come up as statistically 
significant. On the level of the rural society theory, however, both the districts 
protection and the AGFI hypotheses were confirmed. Although the AGFI hypothesis 
was based on evaluation of effect instead of level of agreement/attitude, the 
considerable “effect” also of high districts protection concern on Euroscepticism 
suggests that ruralism is at least as central to popular Euroscepticism as it is to the 
public Eurosceptic argumentation. The study also confirmed what the documentary 
analysis found, namely that strong national attachment and pride and xenophobic 
sentiments cannot explain Norwegian Euroscepticism. Conversely, the findings from 
the regression analysis suggested that cost/benefit evaluations, which were a limited 
part of the public anti-EU debate, make up an aspect which is of considerable 
importance to the Eurosceptic public. To be more precise, if accepting that negative 
egocentric and sociotropic evaluations are synonymous with a priority of egocentric 
and sociotropic benefits (see the above discussion about the limitations of the 
indicators used to measure utilitarianism) or that they signify a stand-alone attitude 
(contrary to Jenssen’s 1998 view, as discussed above), then the study demonstrates 
that utilitarianism, in particular sociotropic utilitarianism, is one of the strongest 
predictors of Norwegian public Euroscepticism. This will be discussed in further 
detail in the next chapter, which considers the research findings presented in this 
and the previous four chapters in an attempt to answer the two very broad questions 
which have guided the thesis research: what is Norwegian Euroscepticism, and how 
can it be explained? 
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Chapter 9

Norwegian Euroscepticism: What and Why? 
“The picture of the EU which is painted in the Norwegian media, and ditto 
by Norwegian scholars, is a distorted picture. That is to say, it gives a kind 
of fairytale about what we are faced with. […] So in light of this [fairytale 
picture of the EU]… the […] 35 percent “yes” [in the polls] which we have 
had for soon to be four years, it is one of the things that amazes me. It… If 
you want my explanation of that, then I have to say that I can’t explain it.” 
The above quote, taken from the interview with SLP politician and NtEU activist 
Dag Seierstad,294 who has over fifty years of experience with opposing the EEC, EC 
and EU, communicates the essence of the research puzzle the thesis grapples with. 
When the “yes” side has had the might, media and millions on its side through the 
last fifty years, how can it be that Norway is still not a member of the EU? Instead of 
focusing on the last four years, like Seierstad, the research investigates Norwegian 
Euroscepticism across the last fifty years in order to find out what it actually is and 
how it can be explained. This chapter is devoted to a discussion of the findings of the 
research and is structured as follows: The first part of the chapter aims to address the 
first research question, namely, what is Norwegian Euroscepticism? It considers 
whether it is appropriate to speak of Norwegian Euroscepticism as one type of 
Euroscepticism and discusses what the research findings reveal about the specific 
characteristics of Norwegian Euroscepticism. In the second part, the chapter focuses 
on the second research question, which asks how Norwegian Euroscepticism can be 
explained, and the third part appraises the merits of the approach used in the thesis. 
Hence, the chapter is devoted to a discussion of the findings presented in the 
previous five chapters, specifically the VCR concept. 
294 Interview with the author, Oslo, 18 September 2009. 
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9.1 What is Norwegian Euroscepticism? 
Norwegian Euroscepticism is a phenomenon which is manifest in six of the seven 
established political parties in the Norwegian party system, the vibrant ad hoc 
organization NtEU and (at the end of 2010) the vast majority of the Norwegian 
population. Norwegian Euroscepticism, as we know it today, was formed in the 
early 1960s and 1970s, when the issue of EEC membership came onto the agenda 
with the British applications for membership. From the perspective of the literature 
on EU support, it can be said to be based on a mix of different factors, primarily geo-
historical ones, but also postmaterialism/exceptionalism, ruralism and utilitarianism. 
As Norway is not a member of the EU and in Norway the concept of EU-motstand 
(EU opposition) is synonymous with opposition to Norwegian EU membership, 
Norwegian Euroscepticism rarely takes the shape of soft Euroscepticism. 
Notwithstanding, it is possible to speak of softer and harder varieties of the 
phenomenon, as there are parties and factions on the “no” side in Norwegian politics 
which are supportive of Norway’s participation in aspects of European integration, 
such as the EEA and Schengen (e.g. the CDP, LP and SME), while others are not (the 
SLP and CP295). However, the most important divide is perhaps between centre/left-
wing and right-wing Norwegian Euroscepticism. Correspondingly, the next section 
proposes a two-fold typology of Norwegian Euroscepticism. 
9.1.1 Norwegian Euroscepticism: Two Broad Types 
If assuming that Norwegian political parties and the “no” movement NtEU are 
representative of and reflect public opinion in Norway,296 then Norwegian 
Euroscepticism can be divided into two broad types: one centre/left-wing type and a 
right-wing type. The documentary party analysis from the 1989-1994 and post-1994 
periods shows that the VCR pattern of Euroscepticism, also found in the newspaper 
study, is present in NtEU and the left-wing and middle parties in the Storting. It 
demonstrates that political culture and political values arguments are the most 
prevalent in these parties and factions, closely followed by rural society and 
295 and NtEU, see Figure 9.2 below.

296 regardless of whether parties influence the public or vice versa
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economic argumentation.297 With the exception of the shared political culture aspect, 
the structure of the PP’s Euroscepticism, on the other hand, is altogether different. 
The PP is the party which reflects the most economic concerns in its Euroscepticism, 
with almost half its argumentation falling into either the utilitarian, economic 
liberalism or “retaining control of the fish” categories, and the other half falling into 
political culture. Because the centre/left-wing type is the most common type of 
Norwegian Euroscepticism, dominating the newspaper debate, NtEU and the party 
system in Norway, it can be appropriately labelled the mainstream type. Moreover, as 
opinion polls make it clear that even the pro-European Conservative Party has 
Eurosceptic voters, it is likely that the PP’s Euroscepticism is more or less 
representative of a right-wing type of Euroscepticism in Norway. 
That it is appropriate to separate between mainstream and right-wing Norwegian 
Euroscepticism is also confirmed by the interview findings. Besides democracy and 
the right of self-determination (sovereignty), all the eight non-PP interviewees cite 
two or more of the following as their personal and/or their party’s main arguments 
against the EU: anti-capitalism/neo-liberalism, the ability to conduct social 
democratic policy, the environment, solidarity with the rest of the world, 
internationalism, regional policy and retaining national control over Norway’s 
natural resources. The two PP interviewees, on the other hand, focus on Norwegian 
interests and natural resources and express scepticism towards the deepening of 
(political) integration, the EU’s culture of economic transfers and protectionism and 
the CSDP.298 In addition, the issue of democracy comes up in the interview with PP 
MP Ulf Leirstein.299 He emphasises the problem of distance to decision makers: 
297 The economic argumentation took up a larger part of the party discourse than the newspaper, LEs’

and NtEU discourse, perhaps reflecting the pressure on parties (as opposed to ad hoc organizations) to

present more interest­based, economically responsible positions.

298 The PP’s scepticism towards the EU’s emerging defence dimension was also reflected in readers’

letters written by PP MPs in the 2000s newspaper analysis and the 2010 survey. These sources, the

interviews and also the 2005 manifesto indicate that the opposition to the CSDP is due to the belief that

the ties across the Atlantic are more important to Norway that any proposed European defence policy.

299 Interview with the author, Oslo, 12 January 2010.
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“I am preoccupied with closeness to the people. I am very preoccupied with 
a thriving democracy. […] I remember being annoyed before I was… before 
I became a politician myself about… I felt that it was very far between those 
who make decisions and the people. […] In Norway, there are quite short 
distances. The EU will be terribly far away […].” 
These findings all point to the conclusion that political culture/geo-historical issues 
are important to both mainstream and right-wing Euroscepticism in Norway, but that 
the two types differ in other aspects. The most obvious difference is the opposing 
economic ideologies; mainstream Euroscepticism is characterized by opposition to the 
EU’s much too heavy prioritization of market forces, while right-wing Eurosceptics, 
in this case the PP MPs, view the EU’s ideology as not market-oriented enough. 
Thus, where the mainstream Eurosceptics’ anti-neo-liberalism directs them down the 
postmaterialist values lane, focusing on the environment, equality and solidarity, the 
right-wing Eurosceptics’ pro-market liberalism has only economic undertones. This 
difference can also be observed in the argumentation related to national control over 
the country’s natural resources and financial transfers through the EEA agreement: 
the contrasts between the farmer Per Ole Lunde’s300 and the PP’s Ulf Leirstein’s301 
reflections on the topic of the current EEA contributions to economic and social 
equalization in the EU are striking. On the one hand, Lunde narrates about travelling 
to Eastern Europe and observing some of the cultural projects sponsored by the EU. 
He says: “I suppose we contribute to this […] maintenance of local art and culture. 
And that is good. That is positive. We can afford that.” Leirstein, on the other hand, 
stresses that “I get to hear about how great it is with all of this money, but we don’t 
get anything back for it.” Put simply, Leirstein views the issue in monetary terms; 
Lunde does not.302 
300 Interview with the author, Vest­Torpa, 15 September 2009. 
301 Interview with the author, Oslo, 12 January 2010. 
Another example, related to the natural resources, is the contrasts between the SLP’s Dag 
Seierstad’s comments about how “absurd” it is that Norway has such a large part of the world’s oil and 
gas resources at its disposal and that some in the SLP have toyed with the idea of putting some of it 
under UN management, and the PP’s Ulf Leirstein comments about not thinking it “a disadvantage that 
we have in many ways struck it lucky with our oil and gas wealth”. 
295 
302 
A further distinctive difference between the two types of Euroscepticism is the 
differing attitudes towards the agricultural sector: whereas all the mainstream 
Eurosceptics want to maintain the Norwegian agricultural policy as it is (with its 
high level of subsidies), the PP’s Leirstein does not want to join the EU because he 
thinks that there are bigger chances of changing the agricultural policy in Norway 
outside the EU than inside the EU. If Norway joins, the EU “will start giving out 
subsidies […] to sparsely populated areas in Norway to maintain something which 
shouldn’t… which isn’t able to sustain its own existence”. A quote from the 
interview with the PP’s foreign policy spokesman, Morten Høglund,303 further 
illustrates this difference between the mainstream Eurosceptics’ concern for the 
maintenance of the agricultural sector for societal reasons and the right-wing 
Eurosceptics neo-liberalist argumentation: 
“Nei til EU is against [the CAP] because it doesn’t look after Norwegian 
farmers well enough. We are against it because it is too expensive and costly 
and is too… [it] doesn’t take good enough care of the free market and 
agriculture’s independent position [...]. So, we attack this from a kind of free 
market way of thinking and a wish for less regulation, fewer transfers.” 
Moreover, although the PP’s Leirstein supports the general political consensus in 
Norway that people should be able to live in the districts if that is what they want, 
he does not think that this is relevant to the EU question, because of the EU’s lack of 
market orientation. Besides, he says, the shipping companies, shipyards and the 
fishing industry ensure that there is decentralized settlement in Norway. This stands 
in sharp contrast to the argumentation used by the mainstream Eurosceptics, who 
throughout the last fifty years have argued that an active regional policy is necessary 
to keep peripheral/rural Norway populated. 
The quantitative data obtained on Eurosceptic MPs’ attitudes also support the 
general findings of the qualitative analysis. They confirm that at the forefront of the 
303 Interview with the author, Oslo, 30 March 2009. 
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mainstream Eurosceptic minds lies first and foremost political culture, but also rural 
and postmaterialist issues are present. Economic interest plays a smaller role in their 
Euroscepticism, and cultural threat does not seem to be connected to the issue of 
European integration in these parties. Again, the findings prove that the PP’s 
Euroscepticism is, with the exception of the political culture element (which actually 
seems to be even stronger in the PP than in the other parties), completely different 
from that of the other parties. Whereas most of the other parties’ Eurosceptic MPs 
view the EU as being too liberalist and market oriented, many of the PP MPs 
evidently view the EU as being too protectionist. Second, although hardly any of the 
other Eurosceptic MPs in the survey thought that the cost of membership is an issue, 
six out of ten PP MPs thought so. And third, the PP was the party with most MPs 
believing that the EU poses a threat to Norwegian culture and heritage. This is an 
interesting finding, especially as it corresponds with the interview findings. Ulf 
Leirstein from the PP, although he does not think that Norwegian identity and 
values are threatened by the EU to a great extent, he is the only interviewee who 
acknowledges that he is “preoccupied with taking care of Norwegian culture”, 
which, he states, “might be difficult if [we] join the EU”. Conversely, all of the eight 
mainstream Eurosceptics interviewed state that they do not consider issues of identity 
or cultural threat relevant to the EU issue; the cultural exchange that accompanies 
globalization is seen as something positive.304 Furthermore, two of the interviewees 
bring up the building up of a European identity as something they view with 
suspicion, because of its unclear purpose. For example, Dag Seierstad from the SLP305 
questions whether taking the leap from e.g. a Swedish identity to a European 
identity makes it easier to be an immigrant in Sweden. He argues that 
“if we are to move on from a national identity, then we should change to a 
global identity and not stop at a white, European identity, or what else one 
is to mean by ‘European identity’”. 
304 It is important to note that Leirstein shares the view that getting new impulses is something positive. 
His scepticism on this point is directed towards the uncertainty surrounding the EU’s future 
development, that in the long term, “some of the identity in your own country might disintegrate”. 
305 Interview with the author, Oslo, 18 September 2009. 
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This is consistent with the overall findings of the study, which show that mainstream 
Eurosceptic argumentation throughout the decades has been largely free of 
nationalist, identity-oriented sentiments. However, further research is needed to 
ascertain whether national identity concerns are indeed something which sets right-
wing Euroscepticism apart from mainstream Euroscepticism. 
Ultimately, it is evident that there is a clear dividing line between mainstream and 
right-wing Norwegian Euroscepticism. Although they share the geo-historical 
features, the two types differ in their approach to postmaterialist, rural and 
economic issues. The structure of the two types is illustrated in Figure 9.1 below. 
Figure 9.1 A schematic depiction of Norwegian Euroscepticism 
Source: Author’s study 
Although the separation between mainstream and right-wing Euroscepticism is the 
most important distinction to make when considering and studying Norwegian 
Euroscepticism, it is of course possible, and indeed meaningful, to divide these two 
broad types into subtypes. In fact, Szczerbiak and Taggart’s (2001) hard/soft 
conceptualization is a particularly suitable tool here, and it is arguably most 
pertinent to divide mainstream Norwegian Euroscepticism into a “softer” type, 
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encompassing the parties, factions and people that are against EU membership but 
in favour of the EEA agreement and other EU initiatives, and a “hard” type, which 
entails rejection of membership, the EEA, Schengen and the vast majority of EU 
policies. Figure 9.2 shows how the Euroscepticism of the different parties and 
factions on the left and centre can be conceptualized according to this division. 
Naturally, right-wing Euroscepticism can also be split into “softer” and “hard” 
Euroscepticism, but “hard” right-wing Euroscepticism is not very common, as the PP 
is pro-EEA and few market liberalists are against the EEA agreement, which gives 
Norway free access to the Single Market. 
Figure 9.2 A diagram of mainstream Norwegian Euroscepticism306 
Source: Author’s study 
To sum up, Norwegian Euroscepticism is most appropriately divided into two types, 
mainstream and right-wing Euroscepticism, alternatively three types: “hard” 
mainstream, “softer” mainstream and right-wing Euroscepticism. These are all varieties 
of rejecting Euroscepticism (Vasilopoulou 2009) or EU-rejectionism (Flood 2002b), i.e. 
hard Euroscepticism. Because Norway is not a member of the EU, the debate tends 
NtEU is difficult to place because it crosses party lines and thus its members are people from 
different parties with different attitudes towards e.g. the EEA agreement. However, an analysis of 
publications and commentaries originating from the organization would arguably suggest that it is 
more appropriately placed under the “hard mainstream Euroscepticism” heading. 
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to be very polarized. This means that politicians, parties and organizations that are 
in favour of membership are unlikely to engage in soft Eurosceptic rhetoric. Hence, 
soft Euroscepticism is not a prominent feature of Norwegian Euroscepticism. 
9.1.2 A Distinctive Euroscepticism? 
”Much of that which is about scepticism towards union is certainly present 
in the vast majority of European countries, almost to the same extent as in 
Norway. The difference is that in Norway one has established a democratic 
practice which does not let itself get overrun.” 
Wegard Harsvik307 
The thesis makes it clear that Norwegian Euroscepticism, both on the elite and 
public level, is a phenomenon which stretches from 1961 to the present day, through 
periods of heightened and latent Euroscepticism. Moreover, the research shows that 
its stability and strength are more than just a myth. However, Norwegian 
Euroscepticism is evidently not a wholly unique phenomenon. As LE Wegard 
Harsvik rightly points out, the scepticism towards the ever closer union, the EU’s 
constant expansion of its areas of competence at the expense of member states’ 
sovereignty is something which characterizes popular and party-based 
Euroscepticism across Europe. Indeed, right-wing Norwegian Eurosceptics seem to 
have much in common with right-wing Eurosceptics in other countries. For example, 
the UK Conservative Party’s Euroscepticism which is based on “a strong market-
oriented neo-liberalism that is combined with a defence of national political 
sovereignty and institutions” and rejects “all potential EU regulatory intervention” 
(Statham 2008: 37-8) is nothing if not a close relative of the PP’s Euroscepticism.308 
Moreover, the protests against the EU’s democratic deficit are not specific to 
Norwegian Euroscepticism; EB data show that the gap between satisfaction with 
democracy at home and in the EU is particularly large in the three Nordic EU 
member states, Finland, Denmark and Sweden (Petersson 2004: 29). Furthermore, 
307 Interview with the author, Oslo, 8 January 2010.

308 The PP’s 1990s position on Europe did also, incidentally, take inspiration from Thatcherism (see

Saglie 2000c; Skinner 2011).
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the mainstream Norwegian Eurosceptics’ concerns for the environment or the welfare 
state are not unique either. Environmental and welfare related arguments against the 
EU are not only shared by Eurosceptics in Norway’s neighbouring countries 
(Petersson 2004; Sørensen 2004; Sunnus 2004), complaints that the EU is not “social 
enough” were also central to many of the French and Dutch “no” votes in the 
referenda on the European Constitution in 2005 (Mulvey 2005; EurActiv 2005; see 
also Kumlin 2004 for more about the welfare/Euroscepticism link). Moreover, 
Sweden’s referendum had almost the same pattern in 1994 as Norway’s, with clear 
centre-periphery and urban-rural dimensions. In addition, as in Norway, the 
Swedish “’yes’ campaign was considered to be identical with the political 
establishment and all the resources at their disposal whereas the ‘no’ side, the 
underdog, was identified with the general public and its lack of resources” 
(Petersson 2004: 21). 
9.1.2.1 The Geo-historical Aspect 
The gap between Norway’s 52.2 percent and Sweden’s 46.8 percent “no” is not vast. 
But if one is to add to the Norwegian “no” vote the 4 percentage points which the 
Swedish suction is thought to have contributed to the “yes” vote (Aardal and 
Jenssen 1995: 38), then the gap spans almost ten percentage points. Why the majority 
in Norway voted “no” even after the Swedes had voted “yes” can perhaps be 
explained by Norway’s “unshakable” democratic practice, as Harsvik argues (see the 
above quote), but this is not to say that for example the Swedish democratic tradition 
is inferior to the Norwegian. The Swedish and Norwegian political cultures are 
strikingly similar in their emphasis on “transparency, equality and popular support” 
(Petersson 2004: 28), but they differ in two important aspects. The first, the countries’ 
historical experiences, is obvious, as every country’s history is unique and will shape 
the respective countries’ political culture. Norway and Sweden share certain 
historical characteristics, such as the absence of a powerful feudal structure and 
federalism and relatively weak urban and liberal influences, but unlike Norway, 
Sweden has no experiences of foreign rule or occupation. These “historical non-
events” (Petersson 2004) are linked to the second aspect, namely Sweden’s 
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collectivism versus Norway’s individualism. As Petersson (2004: 19) argues, they 
“help explain why Sweden did not develop counter-reactions such as national pride, 
a sense of historical destiny, and strong institutions to defend individual rights”. 
Norway, on the other hand, did develop all of these three “counter-reactions”.309 The 
newspaper analysis from the whole period under study indicates that the battle 
against the EU is, by many, viewed as a furthering of the historical battle against 
Europeanizing and centralizing forces. In other words, it is perceived as the 
enactment of Norway’s historical destiny. And last, but not least, the ability to 
choose a separate path, as individuals (folkestyre) and a country (sovereignty) are 
themes which have dominated the Norwegian Eurosceptic argumentation 
throughout the 1960s, 1970s, 1990s and into the 21st century. Trust in the state is high 
in Norway, but arguably higher in Sweden, where there is a much stronger sense of 
collectivism, and thus of dutifulness. Eriksen (1993b: 74) puts forward the idea that 
Swedes can be compared to dogs in the sense that 
“They are always obedient and optimistic […]. When the State asks a Swede 
to do something, it is claimed, he will do it! The Norwegians are also 
obedient, I suppose, but not to the same degree as the Swedes”. 
(original italics) 
The Norwegian author, Odd Børretzen, makes a similar observation in his 
humoristic book “How to understand and use a Norwegian”. He writes: “the Swede 
obeys all the laws, new or old, period. The Norwegian also obeys all the laws, but he 
protests and writes letters to the editor” (Børretzen 1993, cited by Eriksen 1993b: 74, 
original italics). Also in journalist and previous Sweden correspondent to the NRK, 
Kjell Pihlstrøm’s (2010) summary of the most significant differences between Sweden 
and Norway, the issue of obedience is awarded attention. He asserts that 
The 1994 referendum survey shows evidence that national pride is strong in Norway, with 59 
percent saying that they are very proud of being Norwegian and 91.5 percent stating that they are either 
very proud or somewhat proud of being Norwegian. However, it should be noted that the regression 
analysis in Chapter Eight showed that national pride is not significantly related to Euroscepticism. 
Actually, Aardal et al.’s (1998: 251) simple correlations between the 1994 EU vote and a national 
pride dimension show modest relationships between the two in all the Nordic applicant countries. The 
correlation was lowest in Sweden (.05), followed by Norway (.10) and Finland (.16). 
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“Deep down in the Swedish mass of people, there is an obedience gene 
which is difficult to trace in the far more individualist Norway. Ethnologists 
have long ago established that the Swedish obedience is connected to a 
collectivist tradition and trust in the state, which have strong historical 
roots.” 
According to Hofstede’s (2001) individualism (versus collectivism) index, Sweden’s 
score is indeed almost the same as Norway’s, but as Fjærtoft (2006) notes, 
“controversies occur when we consider individualism versus collectivism, 
dependence, independence, mutual dependence and related concepts”.310 Besides, 
the Eurosceptic argumentation makes is very clear that self-determination is a highly 
regarded value in the Norwegian value set (see also Fjærtoft 2006). In other words, it 
seems plausible that the country’s negative historical experiences with foreign rule, 
which one of the interviewees argue “put us in an inferior position”311 and the 
positive historical experiences with challenging the state and the elites, which 
resulted in parliamentarism in 1884 and independence in 1905, have strengthened 
the Norwegians’ sense of individualism and corresponding diminished sense of 
obedience. 
9.1.2.2 Rural Society 
The ruralism aspect of mainstream Norwegian Euroscepticism is also something 
which not immediately stands out as distinctly Norwegian. In all European countries 
there are people resisting urbanization, and selling the countryside as “rural idyll” is 
as commonplace in Spain as it is in Norway (Baylina and Berg 2010). Moreover, at 
the brink of the second decade of the 21st century, with nearly 80 percent of the 
Norwegian population living in built-up areas (2008), Norway is more urbanized 
than it was in 1961, when only six out of ten inhabitants lived in built-up areas (SSB 
310 It should also be noted that in Hofstede’s definition of collectivism, it only refers to in­groups, such

as families, and has no political meaning.

311 Quote from author’s interview with Odd Jostein Sæter from the CDP, Oslo, 22 September 2010.
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2009b: 3).312 In addition, even though the rural influences on Norway’s social and 
political development were stronger than in continental states which were 
industrialized and urbanized early, this is also a feature Norway shares with its 
Nordic neighbours (Ingebritsen 2006). Even so, the combination of three features 
arguably sets the Norwegian attachment to the countryside apart from that in other 
countries: the Norwegian nation building’s reliance on nature and the countryside; 
the country’s comparatively late urbanization,313 and the resulting high support for 
Norwegian agriculture and regional policy, which has been successful at keeping 
Norway comparatively decentralized. These three features are each considered in 
turn below. 
Having been a dependency under Denmark since the Middle Ages, Norway could 
not bask in the glory of military, industrial or ancient architectural grandeur when 
the Norwegian nation-building took place in the nineteenth century. The images of 
victory and splendour which helped build up a sense of national identity in 
countries such as the UK, France and Denmark were completely absent when the 
Norwegian identity was constructed; instead, the nation-builders focused on nature 
and egalitarian and rural values (Eriksen 1993b). Eriksen’s (1993b) review of the 
literature on Norwegian identity supports the idea that the rural is important to 
most Norwegians. Bygda (the rural district) and nature are characteristics of the 
Norwegian identity, he argues. “Even though half of the Norwegians live in cities, 
the Norwegian self-image is rural. What Norwegians perceive as typically 
Norwegian is a smallholding in a mountain valley” (p. 84).314 Because the national 
self-image in Norway is rural and farmer-like to a much stronger degree than in 
other countries, by posing a threat to Norwegian agriculture and the rural, the EU 
also represents a threat to values that are important to the whole population. In an 
312 For a collection of houses to qualify as a “built­up area” according to SSB, it would have to have a 
minimum population of 200 people and a maximum distance between the houses of 50 metres. 
313 Finland and Sweden were also urbanized late, compared to other west European states. 
Eriksen lists seven characteristics central to the Norwegian identity: egalitarian individualism, 
objectivity and sincerity, package solutions, bygda, simplicity, nature and Puritanism. The fact that 
Eriksen identifies simplicity and nature as highly regarded values can be linked to a different argument 
of his, namely that romanticism, when it finally arrived in Norway, got so stuck that it still has not let 
go (1993b: 34). 
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interview with the author, having been asked a question about why dispersed 
settlement is important in Norway, the former LP leader, Odd Einar Dørum, 
responds that it is because “the decentralized is a part of the Norwegian identity. 
[…] It is part of [Norway’s] diversity”.315 
The urbanization of Norway happened very late compared to other European 
countries; while the urban population in Norway only made up 29.6 of the total in 
1920, in Denmark the urban population was 44.2 percent, in the Netherlands 45.6, in 
France 46.4 and in the UK 79.3 percent. The reason why the late urbanization of 
Norway is important to Norwegian Euroscepticism is that it has affected the ties 
between the urban and rural population up to the present day. Up until the 
beginning of the 20th century, the ancestors of the vast majority of the Norwegian 
population were farmers and fishermen. As Eriksen (1993b: 80) aptly puts it, 
“There are not many people from Oslo who have four grandparents from 
Oslo, and many – maybe a majority – of the capital’s inhabitants ‘come 
from’ a different place. Even hyper-urban people […] go ‘home’ for 
Christmas, and ‘home’ then means some rural district in the eastern inland 
area”. 
That the urban population has ties to rural Norway, not just through the national 
rural self-image but also through family and friends, and that this is of relevance to 
Norwegian Euroscepticism is supported by the data from the interview with Odd 
Jostein Sæter from the CDP.316 After democracy and sovereignty, he lists the feeling 
of solidarity with the districts as one of the CDP’s main arguments against the EU: 
“Even [among] people in the cities, in the CDP, this [solidarity argument] 
was very prominent because many… they felt a kind of solidarity with… 
shall we say, the districts, the rural areas […]. We who […] live in Oslo or 
close to the political establishment […], in the central region, we have a 
315 Interview with the author, Oslo, 13 January 2010. 
316 Interview with the author, Oslo, 22 September 2010. 
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responsibility for those who live in the districts. And this solidarity 
dimension, it certainly has a, shall we say, demographic or social 
explanation. That is, very many of those […] who have been active in the 
CDP [are] people who have moved from the rural districts […]. But that you 
also have roots in the rural districts is something which applies to large 
parts of the Norwegian population.” 
Furthermore, the fact that ten percent of the population still lives on agricultural 
properties also serves to confirm the idea that Norwegians have strong bonds with 
the countryside and the agricultural sector (SSB statistics, cited by Oppland 
Arbeiderblad 2008). 
These two points, the central position of the rural to the Norwegian self-image and 
the urban population’s ties to rural Norway, can help explain the continued support 
for Norway’s agriculture317 and regional policy, which has contributed to keeping 
Norwegian society, compared other European countries and its geography 
considered, relatively decentralized. According to UN statistics, the rural population 
of Sweden was only 16.6 percent in 1990, while 27.6 percent of the Norwegian 
population lived in rural areas (UN 1994). The Norwegians are a small people spread 
over a large territory: with only 16 inhabitants per km², Norway has, second only to 
Iceland, the lowest population density in Europe (SSB 2011).318 Besides, 2008 SSB 
statistics show that over half of the Norwegian population live in municipalities with 
fewer than 30,000 inhabitants (SSB 2008).319 Moreover, Figure 9.3 below shows that 
although the population in Norway’s number one periphery, Northern Norway, has 
declined somewhat since 1951, it nevertheless has remained exceptionally stable 
over the last 60 years. It is, in other words, no exaggeration to say that Norway’s 
decentralized settlement pattern has been successfully retained to a large degree. 
317 Ingebritsen (2006) claims that Norway has the highest level of support for agriculture in Europe. 
No UN statistics are available for Sweden between 2000 and 2008, but in 2001, Norway’s rural 
population made up 23.5 percent of the total population (UN 2008). 
319 36 and 45 percent live in 50,000+ and 30,000+ municipalities respectively. Only five Norwegian 
municipalities have over 100,000 inhabitants (Oslo, Bergen, Trondheim, Stavanger and Bærum). 
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Figure 9.3 Proportion of population living in the Oslofjord region320 and 
Northern Norway 1951-2008 and predicted 2020 (in percent)

Oslofjord region Northern Norway 
Source: Figure copied from SSB (2009b: 3) 
Norway’s successful regional policy is a feature of Norway which is quite unique in 
an international setting; the word Utkantnorge (rural Norway) has an almost sacred 
ring to it among Norwegian politicians (Eriksen 1993b), at least among politicians 
outside the PP. Odd Einar Dørum from the LP tries to explain the contrasts between 
a Norwegians’ and a New Yorker’s take on investments in Utkantnorge: 
“a journalist from the New York Times wanted an explanation of the 
tunnels on the Norwegian coast; to be sure, he didn’t see any cars! […] And 
from his perspective, driving through a tunnel in New York, my God, I can 
understand that: ‘what the hell are you doing?’ [laughs] So I understand… 
But that’s not the point! The point is that we have wanted this because we 
[want to] protect the settlement and because we also understand the export 
values that are in motion. […] But a person from another country will not 
320 Oslo, Akershus, Vestfold, Østfold and Buskerud. 
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understand that just like that. But for us, going in for an infrastructure 
which also is beneficial for the peripheries [is important]”.321 
Cathrine Strindin Amundsen from the CP,322 too, emphasises the “export values”, i.e. 
the natural resources in the peripheries in her defence of the decentralized settlement 
pattern, but she also argues from a quality of life perspective: people should be able 
to choose where they want to live. LE Wegard Harsvik expresses this in similar 
terms.323 He argues that “politics is not about allocating resources so that they 
maximize some number […]. It is about people.” But regardless of what Norwegians 
with a centre/left-wing political orientation give as their main reason for supporting 
Norway’s regional policy, their attitude on the matter can be summed up by the 
following statement, made by Amundsen from the CP: “there are actually no good 
arguments for why people shouldn’t live in the districts”. 
The argument about (mainstream) Norwegian Euroscepticism’s distinctiveness comes 
full circle by returning to the point made by SME’s Wegard Harsvik about the 
Norwegian “democratic practice which does not let itself get overrun”, i.e. the 
absence of the “obedience gene” which the Swedes allegedly possess and the 
importance Norwegians attach to the value of self-determination. This is because, on 
the topic of the settlement pattern, Harsvik returns to the democracy aspect of his 
EU opposition. He explains, 
“There is nothing that prevents Norway from having the regional policy 
that the Progress Party or the Conservatives want […]. And I will fight 
against the regional policy that these parties stand for. But if the population 
in Norway in an election, God forbid, were to elect a majority of 
Conservative and Progress Party [MPs] in the Storting, then they would 
implement that policy, right? The issue that is of EU relevance here is that 
the EU will force an agricultural and regional policy upon Norway, one 
321 Interview with the author, Oslo, 13 January 2010. 
322 Interview with the author, Oslo, 13 January 2010. 
323 Interview with the author, Oslo, 8 January 2010. 
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which it has not been possible to get support for in an election. At least not 
up until now.” 
To sum up, the distinctiveness of Norwegian Euroscepticism lies in its geo-historical 
dimension, and to the distinctiveness of mainstream Norwegian Euroscepticism, the 
rural society element can be added. Norwegian Euroscepticism is also unique in its 
stability; in no other country has Euroscepticism remained so enduring, both in 
terms of its structure and strength. However, this is not to say that Norwegian 
Euroscepticism is more distinctive than for example British or Swedish 
Euroscepticism, which are unique in their own ways, only that geo-historical and 
rural factors are what sets Norwegian Euroscepticism apart from its counterparts. 
9.2 Explaining Norwegian Euroscepticism 
The findings of the study show that Norwegian Eurosceptic argumentation on the 
party and newspaper debate level follows a clear VCR structure, with the Values 
component referring to the expression of postmaterialism (and to a limited extent 
Nordic exceptionalism), the Culture component referring to factors related to the 
Norwegian geo-historical context and resulting political culture and the Rural 
component referring to the wish to keep the Norwegian society decentralized. In 
other words, Norwegian mainstream Eurosceptics oppose EU membership because of 
threats the EU poses to the all-important right of self-determination (sovereignty and 
democracy), postmaterialist values such as the environment, the humane society and 
solidarity with the Third World, and finally agriculture and the decentralized 
society, which are important to most Norwegians for many different reasons. 
Sociotropic economic interest, on the other hand, the study demonstrates, has little 
bearing on the motivation of Norwegian Euroscepticism, as the documentary 
analysis makes it very clear that the dominant view in Norway is that as a whole, the 
country would probably be somewhat, albeit not much, better off with membership 
than without. It is of course likely that egocentric utilitarian considerations play an 
important part in the big picture among those groups of the populations which are 
pointed out as the losers of integration, such as farmers and coastal fishermen, but at 
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the same time, both the newspaper study, the interview data and the referendum 
study data indicate that even among these groups, utilitarianism is rarely their 
primary reason for opposing membership.324 Moreover, the study rejects the national 
identity thesis on all levels, as the issues of cultural threat, xenophobia and national 
pride have no significant relationship to Norwegian Euroscepticism.325 
Figure 9.4 gives an illustration of the results of the newspaper study. It demonstrates 
that, perhaps with the exception of the 1960s, when national identity sentiments 
were somewhat more commonplace than in the later periods,326 the above 
conclusions apply to any of the four periods of Norwegian Euroscepticism. 
Figure 9.4 Results of the newspaper analysis 1960s-2000s 
Source: Author’s newspaper study 
This consistent pattern notwithstanding, it is important to remember that, as pointed 
out in the first part of this chapter, Norwegian Euroscepticism can be divided into 
Cf. News reports from Aftenposten (23/05/92, 27/04/9); interviews with Per Ole Lunde (Vest­
Torpa, 15 September 2009) and Cathrine Strindin Amundsen (Oslo, 13 January 2010). For the 
referendum data, see Figure 9.5 below 
325 Some interesting findings showed up in the elite interview and survey data on the PP, suggesting a 
possible relationship between concerns about cultural threat and Euroscepticism in the party. However, 
this is an avenue for future research. 
326 It should be noted that the numbers of national identity­related arguments are inflated for all the 
periods, due to the inclusion of arguments which potentially do not express concerns about culture or 
lack of identification with Europe, but e.g. health and security. 
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two distinct phenomena: mainstream and right-wing Euroscepticism. The findings of 
the newspaper study, displayed in Figure 9.4, only correspond with the results of the 
analysis of Norwegian party-based Euroscepticism on the centre/left of the political 
spectrum, i.e. mainstream Euroscepticism. In other words, only mainstream 
Euroscepticism can be explained by the VCR theory, to explain right-wing 
Euroscepticism, it is necessary to couple the geo-historical/political Culture 
explanation with Utilitarianism and economic Liberalism (CUL). It is absolutely 
crucial to make the distinction between these two types when considering 
Norwegian Euroscepticism because the reasons why right-wing Eurosceptics reject 
EU membership are diametrically opposed to why mainstream Eurosceptics do not 
desire a closer affiliation with the EU. While Eurosceptics from the PP criticize the 
EU for being too socialist and putting the market mechanisms under too much 
restraint, the Eurosceptics from the Labour Party, SLP and CP especially, but also 
from the LP and CDP, think the EU is far too liberalist and do not agree with the way 
in which the market forces are given priority over other “more important” societal 
considerations, such as social policy, regional policy and environmental policy. 
Unlike mainstream Euroscepticism, right-wing Euroscepticism can, at least in part, be 
explained by the economic interest thesis, as right-wing Eurosceptics have, overall, a 
much stronger focus on the economy. They express not only an ideological 
preference for neo-liberalist economics, much emphasis is also put on the cost of 
membership, weighing up the economic costs against the benefits. 
On the topic of the cost/benefit evaluative aspect of Norwegian Euroscepticism, it is 
necessary to comment on public opinion. This is because the findings of the 
regression analysis in Chapter Eight indicated that a negative sociotropic utilitarian 
evaluation of membership is one of the most central motivators of Euroscepticism, 
while the documentary analysis did not. The explanation for this discrepancy is most 
likely to be methodological. Public Euroscepticism could be driven by economic 
utilitarianism to a much larger degree than what the VCRUNI documentary analysis 
was able to capture (i.e. limitations of the approach). Alternatively, the research 
design of the individual-level regression analysis might have been flawed (e.g. 
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imperfect indicators or failure to recognize the presence of two populations). In 
order to investigate this matter further, it is useful to look at additional data from 
both the referendum studies. Figure 9.5 below gives an illustration of the “no” 
respondents’ main argument against membership in the two surveys, coded into the 
same categories as in the documentary analysis.327 These data support the second 
explanation proposed above, i.e. they are congruent with the findings of the 
documentary analysis and disprove the regression analysis’ suggestion that 
economic interest is of primary importance to Norwegian Euroscepticism, at least 
the mainstream type. The triangulation of these data with those from the other part of 
the study strengthens the conclusions drawn previously: the data confirm that geo-
historical and rural society arguments are as important to public Euroscepticism as 
the documentary and regression analyses suggest. 
Figure 9.5 “No” voters’ arguments in 1972 & 1994 according to category 
1972 1994 
Sources: 1972 Referendum Study (taken directly from the dataset provided by NSD) and 1994 
Referendum Study (taken from Pettersen et al. 1996: 275). 
Another inconsistency between the documentary analysis and the regression 
analysis was the apparent lack of a relationship between postmaterialist values and 
Euroscepticism in the latter. The above data restores some of the confidence in the 
results of the qualitative analysis. Although the postmaterialist slice in the 1972 pie 
above is modest, the pie on the right shows that in fact, postmaterialist arguments 
such as concerns for the environment and welfare were of primary importance not 
327 Details of the arguments and which category they were coded to can be found in Appendix I. 
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only on the Eurosceptic discourse level but also among voters in 1994. Thus, the fact 
that postmaterialist values came up as non-significant in the regression analysis is 
likely to be a methodological issue. More specifically, the discrepancy can be 
explained by the fact that postmaterialist arguments such as environmental 
protection and peace promotion were also used by the “yes” side in the debate.328 
This means that postmaterialist values such as concern for the environment can be a 
key driver of Norwegian Euroscepticism without there having to be a positive 
statistical relationship between postmaterialist values and Euroscepticism. To give 
an example, for the same reason that a Conservative MP favours EU membership 
because it means free trade and liberalism and a PP MP opposes the EU because it is 
too socialist and protectionist, a postmaterialist whose main concern is protection of 
the environment can end up on either standpoint, depending on his/her appraisal of 
the EU’s environmental efforts. The goal is the same, but the individual’s perception 
of reality differs. 
So, having triangulated the results of the MM analysis from the previous chapters 
with supplementary data from the referendum surveys, it appears that the VCR 
theory holds ground on all levels of the analysis. One exception is perhaps that the 
postmaterialist values segment of public Euroscepticism was somewhat 
underdeveloped compared to the public discourse in the formative periods. This is 
congruent with data from the World Values Survey (Inglehart and Welzel 2005), 
which show that postmaterialist values were not very widespread in the Norwegian 
population at the time of the first referendum, but that there has been a “silent 
revolution” since the 1980s. Norway’s score on the survival/self-expression index in 
1981, at 0.53, was lower than all the other Nordic countries,329 but in 2006, at 2.13, 
only Sweden had a higher score, at 2.35 (Inglehart n.d.). If the discrepancy between 
the findings on postmaterialism in the quantitative and qualitative data is indeed 
reflective of a post-1980s silent revolution in Norway and not down to a 
The environment argument was the primary argument given by 7.1 and 5.8 percent of “no” and 
“yes” voters in the 1994 Referendum Study respectively (Pettersen et al. 1996: 275­6). 
329 Denmark had the highest score at 1.44, followed by Sweden at 0.85, Iceland at 0.83 and Finland at 
0.82 (Inglehart n.d.) 
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methodological issue, then it has implications for the explanatory power of the 
values segment of the VCR model in relation to early Norwegian popular 
Euroscepticism. However, this issue will have to be investigated further by future 
research. 
On the topic of public Euroscepticism, one important point remains. This is, of 
course, the two types of Euroscepticism, which also have the potential to account for 
some of the discrepancies between the results on the different levels of analysis. The 
two-fold typology of Norwegian Euroscepticism was a finding which emerged quite 
late from the qualitative analysis. Therefore, the regression in Chapter Eight did not 
take the two different types into account, and it is possible that the failure to identify 
that there were two populations in the data (the middle/left parties’ voters and the 
Conservatives/PP’ voters) made the research design of the public-level analysis 
inherently flawed. It could be that the lack of recognition of the two-fold typology 
prevented the regression analysis from picking up on differences between 
mainstream and right-wing Euroscepticism in the population, if these differences do 
indeed exist. This is significant because, as the analysis above has shown, mainstream 
and right-wing Norwegian Euroscepticism are two phenomena which, with the 
exception of the geo-historical aspect, are built on almost opposing premises. 
Nevertheless, having identified the two types of Norwegian Euroscepticism, the 
study paves the way for future research in the field. It would be interesting to see the 
results of a regression analysis which replicates the above regression but 
differentiates between the two types of Euroscepticism. 
9.3 A Critical Evaluation of the Approach 
Any piece of research operates within theoretical and methodological constraints, 
and it is almost inevitably shaped by the researcher’s (or researchers’) moral, 
political and philosophical values. The thesis looked at Norwegian Euroscepticism 
through the theoretical lens provided by the literature on EU support, specifically 
the geo-historical, exceptionalist and (refined) rural identity theses from the 
literature on Norway, and the postmaterialist, utilitarian and identity theses from the 
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comparative literature. A wide range of data materials and different methods were 
used to maximize representativeness and minimize selection bias in the study. 
Although this triangulation strategy arguably served to close some of the gaps that 
might have been left open by a purely qualitative or quantitative approach, the 
choice of the MM approach, combining a thematic analysis of documents with an 
evaluation of qualitative interview data and quantitative survey data, did, at least to 
some extent, predetermine the type of answers the research would give. This is 
because methodology is inextricably linked to theory, which in turn has clear 
implications for what results and conclusions different research approaches 
generate. The next section looks at some of the ways in which the choice of the 
methodological approach has shaped the answers and conclusions reached, 
compared to if a more interpretivist approach had been used. The following section 
considers some of the problems involved in classifying and explaining Norwegian 
Euroscepticism according to the VCRUNI framework. 
9.3.1 Mixed Methods and Implicit Assumptions 
The MM approach was chosen because it was commanded by the research questions 
and the subject under study, i.e. popular and party-based Norwegian 
Euroscepticism. While one of the main aims of the study was to enhance qualitative 
understanding of the phenomenon, it would not have been possible to make any 
meaningful inferences about the Euroscepticism in the population if the quantitative 
analysis had been left out. 
The research puzzle clearly has its origin in the researcher’s value judgements; for 
someone who does not think that public support for the EU matters, it would be 
meaningless to carry out an investigation into public Euroscepticism. For this reason, 
the interpretations made in the study may well reflect the researcher’s own belief 
that a farmer, housewife or a student’s opinion on European integration, whether 
Eurosceptic or Europhile, is just as valid and important as any elite actor’s attitude. 
This is a belief which is also integral to NtEU and all the Eurosceptic parties’ 
fundamental attitudes towards the individual and its role in politics and society. On 
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the left, there is opposition to the elites ruling the masses, and among the middle 
parties, which compete along the territorial dimension, there is a marked awareness 
of the periphery’s strong political tradition and respect for the fact that the elites take 
their power from the people. This is reflected by the interview with the LP’s Odd 
Einar Dørum;330 he points out that “in Norway, political power has in many ways 
grown from the periphery in towards the centre, unlike in many other states where 
the power only is in the centre, or has grown from the centre and out.” The fact that 
the researcher is sympathetic to her subjects’ cause is likely to have implications for 
the researcher’s objectivity throughout the analysis. However, in any qualitative 
research, the researcher is not a truly objective observer, but carries with her/him a 
set of value judgements which inevitably colour interpretations. 
Moreover, the research is based on the assumption that the average voter is a 
rational being who makes decisions based on his/her values and perceived interests. 
The research conforms to the conviction that 
“Politicians do not operate in a vacuum; their electoral promises and their 
policy-making decisions need to make sense in the context of the everyday 
practices and preoccupations of voters to give the former a reasonable 
change [sic] to succeed at the ballot box. For politicians to successfully 
mobilize voters on the basis of certain ideas or programs, voters must sense 
some (material or ideational) affinity with the electoral platform they are 
offered.” 
(Boix 2007: 504) 
In other words, the research is based on the premise that Norwegian Euroscepticism 
is neither simply an elite phenomenon which the Norwegian population is 
manipulated into adopting every time the issue is put on the agenda, nor a straight-
forward bottom-up phenomenon, whereby the political parties reflect the 
preferences of their electorate. There is interaction between the different levels. That 
330 Interview with the author, Oslo, 13 January 2010. 
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Norwegian Euroscepticism does not follow a clear-cut top-down process is not only 
reflected in the high level of grassroots activity around the time of the referenda, it is 
also expressed by the interview data. Farmer and CP member, Per Ole Lunde,331 
criticizes what he calls “conservative argumentation”, “that, if you don’t have 
knowledge, then you need someone to decide for you”. This is because he (and his 
party) believes in the “individual’s value and opportunities” and that “involved 
[people] are fully capable of understanding what the EU issue is really about” and 
thus, of making up their own minds. As Lunde states, “I have [always] wanted to 
acquire knowledge, form an opinion at least”. Interestingly, the interviewed 
politicians express different views on where Norwegian Euroscepticism comes from, 
also supporting the inference that party-based Euroscepticism cannot be explained 
by popular Euroscepticism and vice versa. Dag Seierstad from the SLP, for example, 
perceives his party and NtEU as shapers of public opinion because the vast majority 
of media coverage of EU issues is heavily biased against the “no” camp: “without 
information and therefore without real knowledge, [the goal was] to develop the 
[population’s] knowledge foundation for a ‘no’”.332 Furthermore, Cathrine Strindin 
Amundsen from the CP,333 believes that the party’s Euroscepticism comes from both 
the top and the bottom levels, but that it is primarily a bottom-up process. That 
party-based Euroscepticism in the middle parties does have a clear element of elites 
reflecting voter preferences is also supported by the interview with Odd Jostein 
Sæter from the CDP.334 He states that 
“I think definitively that it has come from below. […] Clearly, those who 
articulate it the strongest will often be leading politicians in a party. But I 
think that in the CDP […] to the extent the MPs have been somewhat… how 
to put it… open to deliberate things […] I think that the general trend has 
been that it is the grassroots pressure which has pulled them from an open, 
more doubting situation, to a ‘no’.” 
331 Interview with the author, Vest­Torpa, 15 September 2009. 
332 Interview with the author, Oslo, 18 September 2009. 
333 Interview with the author, Oslo, 13 January 2010. 
334 Interview with the author, Oslo, 22 September 2010. 
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Explicitly put, the main reason for not choosing a purely interpretivist methodology 
was its poor fit with the research puzzle and the aims of the research, one of which 
was to empirically test theories from the literature on EU support on the Norwegian 
case. If for example discourse analysis had been the chosen methodology for the 
thesis, it would not have been possible to speak of “empirical testing” of the theories 
from the literature on EU support, as this would have been in conflict with the 
epistemological underpinnings of the method. Instead, the research is likely to have 
returned answers akin to Neumann’s (2002), that Norwegian Euroscepticism can be 
explained by the “no” side’s successful use of “identity politics”, i.e. that Norwegian 
Euroscepticism is a top-down process. In fact, this is another reason why the 
discourse analytical toolkit was considered unsuitable for the purposes of the 
research: the research puzzle itself stands in opposition to Neumann’s interpretation; 
if voters are indeed “fools that can be easily manipulated by politicians” (Boix 2007: 
503), then Norway should have become a member of the EU a long time ago. After 
all, the “yes” elites have had the odds on their side throughout the last fifty years: 
they have been in majority and had the might, media and millions335 on their side all 
along. The pro-membership bias in the Norwegian news media is illustrated by 
several studies of the 1994 campaign. Jahn et al. (1998: 75) find that in two thirds of 
cases when the EU issue was mentioned in the two major newspapers, VG and 
Dagbladet, it was linked to positive consequences for Norway. Similarly, Ramberg 
(1995, cited by Ringdal 1995: 53) and Nilsen (1996, ibid) reveal that the non-
subscription newspapers and the news casts on the two main TV channels, NRK and 
TV2, presented more “yes” arguments than “no” arguments. 
9.3.2 VCR, Utility and National Identity 
As mentioned above, in any piece of research it is inevitable that the choice of 
methods and theoretical framework determines, at least to some extent, what kinds 
of answers the research returns. Not only does the thesis give a sociological account 
of Norwegian Euroscepticism, the research is oriented towards theory testing, and 
335 and in 1994, they also had Gro Harlem Brundtland, Kallset (2009) notes. 
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the analytical framework used in the study is also based on categories that are 
strictly defined according to different theories of EU support. This means that the 
answers generated by the research were always going to be either confirmations or 
rejections of the pre-defined theories put forward for testing. In other words, because 
of the choice of analytical framework, the study could never have returned other 
answers than rejection of all, some or none of the postmaterialist, exceptionalist, geo-
historical, rural society, utilitarian or national identity theses.336 Clearly, there are 
several issues with the VCRUNI framework for analysis. In particular, several 
problems can be identified regarding the different categories’ definitions and their 
overlaps. For example, it is questionable whether anti-neo-liberalism motivated by 
protection of the welfare state qualifies as a postmaterialist value. In the study, it is 
treated as a postmaterialist value because it has its basis in the ideal of equality and 
egalitarianism, but it could be argued that it is rather a social democratic value. 
Furthermore, the framework could be criticized because the line between political 
values and political culture is blurred. A clear example of this is that the widespread 
support for the welfare state in the Nordic states is just as appropriately described as 
part of their political culture as it is a political value. Similarly, the political culture 
characteristic of participatory, local, accountable democracy is just as easily 
identified as a self-expression value, and by implication, a postmaterialist value. 
However, these two theories/categories are perhaps clearer when called by their 
original names, namely the geo-historical and postmaterialist/exceptionalist theses. 
Because the political culture category’s definition focuses on geo-historical issues 
which are related to self-determination and Norway’s history of foreign rule, the 
social democratic part of Norway’s political culture is not a natural part of the 
category. One could rather argue that the “political culture” label for this category is 
inappropriate, and that it should rather be called “self-determination”. Solutions to 
the problem of the democracy overlap, on the other hand, were considered at the 
very beginning of the research. Because there was no capacity available to study 
nuances in this body of argumentation, it was decided that “democracy” arguments 
336 With the exception that new categories which did not conform to any of the VCRUNI categories 
could emerge (like the economic liberalism theme). 
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were to be consistently coded to one of the two categories instead of both. As the 
thematic analysis got underway, it became clear that the issue of democracy was a 
much more important part of the geo-historical body of argumentation than it was to 
the postmaterialist discourse, so unless democracy arguments were expressed in 
very clear self-expression/postmaterialist terms, they were all considered part of the 
geo-historical rather than the postmaterialist theme. This was by no means an 
optimal solution to the problem, but it served its purpose, which was to avoid 
ending up with a diluted analysis with no clear lines. Although “democracy” was 
clearly defined as a geo-historical element, not a postmaterialist one, the analysis 
does make it clear that the two categories interact and overlap. In practical terms it 
only means that “democracy” is treated under one heading instead of two; it does 
not prevent the reader from drawing his/her own parallels to popular political 
participation’s place in the definition of postmateralist values. 
The rural society concept is another issue which deserves a brief mention. It is 
evident from the analysis that what is termed and defined as “rural society” in the 
thesis is an intangible concept, which theoretical underpinnings are substantially 
underdeveloped. In the literature it has been suggested that the rural of the 
Norwegian identity and “attachment to the countryside” are factors which can 
account for the pro-agriculture dimension of Norwegian Euroscepticism, but 
findings from the study show that the arguments for the protection of rural Norway 
are plentiful and diverse, ranging from environmentalism to closeness to nature. 
More research is needed to refine this concept and its relationship to Euroscepticism. 
Finally, it is necessary to comment on the tensions between national identity (or 
nationalism) and the geo-historical explanation. There is no doubt that there are 
some scholars who would be tempted to rename this theory/category “nationalism” 
because of its strong focus on national sovereignty. Knudsen (1989) is one of these. 
Even though he acknowledges that it is closely tied with democracy, he equals the 
fear of reduced national sovereignty with a nationalist ideology and argues that 
“nationalism as an ideology was the glue that held […] Folkebevegelsen together” (p. 
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45-6). Notwithstanding, the thesis shows that xenophobia and national pride are not 
related to Euroscepticism in the population when other variables are accounted for337 
and that extremely little of the argumentation in the public debate touches on culture 
or ethnicity. This indicates that the national sovereignty argument in the Norwegian 
Eurosceptic debate is rooted in geo-historical factors, i.e. emphasis on self-
determination and “the wounds left by a history of foreign rule” (Gstöhl 2002a: 214), 
not nationalist sentiments. This interpretation is supported by the fact that the 
sovereignty/independence dimension is closely linked to issues of democracy in the 
debate. Consequently, it would not be useful or correct to explain Norwegian 
Euroscepticism in terms of nationalism. True, national symbols were used by the 
“no” side to further its cause in the past battles, but so were they on the “yes” side. It 
would be just as unfair to label the “no” side in Norway nationalists as it would be 
labelling the “yes” side traitors. Having said this, it is important to emphasise that 
the thesis does not argue that the geo-historical theory is free from links to national 
identity. Quite the contrary, as Knudsen (1989: 26) rightly points out, 
“Norway’s national identity was to a large degree shaped as a confrontation 
with the Danish dominance and with the union with Sweden. In the 
Norwegian cultural consciousness, democracy and nation state [… are] tied 
together as two sides of the same issue”. 
In other words, the geo-historical explanation is preferred to that of “nationalism” or 
the national identity theory from the literature on EU support because the latter two 
imply that Norwegian Euroscepticism is motivated by perceived cultural threat, 
hostility towards other cultures and exclusive national identity – which clearly, is not 
the case. 
Ultimately, the MM approach, guided by the VCRUNI framework from the 
literature on EU support, gives an alternative perspective on Norwegian 
Euroscepticism to those which have been proffered by previous research. Like any 
Even simple correlations between “national attachment”/“xenophobia” and Eurosceptic attitudes, 
are not statistically significant <0.01. 
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other approach, it does not allow us to see Norwegian Euroscepticism “as it is”, but 
it allows us to see Norwegian Euroscepticism from a new perspective. 
9.4 Conclusion 
The chapter argued that Norwegian Euroscepticism is most appropriately divided 
into two broad phenomena: mainstream Norwegian Euroscepticism, encompassing 
the LEs, SLP, CP, CDP, LP and NtEU, and right-wing Euroscepticism, encompassing 
the PP and, in all likelihood, Eurosceptic Conservative members and voters. In other 
words, in Norway, it is not appropriate to differentiate between left-wing and right-
wing Euroscepticism, as the left-wing and centre parties and the mainstream “no” 
movement’s Euroscepticism has the same structure. Whereas mainstream 
Euroscepticism can be accounted for by VCR, with economic interest and national 
identity matters being of limited importance, right-wing Euroscepticism in Norway is 
based on quite different attitudes. The anti-neo-liberalist argumentation of the 
typical mainstream Eurosceptic stands in sharp contrast to the right-wing 
Eurosceptic’s complaints that the EU is too expensive, regulated and socialist. They 
do, however, share one thing in their Euroscepticism: the geo-historical element. 
Both mainstream and right-wing Eurosceptics are concerned about the impact EU 
membership would have on the “right of self-determination”, both on the individual 
(democracy) and national (sovereignty) level. 
Furthermore, it was argued that Norwegian Euroscepticism is distinctive, but no 
more so than any other country’s Euroscepticism, as each country has its own 
unique history, background and political systems impacting on national political 
attitudes. Norwegian Euroscepticism’s distinctiveness lies in its geo-historical 
dimension and, in the case of the mainstream type, rural society elements. Having 
learned about their country’s history of union, Norwegians ascribe high importance 
to the value of self-determination, which again is connected to the EU issue. It was 
also suggested that because Norwegians have seemingly retained much stronger ties 
to the countryside than their fellow Europeans, the argumentation revolving around 
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keeping Norway decentralized is another aspect which stands out, even compared to 
the Nordic countries. 
So, the main argument of the thesis is that postmaterialist values, geo-historical 
factors and rural society (VCR) can explain mainstream Norwegian Euroscepticism, 
that is, Euroscepticism on the left and middle of the political spectrum in Norway, 
and that right-wing Euroscepticism, at least Euroscepticism in the PP, can be 
explained by the geo-historical aspect and issues of economic utility and neo-
liberalism. The chapter argued that even though other approaches and 
conceptualizations would doubtlessly result in different ways of classifying and 
explaining Norwegian Euroscepticism, the VCRUNI perspective gives new and 
valuable insights into the phenomenon. 
The next chapter sums up the findings and conclusions of the thesis and reflects on 
issues which have emanated from the study, making some suggestions for future 
research. 
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Chapter 10

Conclusion 
A dominant assumption in the literature is that the country’s oil wealth is the reason 
why Norway is not a member of the EU. Gstöhl (1996: 4), for example, argues that 
“[b]eing rich is not the reason for [the Norwegians’] reluctance but it allows them to 
cherish national peculiarities much longer”. One of the main aims of the thesis was 
to challenge the assumption that Norwegian Euroscepticism is all about the 
economy. True, many scholars acknowledge that the economy may not be the 
motivating factor, but rather the enabling factor behind Norwegian Euroscepticism, 
but although this might be the case, it is important to point out that there is no 
evidence to support this theory. Quite the contrary, in relation to 1961-2010 
Norwegian Euroscepticism, the research shows little evidence to support the 
economy claim; in fact, the thesis suggests that attachment to the “national 
peculiarities” might well supersede unfavourable economic conditions. The aim of 
thesis was to examine the motivation behind Norwegian Euroscepticism to find out 
more about the nature of the phenomenon, i.e. what the “national peculiarities” 
which Gstöhl and other scholars speak of are, and how it can be explained. This 
concluding chapter sums up the main arguments and conclusions of the thesis. It 
also comments on the wider implications of the study findings and makes some 
suggestions for future research in the field. 
10.1 Two types of Euroscepticism: VCR and CUL 
Drawing on a thematic analysis of a variety of sources, including letters to the editor, 
party literature, Folkebevegelsen/NtEU literature, online articles, interview and survey 
data, the thesis argues that it is appropriate to speak of two broad types of 
Norwegian Euroscepticism. The first type, mainstream Euroscepticism, is found on 
the left and middle of the political spectrum in Norway and can be explained by 
concern about postmaterialist Values, geo-historical/political Culture factors and the 
maintenance of Norway’s Rural society (VCR). In other words, quite uniquely, 
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Norwegian Euroscepticism does not follow a strict left/right structure, as it is not 
possible to separate a specific left-wing Euroscepticism from a centre 
Euroscepticism. Put simply, both the left and the centre share the same 
Euroscepticism, the mainstream Euroscepticism. The second type, right-wing 
Euroscepticism, on the other hand, is motivated by political Culture, Utilitarian and 
market Liberalist issues (CUL). Thus, the research returns little evidence to support 
the economic interest thesis in relation to mainstream Norwegian Euroscepticism, but 
suggests that it is relevant to Euroscepticism on the right of the political spectrum in 
Norway. Notwithstanding, considering that right-wing Euroscepticism was and still 
is the more marginal phenomenon out of the two and, strictly speaking, economic 
arguments were of limited validity in both Sweden and Norway in 1994 due to the 
EEA agreement, it is curious that Norway’s healthy economy was and is still used as 
an explanation for why Norway voted “no” to the EU in 1994 and Sweden voted 
“yes”. Besides, the thematic analysis in the thesis clearly shows that economic 
arguments have been considered more or less irrelevant on the “no” side throughout 
the four phases of Euroscepticism, from 1961 to 2010. 
Despite this, Gstöhl (1996: 15) and others point out that “Norway used the oil money 
for subsidies to precisely those rural areas and industries – well represented in the 
Storting – where opposition to the EU was strongest”, consequently implying that 
EU opposition in the “rural areas and industries”, i.e. among farmers and fishermen 
and their sympathisers, would not have been as strong338 had the oil money not been 
available to spend on agricultural subsidies and other regional policies. However, 
this complex can be viewed from a different perspective, as farmer Per Ole 
Lunde’s339 comments illustrate. He is unsure whether the oil has been an advantage 
or a disadvantage to the agricultural sector and the average farmer, as he points out 
that 
“[the oil] has, after all, changed the cost levels enormously in Norway. And 
the cost levels in other industries have increased an awful lot, certainly, 
338 Or that this electoral constituency would have diminished had the oil not been discovered. 
339 Interview with the author, Vest­Torpa, 15 September 2009. 
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compared to what we earn per hour in agriculture. So I’m not so sure that 
the situation would have been so much worse for the agricultural sector if 
we didn’t have the oil”. 
Put differently, speculations about what the situation would have been if Norway 
did not have the oil could point both ways. This also applies to speculations about 
EEA agreement or no EEA agreement post-1993. Dag Seierstad from the SLP,340 for 
example, does not believe that if the EEA agreement had not been in place, the 
country would have been a member of the EU. He thinks it depends: 
“I mean, if Gro hadn’t gone down the EEA route, I think the majority in the 
referendum would have been just as large. But because the EEA already 
existed, it is possible that it was easier for people to vote ‘no’”. 
Having found little evidence for the economic interest theory, the thesis argues that 
Norwegian Euroscepticism can be, at least in part, explained by issues of self-
determination which have emanated from the “wounds left by a history of foreign 
rule” (Gstöhl 2002a: 214). It contends that throughout the last fifty years, principles 
grounded in history have stood in the way of Norway’s ability to join a 
supranational community with imperfect democratic structures; in 1961, 1972, 1994 
and 2010 alike, the “no” side put significant emphasis on the country’s ability to 
retain its hard-won independence, sovereignty and national control over its 
resources, previously exploited or neglected by their Danish and Swedish rulers, and 
even more importantly, its democracy, its folkestyre, which is characterized by 
closeness to the people and thus incompatible with Brussels’ “remote democracy”. 
Moreover, as part of the VCR explanation, it is argued that mainstream 
Euroscepticism is also motivated by postmaterialist values and a concern for rural 
Norway. Norwegian mainstream Eurosceptics oppose what they perceive as the EU’s 
exaggerated neo-liberalist emphasis on economic growth, the Single Market and the 
340 Interview with the author, Oslo, 18 September 2009. 
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four freedoms because they think that priority should be given to greater social 
equality, quality of life and solidarity with the developing world, and protecting the 
environment instead of promoting further pollution and exploitation of the world’s 
resources. In addition to threatening these postmaterialist values, the EU’s 
“preoccupation with economic growth” is also viewed as jeopardizing the tradition 
of maintaining “district Norway” as it is – populated and characterized by “thriving 
communities” – as many of Norway’s regional policy measures, having the potential 
to distort competition, would be prohibited if Norway joined the EU. Conversely, 
right-wing Norwegian Eurosceptics, as champions of neo-liberalist economic policy, 
oppose EU membership for exactly the opposite reasons: they want fewer transfers, 
less interference from the EU in the name of social and regional equalization, and for 
the Norwegian agricultural sector to die a natural death, without subsidies from 
either the national agricultural policy or the CAP. 
Because mainstream Euroscepticism is the most dominant type of Norwegian 
Euroscepticism, found in all the left-wing and middle parties (SME, SLP, CP, CDP 
and LP) as well as in the ad hoc organizations Folkebevegelsen (1972) and NtEU, it will 
be considered in further detail here. Certainly, alternative labels could be used to 
describe the motivators of Norwegian Euroscepticism. Political culture could be an 
all-encompassing term describing the VCR complex, as all the components relate to a 
centre/left-wing pattern of values, attitudes and beliefs regarding the political system 
in Norway. Identity is another term which has frequently been used to describe the 
underlying structure of Norwegian mainstream Euroscepticism by scholars in the 
field. For example, Archer (2005: 64), argues that 
“a decision […] such as whether to join the EU – is affected not just by 
external elements but also by a mixture of interests, identity and interests 
shaped by identity. In turn, an appeal to a particular identity is made easier 
if it has been embedded in the country’s culture and institutions”. 
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Bringing the country’s “culture and institutions” into the equation, it is clear that 
Archer’s conception of identity is not the same as that of the national identity thesis 
in the literature on EU support (cf. McLaren 2002; Carey 2002). The analysis also 
shows that the way in which it is conceptualized in the comparative literature on EU 
support, i.e. with a focus on exclusive national identity, hostility towards other 
cultures and national pride, has very limited applicability to Norwegian mainstream 
Euroscepticism on all levels. Despite this, there is no doubt that identity, that is, 
Norwegians’ conceptions of themselves, their country and how it should be run, is a 
very important part of the VCR explanation. 
The poem Nordmanden (“the Norwegian”), written by the 19th century poet and 
founder of the nynorsk language, Ivar Aasen, is an interesting point of reference in 
this context, both for those familiar and unfamiliar with its content. With the melody 
composed by Ludvig M. Lindeman, it is one of Norway’s unofficial national 
anthems (see Esborg 2002: 239), sung in classrooms and on Norway’s Constitution 
Day, 17 May, all across the country. Consequently, it represents part of the national 
cultural heritage which every Norwegian is familiar with. The song was also printed 
in NtEU’s songbook Stem i! in 1994 (Esborg 2002), and also features in its 
organization handbook. The author’s translation of the poem is presented in Table 
10.1.341 The poem is interesting because it shows that values such as independence, 
self-determination and local self-governed communities, i.e. political culture (see 
verses one and two particularly), love for and closeness to nature, i.e. rural society 
(verse one to five), and equality, not wealth, i.e. political values (verses six and 
seven) are integral to the Norwegian identity and that they are values which are 
instilled into Norwegians from an early age. In this way, the VCR explanation 
corresponds with an identity or cultural explanation. 
Yet another way the VCR totality can be expressed is a desire to protect the 
“Norwegian way of life” or the “Norwegian way of doing things”, which is different 
from “the EU way”. This could perhaps be linked back to Exceptionalism, but only 
For the Norwegian version, see Appendix J. Only the verses printed in NtEU’s organization 
handbook are reproduced. 
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Table 10.1

The Norwegian 
by Ivar Aasen 
Between hills and rocks by the sea

the Norwegian has built his home,

there, he himself has dug the foundations

and put his house upon them himself.

He looked out at the rocky beaches,

there was no one who there had built. 

“Let us clear and build ourselves communities,

and then we will safely own the clearing”.

He looked out at the undulating sea,

it was squally to get out on it.

But fish were playing down in the depths of the sea,

and that play he wanted to see.

In the winter, he sometimes thought;

I wish I was in a warmer land!

But when the sun shone on the hills in the spring,

he longed for his homely beach. 

And when the hillsides green like gardens,

when flowers on stalks abound,

and when nights are as light as days,

he cannot imagine a more beautiful place.

South on the ocean he sometimes had to sail,

there were riches on benches and tables,

but around him he saw the thraldom hang back

and so he turned again towards north.

Let now other about glory quarrel,

let them sparkle with wealth and grandeur,

among bigwigs I cannot be comfortable,

among equals mostly I am happy.
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in the sense of it being a different way of doing things or the Norwegians’ way of 
doing things, and not a superior way of doing things. The main issue here is to have 
freedom to decide how Norway should be run, “being masters in their own house”, 
being able to keep the humane and districts-oriented Norway, a society which is seen 
as worth keeping. Sigrid Zurbuchen Heiberg from UmEU342 gives a poignant 
account of what Norway signifies to her, parts of which she is worried will be lost 
through for example social dumping and more profit-oriented policies, which EU 
integration is seen as a motor of: 
I feel that being from Norway, it’s a bit like having good parents who you 
can rely on. It’s a bit like always being able to come home, and then 
everything will sort itself out. If you get into lots of trouble, then you can go 
home to your parents, and then everything will be alright. […] In Norway I 
know that… regardless of [...] if I do something bad [...] I will be treated 
fairly, and I will... if I fall ill, I will get help. I don’t need any insurance; I 
will get help. And if I have kids, then they will get a good education and 
they will get free higher education, and… and all of that, that’s what I think 
is the great safety (trygghet) about living in Norway. Not necessarily that I 
have lots of money, but that my country actually… or that the society takes 
care of us. That, I think, is… yes, I think that’s very, very good.” 
Odd Einar Dørum from the LP343 and Wegard Harsvik from SME344 are also reluctant 
to conform to the EU way of doing things because they do not believe there is one 
right way of organizing countries, economies and societies. Dørum argues that 
“everything does not get better by everyone going into the same system and the 
same mill”; he sees the value of small countries being able to give “the big [ones] a 
kick up their backside, forcing them to think”. His key argument is that he believes 
that a country like Norway, “– closely connected to important international 
institutions – can play a limited but meaningful role to contribute to eco-friendliness 
342 Interview with the author, Oslo, 7 January 2010. 
343 Interview with the author, Oslo, 13 January 2010. 
344 Interview with the author, Oslo, 8 January 2010. 
330 
and easing conflict in the big international picture”.345 Harsvik is also worried about 
the one-sidedness the EU leads to. He thinks that “the culture of humanity […] 
should not be channelled in one direction because then you have fewer experiences 
and fewer opportunities to draw on when faced with new challenges […]”. Put 
differently, Norway’s way of organizing its society is regarded as a value not only to 
the people who live in the country, but also in terms of maintaining a diversity of 
ways to govern internationally. 
Political culture, identity or “the Norwegian way of life”; these are all valid ways of 
thinking about mainstream Norwegian Euroscepticism. Nevertheless, the VCR 
viewpoint arguably refines these conceptions somewhat, and gives a different, a new 
perspective on what Norwegian Euroscepticism is about. 
10.2 Contribution to Knowledge 
Although the thesis does not necessarily challenge conclusions drawn in other parts 
of the literature about how issues of identity, political culture or conceptions of the 
Norwegian way of life or the country’s “peculiarities” can explain Norwegian 
Euroscepticism, it does serve to clarify what these labels signify, through reframing 
them and arguing that issues of self-determination, political values and rural society 
interact to form the typical Norwegian unwillingness to join the EU. Unlike much 
previous work on the issue, theoretical in its outlook, the thesis provides empirical 
evidence in support of its conclusions, showing how the geo-historical, 
postmaterialist and rural themes have played out in the debate on the EU in 
Norway. Moreover, instead of going down the avenue of quantitative research 
which is conventional to the study of EU support and Euroscepticism, the thesis 
wrestled with limited data availability and tried to shape a new, creative yet 
rigorous, methodological approach to gain new insights into the phenomenon. The 
long timeline, the gathering and analysis of original data346 and the utilization of MM 
345 Personal communication, 21 February 2011.

346 E.g. readers’ letters and commentaries from five decades and new survey/interview data.
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undoubtedly helped the thesis make an original contribution to current 
understanding of Norwegian Euroscepticism. 
In addition, the empirical study also contributes to enhance the theoretical 
understanding of Euroscepticism, as it challenges some of the literature’s weak 
conceptual definitions and questionable assumptions about Euroscepticism. For 
example, it questions the way the national identity thesis has been applied in the 
literature on EU support, as it shows that it is of limited applicability to a country in 
which identity reportedly has played a significant part in the debate on the EU. 
Moreover, in the literature, it is often assumed that Euroscepticism both among the 
public and the elites is an illegitimate and predominantly populist reaction against 
European integration and a result of ignorance of what the EU is really about. 
Inglehart’s (1977) theorizing, which links low cognitive mobilization, shallow 
reasoning and materialist attitudes to low support for the EC is a good example of 
this; the national identity thesis, which links hostility towards other cultures with 
Euroscepticism (e.g. McLaren 2002) is another. Conversely, the findings of the thesis 
are consistent with the conclusions drawn by Schymik (2006, 2010) in his study of the 
three Scandinavian people’s movements against the EU. He argues that 
“[t]he negative image which is nurtured in politics, media and science does 
not do justice to the people’s movements against the EU in Norway, 
Sweden and Denmark. The EU opponents are not hesitant sceptics who are 
attacked by diffuse afflictions and irrational anxiety. Their opposition is, 
quite the contrary, clearly articulated, rationally testable and above all, 
legitimate.”347 
(Schymik 2010: 85-7) 
Schymik’s (2010) findings show that the conflicts between first, the Single Market’s 
principles and those of the Nordic equality-oriented welfare state, and second, the 
EU’s widely acknowledged democratic deficit and the Nordic ideal of nærdemokrati 
347 Translated from German into Norwegian by Morten Harper and from Norwegian to English by the 
author. 
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(democracy close to the people) are arguments shared by all the Scandinavian 
countries. As these elements of the Norwegian opposition is elaborated on in the 
thesis, through an examination of the reasoning behind the democracy argument 
and the “humane society” versus the profit-driven EU argument, the thesis has the 
potential of shedding further light on the Nordic Eurosceptic rationale too. Thus, in 
this way, the thesis also contributes to the comparative literature on Euroscepticism. 
Furthermore, through establishing that there are two distinct types of 
Euroscepticism in Norway, namely mainstream and right-wing Euroscepticism, the 
thesis arguably makes another significant contribution to knowledge. This finding 
has evident implications for future research in the field, as it compels scholars to 
distinguish between two separate phenomena when analysing Euroscepticism in 
Norway, and arguably also in other countries. That Eurosceptics on the left and right 
of the political spectrum base their Euroscepticism on completely different 
arguments is nothing new. This was even made evident through the discussion of 
the diversity of Eurosceptic argumentation in the literature review (Chapter Two). 
But for exactly this reason, it is perplexing that observers who are concerned with 
explaining why people oppose the EU in previous studies have not separated left-
wing (or in the Norwegian case mainstream) Eurosceptics from right-wing 
Eurosceptics. The thesis makes a clear case for drawing this distinction in future 
research in order to refine our understanding of Euroscepticism in Norway and 
elsewhere in Europe. 
The creation of new knowledge about Norwegian Euroscepticism is important not 
only for the “yes” side and “no” side in Norway in their continuing battle for and 
against Norwegian EU membership, it is important if we are to fully understand the 
European political and social environment we are part of. Currently, there are no 
signs that Euroscepticism is abating, neither in non-member states like Norway, nor 
in the EU. For national and EU-level politicians and policy-makers, it seems more 
important than ever to gain a better insight into what Euroscepticism really is. It is 
doubtlessly much more difficult, if not impossible, to combat a development which 
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is not well-understood or appreciated, than it is dealing with one which causes and 
force are comprehended and accepted. 
10.3 Suggestions for Future Research 
The study raises a number of issues and questions which would benefit from further 
research. First, as touched upon in the previous chapter, to confirm that Norwegian 
public Euroscepticism indeed follows the same mainstream and right-wing patterns of 
elite Euroscepticism as suggested in the thesis, a quantitative study which 
differentiates between the two types and tests the VCRUNI theories should be 
conducted. Using the VCRUNI approach to carry out a comparative study of 
Norway and one or several countries/parties is another avenue for future research, 
which would verify how and to what extent Norwegian Euroscepticism stands out 
from its Nordic and European counterparts. In this context, for example comparing 
the postmaterialist or political culture motivation in Norwegian and Swedish 
centre/left-wing Euroscepticism and Norway and Finland in terms of its support for 
agriculture and attachment to the countryside would be particularly interesting. 
Furthermore, a comparative study of the PP’s and for example the UK Conservative 
Party and/or the SVP could yield some valuable insights into the nuances in right-
wing Euroscepticism across Europe, in member and non-member states. 
Finally, the issue of identity in relation to Norwegian Euroscepticism should be 
explored further. First, the relationship between the PP’s Euroscepticism and 
concerns about national identity and immigration ought to be looked at in more 
detail, as the thesis findings suggest that MPs from the PP are more worried about 
cultural threat in relation to European integration than MPs from other parties. 
Specifically, research should be directed towards testing the national identity theory 
(McLaren 2002; Carey 2002) more thoroughly on the PP’s Euroscepticism or 
alternatively right-wing Norwegian Euroscepticism. Second, the rural society 
complex would benefit from more research. What exactly motivates the support for 
agriculture and the regional policy in Norway (which in turn motivates 
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Euroscepticism)? Is it a rural self-image, postmaterialist values such as solidarity or 
environmentalism, or some other unidentified force? 
The thesis opens up several new avenues for future research in the field of 
Euroscepticism, both as regards case studies and comparative studies. Due to the 
increased awareness of the elite/public gap in EU affairs and the consequential rise 
in demand of the use of referenda to ratify new treaties, the next decade could prove 
to be a very interesting time for scholars of public and party support for and 
opposition to the EU. In Norway, too, the next ten years are likely to be an 
interesting decade in terms of the Norway/EU relationship: at the end of 2011, the 
report on the EEA agreement, which was commissioned by the government in 
January 2010, is due. This is predicted to open up a wide debate on Norway’s form 
of affiliation to the EU. Besides, 2014 does not only mark that it is 20 years since the 
last referendum on membership, it also marks the 200th anniversary of the 
Norwegian Constitution. Whether there will be a new debate on membership in the 
near future remains to be seen, but if the public opinion polls at the beginning of the 
decade are anything to go by, then the “yes” side has quite a lot of convincing to do. 
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1973 
Appendix B

Overview of the Norwegian Party System

Time 
Socialist Left Party 
(Sosialistisk Venstreparti) 
1961 
(1961­1975: Socialist 
People’s Party) 
Progress Party 
(Fremskrittspartiet) 
1973 
Christian Democratic 
Party 
(Kristelig Folkeparti) 
1933 
Centre Party 
(Senterpartiet) 
1920 
(1920­1959: 
Farmers’ Party) 
Table B1 Party members 1950-2003 
SLP Labour CP CDP LP Cons. PP 
1950 200,500 61,500 
1960 165,000 30,500 97,000 
1965 3,000 150,500 68,000 37,500 116,000 
1970 2,500 155,000 70,000 110,000 
1975 138,000 56,500 52,500 6,500 100,000 1,000 
1980 153,500 53,500 70,000 12,000 152,000 10,000 
1985 11,000 174,000 51,500 59,500 170,500 
1990 13,100 128,100 47,100 56,200 11,300 146,300 16,900 
1995 9,300 72,600 46,600 56,600 7,200 78,100 5,000 
2000 7,400 58,800 31,600 47,900 6,600 64,000 11,800 
2003 9,700 51,600 24,200 45,000 5,600 49,900 18,200 
Source: Heidar (2005: 810). Figures taken from parties’ annual reports, adjusted to closest 100. 
Liberal Party 
(Venstre) 
1884 
Labour Party 
(Arbeiderpartiet) 
1887 
Conservative Party 
(Høyre) 
1884 
Left Right 
1884 
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Table B2 Storting election results 1906-1936 (percentages/seats) 
Party 1906 1909 1912 1915 1918 1921 1924 1927 1930 1933 1936 
Labour 15.9 
11 
21.5 
11 
26.2 
23 
32.0 
19 
31.6 
18 
21.3 
29 
18.4 
24 
36.8 
59 
31.4 
47 
40.1 
69 
42.5 
70 
Cons. 32.7 
35 
41.4 
64 
33.0 
24 
28.7 
21 
30.4 
49 
33.4 
57 
32.5 
54 
24.0 
30 
27.4 
42 
20.2 
30 
21.3 
36 
Liberal 45.4 
73 
30.7 
46 
40.2 
76 
33.3 
74 
28.3 
52 
20.1 
37 
18.6 
34 
17.3 
30 
20.2 
33 
17.1 
24 
16.0 
23 
Centre - - - - 4.7 
3 
13.1 
17 
13.5 
22 
14.9 
26 
15.9 
25 
13.9 
23 
11.6 
18 
Chr. D - - - - - - - - - 0.8 
1 
1.4 
2 
Others 6.0 
4 
6.4 
2 
0.6 
0 
6.0 
9 
5.0 
4 
12.1 
10 
17.0 
10 
7.0 
2 
5.1 
3 
7.9 
3 
7.2 
1 
Sources: SSB (2000) ; Aardal 2010a 
Table B3 Storting election results 1945-1973 (percentages/seats) 
Party 1945 1949 1953 1957 1961 1965 1969 1973 
SPP* - - - - 2.4 
2 
6.0 
2 
3.5 
0 
11.2 
16 
Labour 41.0 
76 
45.7 
85 
46.7 
77 
48.3 
78 
46.8 
74 
43.1 
68 
46.5 
74 
35.3 
62 
Centre 8.1 
10 
7.9 
12 
9.1 
14 
9.3 
15 
9.4 
16 
9.9 
18 
10.5 
20 
12.3 
21 
Liberal 13.8 
20 
13.1 
21 
10.0 
15 
9.7 
15 
8.8 
14 
10.4 
18 
9.4 
13 
3.5 
2 
Chr. D 7.9 
8 
8.5 
9 
10.5 
14 
10.2 
12 
9.6 
15 
8.1 
13 
9.4 
14 
11.0 
20 
Cons. 17.0 
25 
18.3 
23 
18.6 
27 
18.9 
29 
20.0 
29 
21.1 
31 
19.6 
29 
17.4 
29 
Progress - - - - - - - 5.0 
4 
Others 12.2 
11 
6.5 
0 
5.1 
3 
3.6 
1 
3.0 
0 
1.4 
0 
1.1 
0 
4.3 
1 
* Results for the SPP in 1961-1969 and for the SEL in 1973. 
Sources: SSB (2000); Aardal 2010a 
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Table B4 Storting election results 1973-1993 (percentages/seats) 
Party 1973 1977 1981 1985 1989 1993 
SLP 11.2 
16 
4.2 
2 
4.9 
4 
5.5 
6 
10.1 
17 
7.9 
13 
Labour 35.3 
62 
42.3 
76 
37.2 
66 
40.8 
71 
34.3 
63 
36.9 
67 
CP 12.3 
21 
8.6 
12 
6.7 
11 
6.6 
12 
6.5 
11 
16.7 
32 
LP 3.5 
2 
3.2 
2 
3.9 
2 
3.1 
0 
3.2 
0 
3.6 
1 
CDP 11.0 
20 
12.4 
22 
9.4 
15 
8.3 
16 
8.5 
14 
7.9 
13 
Conservatives 17.4 
29 
24.8 
41 
31.7 
53 
30.4 
50 
22.2 
37 
17.0 
28 
PP 5.0 
4 
1.9 
0 
4.5 
4 
3.7 
2 
13.0 
22 
6.3 
10 
Others 4.3 
1 
2.6 
0 
1.6 
0 
1.7 
0 
2.2 
1 
3.7 
1 
Sources: SSB (2000); Aardal 2010a 
Table B5 Parliamentary election results post-1994 (percentages/seats) 
Party 1997 2001 2005 2009 
SLP 6.0 
9 
12.5 
23 
8.8 
15 
6.2 
11 
Labour 35.0 
65 
24.3 
43 
32.7 
61 
35.4 
64 
CP 7.9 
11 
5.6 
10 
6.5 
11 
6.2 
11 
LP 4.5 
6 
3.9 
2 
5.9 
10 
3.9 
2 
CDP 13.7 
25 
12.4 
22 
6.8 
11 
5.5 
10 
Conservatives 14.3 
23 
21.2 
38 
14.1 
23 
17.2 
30 
PP 15.3 
25 
14.6 
26 
22.1 
38 
22.9 
41 
Others 3.3 
1 
5.4 
1 
3.1 
0 
2.7 
0 
Sources: SSB 2000; Aardal 2010a. 
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Appendix C

The Pilot Study for the Newspaper Research

The pilot study was carried out in Nationalbiblioteket in Oslo on 2 March 2009. Before 
the pilot, six newspapers were considered for the study: five of the largest 
Norwegian local newspapers, each representing a region of Norway, and one 
national broadsheet newspaper, based in Oslo. The newspapers and their circulation 
are presented in Table C1 below. 
Table C1 Newspapers initially selected 
Newspaper Region Counties* Circulation** 
Nordlys North Finnmark, Troms, 
Nordland 
2.3 
Adresseavisen Middle Nord-Trøndelag, Sør-
Trøndelag, Møre og 
Romsdal 
5.9 
Bergens Tidende (BT) West Sogn og Fjordane, 
Hordaland, Rogaland 
6.4 
Fædrelands-vennen South Aust-Agder, Vest-Agder, 
(Telemark) 
2.9 
Oppland 
Arbeiderblad (OA) 
East Oppland, (Hedmark) 2.1 
Aftenposten Centre 
(national) 
(Oslo, Akershus, Vestfold, 
Østfold, Buskerud) 
18.2 
* The counties in brackets are not covered by the newspaper, but are part of the region. 
** Newspaper’s circulation in 2008, percent of the population (Medienorge, 2009). 
The pilot study had three objectives. First, it aimed to determine whether the 
prospective selected newspapers were suitable for the study. Specifically, it had to be 
checked to what extent they had regular letters to the editor columns throughout the 
fifty-year period. It was also relevant to get an idea of what number of anti-EC/EU 
letters it would be reasonable to expect to find in the different newspapers in each 
decade. The second objective was to estimate the scope of the newspaper study, i.e. 
to find out how many and which newspapers to include. Here it was essential to 
ascertain how much time it would take to search through a newspaper according to 
the chosen data collection strategy and whether covering one, two or three papers 
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would return too little, too much or just the right amount of data for the analysis. 
Third, the purpose of the pilot was to test the analytical framework on a sample of 
the target data to make sure that it was able to capture the tendencies in the data. 
All the six newspapers’ letters pages were inspected, but due to time restrictions, the 
full pilot was carried out only on the local newspaper for the Middle Norway region, 
Adresseavisen. The pilot used a cross-section sampling approach; for purposes of 
simplification, the third year of each decade (i.e. 1962, 1972, 1982 etc.) was selected 
(the first or the second would also have been appropriate to probe each of the five 
decades). For each year, the aim was to cover four months (two rolls of microfilm) 
selected at random in order to avoid striking any readers’ letters ‘black spots’ (i.e. 
months of little readers’ letters activity) and to minimize any bias on the part of the 
researcher. However, although the pilot kept to two rolls of microfilm per year, the 
four months goal was reduced to two months for the last three periods because of 
the increasing volume of the newspaper and the concurrent time limitations. 
Table C2 Time periods covered by the pilot study (Adresseavisen) 
Year Months 
1962 January, February, July, August 
1972 March, April, November, December 
1982 May, June 
1992 January, October 
2002 February, November 
Table C2 shows the periods that were covered by the pilot. At this stage, all the 
readers’ letters on the issue of the EC from the periods were collected (i.e. both pro-
EC/EU and anti-EC/EU). This was done to reduce bias, to get a full picture of both 
sides of the debate and to maximize comprehension of those letters written in 
response to others. 
The pilot generated 56 readers’ letters altogether, which were read and subsequently 
analysed according to the (unrefined version of the) coding protocol outlined in 
Appendix G. Thus, the pilot established the appropriateness of using the VCRUNI 
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framework for analysis. In addition, it confirmed that covering six newspapers and 
three years from each decade would be far above the maximum that one person 
could cover in the time frame of a PhD. Moreover, by giving some indication of the 
number of EU-related letters it would be reasonable to expect from a local 
newspaper, it was decided that, as a minimum, a large (national) newspaper would 
have to be included in the study, as it would contain more relevant data (and, having 
a larger readership, potentially be more representative of the general public’s views). 
Table C3 Expected number of readers’ letters in Adresseavisen 
Year No. of months 
included in pilot 
No. of letters 
found in pilot 
Expected no. of 
letters per year 
1962 4 6 18 
1972 4 25 75 
1982 2 0 0 
1992 2 19 114 
2002 2 5 30 
Whole period 237 
The table above shows how many readers’ letters on the topic of the EC/EU (both 
pro and anti) the pilot study suggested that Adresseavisen would contain each year. 
These are rough calculations based on the number of articles generated in each of the 
years in the pilot study (e.g. 6 letters found during four months in 1962, equals an 
expected number of 18 letters for the whole year). The pilot calculations suggested 
that if three years from each decade were covered in the study and each of 1962, 
1972, 1982, 1992 and 2002 were representative of the other two years in each decade, 
then that there would be 711 EC/EU-related letters available to collect in 
Adresseavisen. It was expected that Aftenposten, being a national newspaper, would 
have as many or more readers’ letters on the topic of EC/EU membership through 
the period and that it would form the core of the newspaper research. 
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Appendix D

Additional Information about the 2006 and

2010 Elite Surveys

The Surveys 
The 2006 survey (Survey A) and 2010 survey (Survey B) were carried out to gain 
additional insight into elite/party attitudes towards the EU beyond what the 
documentary analysis and the secondary literature could offer. The first survey was 
originally conducted for my final year BA project at the University of the West of 
England, entitled “Norway: A Country of Persistent Eurosceptics or Moving towards 
a New EU Membership Application?” (2007), and created the starting point for the 
2010 survey. 
The Questionnaires 
Both the questionnaires were limited to ten questions on two A4 pages to avoid 
deterring the respondents and maximize the response. For the same reason, the 
majority of the questions were closed-ended. The questions primarily asked about 
the respondents’ attitudes towards Norwegian EU membership, different aspects of 
European integration and issues related to Norway joining the EU. The design of the 
questionnaire for Survey B built on the experiences from Survey A; the most relevant 
and successful question items were reproduced, while the items which were less 
relevant to the current project were discarded. The latter were replaced by questions 
which addressed some of the issues raised by the literature review and documentary 
analysis, such as the importance of the settlement pattern and maintaining control 
over the natural resources. The Norwegian version and the English translation of the 
questionnaires are reproduced below. 
Procedure 
First on 31 October 2006 and subsequently on 6 January 2010, envelopes containing a 
copy of a two page questionnaire and a cover letter, were distributed to the 169 
Norwegian MPs. On both occasions, the envelopes were left with the Storting 
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reception staff in Løvebakken in Oslo. The respondents were asked to return the 
completed questionnaires to my parents’ home address in Norway. Around a month 
later, an e-mail was sent to all the MPs, which thanked them for their participation 
and gave those who had not responded another chance to reply, this time by e-mail. 
Response 
89 questionnaires were returned for Survey A and 84 for Survey B, which means that 
the survey response rates were 53 and 50 percent respectively. In both surveys, the 
response rate was highest in the CP, Conservative Party and PP, consistently over 60 
percent. It was lowest in the LP and the Labour Party, with less than half of the MPs 
retuning the questionnaires on both occasions. It should be noted, however, that the 
LP’s zero response rate in 2010 is out of a total of three MPs. Further details of 
survey response according to party can be seen in Table D1 below. 
Table D1 Survey response by party (A and B) 
Survey A 2006 Survey B 2010 
Response 
(count) 
Party response 
rate 
Responded Party response rate 
SLP 6 40% 6 55% 
Labour 27 44% 25 39% 
CP 8 73% 7 64% 
LP 3 30% 0 0% 
CDP 6 55% 3 30% 
Cons. 15 65% 18 60% 
PP 24 63% 25 61% 
89 53% 84 50% 
Furthermore, 45 and 38 percent of the MPs who took part in Survey A and B 
respectively, reported that they did not want Norway to become a member of the 
EU. 
Data Analysis 
SPSS (Statistical Package for the Social Sciences) was utilized to compile and analyse 
the quantitative data. The qualitative data obtained from the qualitative questions 
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were compiled in one document and analysed as part of the textual analysis in 
Chapter Seven. 
(See below for copies of the Norwegian and English versions of the questionnaires) 
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Holdninger til europeisk integrering blant norske

Stortingsrepresentanter

En spørreundersøkelse utført av Marianne Sundlisæter, forsker i Europeiske

Studier ved University of the West of England, Bristol, Storbritannia

Kjønn: □ kvinne □ mann 
Politisk parti: _____________________________________ 
Fylke: ____________________________________________ 
1. Synes du Norge burde søke om medlemskap i den Europeiske Union (EU)? 
□ Ja □ Nei □Ingen formening 
2. Hva stemte du ved siste folkeavstemning om norsk EU-medlemskap? 
□ Ja □ Nei □ Avla ikke stemme 
3. Tror du Norge kommer til å søke om medlemskap i EU innen 2009? 
□ Ja □ Nei □ Ingen formening 
4. Tror du Norge kommer til å søke om medlemskap i EU i neste 
Stortingsperiode (2009-2013)? 
□ Ja □ Nei □ Ingen formening 
5. Hvilke av følgende EU-initiativer støtter du? Vennligst sett kryss i alle 
gjeldende ruter: 
□ Den felles landbrukspolitikken 
□ Den felles utenriks- og sikkerhetspolitikken 
□ Det indre marked 
□ EØS-avtalen (EEA) 
□ Schengen-avtalen 
□ Utvidelsen østover, mai 2004 
□ Videre utvidelse (inkludert Tyrkia) 
□ Økonomisk og monetær union (EMU) / Euroen 
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_____________________________________________________________________ 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
6. Hvilke av følgende argumenter mot norsk EU-medlemskap støtter du? 
Vennligst sett kryss i alle relevante ruter: 
EU-medlemskap vil… 
□ …bety mer byråkratisering 
□ …skade landbruket og fiskerinæringen 
□ …ta fra Norge sin nåværende innflytelsesrike posisjon utenrikspolitikk 
□ …true den norske velferdsstaten 
□ …true nasjonal suverenitet (inkludert selvråderetten) 
□ …true norsk kultur og kulturarv 
□ …true norsk lokalpolitikk 
□ …være for dyrt 
7. Hvilke av følgende argumenter for norsk EU-medlemskap støtter du? 
Vennligst sett kryss i alle relevante ruter: 
EU-medlemskap vil… 
□ …bidra til å ivareta gode forhold og fred på kontinentet 
□ …forbedre Norges forhold til Europa 
□ …gi Norge en mulighet til å ta del i viktige beslutninger på EU-nivå 
□ …gi Norge muligheten til å melde seg inn i EMU 
□ …gi norske bedrifter bedre konkurransevilkår i Europa 
□ …gjøre Norge mer innflytelsesrik i internasjonal politikk 
□ …ha en positiv innvirkning på norsk økonomi 
□ …vise norsk solidaritet med de mindre utviklede landene i Europa 
Til hvilken grad vil du si deg enig med følgende utsagn: 
8. EU-spørsmålet er et viktig tema på den nasjonalpolitiske arena i Norge. 
Helt uenig	 Uenig til en Verken uenig Enig til en Helt enig 
viss grad eller enig viss grad 
9. Norske partier og politikere bagatelliserer Europaspørsmålet ved nasjonale valg. 
Helt uenig	 Uenig til en Verken uenig Enig til en Helt enig 
viss grad eller enig viss grad 
10. Hva er dine egne følelser angående Norges framtidige forhold til EU? 
Hjertelig takk for hjelpen. Oktober-november 2006/M Sundlisæter 
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______________________________________________________________________________ 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
Stortingsrepresentantenes holdninger til EU 
Kjønn: □ kvinne □ mann 
Parti: ___________________________________________ 
Fylke: ___________________________________________ 
1. Synes du Norge bør bli medlem i EU? 
□ Ja	 □ Nei □Ingen formening 
2. Hva stemte du ved folkeavstemningen om norsk EU-medlemskap i 1994? 
□ Ja	 □ Nei □ Avla ikke stemme 
3. Hva stemte du ved folkeavstemningen om norsk EF-medlemskap i 1972? 
□ Ja	 □ Nei □ Avla ikke stemme 
4. Når tror du EU-saken vil bli aktuell igjen i Norge? 
5. Hvilke fem av de følgende er mest dekkende for hva du mener EU står for? 
□	 Den felles utenriks- og sikkerhetspolitikken 
□	 Frihandel og liberalisme 
□	 Utilstrekkelig fokus på miljøet 
□	 Økonomisk samhørighet 
□	 Et Europa av regioner 
□	 Et fredsprosjekt 
□	 Nærhetsprinsippet 
□	 Sentralisering 
□	 Økonomisk og monetær union 
□	 Et føderalt Europa / en europeisk superstat 
□	 Et Europa av uavhengige stater 
□	 Demokratisk underskudd 
□	 En høyere form for demokratisk styring 
□	 Miljøvern 
□	 Barrierer mot resten av verden 
□	 EUs strukturfond 
□	 Frarøvelse av suverenitet 
□	 Byråkrati 
□	 Annet: _____________________________ 
6. Hvilken av de følgende utsagn er du mest enig i? 
□	 EU er en bra ting både for Europa og verden, og Norge bør bli medlem. 
□	 EU kan være en bra ting for andre europiske land, men EU-medlemskap passer 
ikke for Norge. 
□ EU er verken en bra ting for Europa, verden eller Norge. 
Eventuelle kommentarer: 
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______________________________________________________________________________ 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
7. Hvilke av følgende EU-initiativer støtter du? Vennligst sett kryss i alle gjeldende ruter: 
□ Den felles landbrukspolitikken 
□ Den felles utenriks- og sikkerhetspolitikken 
□ Det indre marked (de fire friheter) 
□ EØS-avtalen 
□ Schengen-avtalen 
□ Utvidelsen østover, mai 2004 
□ Videre utvidelse (inkludert Tyrkia) 
□ Økonomisk og monetær union (euroen) 
□ Økt bruk av kvalifisert flertall 
□ EUs strukturfond 
8. Hva er dine hovedargumenter for/imot EU (og norsk EU-medlemskap)? 
9. Hvor viktig synes du det er at Norges spredte bosetting opprettholdes? 
1 2 3 4 5 
Ikke viktig i	 Litt viktig Verken viktig Ganske viktig Veldig viktig 
det hele tatt eller uviktig 
Hvis du krysset av for 4 eller 5, hvorfor er bosettingsmønsteret så viktig for deg? 
10. Hvor viktig synes du det er å ha nasjonal kontroll med naturressursene? 
1 2 3 4 5 
Ikke viktig i	 Litt viktig Verken viktig Ganske viktig Veldig viktig 
det hele tatt eller uviktig 
Hvis du krysset av for 4 eller 5, hvorfor mener du det er viktig? Er det av hovedsaklig 
økonomiske årsaker eller er det andre målsettinger som er viktig? 
Hjertelig takk for hjelpen! Januar 2010/M Sundlisæter Skinner
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Attitudes towards European integration amongst

Norwegian MPs

A survey carried out by Marianne Sundlisæter, a researcher in European Studies 
at the University of the West of England, Bristol, Great Britain 
Gender: � female � male 
Party: ___________________________________ 
Constituency: _____________________________ 
1. Do you think Norway should apply to become a member of the European Union? 
□ Yes □ No □ Undecided / No opinion 
2. Which way did you vote at the last referendum on Norwegian EU membership? 
□ Yes □ No □ Did not vote 
3. Do you think Norway will apply for EU membership before 2009? 
□ Yes □ No □ Undecided / No opinion 
4. Do you think Norway will apply for EU membership between 2009 and 2013? 
□ Yes □ No □ Undecided / No opinion 
5. Which of the following aspects of the EU do you support (if any)? Please tick all 
applicable boxes: 
□ Common Agricultural Policy 
□ Common Foreign and Security Policy 
□ Single Market 
□ EEA Agreement 
□ Schengen Agreement 
□ Enlargement, May 2004 
□ Further enlargements (including Turkey) 
□ EMU/the Euro 
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___________________________________________________________________________ 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
6. Which of the following arguments against Norwegian EU membership do you 
support? Please tick all applicable boxes: 
EU membership would… 
□ … add unnecessary bureaucracy 
□ … damage the agricultural and fisheries sectors 
□ … rob Norway of its current influential position in foreign affairs 
□ … threaten the Norwegian welfare state 
□ … threaten national sovereignty (including “selvråderetten”) 
□ … threaten Norwegian culture and heritage 
□ … threaten Norwegian regional policy and municipalities 
□ … be too expensive 
7. Which of the following arguments for Norwegian EU membership do you 
support? Please tick all applicable boxes: 
EU membership would… 
□ …help maintain good relations and peace on the continent 
□ …improve relations with Europe 
□ …enable Norway to take part in important decision-making on an EU level 
□ …give Norway the chance to join the EMU 
□ …make Norwegian firms more competitive 
□ …make Norway more influential on the world stage 
□ …boost the Norwegian economy 
□ …show Norwegian solidarity with the less developed parts of Europe 
To what extent do you agree with the following two statements: 
8. The EU is an important issue on the domestic political agenda in Norway. 
Strongly Disagree Neither agree Agree Strongly 
disagree to some extent nor disagree to some extent agree 
9. Norwegian parties and politicians downplay the issue of Europe in domestic elections. 
Strongly Disagree Neither agree Agree Strongly 
disagree to some extent nor disagree to some extent agree 
10. What are your own feelings about Norway’s future relationship with the EU? 
Thank you very much for completing the questionnaire. October, 2006/M Sundlisæter 
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______________________________________________________________________________ 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
Norwegian MPs’ Attitudes towards the EU 
Gender: □ female □ male

Party: ___________________________________________

County: ___________________________________________

1. Do you think Norway should become a member of the EU? 
□ Yes □ No	 □ No opinion 
2. What did you vote in the referendum on Norwegian EU membership in 1994? 
□ Yes □ No	 □ Did not vote 
3. What did you vote in the referendum on Norwegian EC membership in 1972? 
□ Yes □ No	 □ Did not vote 
4. When do you think the EU question will come back onto the agenda in Norway? 
5. Which five of the following best cover what you think the EU is about? 
□	 Common Foreign and Security Policy 
□	 Free trade and liberalism 
□	 Inadequate focus on the environment 
□	 Economic community 
□	 Europe of Regions 
□	 A peace project 
□	 The principle of subsidiarity 
□	 Centralization 
□	 Economic and Monetary Union 
□	 A federal Europe / a European superstate 
□	 Europe of independent states 
□	 Democratic deficit 
□	 A higher form of democratic governance 
□	 Environmental protection 
□	 Barriers to the rest of the world 
□	 EU’s structural funds 
□	 Loss of sovereignty 
□	 Bureaucracy 
□	 Other: _____________________________ 
6. Which of the following statements do you agree with the most? 
□	 The EU is a good thing, both for Europe and the world, and Norway should 
become a member. 
□	 The EU can be a good thing for other European countries, but EU membership is 
not for Norway. 
□ The EU is not a good thing for Europe, the world or Norway. 
Other comments: 
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______________________________________________________________________________ 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
7. Which of the following EU initiatives do you support? Please tick all relevant boxes: 
□ Common Agricultural Policy 
□ Common Foreign and Security Policy 
□ Single Market (the four freedoms) 
□ EEA Agreement 
□ Schengen Agreement 
□ Eastward enlargement (May 2004) 
□ Further enlargement (including Turkey) 
□ Economic and Monetary Union (the Euro) 
□ Increased use of qualified majority voting 
□ EU’s structural funds 
8. What are your main arguments for/against the EU (and Norwegian EU membership)? 
9. How important do you think it is that Norway’s dispersed settlement is maintained? 
1 2 3 4 5 
Not at all Somewhat Neither important Quite Very 
important important or unimportant important important 
If you circled 4 or 5, why is the settlement pattern so important for you? 
10. How important do you think it is to have national control over the natural resources? 
1 2 3 4 5 
Not at all Somewhat Neither important Quite Very 
important important or unimportant important important 
If you circled 4 or 5, why do you think it is important? Is it mainly because of economic 
reasons, or are there other goals which are important? 
Hjertelig takk for hjelpen! Januar 2010/M Sundlisæter Skinner
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Appendix E

Details of the Interviews and Interviewees

Amundsen, Cathrine Strindin. Interviewed in Oslo on 13 January 2010.

CP politician. Adviser for the CP’s Storting group from 2007, leader of Akershus CP

and deputy leader of Fredsinitiativet (the Peace Initiative). Previously she worked as

an Organization and Campaign Consultant in Nei til EU. She has also been

International Leader in the party’s youth wing, Senterungdommen and a member of

the managing body of Fellesutvalget for Palestina (the Joint Committee for Palestine)

for a number of terms.

Dæhlen, Tale Marte. Interviewed in Oslo on 7 January 2010.

Member of Oslo UmEU’s county board (2008-2009), member of UmEU’s central

board (2009-2010), and UmEU’s leader from January 2010 to January 2011. Currently

employed by Nei til EU.

Dørum, Odd Einar. Interviewed in Oslo on 13 January 2010.

LP politician. MP for Sør-Trøndelag between 1977-1981 and for Oslo from 1997 to

2009. Minister of Transport from 1997-1999 and Minister of Justice between 1999-

2000 in Bondevik’s first government and Minister of Justice from 2001-2005 in

Bondevik’s second government. Active in the LP since the early 1960s: elected leader

of Sør-Trøndelag LP’s youth wing, Unge Venstre, in 1962; elected leader of the youth

wing in 1970; and leader of the LP between 1982-1986 and 1992-1996.

Harsvik, Wegard. Interviewed in Oslo on 8 January 2010.

Labour Party politician. In the early 1990s he was active in the Labour Party’s youth

organization, AUF and SME. He has also been active in FoEN and Nei til EU. He was

a government adviser to the Minster for Education in the first Stoltenberg

government (2000-2001), State Secretary in the Ministry of Health and Care Services

from 2005 to 2007 and in the Ministry for Culture and Church Affairs from 2007 to

2009. Harsvik is one of the authors of the 2004 publication Et nytt nei (“A new no”).

He is the leader of the union Fagforbundet’s (Norwegian Union of Municipal and

General Employees) Labour Party branch.

Heiberg, Sigrid Zurbuchen. Interviewed in Oslo on 7 January 2010.

Leader of UmEU from February 2009 to January 2010.

Høglund, Morten. Interviewed in Oslo on 30 March 2009.

PP politician. MP for Akershus since 2001. Member of the Storting’s Standing

Committee on Foreign Affairs and Defence, Chairman of the PP’s international

committee, member of the PP’s central board.

Leirstein, Ulf. Interviewed in Oslo on 12 January 2010.
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PP politician. MP for Østfold since 2005. First deputy leader of the Storting’s

Standing Committee on Finance and Economic Affairs and member of the PP’s

central board since 2003. Declared “no” position on Norwegian EU membership.

Lunde, Per Ole. Interviewed in Vest-Torpa on 15 September 2009.

Farmer, CP member and previously active in Nei til EU.

Seierstad, Dag. Interviewed in Oslo on 18 September 2009.

EU adviser for the Storting group of the SLP. Member of the party's national board.

Active on the socialist left of Norwegian politics since 1958. Researcher for Nei til EU

1995-2003. His (Norwegian) blog can be found at: http://seierstadeu.blogspot.com/

Sæter, Odd Jostein. Interviewed in Oslo on 22 September 2010.

CDP politician. Senior adviser on foreign affairs for the CDP’s Storting group. Active

in the CDP since 1969. State Secretary at the Prime Minister’s Office 1997-2000 and

2001-2005 and State Secretary in the Ministry of Foreign Aid from 1983-1986.
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Appendix F

Complete List of Data used in the

Documentary Analysis 
Documentary data from the 1960s period Table F1 
Type of 
Document 
Manifestos 
Speeches 
Aftenposten 
items 
Author 
CDP 
CDP 
CDP 
SLP 
SLP 
SLP 
CP 
CP 
CP 
LP 
LP 
LP 
Labour 
Labour 
Labour 
Trygve Bull (Ap) 
Anon (feature 
article) 
Anon (news 
report) 
Anon (feature 
article) 
Anon (news 
report) 
Arnljot S. Svendsen 
Harald Giæver 
Title 
Utenrikspolitikk og forsvar 
Samarbeid mellom nasjonane 
Internasjonalt samarbeid -
fredsarbeid 
Handel med alle 
Handel med alle 
Utenrikspolitikk 
Næringslivet 
Internasjonalt samarbeid 
Utenriks- og forsvarsspørsmål; 
Norge og markedsspørsmålene 
Internasjonalt økonomisk 
samarbeid 
Norge og det mellomfolkelige 
økonomiske samarbeid 
Internasjonale marknadstilhøve 
Norge og verden 
Fred og samarbeid med verdens 
folk 
Vi vil ha en verden med rettferd, 
frihet og fred 
Jo større staten er, desto mindre er 
friheten 
Fellesmarkedet er farlig for 
Norge** 
EFTA må styrkes, 
sammenslutning med 
fellesmarkedet helt i det blå 
Braadland og fellesmarkedet* 
Arbeiderpartiets ledelse til 
frontalangrep mot SF i Stortinget 
Frihets-fellesskap og økonomisk 
vekst 
Har vi råd til å stå utenfor 
Fellesmarkedet? 
Date 
1961 
1965 
1969 
1961 
1965 
1969 
1961 
1965 
1969 
1961 
1965 
1969 
1961 
1965 
1969 
26 Apr 1962 
5 Nov 1960 
18 Nov 1960 
8 Sep 1961 
25 Oct 1961 
20 Nov 1961 
5 Dec 1961 
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Anon (news 
report) 
Frisch-Johansen bruker ikke 
anstendige argumenter i EEC-
saken 
8 Dec 1961 
Rolf Pedersen Professor Frisch og 
Fellesmarkedet* 
21 Dec 1961 
the 143 Opprop mot norsk medlemskap i 
Fellesmarkedet 
2 Jan 1962 
Bjørn Frisholm Hva koster det å stå utenfor EEC? 8 Jan 1962 
Alf Rolfsen Norges suverenitet 19 Jan 1962 
Alf Rolfsen Fellesskapet 26 Jan 1962 
Anon (news 
report) 
EEC kapitalistisk, sier Gunnar Bøe 2 Mar 1962 
Alette Buttingsrud Norge et politisk folkemuseum? 8 Mar 1962 
Anon (news 
report) 
Vår selvbestemmelsesrett må ikke 
bindes for alltid 
13 Apr 1962 
Anon (news 
report) 
Den politiske integrasjon er 
hovedmålet for EEC 
13 Apr 1962 
Anon (news 
report) 
Jordbrukets årstap blir 660 
millioner 
13 Apr 1962 
Anon (news 
report) 
Statsministeren i kraftig oppgjør 
med hetsmakerne* 
26 Apr 1962 
Anon (news 
report) 
Braadland insinuerer at vi ikke er 
herrer i eget hus* 
26 Apr 1962 
Anon (news 
report) 
Stor feil å tro at bare Norge har 
sosialpolitikk* 
20 Jun 1962 
Lars Roar Langslet Kan norsk kultur overleve?* 17 Oct 1962 
Lars Roar Langslet Kan norsk kultur overleve?* 18 Oct 1962 
Johan B. Hygen Fellesmarkedet og katolisismen 25 Oct 1962 
Lars Roar Langslet Professor Hygen og EEC** 29 Oct 1962 
Anon (editorial) Europa-politikk* 16 Nov 1962 
Anon (news 
report) 
Kirken kan ikke ta standpunkt til 
EEC** 
16 Nov 1962 
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* Pro-EC letter/commentary 
** Not included in the analysis due to absence of anti-EC/EU argumentation 
Table F2 Documentary data from the 1970s period 
Type of 
Document 
Author Title Date 
“No” Folkebevegelsen 
literature (Cappelen 2001) 
Olav Bergo (AUF) 
Thomas Chr. 
Wyller, professor 
Arthur Berg and 
Arne Rostad (eds.) 
Norge og EEC: Hva saken gjelder 
Argumentasjonsplan vedr. EEC 
EEC-motstand: Det vesentligste 
Vi stemte mot 
1972 
n.d. 
n.d. 
n.d. 
Sæther et al. (eds.) Hva er EEC? 1971 
Speeches Reidar T. Larsen 
(NKP) 
For folkets selvbestemmelsesrett 23 Apr 1971 
Finn Gustavsen 
(SPP) 
Nei-velger: Over til SF! 2 Mar 1973 
Aftenposten 
items 
Henrik Sødal EEC og folkemeningen 10 Jan 1970 
Johan I. Holm EEC som alternativ** 9 Feb 1970 
Odd Dahlstrøm Nordøk og nasjonal suverenitet 19 Feb 1970 
Johan I. Holm Med bind for øynene 2 Mar 1970 
Johan I. Holm Skipsfarten og EEC 6 Mar 1970 
Hans Borgen Hans Borgens EEC-beregninger 9 Mar 1970 
Johan I. Holm Selvstyrets verd 16 Mar 1970 
Sverre Tysland Politiske blokker 6 Apr 1970 
Johan I. Holm Folkesuverenitet og personlig 
frihet 
22 Apr 1970 
Johan I. Holm EEC, apropos 17. mai 6 May 1970 
Johan I. Holm EEC-medlemskap 
grunnlovsstridig 
14 May 1970 
Jørgen Vogt Norge og Fellesmarkedet 25 Jun 1970 
Johan I. Holm Ikke samarbeide, men integrasjon 19 Jun 1970 
Johan I. Holm Kystfisket og EEC 19 Aug 1970 
Arne Haugestad Virkelighet og ønsketenkning om 
vår fiskeripolitikk 
26 Aug 1970 
Kjell Magne 
Bondevik 
Ungkommunisters grunnholdning 
– og Kr.F.U.’s 
12 Sep 1970 
Marie Bjerkan-
Melsom 
Skjebnesvangert valg 14 Sep 1970 
Norges Bondelag EEC – eneste fremtid for 
jordbruket i Norge? 
23 Sep 1970 
Argus Takk for Leirfall-programmet 24 Sep 1970 
Johan I. Holm Jordbrukets fremtid i A/S Norge 
og EEC 
26 Sep 1970 
Ottar Brox EEC og bygdefolket i Norge 2 Oct 1970 
Europa-tilhenger Landbruket og EEC* 3 Oct 1970 
Norges Bondelag EEC eneste fremtid for jordbruket 
i Norge -? 
10 Oct 1970 
J.N. EEC 29 Oct 1970 
Johan I. Holm EEC og norsk konstitusjon 17 Nov 1970 
Egil Sundar EEC-motstanders strategi* 18 Nov 1970 
Odd M. Tingstad Skriftemål fra EEC-skeptiker 20 Nov 1970 
Sverre Tysland Overflod 20 Nov 1970 
Kr. Døhlie Ja og ikke (n)ja 28 Nov 1970 
Bergljot Hammer Quo Vadis, Ola? 30 Nov 1970 
F. Brøvig Dürbeck Mistenkeliggjørelse* 2 Dec 1970 
Sverre Roed Larsen Fredsrådet og EEC 2 Dec 1970 
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Renf. Assosiering eller handelsavtale 2 Dec 1970 
I. Ø. Ad EEC 3 Dec 1970 
Peder Furubotn Et spørsmål 9 Dec 1970 
Atle Zeiner Grunnloven og EEC 10 Dec 1970 
Arne Haugestad Stortingsmann Willoch og 
markedsforhandlingene 
10 Dec 1970 
Ragnar Frisch Halv-Europastaten, isolasjonisme 
og mammonisme 
10 Dec 1970 
Tom Ronnow Norge – Europa 19 Dec 1970 
Torstein Eckhoff Norges selvstendighet, EEC og 
Grunnloven 
2 Jan 1971 
Johan I. Holm Drømmen om det nye Europa 4 Jan 1971 
H. K. EEC-propaganda 6 Jan 1971 
Anon (news 
report) 
”EEC truer demokratiet”: Bratteli 
er ulogisk, hevder Ragnar 
Kalheim 
11 Jan 1971 
Ingvald Godal Hakkeloven, pressen og EEC 14 Jan 1971 
Ragnar Frisch Felle-setterne og vi andre 19 Jan 1971 
Arne Haugestad Kan vi stå utenfor EEC? 20 Jan 1971 
Johan I. Holm Vår selvstendighet og EEC 25 Jan 1971 
Alf Thon Norges selvstendighet, EEC og 
Grunnloven 
1 Feb 1971 
S. E. S. Endelig kom det da – dyret i 
åpenbaringen* 
9 Feb 1971 
Einar Adland ”Kortblanding” 15 Feb 1971 
Ludv. Jerdal Vi vil ikke bli styrt av 
”Folkebevegelsen”* 
11 Mar 1971 
E. Tollerud Fellesmarked eller ikke 20 Mar 1971 
Norvald 
Lyngstadaas 
Enda et regjeringsskifte før EEC-
saken bringes i havn 
24 Mar 1971 
Arne Haugestad EEC og økningen i 
matvareprisene 
24 Mar 1971 
Johan I. Holm Det dreier seg om Norges 
selvstendighet 
17 Apr 1971 
Rolf Roem Nielsen ”Uholdbare påstander om EEC”* 19 Apr 1971 
Berge Furre Haldbare påstander om EEC 23 Apr 1971 
Fredrik Ihlen Våre fiskerier og EEC 28 Apr 1971 
Berge Furre Bygdenæringene og Fellesskapet 23 May 1971 
Arne Haugestad EEC og hyttekjøp 26 May 1971 
Norges Bondelag Industrien og støtten til jordbruket 27 May 1971 
Iver Lo Viljen til å støtte jordbruket i fare? 2 Jun 1971 
Johan I. Holm Skipsfart og EEC 9 Jun 1971 
Erik Solheim Skoleinformasjon om EEC 15 Jun 1971 
Ivar Sekne EEC og harmoniseringen av 
utdanningspolitikken 
17 Jun 1971 
Berge Furre Fremmedarbeidere og 23 Jun 1971 
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arbeidsmarkedspolitikken innen 
EEC 
Mauritz Sundt 
Mortensen 
EEC – for stor? 25 Jun 1971 
P. B. Er EEC bare landbrukspolitikk?* 6 Jul 1971 
Tor Arnt-Jensen Senterungdommen og EEC* 14 Jul 1971 
Hans Borgen Norske skipredere og EEC 14 Jul 1971 
Alf Seeland ”Meget gjennomarbeidet”* 23 Jul 1971 
Bjørn Skundberg Eiendomsomsetning og EEC 23 Jul 1971 
Kjell Hanssen Motstandernes siste skanse* 27 Jul 1971 
Hans Borgen EEC-debatten 30 Jul 1971 
Anon (news 
report) 
”Umulig å bli EEC-tilhenger når 
naturen er så fantastisk” 
3 Aug 1971 
Per Ruud Norges sikkerhetsproblem og EEC 17 Aug 1971 
Oddmund H. 
Hammerstad 
Norges sikkerhetsproblem og 
EEC* 
19 Aug 1971 
Torstein Eckhoff Castberg og EEC 28 Aug 1971 
Birger M. Flood Prisstigningen i EEC-landene 8 Sep 1971 
Teddy Dyring Om Folkebevegelsen og 
meningsimport** 
10 Sep 1971 
E. F. Beskytt de små yrkesfiskere 11 Sep 1971 
Kari Trasti Distriktsutbyggingen i EEC-
landene 
14 Sep 1971 
Bjørn Unneberg Sp’s grønne teori 11 Oct 1971 
Einar Oygard Ikkje eit rødt øre* 20 Oct 1971 
Arne Haugestad Ansvaret for splittelse 29 Oct 1971 
Jon Leirfall Støtte til norsk korndyrking eller 
til franske bønder 
13 Nov 1971 
Atle Hagtun Willoch – Haugestad 29 Nov 1971 
Kjell Magne 
Bondevik 
Hva det ikke forhandles om 29 Nov 1971 
Torstein Eckhoff Jordbruket og EEC 29 Nov 1971 
Erik Kjøs Er formen for støtte til jordbruket 
likegyldig? 
4 Dec 1971 
Ivar Sekne En fremtid utenfor EEC 7 Dec 1971 
Torstein Eckhoff Kampen om opinionen vil avgjøre 
EEC-spørsmålet 
8 Dec 1971 
Erik Kjøs Er formen for støtte til jordbruket 
likegyldig? 
10 Dec 1971 
Sylvi Steinsvik 
Teyler 
Brevet fra Heath og 
Fellesmarkedet 
14 Dec 1971 
J. Stenseth Norsk utholdenhet og 
Fellesmarkedet 
17 Dec 1971 
Erik Kjøs Jordbrukets støtteformer 17 Dec 1971 
Kjell Magne 
Bondevik 
Ungdommen og EEC 18 Dec 1971 
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Augun Parman Hva lever Industriforbundets 
president av? 
3 Jan 1972 
Karl-Anders 
Hovden 
EEC og norsk olje 12 Jan 1972 
Borlig medlem av 
Folkebevegelsen 
Er all EEC-motstand 
kommunisme? 
12 Jan 1972 
Kjell Magne 
Bondevik 
Ungdommen og EEC 17 Jan 1972 
Erik Braadland EF-medlemskap og fredsgaranti** 28 Jan 1972 
Senterpartiets 
pressekontor 
”Senterpartiets tåkelegging” 31 Jan 1972 
Per Morten Vigtel Hva ekspertene mener om 
sosialpolitikken innen EF* 
2 Feb 1972 
Gunnar Garbo Fra 1962 til 1972 5 Feb 1972 
Arne Haugestad Spørsmålet om en statlig støtte til 
Folkebevegelsen 
8 Feb 1972 
Gutorm Gjessing ”EF og norsk isolasjonisme” 8 Feb 1972 
Torstein Eckhoff Reell garanti til Norge i 
fiskeripolitikken? 
12 Feb 1972 
Kjell Magne 
Bondevik 
Ungdom og EF 18 Feb 1972 
Jan Olav 
Brynjulfsen 
Om å kaste politiske baller 26 Feb 1972 
Eugen Aaen EF og vårt edruskapsarbeide 26 Feb 1972 
Ole J. Kobbe Den norske fisken 1 Mar 1972 
Halvor Kjellberg Et spørsmål til UD 1 Mar 1972 
Kjell Magne 
Bondevik 
Ungdommen og EF 2 Mar 1972 
Torstein Eckhoff EF-medlemskap og hyttetomter 2 Mar 1972 
Alette Buttingsrud Romatraktaten, Grunnloven og 
forurensningsspørsmålene 
3 Mar 1972 
Torstein Eckhoff EF og Norges selvstendighet 10 Mar 1972 
Birgit Hoem Kvinnene og EF 18 Mar 1972 
Oddmund H. 
Hammerstad 
Europa og vår sikkerhet* 18 Mar 1972 
Bjørn Bjøro Alkoholomsetningen og EF 22 Mar 1972 
Sven-Even W. 
Maamoen 
Midler i debatten* 7 Apr 1972 
Norvald 
Lyngstadaas 
EF og sikkerhetspolitikken 7 Apr 1972 
Anon (article) Bibel-misbruk i EF-debatten innen 
Kr.F. 
7 Apr 1972 
Iver Lo Professoren og folkevettet 10 Apr 1972 
Kjell Magne 
Bondevik 
Aftenposten og Kr. Folkepartis 
landsmøte 
12 Apr 1972 
Erling Petersen Jorbruksprivilegier enda engang 18 Apr 1972 
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Sven Sæther Selvråderetten og EF 22 Apr 1972 
Valborg Jacobsen Ja, professor Fleischer 29 Apr 1972 
Torkel Opsahl EF og ”En Verden” 4 May 1972 
Stian Sørlie Skjebnesvangert hvis Norge sier 
nei til EF? 
5 May 1972 
Leif Sletsjøe En Verden og EF 10 May 1972 
Interview with Rolf 
Hanoa 
Søkelys på motstandere II: ”EF 
skaper sosiale problemer – intet 
problem ved å stå utenfor” 
12 May 1972 
Stian Sørlie Skjebnesvangert å si Ja? 19 May 1972 
Aasmund Stokke Kommentar til ”Ja til EF” 23 May 1972 
Sigve Erland Vil vi klare en eventuell rente-
subsidiering i EF? 
24 May 1972 
Lisbeth Hårstad Ord og virkelighet 29 May 1972 
Per Ludvig 
Magnus 
Fagfolk i sosialsektoren og deres 
troverdighet* 
8 Jun 1972 
Stian Sørlie Mer om det skjebnesvangre 9 Jun 1972 
Gunnleik Seierstad Velkommen i EF! 15 Jun 1972 
Aasmund Stokke Sluttreplikk til ”JA til EF” 15 Jun 1972 
Karl Evang Forstår Benkow? 17 Jun 1972 
Einar Kringlen Fagfolk innen psykisk og sosial 
helsevern imot EF 
19 Jun 1972 
Einar Grepperud Blir vi truet? 27 Jun 1972 
Stian Sørlie Flukten inn i det store 27 Jun 1972 
Jørgen Vogt Om støl jenka m.m. 30 Jun 1972 
Erling Vårdal ”Handelsavtale gir ikke øket 
konkurransepress” 
5 Jul 1972 
Lars Korvald Wisløff og alternativet 7 Jul 1972 
Per Flatberg Legemidler og EF 10 Jul 1972 
Erik Plathe Norske forskere og EF 11 Jul 1972 
Einar Kringlen Sosiale problemer ved 
handelsavtale 
12 Jul 1972 
Alf Nordhus Outrert dilettantisme 19 Jul 1972 
E. S. Debatten om jordbruket 19 Jul 1972 
Hans Skoie EF’s forskningspolitikk 20 Jul 1972 
Arne Østli ”EF-medlemskap øker våre 
elevers problem” 
21 Jul 1972 
Tor E. Henriksen Ja til USA? 24 Jul 1972 
Erling Vårdal Handelsavtale og konkurransen 25 Jul 1972 
Alf Nordhus Mitt ”dårlige” selskap 29 Jul 1972 
Alf Rabe Vi som er i dårlig selskap 31 Jul 1972 
Per M. Arnstad Et bedrag 3 Aug 1972 
Aase Kristoffersen EF og forbrukerne 5 Aug 1972 
Rolf Hanoa Mork-utvalgets innstillinger 5 Aug 1972 
Asbjørn Dahl ”Snevre og kortsiktige interesser” 9 Aug 1972 
Erik Kjøs Jordbruket og EF 9 Aug 1972 
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Egil Werner 
Erichsen 
Omkring EF-agitasjonen* 12 Aug 1972 
Kjell Magne 
Bondevik 
EF, union og ungdom 16 Aug 1972 
Terje Tollefsen Norge og EF 18 Aug 1972 
A. M. Bjelke Nei og ja 25 Aug 1972 
Hans Skoie EF og forskningspolitikken 25 Aug 1972 
Alf Nordhus ”Dom er ikke avsagt” 26 Aug 1972 
Torstein Eckhoff Handelsavtale som alternativ 29 Aug 1972 
Ivar Aars Var Garborg EF-tilhengjar? 8 Sep 1972 
Karl Evang EF-motstander, uansett 11 Sep 1972 
Edvard Beyer Enten eller 13 Sep 1972 
Stian Sørlie To spørsmål til professor Fleischer 16 Sep 1972 
Johanne Beck Kort sagt 16 Sep 1972 
Eyv. Fjeld 
Halvorsen et al. 
Om et akademisk opprop* 18 Sep 1972 
Birgit Wiig Efter Lullings besøk 18 Sep 1972 
Stian Sørlie Inngang og utgang 18 Sep 1972 
Bastiansen, Beyer 
and Waler 
Forskere mot EF 18 Sep 1972 
Anders Aune Prisen: lavere levestandard* 20 Sep 1972 
Arne Haugestad ”Nye skremsler” i Aftenposten 21 Sep 1972 
Odd Austveg Kr.F.U.-propaganda vekker 
forferdelse* 
21 Sep 1972 
Kjell Hanssen Unneberg-planen for lavere lønn* 22 Sep 1972 
Alf Nordhus Forstemmende, hr. Rolfsen 22 Sep 1972 
Erik Roed Nasjonalromantisk psykose* 2 Oct 1972 
Willy Laumann-
Olsen 
Jeg er flau på innsenderens vegne 20 Oct 1972 
Hans Borgen Norske matvare-priser ved ulike 
EF-ordninger 
15 Dec 1972 
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* Pro-EC letter/commentary 
** Not included in the analysis due to absence of anti-EC/EU argumentation 
Table F3 Documentary data from the 1980s period 
Type of 
Document 
Author Title Date 
Manifestos SLP 
SLP 
SLP 
SLP 
CP 
Forsvars- og utenrikspolitikk 
Internasjonal solidaritet og 
fredsarbeid 
Fredsarbeid og internasjonal 
solidaritet 
Avspenning og samarbeid i 
Europa 
Norge og Europa; Forsvars- og 
sikkerhetspolitikk; Naturressurser 
1973 
1977 
1981 
1985 
1973 
og samfunnsplanlegging 
CP Norge i det internasjonale 
samfunn; Forsvars- og 
sikkerhetspolitikk 
1977 
CP Norge i det internasjonale 
samfunn 
1981 
CP Norge og Europa 1985 
CDP Internasjonalt samarbeid; 
Samarbeid i Norden 
1973 
CDP Internasjonalt samarbeid 1977 
CDP Internasjonalt samarbeid 1981 
CDP Internasjonalt samarbeid 1985 
LP Innleiing; Vårt forhold til andre 
land 
1973 
LP Økonomisk og handelspolitisk 
samarbeid 
1977 
LP Samarbeidet med andre 
industriland; Avspenning og 
nedrustning 
1981 
LP Samarbeidet med andre 
industriland; Europa 
1985 
PP [No mention of Europe] 1973 
PP Norge og EF 1977 
PP [No mention of Europe] 1981 
PP [No mention of Europe] 1985 
Labour En verden i samarbeid 1973 
Labour Noreg og verda 1977 
Labour Norge og Europa; Norge og 
Norden 
1981 
Labour Ansvar for fred og rettferdighet 1985 
Aftenposten 
items 
Anon (news 
report) 
Sp.-sekretær med omfattende 
avhandling om Nordøk: 
Mellomakt i en europeisk pause** 
17 Mar 1980 
Hugo Sandberg ”Norge inn i EF?” 1 Apr 1980 
Grethe Værnø Europas fremtid – ingen 
entydighet og klare tendenser** 
22 Jul 1980 
Anon (news 
report) 
Betenkelig med Frydenlund i UD, 
ifølge Haugestad: Ånden fra EF-
kampen levende** 
18 Sep 1980 
Anon (news 
report) 
Unge Venstre: Brudd med EF, ut 
av NATO 
22 Sep 1980 
Arne Haugestad Nei til EF – og forhåndslagring 24 Sep 1980 
Terje Hagen Unge Venstre og frihandel 27 Oct 1980 
Gerhard G. 
Johannessen 
“Pengesøl over alle grenser i EF” 2 Jan 1981 
Anon (news Fru Brundtland om EF idag: 5 May 1981 
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report) ”Vanskelig å si ja eller nei”** 
Grethe Værnø Efterlyst: Aktiv Europa-politikk** 13 Aug 1981 
Martin Sæter Europa som styrt prosess – ingen 
nøytralisme** 
24 Aug 1981 
Karin A. 
Johannessen 
Nye toner fra SV** 4 Sep 1981 
Anon (news 
report) 
Sp. inn for debatt om Europa** 29 Jan 1986 
Halfdan Hegtun Viktig dag også for Norge** 26 Feb 1986 
Anon (news 
report) 
SV ber om åpen Europa-debatt** 24 Mar 1986 
Lars Holm-Hansen Sosialist for EF** 15 Apr 1986 
Johan I. Holm Suverenitet ikke noe som skiller 13 May 1986 
Arve Lønnum Norge, Norden og EF 28 May 1986 
Anon (news 
report) 
Bondelagsårsmøtet: EF-debatt 
blusset opp** 
19 Jun 1986 
Johan I. Holm Menneskerettighetene er evige og 
uforanderlige 
24 Jun 1986 
Nils Valla Vi må ta ny EF-debatt! 28 Jun 1986 
Johan I. Holm Prisen for norsk EF-medlemskap 29 Jul 1986 
J. V. Norge og EF 12 Aug 1986 
Johan I. Holm Integrasjon i praksis? 3 Sep 1986 
Johan I. Holm Markedsproblem og suverenitet 8 Sep 1986 
Johan I. Holm Fedrelandsløse teknokrater 19 Sep 1986 
Johan I. Holm En uklar drøm om “Det nye 
Europa” 
26 Nov 1986 
** Excluded from the analysis due to absence of anti-EC/EU argumentation 
Table F4 Documentary data from the 1990s period 
Type of 
Document 
Author Title Date 
Manifestos SLP Aksjoner og folkelig mobilisering; 
Hvordan følger vi opp seieren i 
folkeavstemninga om EF?; EFs 
indre marked; Næringspolitikk; 
SVs landbrukspolitikk; 
Fiskeripolitikk; Nei til EF-
medlemskap; Økt nordisk 
samarbeid 
1989 
SLP SV sier nei til EF-medlemskap 
CP Hovudsaker i perioden; 
Folkestyre og desentralisering 
1989 
CP Norge i det internasjonale 
samfunnet; Hovedsaker i perioden 
1993 
CDP Samarbeid over landegrensene 1989 
CDP Norden og Europa 1993 
395 
LP Utfordringene i Europa 1989 
LP Folkeavstemninger; En tryggere 
verden; Nei til norsk EF-
medlemskap; Ja til EØS; Et 
forpliktende nordisk samarbeid 
1993 
PP Norge og Europa 1989 
PP Norge og Europa 1993 
Labour Fred, rettferd, bærekraftig 
utvikling 
1989 
Labour Den europeiske utviklingen; 
Norge i Norden – Norden i 
Europa; Åpent Europa 
1993 
SME 
literature 
SME Press release from SME’s national 
conference 9 and 10 April 1994 
(Kallset 2009: 265-6) 
10 Apr 1994 
LO The LO Congress’ resolution on 
the EU issue (Kallset 2009: 267-75) 
22 Sep 1994 
Kjell-Erik Kallset 
and Jo Heinum 
Det visjonære nei (Oslo: AUF) 1991 
Rita Ottervik, 
Snorre Wikstrøm 
and Wegard 
Harsvik (eds.) 
Sosialdemokratisk alternativ 
(SALT) (Trondheim: AUF) 
1992 
Speeches Anne Enger 
Lahnstein (CP) 
Vår visjon for Europa 1 May 1991 
Anne Enger 
Lahnstein (CP) 
EØS-avtalen 29 Jun 1991 
Anne Enger 
Lahnstein (CP) 
EØS-avtalen er vedtatt 17 Oct 1992 
Anne Enger 
Lahnstein (CP) 
EF og norsk sikkerhet 25 Jan 1993 
Anne Enger 
Lahnstein (CP) 
Nasjonal selvråderett 29 Jan 1993 
Anne Enger 
Lahnstein (CP) 
Norge og fremtidens Europa – 
samarbeid og sikkerhet 
15 Feb 1993 
Anne Enger 
Lahnstein (CP) 
Seiren ved Stortingsvalget 16 Oct 1993 
Anne Enger 
Lahnstein (CP) 
Senterpartiet i 1994 12 Jan 1994 
Anne Enger 
Lahnstein (CP) 
Forhandlingene om EU-
medlemskap 
12 Mar 1994 
Anne Enger 
Lahnstein (CP) 
Stem nei! (Sluttappell i 
partilederdebatt om EU) 
25 Nov 1994 
Erik Solheim (SLP) Stem nei! (Sluttappell i 
partilederdebatt om EU) 
25 Nov 1994 
Other ”no” Anne Enger EF og grunnloven (Oslo: 1993 
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literature Lahnstein (CP) Senterpartiets hovedorganisasjon) 
Berge Furre (SLP) Nei til EU (Oslo: Gyldendal) 1994 
Aftenposten 
items 
Siri Frost Sterri Kvinnene vil ikke tape i EF* 3 Jan 1992 
Geir Salvesen Dyret er på banen i pinlig Europa-
debatt* 
10 Jan 1992 
Gisle Hollekim 
(article) 
Endetiden, Dyret og EF... 12 Jan 1992 
Nils Morten 
Udgaard 
Med de intellektuelle som 
anførere: Norge på vei bort fra 
Europa** 
18 Jan 1992 
Else Skjønsberg Kvinners forhold til EF 7 Feb 1992 
Aslak Bonde (news 
report) 
EF-kampen skjerpes** 14 Feb 1992 
Aslak Bonde (news 
report) 
På Hitra er alle redde for EF 15 Feb 1992 
Einar Solvoll 
(Interview with 
Ole Abel Sveen) 
EF – 1972 og i dag: Enda sikrere i 
sin motstand 
21 Feb 1992 
Ulf Andenæs 
(article) 
EF-striden den gang og nå: Strid 
mellom utkant og sentrum** 
22 Feb 1992 
Aslak Bonde (news 
report) 
Vern om hver tøddel av landet! 22 Feb 1992 
Einar Solvoll 
(Interview with 
Asbjørn Aarnes) 
EF – 1972 og i dag: Skifter fra ja til 
nei 
26 Feb 1992 
Else Skjønsberg Fakta om kvinner og EF 2 Mar 1992 
John H. Hammer Utkant og sentrum 2 Mar 1992 
Einar Solvoll 
(Interview with 
Odd Børretzen) 
EF – 1972 og i dag: Sakte men 
sikkert fra ja til nei 
3 Mar 1992 
Yngvar Senstad Frykten for Stor-Germania 17 Mar 1992 
Trygve Monsen 
(news report) 
Ap.: Sårene fra 1972 er lukket: 
Åpent marked for EF-debatt 
21 Mar 1992 
Torstein Eckhoff Galt om distriktspolitikk 25 Mar 1992 
Kristian Mosvold 
Larsen 
Ellemann-Jensens vekstsyn 30 Mar 1992 
Olav Garfors Norden eller EF? 30 Mar 1992 
Einar Solvoll 
(Interview with 
Thomas Chr. 
Wyller) 
EF – 1972 og i dag: Bekymret for 
miljøvernet 
1 Apr 1992 
Pelle Christensen Union i arenaen 5 Apr 1992 
Bente E. Engesland 
(news report) 
EF-union skjerper frontene 7 Apr 1992 
Per Chr. Sæbø Legemidler og EØS 7 Apr 1992 
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Arne Næss Tap av norsk selvstendighet 8 Apr 1992 
Else Skjønsberg EF i høy grad en kvinnesak 13 Apr 1992 
Einar Vetvik Prisipp som forsvinner 22 Apr 1992 
Vox populi’ Verdier i EF 28 Apr 1992 
Johan I. Holm De store rår over de små 4 May 1992 
Bente E. Engesland 
(news report) 
Vesterålsfiskere frykter 
spanjolene: ”Ka farsken ska vi i 
EF?” 
23 May 1992 
Bente E. Engesland 
(news report) 
EF et antihumant system 2 Jun 1992 
Kåre Gjønnes EØS som et varig alternativ** 2 Jun 1992 
Christian Moe Miljø-følgene 2 Jun 1992 
Morten Malmø 
(Interview with 
Bernt Aardal) 
Argumentene som styrker nei-
siden** 
5 Jun 1992 
Haakon Stang Norden hva nå? 16 Jun 1992 
Torstein Eckhoff Avtalen er ikke påkrevet 27 Jul 1992 
Aina Edelmann Vet vi nok om EØS-avtalen? 7 Sep 1992 
Erik Rakoczy Næringsliv mer enn NHO 15 Sep 1992 
Per Magnar 
Arnstad 
Norden med særavtale til EF 22 Sep 1992 
Hilde Harbo 
(article) 
Tema: 20 år siden 
folkeavstemningen: Dengang nei 
25 Sep 1992 
Carl I. Hagen Nei-siden hjelpes av Gro/Kaci** 28 Sep 1992 
Arne Borgir Unionsvirvar 28 Sep 1992 
Guro Fjellanger Fire felles friheter: Nei til EØS 7 Oct 1992 
Georg Blichfeldt EF med snabel i ”smutthullet” 8 Oct 1992 
Dag Hareide Felles forurensning og felles 
miljøvern: Nei til EØS 
9 Oct 1992 
Øyvind Østberg Biskoper og EØS 9 Oct 1992 
Arent M. 
Henriksen 
Norske fiskere sier nei til EØS: Nei 
til EØS 
14 Oct 1992 
Fredrik S. 
Heffermehl 
EØS blir et tungt ansvar 16 Oct 1992 
Odd Einar Dørum Godtar Norge Maastricht? 16 Nov 1992 
Aslak Bonde and 
Hilde Harbo (news 
report) 
Historisk ja til EF-søknad** 20 Nov 1992 
Quotes: Erik 
Solheim and Anne 
Enger Lahnstein 
Sagt i EF-debatten 20 Nov 1992 
Eirik Ramberg 
(news report) 
Stortingsvalg om EF neste år** 28 Nov 1992 
Elise Hubert Europeisk føderasjon 1 Dec 1992 
Olav B. Brusdal EF-unionen 5 Dec 1992 
Arne Bergholt Union og norsk EF-medlemskap 9 Jan 1993 
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Fridtjof Frank 
Gundersen 
Må Norge godta Maastricht?** 5 Feb 1993 
Torstein Eckhoff Mulighetene for nordisk 
innflytelse 
10 Feb 1993 
Ann Merete F. 
Gjedtjernet 
Skogbruket og EF 22 Feb 1993 
Kåre Lidsheim Tredveårskrigen om Fellesskapet 1 Mar 1993 
Anon (article) Dette mener motstanderne 25 Mar 1993 
Jan Valand Overganger 15 Apr 1993 
Per Christensen Norsk kultur og EF 16 Apr 1993 
Jørn Magdahl Ulogisk om Maastricht 22 Apr 1993 
Guro Fjellanger Fraskriver seg ansvar 22 Apr 1993 
Aslak Bonde (news 
report) 
Sirkelen sluttet for Hagen i EF-
saken** 
26 Apr 1993 
Hege 
Ragnhildstveit 
Lavt debattnivå 28 Apr 1993 
Knut Henning 
Thygesen 
Miljøpolitikk i et for snevert lys 10 May 1993 
Jostein Laugaland Alkoholen i EF 15 Jul 1993 
Anette Louise 
Strøm 
Demokratisk kontroll 8 Aug 1993 
Gerd von der 
Lippe 
Kjempesprekk i grunnmuren 18 Aug 1993 
Aslak Bonde 
(Interview with 
Anne E. Lahnstein) 
Ja til et bastant EF-nei** 20 Aug 1993 
Geir Lundestad Hvorfor er vi så skeptiske til EF? 30 Aug 1993 
Hilde Harbo and 
Aslak Bonde 
(Interview with 
Odd Einar Dørum) 
Lavere marginalskatt** 31 Aug 1993 
Aslak Bonde 
(Interview with 
Erik Solheim) 
Gir mest økonomisk vekst 2 Sep 1993 
Margaret Eide 
Hillestad 
Ap har lagt på lokket 13 Sep 1993 
Berit Østbye Norske verdier og identitet 16 Oct 1993 
Heidi Borud (news 
report) 
Frykter større forskjeller i EF 28 Oct 1993 
Aslak Bonde (news 
report) 
SME er ingen fraksjonsgruppe** 28 Oct 1993 
G. K. Et styrket Europa? 28 Oct 1993 
Ole Henrik Nissen-
Lie (Interview with 
Aksel Breian) 
Nei til EF og innvandring 31 Oct 1993 
Ivar Wessel Nasjonalisme 31 Oct 1993 
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Olav Garfors Mot sin hensikt 5 Nov 1993 
Trygve Monsen 
(Interview with 
Hallvard Bakke) 
Taler partitoppen midt imot 7 Nov 1993 
Grethe Haldorsen Hvilken EF-debatt? 8 Nov 1993 
Senior USA-hets 8 Nov 1993 
Fredrik S. 
Heffermehl 
Usikkert hva EF vil bety 18 Nov 1993 
Bergljot Andersen Dristig i EF-saken 24 Nov 1993 
Fredrik S. 
Heffermehl 
Intet alternativ til EF? 15 Dec 1993 
Kjell Eide Base- og atompolitikken 23 Dec 1993 
Fredrik S. 
Heffermehl 
EF og demokrati 6 Jan 1994 
Kjell Eide Base- og atompolitikken 12 Jan 1994 
Fredrik S. 
Heffermehl 
Stortinget på sidelinjen 26 Jan 1994 
Ole Nygaard 
(Interview with 
Ottar Brox) 
Frykter nye klasseskiller 30 Jan 1994 
Erik Bye Selv en EU-strid kan føres 
renhårig 
15 Feb 1994 
Sylvi Steinsvik 
Teyler 
Et tannløst EØS-forum 16 Feb 1994 
Per Olaf 
Lundteigen 
Kampen for et annerledes Norge 1 Mar 1994 
Harold S. Bidmead EU-brosjyre 2 Mar 1994 
Steinar Alsos Viktig gruppe uteglemt 3 Mar 1994 
Knut Rellsmo Debatten om EU** 11 Mar 1994 
Morten Lund Øyangens mål for matproduksjon 12 Mar 1994 
Fredrik S. 
Heffermehl 
Uteblitt debatt? 13 Mar 1994 
Geir Salvesen 
(news report) 
Argumentene fra 1972 slipes** 17 Mar 1994 
O. KJ. Hotellpris 21 Mar 1994 
Ingerid E. 
Wergeland 
Fatale unionsforsøk 24 Mar 1994 
Knut Okkenhaug Kanskje vinden snur? 30 Mar 1994 
Geir Lundestad EU og norsk identitet** 5 Apr 1994 
Odd Einar Dørum Ja-folk i Venstre** 5 Apr 1994 
Else Hübert Jaglands optimisme 11 Apr 1994 
Peter Ørebech Statsrådens umulige konklusjon 14 Apr 1994 
Per Christensen Man er lokalpatriot 18 Apr 1994 
Rolf Holth Barkebrød eller EU? 18 Apr 1994 
Andreas 
Heffermehl 
Utmeldelse** 20 Apr 1994 
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Peter Ørebech Eiendomsrett 21 Apr 1994 
Rolf Enge Dyrehelse i Norge 22 Apr 1994 
Tore Sanner Tobakk-industrien er vinneren** 22 Apr 1994 
Dag Hareide Brundtlands vekstromantikk II 24 Apr 1994 
Agnar Jørgensen Bestemmer selv 24 Apr 1994 
Geir Salvesen and 
Hilde Harbo (news 
report) 
EU-debatt med harde fronter 27 Apr 1994 
Odd Inge Skjæves-
land (news report) 
Styrket nei-standpunkt på 
galleriet 
27 Apr 1994 
Leif Syljuåsen EU vårt verdivalg? 27 Apr 1994 
Christian Bors Lind Uklokt av Befring** 28 Apr 1994 
Berge Furre Kva er den viktigaste EU-
debatten? 
30 Apr 1994 
Eivind Flatmo Ekteskapet og EU** 3 May 1994 
Johan I. Holm På tide at Grunnloven trekkes inn 4 May 1994 
Tore Thonstad Brundtland tar feil 4 May 1994 
M. Ø. Europa-unionen 4 May 1994 
Ingrid E. 
Wergeland 
Risikofaktor eller fredsgarantist? 7 May 1994 
Heidi Borud 
(Interview with 
Hallvard Bakke) 
Ap.s steile EU-mot-Bakke 8 May 1994 
Erling Indreeide Om midlar til politisk aktivitet 9 May 1994 
Jon Fixdal Råd fra en EU-tviler 9 May 1994 
Berge Furre Demokratisk underskot i EU? 10 May 1994 
Sigurd Stein Røed Galtung I 10 May 1994 
Rolf Thue Ubetinget forrang 13 May 1994 
Bernt Hagtvet Bare bjerkeløv og folkestyre?** 16 May 1994 
Berge Furre For seint å angra i 1996 19 May 1994 
Berner Grunnloven 19 May 1994 
Helge Jordhøy Statsråd uten mål og mening 21 May 1994 
Olav B. Brusdal Fellesskapet en stadig prosess 2 Jun 1994 
Amund 
Wormstrand 
Overkjørt faginstans 2 Jun 1994 
William M. 
Lafferty 
Politisk anstendighet 5 Jun 1994 
Odd Inge Skjæves-
land (Interview 
with Jon Eikemo) 
Eikemo har bestemt seg: - Nei til 
EU, veit eg 
7 Jun 1994 
Berge Furre EU og folkestyrets framtid 11 Jun 1994 
Else Øyen Statsministerens paradoks 12 Jun 1994 
Ludvik M. Rådalen Var en tviler 16 Jun 1994 
Helen Bjørnøy Kvinner og EU 19 Jun 1994 
Arnljot Moseng Helhetlig ideologi 20 Jun 1994 
Ottar Brox Haaland Matlarys argumenter 21 Jun 1994 
401 
Anne Sofie Lægran EU og utdannelse 23 Jun 1994 
Fredrik S. 
Heffermehl 
EU demokratisk? 27 Jun 1994 
Rolf Utgård Svartmaling av EU? 27 Jun 1994 
Inger Bartnes Folkestyre 29 Jun 1994 
Berge Furre Det brune kortet 1 Jul 1994 
Andreas 
Heffermehl 
EU og maktfordeling 1 Jul 1994 
Else Skjønsberg Statsministerens påstander 3 Jul 1994 
Thomas Chr. 
Wyller 
Demokrati-underskuddet i 
Europa-unionen 
4 Jul 1994 
Kjell Eide Trussel mot fredsprosessen 6 Jul 1994 
Steinulf Tungesvik Send ut Maastricht! 7 Jul 1994 
Anne Sofie Lægran Studentutveksling** 7 Jul 1994 
Elise Hübert EU og vår suverenitet 18 Jul 1994 
Baard Borge Øst-Europa i EU? 22 Jul 1994 
Dagfinn Drabløs Bøndene og EU 22 Jul 1994 
Berge Furre Den europeiske union – eit 
fredsrike? 
23 Jul 1994 
Anne Sofie Lægran Udemokratisk 23 Jul 1994 
Elise Hübert Felles tiltak for miljøet? 25 Jul 1994 
Gunnar Dalen Øyangens manglende 
troverdighet 
28 Jul 1994 
Thomas Chr. 
Wyller 
Utfordringen til ja-siden 29 Jul 1994 
Lars Birkelund Berges selvskryt 29 Jul 1994 
Hans Ebbing Hemmelige EU-vedtak mot 
Norge? 
30 Jul 1994 
Olav Flatjord Dårlig sak** 31 Jul 1994 
Terje Johansen Bernanders syn på demokratiet 2 Aug 1994 
Lars Velsand En fornærmelse 2 Aug 1994 
Elise Hübert Unionen som fredsbevarer 3 Aug 1994 
Tor Guttu Langsiktig vernearbeid** 5 Aug 1994 
Gunnar K. Wentzel Billig 6 Aug 1994 
Joan Tindale Saklighet? 9 Aug 1994 
Berge Furre Solidaritet og sjanse 10 Aug 1994 
Kjell Sørensen EU og Norge 10 Aug 1994 
Roger Jan Støyva Miljøsaker i EU 10 Aug 1994 
Alf Schønhardt De fagorganisertes rettigheter 11 Aug 1994 
Elise Hübert Økologisk ubalanse 11 Aug 1994 
Bjørn Stordrange Fortsatt strid om eneretten 12 Aug 1994 
Frode M. 
Lindtvedt 
Ja-sidens EU- og EØS-bløff 13 Aug 1994 
Terje Johansen Norge står på egne ben 14 Aug 1994 
Joan Tindale EU og demokrati 15 Aug 1994 
Marit Arnstad Internasjonal solidaritet 16 Aug 1994 
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Hans Ebbing Hemmelige vedtak 17 Aug 1994 
Ola Vaagan Slåtten Petersen på bærtur 17 Aug 1994 
Bjørn Sivertsen Forbausende 17 Aug 1994 
Berge Furre Fred og framtid for Europa 18 Aug 1994 
Gunnar Dalen EU og landbruk 18 Aug 1994 
O. KJ. Freden i Europa 18 Aug 1994 
Atle Faye Verneverdig minoritetsspråk i 
EU? 
20 Aug 1994 
E. A. Det norske jordbruket 22 Aug 1994 
Norvald 
Lyngstadaas 
Norge er en flankestat** 23 Aug 1994 
Trygve Monsen 
(news report) 
Fiskerne nordpå ga Lahnstein 
støtte... mens foredlere i vest 
ønsker ja 
25 Aug 1994 
Magne Botnen Fri flyt av narkotika? 25 Aug 1994 
Ragnhild S. 
Folgero 
Tar direktør Jan Solberg ogsa feil? 27 Aug 1994 
Trygve K. Norman 
and Kåre Olerud 
Plass til ja-folk også! 28 Aug 1994 
Geir Salvesen 
(news report) 
Møter nei-siden i Høyre** 30 Aug 1994 
Bård Idås (news 
report) 
Klar nei-røst fra 
tørrfiskmillionærene 
30 Aug 1994 
Odd Løschbrandt Uvillige medlemmer 30 Aug 1994 
Terje Johansen Ingen blankofullmakt til eliten 1 Sep 1994 
Anders Evang Fugelli har rett 2 Sep 1994 
Erlend Lous Legalisering en trussel mot Norge 3 Sep 1994 
Berge Furre Dersom Sverige røystar Ja til 
Unionen 
3 Sep 1994 
Interview with Erik 
Solheim 
Solheim tviholder på sitt nei 4 Sep 1994 
Globetrotter Danmarks særpreg 5 Sep 1994 
Rolf Utgård Møte med virkeligheten 6 Sep 1994 
Arne Struksnæs Omstilling er utopi 6 Sep 1994 
Hallvard Hegna Skjebnevalg 7 Sep 1994 
Aina Edelmann Den endelige løsning? 9 Sep 1994 
Erik Rakoczy Tollettelser har liten betydning 13 Sep 1994 
Lars Hellberg Åpen strid om EU også i KrF** 14 Sep 1994 
Svenn Korseth Skuffende av Clemet 14 Sep 1994 
Berge Furre Tryggingsordning for heile 
Europa 
15 Sep 1994 
Bjørn Eidsvig Medlemskap gir færre muligheter 15 Sep 1994 
Gudmund Restad Kortene må legges på bordet 15 Sep 1994 
Jørgen Sørensen Kosmo tar feil 15 Sep 1994 
Yngve Ruud Lærerlaget er slett ikke upolitisk 19 Sep 1994 
Elisabeth Eide Sminket EU-mat? 19 Sep 1994 
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Bjarne Tveiten Verre for samfunnstaparane 20 Sep 1994 
Eivind Harry 
Wulfsberg 
Frykten for det kjente 20 Sep 1994 
Erik Kjøs Folkeopplysning 20 Sep 1994 
Peter Angelsen Ingen varige unntak for Norge 22 Sep 1994 
Johan I. Holm Sveits velger frihandel 22 Sep 1994 
Heidi Borud 
(article) 
Det demokratiske dilemma i Den 
europeiske union** 
27 Sep 1994 
Kristin Halvorsen EU og matpriser 27 Sep 1994 
Jon Hareide 
Aarbakke 
Absurd å gi EU æren 29 Sep 1994 
Margaret Eide 
Hillestad 
Ja-sidener grepet av panikk 29 Sep 1994 
Lars Birkelund Tenk selv! 3 Oct 1994 
Skattebetaler i 60 år U-hjelpen fra Norge 3 Oct 1994 
Elisabeth Dale Demokrati i EU? 3 Oct 1994 
Svein Eng Uriktig om norsk selvbestemmelse 7 Oct 1994 
Rolf Utgård La EØS få virke 7 Oct 1994 
Svein Halbjørhus Kva skal ein bonde gjere? 7 Oct 1994 
Tore Thonstad Norges muligheter 10 Oct 1994 
Bjørn Eidsvig Store faremomenter 11 Oct 1994 
Erling Moe Gi tvilen et pustehull 11 Oct 1994 
Per Olaf 
Lundteigen 
Uendret norsk rett? 12 Oct 1994 
Bård Idås (news 
report) 
Høyresiden organiserer 
motstanden 
14 Oct 1994 
Mone Sæland Forvirring i matbutikken 14 Oct 1994 
Bjørn Strøm Effektivitet kontra legitimitet 15 Oct 1994 
Berge Furre EU og dei folkelege interessene 15 Oct 1994 
Hans Ebbing Hemmelige journaler 17 Oct 1994 
Knut Utstein 
Kloster 
Alt for Norge! 17 Oct 1994 
Lars Birkelund Nærhetsprinsipp? 17 Oct 1994 
John Dale Styre av folket, ved folket, for 
folket 
19 Oct 1994 
Anne Elisabet Bye 
Nielsen 
”Særgrupper” 20 Oct 1994 
Trygve Bauer-
Nilsen 
Næringsmiddelindustrien og EU 21 Oct 1994 
Heidi Borud (news 
report) 
- Norsk landbruk er best på miljø! 23 Oct 1994 
Sigmund Vangsnes Atomopprydning 24 Oct 1994 
Ola Skjåk Bræk Høye bølger i fiskeridebatten 24 Oct 1994 
Lars Birkelund Medlemskap i EU 24 Oct 1994 
Rolla Ap og EU 24 Oct 1994 
Heidi Borud Den demokratiske dragkampen 25 Oct 1994 
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(article) 
Erik Solheim Den demokratiske dragkampen: 
NEI 
25 Oct 1994 
Nils Aarsæther Pinlig å være norsk? 26 Oct 1994 
Roger Jan Støyva EU trugar sosialdemokratiet 26 Oct 1994 
Tore Ruud Uvederheftig 27 Oct 1994 
Peter Ørebech Grunnloven hindrer? 27 Oct 1994 
Per Thorsdalen EU-motstandens moralske 
idealisme** 
27 Oct 1994 
Thomas Mediaas 
Wagle 
Ap’s virkelighet 27 Oct 1994 
Helge Jordhøy Farlig for dyr og folk 27 Oct 1994 
Dag Hareide Ikke stygt kallenavn 28 Oct 1994 
Svein Eng Tap av selvbestemmelse 30 Oct 1994 
Johan Mathis 
Klemetsen 
Vi vil klare oss 31 Oct 1994 
Thor Edquist Vanskelig for ja-siden 31 Oct 1994 
Ole Kopreitan Fremtidig atomstrategi 1 Nov 1994 
Anniken Dulin Makten overføres til Brussel 1 Nov 1994 
Torbjørn Almlid Øyangen, hva skal vi si? 1 Nov 1994 
Peder Aasen Union eller samarbeide? 1 Nov 1994 
Bjørn Wichstrøm Virkningen på demokratiets kår 2 Nov 1994 
Thorbjørn 
Andersen 
Hva mener NHO? 2 Nov 1994 
Kvinnefrontere Nei-sidens fremgang 2 Nov 1994 
K. Bj. Nei-valg og lojalitet 2 Nov 1994 
Gunnar Øi Vi over 60 stemmer nei! 3 Nov 1994 
Steinulf Tungesvik Skuebrød 3 Nov 1994 
Per Olaf 
Lundteigen 
En EU-revolusjon i norsk rett? 4 Nov 1994 
Erik Damman EU-spørsmålet som verdivalg 7 Nov 1994 
Lasse Schriwer Med lov skal landet bygges, ikke 
med ulov ødes 
7 Nov 1994 
Charlotte Persen Samen: Stolt, sterk, sta 7 Nov 1994 
Rolf Vossgård Det europeiske huset 7 Nov 1994 
Randi Alsnes Tenk på eit tal 7 Nov 1994 
I. K. Bønder og fiskere 7 Nov 1994 
Espe Hvem er fienden? 7 Nov 1994 
Heidi Sørensen Myhre tar feil 8 Nov 1994 
Thomas Johansen EU og atomkraft 8 Nov 1994 
Ole Mathismoen 
(article) 
Politikerne er EUs miljøproblem** 9 Nov 1994 
Heidi Sørensen Politikerne er EUs miljøproblem: 
NEI 
9 Nov 1994 
Ingvild Haugan 
Størkersen 
EU er imot de forsvarsløse 9 Nov 1994 
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Finn Jacobsen Økonomisk vekst 9 Nov 1994 
Stein Undset Skremmeskudd 10 Nov 1994 
Kari Vangsnes Likestilling ikke lettere 10 Nov 1994 
Marius Nygaard Marked med autopilot 11 Nov 1994 
Anders Skonhoft 
and Atle Kjærvik 
Norge – de velbeslåttes 
veidemark? 
11 Nov 1994 
Erik Kjøs Blå øyne kontra egeninteressen** 11 Nov 1994 
Adolph Denis 
Horn 
Ikke nok penger? 11 Nov 1994 
Torunn Berg Faar lov av EU 14 Nov 1994 
Magne Botnen Grunn til bekymring 14 Nov 1994 
O. H. Tyskland og EU 14 Nov 1994 
Terje Gustavsen 
(article) 
Det forunderlige nei-landet 15 Nov 1994 
O. Anker Hagen Hva med Norges tolltap? 15 Nov 1994 
Svein Lund Folkeflertall omgått** 15 Nov 1994 
Torolf Nordbø Underlig samarbeid 15 Nov 1994 
Ivar Bakke Overlever folk i EU? 15 Nov 1994 
Edvin Helgheim ”Norge er endelig på rett vei” 15 Nov 1994 
Helge Skaranger EU øker problemet 15 Nov 1994 
Ole Hoel Norge og råderetten 15 Nov 1994 
Demokrat Demokrati? 15 Nov 1994 
Robert Solvang EU en fare for demokratiet? 16 Nov 1994 
Per Olaf 
Lundteigen 
Herre i eget hus 16 Nov 1994 
Eilef A. Meland Renten må være et politisk 
virkemiddel 
16 Nov 1994 
Anne Paus Høyre og EU 16 Nov 1994 
Lars Birkelund Mangler avfeies 16 Nov 1994 
Odd Inge Skjæves-
land (news report) 
- Unionen truer velferdsstaten 17 Nov 1994 
Rudi Kessel Brussels lobbyisme 17 Nov 1994 
Aslak Bonde (news 
report) 
Nesten alle fylker sa nei i 
skolevalg** 
18 Nov 1994 
Yngvar Senstad Et sentralt argument 18 Nov 1994 
Egil Roed 17.mai-feiring i Unionen 18 Nov 1994 
K. E. Arntsen Når melk blir industriprodukt 18 Nov 1994 
Jose J. Gonzalez NHO fant ”De vises sten” 18 Nov 1994 
Torunn Berg Fra ja til rungende nei 18 Nov 1994 
Dag Hareide EURATOM og fisk 19 Nov 1994 
Henrik Width 
(article) 
Ja i fornuften, nei i hjertet** 19 Nov 1994 
Tore Thonstad Løse gjetninger om vekst 20 Nov 1994 
Robert Solvang Overgrep mot Utkant-Norge 20 Nov 1994 
Øystein Flack Norge og Vestunionen 21 Nov 1994 
Ove S. Berntsen Et møte i døren 21 Nov 1994 
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R. Røysum EU-valget 21 Nov 1994 
Globetrotter Sveitserne og EU 21 Nov 1994 
Kjell Magne 
Bondevik 
Innsnevret Europabegrep 22 Nov 1994 
Sigrid Haavik Plakatpropaganda 22 Nov 1994 
Erling Mysen Holder bananen mål? 22 Nov 1994 
Einar Grannes EU – et kremmerlaug 22 Nov 1994 
Hans Høydahl EU ikke føre var** 22 Nov 1994 
Einar G. Aksnes Grunnlov endret av nød 22 Nov 1994 
Jostein Lindland Løses ikke av EU 22 Nov 1994 
Hanna Kvanmo Medlemskap og velferd 23 Nov 1994 
Jostein Laugaland Ja-forstand 23 Nov 1994 
Stein Mehren Stem for Europa – mot EU 23 Nov 1994 
Adolph Denis 
Horn 
Hvem går baklengs inn i 
fremtiden? 
23 Nov 1994 
Jostein Laugaland Kriminelt ja-argument 23 Nov 1994 
Dagfinn Ystad Noreg skal endre EU 23 Nov 1994 
Gudrun Kolderup Sterkest alene 23 Nov 1994 
Per Olaf 
Lundteigen 
Syvmilssteg mot integrering 24 Nov 1994 
Mons Lie Norge, EU og FN 24 Nov 1994 
Kjell Magne 
Bondevik 
Én stemme i FN som EU-medlem? 24 Nov 1994 
Amund Venger Sterkt beklagelig 25 Nov 1994 
Hermann Nielsen Bruk av atomvåpen 25 Nov 1994 
Morten Lund Dårlig kamuflert EU-agn 25 Nov 1994 
Nils Rød Unngå kostbare dumheter 25 Nov 1994 
Gerd Kringlen Viktig minus ved unionen 25 Nov 1994 
Leif Osvold Nordmenn er ikke europeere 25 Nov 1994 
Trond Bjarneson 
Prytz 
La det bli en utfordring 25 Nov 1994 
Carl August 
Fleischer 
”Juristkulturer” og EU** 26 Nov 1994 
Berge Furre På tampen av det lange EU-
ordskiftet 
26 Nov 1994 
Margaret Eide 
Hillestad 
EU, bønder og Oslo 27 Nov 1994 
Didrik Seip Annerledeslandet 28 Nov 1994 
Morten Fjeld Makt og styring i EU 28 Nov 1994 
Svein I. Jensen Selv Delors tviler 28 Nov 1994 
Steinar Alsos EU ingen hjelp på Kola 28 Nov 1994 
Anna Harrieth 
Hustad 
Takk til nei-folk i 1972 28 Nov 1994 
Aasmund Willers-
rud (news report) 
Pressen: Et spesielt folk** 30 Nov 1994 
Rolf Larsåsen Vårt EU-standpunkt 1 Dec 1994 
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Erik Sæther Noe midt i mellom** 5 Dec 1994 
Amunda Mot EU-strømmen 6 Dec 1994 
Kåre Willoch Hvorfor kom vi ikke med i EU?** 7 Dec 1994 
Olive Moen Monsens husmannsånd 12 Dec 1994 
Brit Salbu, Knut 
Hove and Rolf 
Arnt Olsen 
Norsk nei til atomberedskap?** 13 Dec 1994 
Erik Gjems-Onstad Husmannsånd og EU-avstemning 13 Dec 1994 
Atle Hagtun Glitrende av Monsen 13 Dec 1994 
Adolph Denis 
Horn 
Ressursmoral 13 Dec 1994 
Solveig Sæther 
Kjus 
Husmannen i Norge 13 Dec 1994 
Knut E. Andersen Filosofisk om nei/ja 15 Dec 1994 
Kvinnelig Høyre-
velger 
Et fall fra pidestall 15 Dec 1994 
Carol Aall Vi som stemte nei 16 Dec 1994 
Ola Bergheim Priviligerte og bortskjemte? 20 Dec 1994 
Magne A. Eek Et grønnere landbruk** 21 Dec 1994 
Reidar Rasch Husmenn og husbondsfolk 23 Dec 1994 
Inger Marie 
Solberg 
Vi vil oss et land 23 Dec 1994 
Haakon Nord Vår fremmedpolitikk må endres** 29 Dec 1994 
Manifestos SLP 
SLP 
SLP 
SLP 
CP 
CP 
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* Pro-EC letter/commentary 
** Not included in the analysis due to absence of anti-EC/EU argumentation 
Table F5 Documentary data from the post-1994 period 
Type of 
Document 
Author Title Date 
Folkemakt mot pengemakt; EU 
Forbrukarane har rett til trygg 
mat; Fiske; Fred og sikkerhet; EUs 
forsvarssamarbeid; EU og EØS 
For solidaritet; SVs alternativ – ti 
forslag til ny kurs; Ei grønn 
framtid; Et humant arbeidsliv 
Samarbeidet i Europa 
Vilkår for styring; Forskning; 
Sikkerhetspolitikk; Norge og 
Europa 
Frihetssamfunnet; 
Forskjellssamfunnet; Folkestyrt 
utvikling; internasjonal 
kriminalitet; Olje og gass; 
Forskning; Ta hele Norge i bruk!; 
Forsvar, sikkerhet og beredskap; 
1997 
2001 
2005 
2009 
1997 
2001 
Norden og Baltikum; Den 
Europeiske Union; EØS 
CP Senterpartiets verdigrunnlag; Vi 
vil noe med Norge; Norge i det 
internasjonale samfunn 
2005 
CP Samarbeid mellom likeverdige 
stater 
2009 
CDP Norden og Europa 1997 
CDP Fredsarbeid og nye 
sikkerhetspolitiske utfordringer 
2001 
CDP Næringsliv og næringsutvikling; 
Distriktspolitikk; Skatte- og 
avgiftspolitikk; Utenrikspolitikk; 
Norges forhold til Den Europeiske 
Union; Norden og nærområdene; 
Europas ”yttergrenser”; Forsvaret 
2005 
CDP Norges forhold til EU 2009 
LP Ja til Europa – nei til EU-
medlemskap 
1997 
LP Aktiv Europapolitikk; Forsvars-
og sikkerhetspolitikk for en ny tid 
2001 
LP Tilgang på arbeidskraft – økt 
arbeidsinnvandring; Tettere 
regionalt samarbeid i Europa 
2005 
LP Europa 2009 
PP Norge og Europa 1997 
PP Norge og Europa 2001 
PP Norge og Europa 2005 
PP Norge og Europa 2009 
Labour Globalt fellesskap 1997 
Labour Mer demokrati 2001 
Labour Det globaliserte samfunn: 
fordeling og styring 
2005 
Labour Europa og EU 2009 
Other party 
literature 
John Inge Løvdal 
(ed.) (CDP) 
Norge og EU: Et studieopplegg 
om Norge, EU og EØS (Oslo: KrF) 
2004 
Stortinget (2008) Debatt om utenriksministerens 
redegjørelse om viktige EU- og 
EØS-saker i løpet av inneværende 
halvår 
24 Apr 2008 
Speeches Kristen Nygaard 
(NtEU) 
Politisk hovedinnledning 27 May 1995 
Heming Olaussen 
(NtEU) 
Hilsen fra Nei til EU 19-22 Mar 
2009 
Knut Vollebæk 
(CDP) 
Redegjørelse om Regjeringens 
Europa-politikk, med hovedvekt 
19 Jan 1999 
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på forholdet til EU 
Elite 
survey data 
Author’s survey A 12 qualitative responses to 
question 10 
Nov/Dec 
2006 
Author’s 2010 
survey 
30 qualitative reponses to question 
8 
Jan/Feb 
2010 
Nei til EU 
literature 
Nei til EU Organisasjonshåndbok Sep 2006 
Nei til EU (2009b) Standpunkt: Stortingsvalg 2009 – 
Valginformasjon Oppland 
2009 
Nei til EU Fire grunner til å si nei til EU Jun 2010 
Morten Harper and 
Inge Matland (eds.) 
EU-guiden: Verden er større enn 
EU 
Jul 2010 
Argument 
books 
Oen et al. Hei verden! Et solidarisk og 
internasjonalt nei til EU (Oslo: 
AUF) 
2000 
Moen et al. Et nytt nei (Oslo: Spartacus) 2004 
Ottar Brox Hvorfor nei? (Oslo: Nei til EU) 2004 
Aftenposten 
items 
Knut Elgsaas Norge og sikkerhetspolitikken 10 Jan 2000 
Maria K. Lyngstad Sveits uten husmannskontrakt 27 May 2000 
Ivan Kristoffersen Hva er Jaglands norske EU-visjon? 13 Jun 2000 
Frank Bjerkholt Toten i oss og utenfor** 27 Jul 2000 
Odd Oskarsen ”Hemmelig” EU-bok 26 Aug 2000 
Marius Vahl Nye spørsmål for ny EU-debatt i 
Norge* 
5 Sep 2000 
Anne Brinch 
Skaara 
Stortingsvalg = EU-valg! 2 Oct 2000 
Siri Teige Mat med EU-sminke 30 Oct 2000 
Ivan Kristoffersen EU i norsk debatt 11 Jan 2002 
Fridtjof Frank 
Gundersen 
På vei mot Europas forente stater 12 Feb 2002 
Kåre Valebrokk Folkesjelen i kikkerten* 10 Mar 2002 
Finn Lied Langsiktig ressursforvaltning 16 Mar 2002 
Ivan Kristoffersen Meningssuget fra Island 23 Mar 2002 
Margaret Eide 
Hillestad 
Island taper på EU-medlemskap 21 Apr 2002 
Fridtjof Frank 
Gundersen 
Menneskerettigheter i EU-
grunnlov 
13 Sep 2002 
Noralv Veggeland Demokratiet skrumper inn 16 Sep 2002 
Andreas Selliaas Derfor skal vi bry oss om EU(*) 19 Sep 2002 
Gisle Hannemyr EU-direktiv betyre redaktøransvar 
for nettverter 
14 Oct 2002 
Daniel Liseth Sveitsisk EU-avtale bedre enn 
EØS 
29 Oct 2002 
Kai Leitemo and 
Erling Steigum 
Euro ingen god løsning 31 Oct 2002 
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Ottar Brox „Europas mørkeste krefter“ 16 Dec 2002 
Sigurd Teige Mange hindre for fiskernes ja til 
EU 
17 Dec 2002 
Dag Leonardsen 
and Jon Helge 
Lesjø 
Ble vi så nasjonalistiske etter OL i 
94? 
23 Feb 2004 
Morten Høglund EU trenger en liberal utfordring 3 Mar 2004 
Ole J. Kobbe Erna Solbergs EU-møter 10 Mar 2004 
Alfred Kvalheim Åslaug Haga og EU* 11 Mar 2004 
Sigurd Teige Fiskerinæringens krav til EU-
landene 
15 Mar 2004 
Ragnar Kvam Jr. Et tredje nei? 16 Mar 2004 
Ottar Brox Er det nok med 50,1 prosent i en 
folkeavstemning? 
17 Mar 2004 
Halle Jørn Hanssen Livsfjerne påstander om u-land og 
norske bønder 
20 Mar 2004 
Åslaug Haga EU svekker velferden 24 Mar 2004 
Christian Tybring-
Gjedde 
Folket skal avgjøre EU-spørsmålet 30 Mar 2004 
Lars Birkelund Intellektuelt underskudd i 
Europa-bevegelsen 
15 Apr 2004 
Fridtjof Frank 
Gundersen 
EU skritt for skritt mot en 
statsdannelse 
18 Apr 2004 
Christian Tybring-
Gjedde 
Høyres EU-diktat 23 Apr 2004 
Peter Ørebech EU – en stat? 26 Apr 2004 
Fridtjof Frank 
Gundersen 
EU og nasjonalstatene 21 Jun 2004 
Fridtjof Frank 
Gundersen 
EU-grunnloven – bare en ny 
Roma-traktat 
29 Jun 2004 
Steinulf Tungesvik Bitter EU-tilhengjar** 11 Jul 2004 
Ole Anton 
Smedshaug 
Mer demokrati med EUs nye 
grunnlov? 
20 Jul 2004 
Jon Kvalbein EU og Norge 27 Jul 2004 
Ottar Brox Hvis industrien får kloa i 
fiskekvotene 
4 Aug 2004 
Bjørn Remseth Liux er et seriøst alternativ 20 Aug 2004 
Fridtjof Frank 
Gundersen 
Norge forsvarspolitisk haleheng 
til EU 
2 Oct 2004 
Leif-Andre 
Trøhaugen 
EU er neppe interessert i Bøler 13 Oct 2004 
Leif-Andre 
Trøhaugen 
Nok tilhengere av EU som det er? 21 Oct 2004 
Fridtjof Frank 
Gundersen 
EU-parlamentet tilsidesetter 
nasjonen 
30 Oct 2004 
Dagfinn Høybråten Vårt nei til EU er nyansert 11 Nov 2004 
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Steinar Bastesen Hvem skal norske EU-soldater dø 
for? 
20 Nov 2004 
Jacob Børresen Skal Norge delta i Forsvaret for 
EU? 
25 Nov 2004 
Arve Thorvik Europa har endra seg – igjen** 28 Nov 2004 
Jacob Børresen Norge mellom EU og USA 2 Dec 2004 
Jahn Otto Johansen Vi er oss selv nok* 23 Dec 2004 
Anon (editorial) Forbrukerne skal ha beskyttelse 3 Mar 2009 
Kristin Clemet EU er på dagsordenen* 7 May 2009 
Erling Folkvord Vil Ap ha dyrere og dårligere 
post? 
8 Jul 2009 
Runar Iversen Norge inn i EU nå!** 22 Jul 2009 
Bård Hoksrud SV og Sp godtar overvåking 19 Oct 2009 
Snorre Valen and 
Hallgeir H. 
Langeland 
Frp – både for og mot datalagring? 26 Oct 2009 
Heming Olaussen Svabøs sleivspark 4 Dec 2009 
Niels Chr. 
Geelmuyden 
Juksemakernes jubeltid 8 Dec 2009 
Hallgeir Langeland Ingen post på lørdag 13 Dec 2009 
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Approach:

Unit of analysis: 
Double coding: 
Sampling: 
Test on sample: 
Consistency checks:

Appendix G 
The Coding Protocol 
Directed qualitative content analysis (Hsieh and Shannon 
2005): 
- The initial coding starts with a theory, but themes are 
allowed to emerge during data analysis. 
- An initial list of coding categories is generated from the 
theory, but this can be modified during the course of the 
analysis as new themes emerge (Miles and Huberman 1994) 
- A word or a group of words that can be coded under one 
category. 
- A text chunk of any size, representative of a single 
theme/category (i.e. a single word, a sentence, a paragraph or 
an entire document). 
- The categories are not expected to be mutually exclusive or 
exhaustive 
- A unit of text can be assigned to more than one category 
simultaneously. 
- Nevertheless, the defined categories should be as 
homogeneous as possible internally, and as heterogeneous as 
possible externally (Lincoln and Guba 1985). 
- Probability sampling, as the research is deductive, aimed at 
testing hypotheses and address research questions generated 
from theories and previous empirical research. 
N.B. Approach changed to purposive sampling post-1960s 
because of lack of data. 
- 50 readers letters. 
- Doubts and problems about definitions of categories, coding, 
rules or categorisation of specific cases to be resolved 
- Some changes made: stopped coding democracy arguments 
to PoM; decision to code left-wing argumentation to PoM; 
redefined the rural identity category into RS; decision to 
double-code natural resources and employment 
argumentation to UT and PoM; to distinguish between PoM 
and EX, superiority has to be expressed; national sovereignty 
argumentation is coded to GH. 
- Interpretations checked against raw data 
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- Consistency checks in the coder’s understanding of the 
categories and coding rules over time carried out by regularly 
referring back to the coding protocol 
Category definitions:- Main categories and sub-categories created 
- Theory-based formulations of definitions, examples and rules 
for the individual categories 
- Detailed definitions/properties of the categories 
- Distinctions between categories defined where needed 
(coding rules) 
- Examples to be added to the scheme in the subjects’ own 
language as it appears in the texts (prototypical text passages) 
Table G1 Coding scheme 
CATEGORY THEMES DEFINITION 
Utilitarian - Egocentric Theory: Euroscepticism is the result of negative 
(UT) - Sociotropic assessments of personal and/or national economic 
- Employment benefits from EU entry 
- Natural 
resources ­ Covers sociotropic or egocentric 
- Play down economic interest, such as concern for 
disadvantages national economic growth, national 
business interest or loss of personal 
economic benefits (e.g. subsidies, job, 
higher prices) 
N.B. Concern for employment and/or 
redistribution might also be coded to PoM if 
there is also expression of egalitarian values 
(PoM) 
Postmaterialist - Rejection of Theory: Eurosceptics oppose the EU because its 
(PoM) materialist preoccupation with economic growth is a barrier to 
thinking pursuing postmaterialist goals. 
- Morality 
- Environment ­ Covers arguments driven by non-
- Equality material goals and values, such as self-
- External expression, morality and quality of life. 
solidarity 
- Internal N.B.1 Democracy should only be coded to 
solidarity PoM when it is couched in clear 
- Peacefulness/ postmaterialist terms, unrelated to 
anti-war Norway’s history and traditions 
- Human Rights 
- Quality of life/ N.B.2 Left-wing/anti-capitalist/liberalist 
focus on people sentiments (e.g. workers’ interests and 
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- Idealism 
- Anti-liberalism 
rights, redistribution of wealth, state 
control, full employment AND anti-
capitalism) can be coded to PoM due to its 
preference for egalitarianism and social 
equalization as opposed to economic profit 
(although it should be treated with caution) 
Exceptionalist 
(EX) 
Superior form of 
society 
- Environment 
- Egalitarianism 
- External/ 
internal solidarity 
- more peaceful 
Theory: The EU is opposed because it entails an 
erosion of the Nordic superior form of society. 
Exceptionalism is the superior value-mix 
underpinning the welfare state (and social 
democracy): 
1) prominence of the value of solidarity 
­ welfare state built on the principles of 
universalism and decommodification – 
­ regional policy 
­ foreign policy 
2) internationalist progressivism348 
­ ethically (not interest) driven activism 
above and beyond the average, e.g. 
peace keeping, high ODA, conflict 
management, migration hospitality 
­ positive model of the internationalist 
sovereign state 
3) egalitarian values 
4) environmentalism high standards 
N.B. Superiority has to be implied or stated, or 
it should be coded to PoM. 
Right-Wing/ 
Economic 
Liberalism 
(RW) 
- Anti-regulation 
- Anti-transfers 
- EU criticized for 
being 
protectionist/ 
socialist 
Theory: Eurosceptics do not want membership 
because the EU has become a protectionist and 
socialist machinery. 
­ Covers right-wing ideological thinking, 
such as concerns for an open, free 
market (e.g. anti-regulation, anti-social 
policy/transfers) 
National 
Identity (NI) 
- Strong national 
attachment/ 
national pride 
- Hostility 
towards other 
cultures 
- Perceived 
cultural threat 
Theory: Euroscepticism is a result of concerns about 
threats to the national identity and/or hostility 
towards other cultures. 
­ Expression of concern for the national 
identity 
1) Expression of intense feeling toward 
one’s country 
Striving for better societal and governmental conditions. 
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- Exclusive 
national identity 
- Anti-
Europeanization 
of culture 
- EU/Norway = 
different/ 
incompatible 
cultures 
2) Antipathy/hostility towards other 
cultures (stemming from nationalistic 
attachment) 
3) Exclusive national identity 
4)Perceived cultural threat: fear of other 
identities and culture encroaching on the 
dominant culture of the nation (loss of 
national identity and culture) 
N.B. If political/historical resistance to 
Europeanisation (political system, e.g. self-
determination, form of democracy), then it 
is coded to GH 
Rural Society 
(RS) 
- Settlement 
pattern 
- peripheries’/ 
rural interests 
- regional policy 
- protect nature 
- agriculture 
- fisheries 
- rural traditions 
- romanticism 
Theory: Norwegians have a strong attachment to 
the countryside and the rural way of life. 
Norwegians are Eurosceptic because of the threat 
the EU poses to rural/peripheral Norway. 
­ Covers concern for keeping rural 
Norway as it is, i.e. wanting to protect 
the primary industries, the regional 
policy, the settlement pattern, the local 
communities, rural traditions, nature 
and countryside. 
Geo-historical 
(GH) 
- independence 
- democracy 
- bureaucracy 
- elite rule 
- technocracy 
- history/ previous 
battles 
- periphery’s 
strong tradition 
Theory: Opposition to EU entry is caused by the 
individual’s ties to the historical Norwegian nation, 
and thus the idea of self-determination. 
Covers argumentation which 
­ deals with the issue of self-
determination, whether on the 
individual (democracy) or nation 
(sovereignty/independence) level 
­ draws parallels to past foreign rule and 
the fighting Norwegian nation/ the 
people’s struggle for independence 
­ uses historical images of “self”/”the 
other” 
- people/bureaucracy 
- people/state 
- open/closed 
­ casts the battle as between the elites and 
the people 
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Appendix H

Methodology: Regression Analysis

Data 
Because the EU issue was not a live political issue in the 1995-2010 period and 
conducting statistical tests on a data set from this period would not give any strong 
indications about how people would vote following a new debate in the future, the 
study uses data sets from heightened periods of Norwegian Euroscepticism. For the 
regression analysis, the 1994 referendum survey is used, but descriptive statistics 
from both the referendum surveys are also included to supplement the analysis. 
Using data from 1994 (i.e. data from the latest period of heightened Euroscepticism) 
maximizes the study’s generalizability to a future membership debate. At the same 
time, it seems reasonable to assume that findings from statistical tests on the 1994 
referendum survey can be extended to public attitudes in any of the periods under 
study (1961-2010) considering the continuity in the voting patterns between the first 
and the second referenda and the consistency in the Eurosceptic public discourse 
across the five decades. 
Another reason why the 1994 referendum study data set was chosen for the research 
is availability and accessibility. Few surveys have been conducted on nationally 
representative samples probing public opinion on the EU and other political 
attitudes outside the context of the two referenda,349 so the choice was destined to be 
limited. Even the 1972 referendum survey, although providing an extensive 
collection of data, does not provide indicators for all the kinds of attitudes needed 
for the research, which is yet another reason why the 1994 survey was the best 
choice. 
The data sets were kindly supplied by the Norsk Samfunnsvitenskapelige Datatjeneste 
(NSD), but collection and preparation of the data were originally carried out by SSB. 
349 One exception is the survey (conducted by MMI for the employers’ organization NHO) Hagen and 
Sverdrup’s (2003) study is based on. 
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There are clear benefits in using data collected by an experienced and trusted agency 
like SSB, as they are committed to producing reliable and nationally representative 
data sets. Besides, in 1994, the agency had the benefit of being able to make use of the 
experience of having conducted an EU survey once before. The data for the 1994 
referendum study were collected between August and December 1994 according to a 
national two-step random selection sampling procedure. In total, 4,891 respondents 
between 18 and 80 years of age were interviewed with a structured questionnaire, 
and of these, 700 were from municipalities with less than 2,000 inhabitants.350 The net 
selection was 3,353 respondents (NSD 2010a, b). The data was collected in three 
stages: first structured interviews were conducted in late August/early September, 
second phone interviews were carried out some time during the campaign (with the 
respondents who had a phone); and third, phone interviews or questionnaires were 
completed after the referendum (Jenssen and Valen 1995). The data were supplied to 
the researcher in an SPSS format. 
Regression: Methodological Considerations 
The aim of the research was to ascertain what effect different independent variables 
(measuring concern for VCR) had on the dependent variable (Euroscepticism) while 
controlling for effect from other variables (measuring utilitarian considerations, 
national identity, left/right self-placement, gender etc.). In effect, the choice of 
regression analysis as an analytic tool was straight-forward. However, in the 
literature on EU support, a variety of different regression methods are used. Some 
use the method of Ordinary Least Squares (OLS), while others use the maximum 
likelihood method (ML). For example, Gabel (1998b) and McLaren (2002) use linear 
regression (OLS) with a dependent variable constructed from two questions with 
ordered categorical responses, while Anderson and Reichert (1996) use OLS with a 
three-point scale dependent variable. Carey (2002), on the other hand, uses an 
ordered logit model, and in a different study, Gabel (1998c) uses ordered probit 
regression. Linear regression is based on the assumption that the variables included 
the analysis are truly continuous (not categorical), and therefore, it carries a 
350 The latter were weighted to avoid bias in the data material. 
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weakness when applied to the study of EU support/Euroscepticism, where responses 
are ordered according to artificial scales. The ML method is more appropriate when 
the dependent variable consists of a few ordered categorical responses. However, 
because the dependent variable used in the study is a 12 point scale measure of EU 
attitudes, as opposed to the dichotomous variable “what did you vote?” used in 
previous studies, linear regression was used in the study.351 The primary aim of the 
regression analysis was to take stock of the unique effects of independent variables 
on the dependent variable; i.e. not to seek maximisation of the explained variance in 
the two models. 
Dependent Variable 
The survey question “what did you vote in the referendum” provided the basis for 
the dependent variable in the study. 49.2 and 50.8 percent of respondents in the 
survey voted “yes” and “no” to membership in the referendum respectively (N = 
2,427). As discussed in section 2.1 of Chapter Two, support or opposition to the EU is 
more than merely a “yes” or “no” to EU membership. 
Figure H1 Attitudes to the EU (1 pro-EU, 8 anti-EU) 
0 
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300 
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Source: 1994 Referendum Study dataset 
351 The range for the dependent variable is wider than in the above­mentioned studies, and thus, it is 
arguably acceptable to use OLS. 
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This becomes evident when also taking into account how easy or hard people found 
it to decide what to vote in the referendum; the eight point EU attitude scale showed 
in Figure H1 is constructed on the basis of respondents’ yes/no vote and how easy or 
hard they found the decision.352 
Figure H1 shows that the convinced voters on either side of the yes/no divide made 
up the largest groups in 1994. However, it also shows that a large number of voters, 
almost 6 out of 10 voters, did not view the issue in black and white terms. 
Furthermore, if one disregards ease of decision and takes a look at voters’ 
preferences on Norway’s form of affiliation353 into account instead (combined with 
the yes/no vote), then it becomes clear that the groups at the polar opposites of the 
scale are in fact more marginal than the eight point scale suggests (see Figure H2). 
Figure H2 Attitudes to the EU (1 Europhile, 6 EU-rejectionist) 
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Source: 1994 Referendum Study dataset 
352 1 = yes and very easy; 4 = yes and very difficult; 5 = no and very difficult; 8 = no and very easy. 
The question asked: “In the political debate, there are different proposals on Norway’s future 
relationship with the EU. Which of the proposals are most congruent with your opinion? 1. Norway 
should not be a member of the EU, and the EEA agreement ought to be terminated. 2. Norway should 
not be a member of the EU, but should keep the EEA agreement. 3. Norway should be a member of the 
EU, but decline cooperation in selected areas such as defence and a common currency. 4. Norway 
should be a member of the EU in accordance with the negotiated agreement between Norway and the 
EU’s member states. 5. Norway should be a member of the EU and contribute to a merging of the 
EU’s member states to a united states of Europe. 
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’These two computed variables were combined to form the dependent variable in the 
regression analysis to ensure that the variable captured not only respondents’ 
support or opposition to membership, but to the idea of European integration in 
general. In order to make the dependent variable as close to a continuous variable as 
possible, the eight and six point scales above were summated to create one 12 point 
EU attitude variable. To confirm that the 12 point scale is a meaningful measurement 
of respondents’ attitudes toward the EU and a suitable dependent variable for the 
analysis, the relationship between respondents’ preference on affiliation and their 
referendum vote as well as their location on the 8 point attitude scale were 
examined. 
Table H1 Correlation matrix for indicators of EU attitudes 
Spearman s Correlation Coefficients 
What did you 
vote? 
Preference on 
affiliation 
EU attitude 
8 scale 
EU attitude 
12 scale 
What did you vote? 
(N) 
-
2530 
.751 
2302 
.876 
2526 
.868 
2299 
Preference on 
affiliation (N) 
.751 
2302 
-
2690 
.775 
2299 
.881 
2299 
EU attitude 
8 scale (N) 
.876 
2526 
.775 
2299 
-
2527 
.976 
2299 
EU attitude 
6 scale (N) 
.876 
2302 
.970 
2302 
.849 
2299 
.928 
2299 
EU attitude 
12 scale (N) 
.868 
2299 
.881 
2299 
.976 
2299 
-
2299 
All correlations are significant at the .001 level. 
Source: 1994 Referendum Study dataset 
The high correlation coefficients displayed in Table H1 indicate not only that, as 
expected, there is great consistency between how people voted in the referendum 
and their preference on affiliation, but more importantly that the eight point scale 
(vote and ease of decision) is a meaningful measure of attitudes, as it correlates even 
higher with affiliation preference (.775) than vote alone does (.751). The correlation 
coefficients for the 12 point scale are naturally all high, as they are based on three of 
the other variables, but they nevertheless confirm that the 12 point scale is a suitable 
measurement of EU support/opposition. 
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Hypotheses and Independent Variables 
The independent variables were constructed according to the theoretical framework 
used throughout the thesis, namely VCRUNI, so that these theories could be tested 
statistically. First, the political culture theory posits that Norwegian citizens oppose 
EU membership because of the threat it poses to national sovereignty and 
independence, out of a deep-seated aversion to foreign rule and out of concerns 
about its damaging effects on Norwegian folkestyre, i.e. the average citizen’s ability to 
decide the country’s future. From this, hypotheses one, two and three were derived 
(see Table 8.7 in Chapter Eight).354 To test the hypotheses, two survey items asking 
the respondents to what degree they thought loss of sovereignty and “the average 
Norwegian’s loss of influence” were very good, good, neither good nor bad, bad or 
very bad arguments against membership355 were used, in addition to one asking 
them to rate on a scale from 0 to 10 to what extent they thought it to be “positive or 
negative if the EU develops into a federal state, a kind of United States of Europe”. 
The variables Sovereignty and Folkestyre retained the 1 to 5 scale (l = low concern) and 
Federal Europe the 0 to 10 scale (0 = positive, 10 = negative). 
Second, the political values theory holds that people with postmaterialist values, 
such as concern for the environment, equality and morality, are less supportive of 
European integration because the EU’s number one priority is economic growth, and 
as a result, it poses a threat to these values. Based on the availability of suitable 
proxies for postmaterialist values in the 1994 data set, Hypothesis four, five, six and 
seven were put forward for testing (see Table 8.7). An “environmentalism” variable 
was constructed by combining the responses to two survey items, that is, agreement 
with the statements “[we should] go in for an environmentally-friendly society even 
354 Each of the hypotheses in the study could alternatively be formulated according to the following 
format: “As a citizen’s [concern for national sovereignty] increases, so does his/her level of 
Euroscepticism”. 
355 Note that all the survey questions are translated from Norwegian into English by the author. The 
question asked: “In the ongoing debate, a multitude of arguments have been mentioned for and against 
becoming members of the EU. We have collected some of them. For every argument I read, I will ask 
you to tell me if you think it is a very good argument, good argument, neither good nor bad argument, 
bad argument, or very bad argument. ‘Membership of the EU will entail a surrendering of national 
sovereignty’. ’The power machinery in Brussels is so remote that the average Norwegian will lose 
influence over the administration [of the country] if we enter the EU.’” 
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if it entails low or no economic growth” and “the environmental demands ought to 
be lowered with the economic situation Norway is in today”.356 “Environmentalism” 
ranged from 1 (low) to 9 (high). For gender equality, the survey question “would 
you say that gender equality ought to go further, has gone far enough or has gone 
too far?” was used, based on a scale from 1 (too far) to 3 (go further). On aversion to 
income equality, the question used asked for agreement or disagreement to the 
following statement: “To encourage individuals to work harder, we should accept 
higher income differences than we do today.”357 For this indicator, the 1 to 5 scale of 
agreement was retained, signifying low to high opposition to income inequality. To 
test the external solidarity hypothesis, a question asking to what extent the 
respondent thought reducing development aid was a good proposal was used.358 The 
scale ranged from 1 (low concern for external solidarity) to 5 (high concern). 
Another category treated under the political values heading in the documentary 
analysis was anti-neo-liberalism, because these arguments argued against the EU’s 
adherence to neo-liberal economic thinking, that is, its priority of economic growth 
over other matters, such as egalitarianism and quality of life. This testable hypothesis 
of this sub-category took the form of Hypothesis eight (see Table 8.7). H8 was tested 
by using an anti-neo-liberalism indicator which was constructed by combining the 
answers to three questions about people’s opinions on the size of the public sector, 
priority of economic growth and productivity and control with multinationals,359 
ranging from 1 (low anti-neo-liberalist score) to 13 (high anti-neo-liberalist score). 
356 The first question was preceded by the following: “I will now read a few proposals for you that 
many think ought to be carried through in Norway. Can you for each proposal tell me if you think it is 
a very good proposal, fairly good proposal, neither good nor bad proposal, fairly bad proposal or very 
bad proposal”, and the second by “We will now be dealing with quite a few opinions which people 
commonly express: Can you for each claim I read to you tell me if you agree entirely, agree somewhat, 
both agree and disagree, disagree somewhat or disagree entirely.” 
357 The question asked: “We will now be dealing with quite a few opinions which people commonly 
express: Can you for each claim I read to you tell me if you agree entirely, agree somewhat, both agree 
and disagree, disagree somewhat or disagree entirely.” 
358 This question took the same format as the first environmentalism question. 
Level of agreement (1 to 5) with the proposals “reduce the public sector”, “we should go for a 
society with high economic growth and productivity” and the statement “we need stricter control with 
the multinational corporations’ activities in Norway”. 
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The rural society theory posits that voters are opposed to EU membership because of 
the damaging effect it would have on Norway’s decentralized societal structure. EU 
membership would derail the Norwegian agricultural sector and threaten the 
survival of traditional coastal fishing communities and as a result, put pressure on 
the dispersed settlement pattern, which is an extremely central feature of Norway in 
historical, political, cultural and economic terms. At the centre of this lies a concern 
for rural/peripheral Norway, the districts, and it was hypothesized in H9 and H10 
(see Table 8.7). 
To measure districts concern, the answers to four survey items were combined to 
form one indicator. The respondents were asked about their level of agreement with 
the following four statements: “The many small municipalities in this country have 
to be merged to make the administration more effective”, “it is only fair that income 
levels are higher in the cities than in the districts”, “it is the rootlessness in the cities 
which creates social problems and drug abuse” and “the politicians and the 
bureaucrats in Oslo understand little of what goes on in rural Norway”,360 and the 
indicator took the form of a 1 (low districts concern) to 17 (high) scale. To test H10, 
the survey question asking respondents to evaluate the effects of membership on 
different policy areas or sectors was used,361 specifically the “agriculture” and 
“fisheries” (AGFI) components of the question. The weakness of using this 
hypothesis/question as an indicator of concern for the primary sector is that it does 
not ask whether the issue is important to the respondent, merely what the 
respondent’s assessment of the effect of EU membership is. In other words, 
respondents who believe the EU to have an adverse effect on the primary sector but 
who do not necessarily care about this issue might wrongly be ascribed high AGFI 
concern in the study. Nevertheless, in the absence of any other suitable proxies for 
AGFI concern, this indicator is used. The answers to “agriculture” and “fisheries” 
The survey options were: agree entirely, agree somewhat, both agree and disagree, disagree 
somewhat, disagree entirely. 
361 The wording of the question was: “What do you think that Norwegian membership of the EU will 
entail for the development in Norway in the following areas? Will there be great improvement, some 
improvement, neither, some worsening or great worsening.” 
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were combined into one variable, which ranged from 1 (low AGFI concern) to 9 
(high AGFI concern). 
Economic voting models postulate that people cast their vote in elections and 
referenda on the basis of cost/benefit analyses. Thus, according to egocentric 
economic voting theory, people do not want EU membership because they are 
worried about the adverse effect membership would have on their personal 
economic situation, while people who think membership would bring economic 
benefits, are for the EU. Similarly, sociotropic economic theory explains popular 
Euroscepticism in terms of positive or negative evaluations of EU membership’s 
effect on the national economy. Considering that employment was the only 
economic issue which was of any significant prominence in any of the debates, H11 
and H12 are put forward (see Table 8.7). 
The survey only contained one item asking about how respondents thought EU 
membership would affect their economic situation, so this was used. The question 
asked: “If we become members of the EU: Do you think that your own economic 
situation will become noticeably better, or noticeably worse, or do you think that 
your economic situation will not be particularly affected by our entry or non-entry to 
the EU?” The three point scale was retained, with 1 signifying “noticeably better” 
and 3 “noticeably worse”. To test H12, the above-mentioned survey question asking 
respondents to evaluate the effects of membership on different policy areas or 
sectors was used, but instead of AGFI, the focus was on “the national economy” and 
“employment”. Based on the same survey question as AGFI, the sociotropic 
utilitarianism variable naturally carried the same limitations as noted for the AGFI 
indicator above. The variable was constructed in the same way as AGFI concern, and 
was based on a 1 to 9 scale. 
The final theory to be tested was the national identity theory, which puts focus on 
hostility towards other cultures, perceived cultural threat, strong national 
attachment/pride and exclusive national identity as explanations for Euroscepticism. 
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As the concept of exclusive national identity is problematic to operationalize in the 
study due to an absence of suitable indicators, only the relationship between EU 
attitudes and xenophobia and national attachment was hypothesized (see H13 and 
H14 in Table 8.7). 
To measure national attachment/pride, an indicator ranging from 1 (low) to 12 (high) 
was constructed and used. It was based on questions about level of agreement with 
the statement “regardless of whether Norway acts right or wrong, I will always 
stand on my country’s side” and the proposal “[we should] go for a society which 
guards traditional Norwegian values”, as well as the question “how proud are you 
of being Norwegian? Are you very proud, somewhat proud, not particularly proud, 
not proud at all?” The Xenophobia proxy was based respondents’ reported level of 
agreement with the statement “immigration constitutes a serious threat to our 
national distinctiveness” and the proposal “[we should] go for a multicultural 
society with high tolerance to people from other countries with other religions and 
ways of life” and the scores were between 1 (low) and 9 scale (high). 
Control Variables 
Eight control variables were included in the model. These were variables which the 
literature suggests might have an effect on the relationships between the dependent 
and the independent variables. The first four were dummy variables: gender (1 = 
woman), primary sector employment, public sector employment, and peripheral 
location (1 = the West, Trøndelag and the North),362 which all were expected to be 
positively related to EU opposition. In addition, two continuous variables were 
included: age and income,363 also expected (in the comparative literature) to be 
positively related to Euroscepticism. And finally, the two ordinal variables, 
urban/rural location and left/right self-placement, were included. The urban/rural 
variable ranged from 1 (urban) to 5 (rural), and left-right placement retained its 
362 Oslo, the East, Agder and Rogaland were included in the reference category. 
Household income was used to get a more accurate picture of the respondents’ overall financial 
situation. The Spearman’s correlation between household income and the vote in the referendum was 
slightly higher than between personal income and the vote. 
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original 0 (far left) to 10 (far right) scale.364 Several variables commonly included in 
studies of EU support were excluded from the analysis for a variety of reasons. First, 
occupation was not included because it has not been found to have a significant 
effect on the EU vote in Norway in previous studies (the primary and public sectors 
excepted). Second, party preference was also excluded because of the high electoral 
volatility recorded in the election preceding the 1994 referendum. Left-right self-
placement was used as an alternative gauge of political views. Third, measurements 
of cognitive mobilization, such as involvement in politics and knowledge of the EU 
were not included because, as mentioned earlier, simple correlations between these 
showed up non-significant in the data set. And finally, education was not included 
because the indicators found in the survey for this were deemed inadequate.365 Tests 
were run to ensure that multicollinearity between predictors was not too high, and 
they confirmed that this was not a problem.366 
364 Although few of the independent variables used in the study were truly continuous, they were 
treated as continuous variables. This is because, although the attitudinal variables included in the study 
are not truly quantitative in nature, they were arguably measured on meaningful numerical scales, and 
therefore the alternative (dichotomization) was more likely to return more misleading results than if 
scale variables are used (also see MacCallum et al. 2002). The nature of some of the indicators used, 
particularly those based on three or five­point scales (e.g. agree, neither agree nor disagree, disagree) 
make it particularly inappropriate to use dichotomization, as the middle category would not fit into a 
dichotomized category. Another drawback of dichotomization is that information about individual 
differences can be lost (MacCallum et al. 2002: 19). 
365 There was one question asking about pre­university education in the survey, which differentiated 
between different old or newer systems of compulsory schooling. This was not deemed an accurate 
measure of high or low levels of education, as both respondents scoring high and low on this scale 
reported they had started or completed some “other education which normally lasts at least 5 months”. 
An indicator based on these two questions was not constructed because of the vagueness of the latter; 
e.g. lumping people with a five year long full­time university education together with someone who 
has done a part­time 6 months course in marketing creates very heterogeneous categories and by 
implication, meaningless measures of education levels. 
366 None of the predictors correlated above .65, and the VIF values were all well below 10 and the 
tolerance statistics all well above .2. The average VIF (1.399) was also satisfactorily close to 1 (Field 
2005). 
430 
Appendix I

Coding of Public Opinion Arguments

The coding of the arguments given by respondents in the two Referendum Studies 
was in many ways more problematic than the coding of arguments in the 
documentary analysis. This was because, contrary to the qualitative data, no context 
was offered to identify what attitude or specific concern underpinned arguments 
falling into the categories. Therefore, in order to classify the different argument 
categories according to the VCRUNI scheme, the detailed knowledge of the 
Eurosceptic argumentation which was acquired from the documentary analysis was 
used. Particularly ambiguous categories included the “sale of Norway”, “the 
political consequences”, “Europe too large a bloc”, “free right of establishment”, 
“foreign workers” and “unstable labour market” categories in the 1972 dataset and 
“criticism of EU and EU system”, “economic policy, EEA”, “employment” and 
“welfare state, pensions, etc.” in the 1994 study (see Table H1 and H2 below). The 
“sale of Norway” and “free right of establishment” groups were classified as geo-
historical (GH) arguments because in the debate they both referred to the ability to 
retain national control (sovereignty) over the country and its resources. The latter 
was also coded to utilitarianism because of its potential economic motivation. All 
double codes were split down the middle; to use “free right of establishment” as an 
example, 0.4 percent was coded to the geo-historical category and 0.4 percent was 
coded to utilitarianism. “The political consequences” argument was coded solely to 
GH. The reason why it was not considered for the political values grouping was that 
in the 1960s and 1970s debate, the “political consequences” referred to matters 
related to the constitution, primarily the loss of national sovereignty. The argument 
that “Europe [is] too large a bloc” was double-coded to GH and PoM. On the one 
hand, its underpinnings could have been geo-historical/political culture-based 
because the concept of “bloc politics” does not sit well with Norway’s political 
culture and historical experiences. On the other hand, it also frequented the debate 
as a postmaterialist argument: many feared that Europe as a large bloc would not be 
conductive to world peace and would further disadvantage countries in the 
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Table I1 “No” voters’ main argument in 1972 
Arguments as coded by SSB Percent VCRUNI code 
Too expensive ticket 0.3 UT 
Economic argument generally 0.9 UT 
Remote rule from Brussels 8.5 GH 
Lose independence 38.6 GH 
Cannot leave 4.4 GH 
Sale of Norway 0.8 GH 
The political consequences 1.4 GH 
Bureaucratic centralization 2.4 GH 
Europe too large a bloc 4.2 GH/PoM (50/50) 
No economic advantages 2.1 UT 
Norway better than Europe 1.1 EX 
Fisheries and agriculture 12.2 RS 
Regional policy/periphery policy 1.0 RS 
Foreign workers 3.9 NI/UT (50/50) 
Free right of establishment 0.8 GH/UT (50/50) 
Unstable labour market 1.1 UT/PoM (50/50) 
Unequal distribution of benefits 1.4 PoM 
Good the way it is 2.5 Other* 
Don't know what's around the corner 4.6 Other* 
Other 7.5 Other* 
No answer 0.2 Other* 
Total 100.0 
* Not included in Figure 9.5 in Chapter Nine. 
Source: 1972 Referendum Study dataset 
Table I2 “No” voters’ main argument in 1994 
Argument as coded by SSB Percent VCRUNI code 
Sovereignty, democracy 26.1 GH 
Criticism of EU and EU system 10.6 GH/PoM (50/50) 
Economic policy, EEA 10.4 UT/PoM (50/50) 
Environmental concerns 7.1 PoM 
Agriculture 6.9 RS 
Employment 6.7 UT/PoM (50/50) 
Fisheries, fish quotas 5.0 RS 
Regional policy 3.8 RS 
Counter-culture 3.3 NI 
Welfare state, pensions, etc. 3.2 PoM/UT (50/50) 
Border control, drugs, etc. 3.2 Other* 
Know what we have, but… 3.0 Other* 
EU aggressive, oppose common defence 0.8 PoM 
Gender equality 0.2 PoM 
Other No arguments 10.0 Other* 
Total 100.3 
* Not included in Figure 9.5 in Chapter Nine. 
Source: 1994 Referendum Study (cited by Pettersen et al. 1996: 275). 
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developing world. The “foreign workers” 1972 argument might have been motivated 
by perceived cultural threat and/or hostility towards other cultures through 
opposition to immigration, or alternatively, threat to one’s employment and financial 
security. It was therefore double-coded to national identity (NI) and utilitarianism. 
Similarly, concerns about the labour market might reflect economic calculations, but 
it might also indicate a more (postmaterialist) solidarity-oriented attitude. 
This utilitarianism/postmaterialism cross-over also applied to the “economic policy, 
EEA”, “employment” and “welfare state, pensions, etc.” 1994 categories, so they, too, 
were double-coded. “Criticism of EU and EU system”, on the other hand, was 
double-coded to GH and PoM: both geo-historical argumentation pertaining to the 
democratic deficit and postmaterialist argumentation referring to the EU as an 
inhumane system overly focused on economic growth were dominant EU-critical 
discourses in the 1994 debate. 
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Appendix J

Nordmannen (Mellom bakkar og berg)

Tekst: Ivar Aasen Melodi:L.M. Lindeman

Mellom bakkar og berg utmed havet

heve nordmannen fengje sin heim,

der han sjølv heve tuftene grave

og sett sjølv sine hus uppå deim.

Han såg ut på dei steinute strender,

det var ingen som der hadde bygt.

Lat oss rydja og byggja oss grender,

og so eiga me rudningen trygt.

Han såg ut på det bårute havet,

der var ruskut å leggja utpå.

Men der leikade fisk ned i kavet,

og den leiken den ville han sjå.

Fram på vetteren stundom han tenkte;

gjev eg var i eit varmare land!

Men når vårsol i bakkane blenkte,

fekk han hug til si heimlege strand.

Og når liene grønkar som hagar,

når det lavar av blomar på strå,

og når netter er ljose som dagar,

kan han ingenstad venare sjå.

Sud om havet han stundom laut skrida,

der var rikdom på benkjer og bord,

men ikring såg han trældomen kvida

og so vende han atter mot nord.

Lat no andre om storleiken kivast,

lat deim bragla med rikdom og høgd,

mellom kaksar eg inkje kan trivast,

mellom jamningar helst er eg nøgd.

Source: Nei til EU (2006: 65)
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Appendix K

Translation of Norwegian Terms and Names

Aftenposten Norway’s largest broadsheet newspaper 
Aksjon mot medlemskap i Appeal against membership of the Common Market -
Fellesmarkedet - de 143 the 143 
Anders Langes parti til sterk Anders Lange’s party for a strong reduction of taxes, 
nedsettelse av skatter, duties and government intervention 
avgifter og offentlige inngrep 
Arbeidernes Ungdomsfylking the youth wing of the Labour Party 
Bokmål The Danish-influenced written standard of Norwegian 
Bunad Norwegian national costume 
Bygd, bygda Rural district(s) 
Dagbladet Norway’s second largest tabloid newspaper 
Dagens Næringsliv Norway's leading business publication 
Det Eurpeiske Fellesskap the European Community 
Det liberale folkeparti the Liberal People’s Party 
Det nye folkeparti the New People’s Party 
Distriktspolitikk Regional policy, the collective term used in Norway to 
denote the various policies aimed at benefitting the 
peripheries (at the expense of central areas) in order to 
maintain a variety of goals related to settlement, 
natural resources, welfare and culture (Kommunal-
og regionaldepartementet 2010) 
Dyret ”the Beast” (in the Bible) 
EF EC 
EU-motstand EU opposition 
Europabevegelsen European Movement 
Europeisk Ungdom European Youth 
Fiskebåtredernes forbund the Fishing Boat Shippers’ Association 
Folkeaksjonen MOT EU- People’s Action against EU membership 
medlemskap 
Folkebevegelsen People’s Movement 
Folkestyre People rule, participatory democracy 
Folkesuverenitet People’s sovereignty 
Folkesuverenitetstanken The idea of people sovereignty 
Forum for utvikling og miljø Forum for development and environment 
Frihet Freedom 
Handlefrihet Freedom of action 
Hurtigruten the Coastal Express 
Kristelig folkepartis ungdom Norwegian Young Christian Democrats 
Kystpartiet Coast Party 
Landsorganisasjonen the Norwegian Confederation of Trade Unions 
Miljøpartiet de grønne the Norwegian Green Party 
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Nærdemokrati Democracy close to the people 
Nasjonalbiblioteket National Library 
Natur og Ungdom Nature and Youth/Young Friends of the Earth Norway 
Naturherligheter Glorious nature 
Nei til EU No to the EU 
NHO Confederation of Norwegian Enterprise 
Noregs Mållag Norwegian Language Society 
Norges Bondelag Norwegian Farmers’ Union 
Norges kommunistiske parti Communist Party of Norway 
Norges naturvernforbund Friends of the Earth Norway 
Norsk bonde-og småbrukarlag Norwegian Farmers and Smallholders’ Union 
Norsk Fiskarlag Norwegian Fishermen's Sales Organisation 
Norsk samfunnsvitenskapelige Norwegian Social Science Data Services 
datatjeneste 
Nynorsk The Norwegian language form based on rural dialects 
Næringslivets Confederation of Norwegian Enterprise 
hovedorganisasjon 
Opplysningsutvalget om The Information Committee about Norway and the EC 
Norge og EF 
Riksarkivet Norwegian state archives 
Rimi Norwegian supermarket chain 
Rød Valgallianse Red Electoral Alliance 
Rådighet Right to control 
Selvbestemmelsesrett Right to make own decisions, self-determination 
Selvråderett Self-determination 
Selvstendige beslutninger Independent decisions 
Selvstendighet Independence 
Selvstyre Self-government 
Sosialdemokrater mot EU Social Democrats against the EU 
Sosialdemokratisk Alternativ Social Democratic Alternative 
Statistisk Sentralbyrå Statistics Norway 
Stormaktspolitikk Great power politics 
Stortinget the Norwegian Parliament 
Studenter mot EU Students against the EU 
Studentmållaget the Student wing of the Norwegian Language Society 
Styrerett Right to govern 
Suverenitet Sovereignty 
Trivsel Well-being, contentment, feeling of happiness/comfort 
Trygghet Safety, security, comfort 
Uavhengighet Independence 
Ungdom mot EU Youth against Norwegian Membership of the EU 
Utkantnorge Rural Norway 
VG Norway’s largest tabloid newspaper 
Vinmonopolet Wine monopoly, Norwegian state monopoly on 
(import, export and) wholesale of alcohol 
1814 the year of the Norwegian Constitution 
1905 the year of the dissolution of the union with Sweden 
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